The 'third way' in action: Inclusion at a cost by Begg, Clive
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clive Begg B.A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Social Science 
Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences 
 
The University of Queensland, Australia 
 
 
 
 
September 2002 
The ‘third way’ in action: Inclusion at a cost
 ii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Except where otherwise acknowledged in the text, this thesis represents my 
original research. The material in it has not been previously submitted, in 
whole or in part, for a degree at this or any other University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clive Begg 
 iii
 
 
Abstract  
 
 
 
 
The recent emergence of the ‘third way’ as a construct formalised by Anthony 
Giddens, charting the middle ground between social democracy and neo-
liberalism, follows an historically recursive trend. This latest variant, unlike its 
predecessors, has found political favour across the world. The disparateness 
of opinion over its philosophy, together with a lack of research into its 
implementation requires data on its application to validate assertions that it 
either increases, or decreases, democracy and civic engagement.  
 
This research draws on the perceptions of 35 elite informants within 
government, nongovernmental organizations, for-profit, union and community 
sectors across four inferred ‘third way’ sites, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
the United States of America and Australia.  Using recursive methods within 
and across respondent interviews, these perceptions were transcribed and 
coded. The narratives that formed the basis for interpretive inquiry were cast 
in a critical theoretical context to arrive at an understanding of what the ‘third 
way’ means in practice.   
 
The findings of this research indicated that respondents had mixed levels of 
knowledge about Giddens and the ‘third way’ and felt apprehension that 
dissent against government policy was being curtailed through funding and 
other strictures. The implications of the research suggest that the ‘third way’ 
(or new social democracy) is transportable from left to right and back again. 
The apparent primary intent of the ‘third way’ is the maintenance of 
government (the “political imperative”) at all costs with a conservative 
normative agenda (the “moral imperative”) to direct this process. Thus, 
traditional forms of social critique find no home in the ‘third way’.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 
This chapter will introduce the ‘third way’i and provide summary justification 
for the research. It does this in the context of the contested nature of ‘third 
way’ discourse and the apparent lack of research into the implications of 
‘third way’ implementation in practice. Further, this chapter will identify the 
research question for the study providing some background contextual 
information. Finally, a series of “contexts” into which ‘third way’ discussion 
should be placed will be examined. From the outset it is noted that this was a 
small research project that had the capacity to look at only one small corner 
of an otherwise expansive picture. Accordingly, the study has not evaluated 
or critiqued the whole ‘third way’, only a specific subset of elements 
(community and development) and only in relation to the perceptions of some 
engaged with its implementation in practice.  
 
For the purpose of this study, ‘community development’ will be taken to imply 
the qualities of a citizenry with an emphasis upon personal and community 
responsibility and empowerment, democratic participation, communal 
identity, solidarity, and collective participation bound to the notion of social 
capital (McClenaghan 2000) i.e. a ‘political community’ (McIver 1917) forged 
in a civil society “created by grass-roots initiatives and association’ 
(Dahrendorf and St. Antony's 1997 at pp. 77-78) – the socio-political rather 
than the economic or regenerative. To Anthony Giddens (and Amitai Etzioni), 
the nurturing of an active civil society is at the core of the politics for the ‘third 
way’ (Giddens 1998: 78). Giddens, for example, argues that civil society is in 
decline with a weakening sense of solidarity, in part explained, he suggests, 
                                                 
i  For the purpose of this dissertation the term third way will hereinafter be referred to as the 
‘third way’ (without capitalisation), in line with the convention first used by its latest author 
Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1998: vii). 
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by the break-up of marriages and families (ibid). The concept of civil society 
will be revisited during the course of the thesis - particularly as it relates to 
the significance of ideas over social relations throughout the course of 
political history. Firstly, however, a review of this notion of a ‘third way’ in 
history will be useful. 
 
The notion of a ‘third way’ originated from within the centre left of politics as a 
reportedly alternative mode of thought between oppositional notions such as 
capitalism and socialism; liberalism and centralistic collectivism; anarchistic 
capitalism and social redistribution. Conceptually it has been recursive 
throughout history, however it is the writings and subsequent implementation 
of strategies of Anthony Giddens (in the UK, who in more recent times has 
re-branded his ‘third way’ to ‘new social democracy’ii) and Amitai Etzioni (in 
the United States) that have found it political favour as a model for political 
and social administration.  
 
Giddens (and to a lesser extent, Etzioni) are the latest in a long line of those 
in history who have sought to chart a middle path between the conflicting 
interests of the “left” and the “right”. As will be argued in the following 
Chapter, Giddens’ formalisation of the concept follows upon the successful 
electoral incursions by Prime Ministers Hawke and Keating in Australia 
(during the 1980s). The rallying call for a ‘third way’ between capitalism and 
socialism was, however, raised as early as the end of the nineteenth century 
by Pope Pius X11 (John Browning, The Economist in Halpern and Mikosz 
2000: 3).  Since then, various ‘third ways” emerged (Celestin Bougle 1925; 
Mannheim 1936; MacMillan 1938; Sik 1976; Szelényi and Manchin 1988, to 
name a few) but all failed in their mission to find populist support. None could 
resolve the tensions between the economic and social theories of the “left” 
and the “right”, particularly since the end of World War 2. The rise of 
Thatcher, Reagan and Bush styled neo-liberalism (and their continual 
electoral successes) with the resultant demise of the Welfare State during 
                                                 
ii  During the course of the dissertation the term ‘new social democracy’ will be referred to as 
new social democracy (without parenthesis or capitalisation) in line with the convention first 
used by its author Anthony Giddens (Giddens 2002: 11). It is noted, however, that 
references to new social democracy predate its usage by Giddens (Latham 2001: 3). 
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their administrations, provided the catalyst for a revisiting of this middle-path 
concept by social democratic parties - which had been fundamentally denied 
government for long periods in the United States and in Europe. The mood 
was set for the acceptance of an idea (Giddens’ ‘third way’) which, once 
applied, promised electoral success for these social democratic oppositions. 
It will suggested throughout this thesis that ideas rather than social relations 
have become important in the pursuit of government by both the “left” and the 
“right” and that Giddens’ ‘third way’ is one such idea.  
 
The latest version of the ‘third way’ has been adopted by Blair in the UK, 
Clinton in the US, Schroeder in Germany, Pordi of Italy, Jospin of France, 
and Chrétien of Canada as well as some within the Australian Labour Party. 
It will be argued that elements of this ‘third way’ also resonate within the right 
of politics, a matter that will be expanded upon throughout subsequent 
chapters. This marks an historically significant phenomenon, as this model 
seemingly becomes a dominant political paradigm followed by both the left 
and the right of politics, an issue that will be explored as the research 
unfolds.  
 
Those who support the ‘third way’ are as vigorous as those who oppose it. Its 
detractors view the process as an abrogation of social democratic history in 
favour of government for the sake of government. It is a method that, they 
believe, formalises relations between government and civil society in a way 
that may challenge the expression of dissent on social issues within civil 
society and potentially dislocates “social justice” considerations in favour of 
“market forces” and “globalisation”. In this context, one needs to consider the 
future of those organized groups and individuals who would otherwise 
provide the checks and balances to government policy development. ‘Third 
way’ supporters, however, argue that the process invigorates democracy, 
recasting the roles of government and civil society away from the less 
participatory strictures of social democratic and neoliberal ideologies towards 
more equitable arrangements. These will enhance policy-making, they argue, 
through a level of inclusiveness that has previously not been afforded civil 
 4
 
 
society.  
 
This disparateness of opinion requires data on the application of the model in 
order that reasonable conclusions may be drawn as to the merits of opposing 
views. This is particularly important in the context of how the ideology of the 
model “trickles down” to those responsible for its implementation – and its 
relevance for grass-roots democracy. 
 
An introductory orientation to the issues 
 
Those who support this ‘third way’ assert that centrist thinking 
accommodates what they perceive to be the needs of a burgeoning middle 
class across Western economies. Its elemental features, others would assert, 
dismantle the welfare state in a way that negates significant social 
development created historically during periods of social democratic 
government. The net effect of this negation, they purport, has been to 
discount beneficence for those less capable within these same communities. 
Notwithstanding the critics, ‘third way’ concepts have been formulated by 
significant think tanks such as the Progressive Policy Institute, the Institute 
for Public Policy Research and Demos.  Scholars such as Tony Giddens, 
Tom Bentley, Charles Leadbeater, Amitai Etzioni, Mark Latham and Robert 
Putnam have influenced its philosophical underpinnings.   
 
Also, according to its supporters, the ‘third way’ ends “ideological paralysis” 
and declares, “... our mutual responsibility, our belief in a common purpose 
… (where there) is no such ‘thing as society’” (1998: British Home Secretary 
Jack Straw in Rose 2000: 1395) [note the similarity of sentiment to that of 
Margaret Thatcher]. Nikolas Rose describes this almost intangible construct, 
which he suggests is not a political movement, as a “... certain way of 
visualising political problems, a rationality for rendering them thinkable and 
manageable, and a set of moral principles by which solutions may be 
generated and legitimised” (Rose 2000: ibid). Some cynically claim that 
Giddens appears to capitalise on what Durant (1995) and Meier (1997) refer 
to as an “... anxious, policy-challenged and alienated public, a product 
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partially of Third Wave transformational change” (Durant 1995: 26-27; see 
also Meier 1997) in a populist-sounding mode to inspire citizen participation 
(cf. Morone 1998). Certainly there is a disparateness of opinion in the 
literature, which is fundamentally centred upon its theory. At the same time 
there appears to be a lack of research into its impacts in practice. This 
research seeks to fill that void by answering the simple question “What does 
the ‘third way’ mean in practice?”. 
 
In arriving at an answer to this question, the interrelatedness of three notions 
will be canvassed: the perceived political imperative of government (implied 
in the Giddens’ ‘third way’ approach); the economic imperative of global 
capitalism, and; the perceived moral imperative within civil society (also 
implied in Giddens and Etzioni). For the purpose of clarification, the “political 
imperative” is connoted as being the combination of political dictates of a 
conservative nature designed to maintain power by governments. When the 
researcher refers to the “moral imperative” this will relate to a series of moral 
dictates of a conservative nature involving the imposition of narrow 
understandings of “family”, “community” and “responsibility” upon citizens 
which may be threatening to cultural and lifestyle difference and/or political 
dissent. In the United States context these are bolstered by religious forces 
and factors through George W. Bush’s “faith-based initiatives”.  
 
A distillation process will interrogate the data having regard to what are 
defined as the “philosophy” and “armature”iii of the ‘third way’. Meanings 
attaching to respondents’ knowledge of this phenomenon will also inform the 
further dimensions of these political and moral imperatives. During the course 
of this dissertation the “philosophy” of the ‘third way’ will be deemed to be 
that set of norms, expectations and moral values together with narrative, 
which in combination produce the ideology for the ‘third way’. The “armature” 
of the ‘third way’ is deemed to be those concrete policies and institutional 
                                                 
iii  Stuart Hall coined the term “armature” in the 1970s to describe concrete institutions that 
do the work of more abstract processes and constructs. Throughout this thesis the term will 
be applied to describe those concrete policies and institutional relationships that determine 
what happens on the ground, i.e. those mechanisms or sub-systems that do the work of the 
‘third way’ (civil society, NGOs and partnerships). It will not, however, be inclusive of all 
potential armatures such as “the State”, “Markets”, “Entrepreneurs” and “Politics”.  
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relationships within the ‘third way’ that determine what happens on the 
ground (isolated as being civil society, NGOs and partnerships). 
 
An assessment of what constitutes civil society cannot be removed from 
debate centring on either of these political and moral imperatives within the 
framework of ‘third way’ philosophy and praxis. According to the ‘third way’, 
the vehicles for the enhancement of civil society (and thereby the 
advancement of “New Democracy”) are seen to be partnerships and strategic 
alliances, which engage all levels of government with nongovernmental 
organizations, corporate and community-based organizations - collectively 
“civil society” (Giddens 1998: 69). An important element of testability for ‘third 
way’ implementation in this research will be the perception of inclusiveness 
or exclusiveness of any or all constituent “partners” beyond government and 
the way in which exclusion, should it be established, sits contextually within 
the notion of the political imperative. A further test on the pervasiveness of 
these partnerships will be the context within which they are situated, i.e. 
across government types or consequent upon a change in government type. 
Should it be demonstrated that partnerships do in fact persist in spite of 
government change, this may provide evidence that the ‘third way’ is no 
longer a contested space but a method of government that has universal 
appeal albeit with differing players. 
 
This being said, it is important to review earlier theorising. No reasonable 
discussion on the rise of the contemporary ‘third way’ can occur without 
reference to its principle architects, Anthony Giddens and Amitai Etzioni. 
What follows is an overview of the schemata of both, which will be 
significantly expanded upon in Chapter 2 (with a further elaboration on 
Etzioni’s model in Chapter 6). 
 
The Model of Anthony Giddens 
 
Anthony Giddens, Director of the London School of Economics and Politics, 
was the person who formalised the concept of the ‘third way’ in his 
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publications The Third Way, The Renewal of Social Democracy (1998) and 
The Third Way and its Critics (2000). In a more recent publication Where 
Now for Labour? (2002) Giddens extends his arguments in the context of 
New Labour being in power during a second term in the United Kingdom. In 
suggesting that Giddens formalised the construct of the ‘third way’, this 
research will have regard to the intellectual work of Amitai Etzioni in the 
United States some ten years prior and the political machinations of the 
Hawke/Keating Governments in Australia during the 1980s which saw the 
anomalous electoral retention of a social democratic government in that 
country when others had failed elsewhere. The former matter will be explored 
in a subsequent section of this chapter. The latter issue is of relevance since 
both Clinton in the United States and Blair in the United Kingdom came to 
Australia prior to their election to leadership in their respective jurisdictions to 
study the method of government applied (Kerr 2002 - Transcriptions: 517), a 
method, which it will be argued in Chapter 2, that was already decidedly ‘third 
way’ in character.  
 
In defining his interpretation of ‘third way’ politics, Giddens’ addresses what 
he perceives to be the “Five Dilemmas” for social democratic parties: 
 
o Globalisation – what exactly it is and what implications it has;  
 
o Individualism – to what degree modern societies have become more 
individualistic; left and right - is there a divide?;  
 
o Political agency – is politics migrating away from orthodox 
mechanisms of democracy, and;   
 
o Ecological problems – how should they be integrated into social 
democratic politics  (1998: 27, 28).   
 
It would be fallacious not to consider his rendering of each of these without 
some understanding of the synthetic approach that Giddens has applied to 
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the development of previous theory. In Giddens’ structuration theory, for 
example, he sought to define the contours of a divisive debate through a 
“synthesis” of disparate strands by recycling elements of each to a model 
upon which all could revolve (Layder 1994: 127). In an ‘omelette analogy’, 
Ian Craib (1992) speaks of “eggs … (as being) the achievements of 
sociology” (Craib 1992: 13) some of which Giddens believes have gone bad 
and therefore worthy of rejection, whilst “… he also wants to add a range of 
unexpected, novel ingredients and prepare some old ingredients in a new 
way” (ibid). In likening Giddens approach to that of Paul Feyerabend’s 
(Against Method 1975) concept of “theoretical pluralism” he accuses him of 
creating a “theoretical meld in which all differences disappear” (ibid: 10).”  
The philosophical underpinnings to the conceptualisation of Giddens’ ‘third 
way’ is therefore of some relevance in the context of his synthetic approach. 
 
In this context, in reflecting on his “dilemmas”, one is drawn to their similarity 
with Edmund Burke’s “five pillars of reason”. Burke’s concepts of order, 
principle (a commitment to “fundamental principles” and “ultimate goals”), 
experience (sustainable against empirical evidence), prudence (“practical 
wisdom”) and dialogue (the moral basis for which is civility), whilst not exactly 
equating to Giddens’ “dilemmas” (there may certainly be an issue in relation 
to order) are, notwithstanding, reflected in Giddens’ work. In a seeming 
borrowing of elements of reason enunciated by Edmund Burke (and later 
Max Horkheimer) to find “genuineness” and “comprehensiveness” (Selznick 
1992: 57), Giddens embraces substantive and historical reason, choosing 
however to dispense with the “objective” and judgement derived from the 
abstractions [to Burke and Horkheimer] of motivation, cognition and decision. 
It is in this environment that Giddens enunciates the failure of social 
democracy to raise an “integrated agenda” (1998: 27), substantiating a model 
in which acquiescence to market forces and a concern for economic 
indicators prevail.  
 
This thesis will not explore in detail the biographical elements relating to 
Giddens, although material of relevance will be treated at various points 
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throughout. For a more detailed biographical treatment of Giddens, reference 
is made to Jary and Jary 1995; Craib 1992 (cited above); and, Jary and 
Bryant 1997. 
 
The Approach of Amitai Etzioni 
 
As noted previously, Etzioni’s intervention predates that of Giddens by some 
ten years and seeks to chart a middle course between what he defines as the 
“ideal types” of enlightenment and romanticism. In his schematic people are 
viewed as pursuing goals they acquire from their communities as well as 
inner moral and emotive developments, which he refers to as “normative-
affective” factors (Etzioni 1988).  Etzioni is part of a intellectual movement 
emanating from the United States known as “communitarianism” (see also 
Fukuyama 1996; Galston 1991; Glendon and Blankenhorn 1995), influenced 
by writers in the 1980s such as Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael 
Walzer (on Taylor and Walzer see Nussbaum and Cohen 1996). From “The 
Responsive Communitarian Platform” this phenomenon recognises: 
 
... that the preservation of individual liberty depends on the active 
maintenance of the institutions of civil society where citizens learn 
respect for others as well as self-respect: where we acquire a lively 
sense of our personal and civic responsibilities, along with an 
appreciation of our own rights and the rights of others (Etzioni 1997 
[a]: 1). 
 
In essence the communitarian vision is the balance between individual rights 
and public duty and arises, according to Etzioni, as a consequence of the 
obsession for “rights” in the United States, where, Robert Bellah suggests, a 
flawed individualistic policy was, in part, responsible for the disintegration of 
community and social order (Bellah 1996 in Warnick 1998: 313). By rejecting 
the underlying thesis of Kant, Locke and Rawls that individuals are 
freestanding entities whose moral decision-making is based on abstracted 
principles, the communitarians embrace the proposition that individuals are 
integrated into social groups with obligations internal to these groups.  
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In his analysis of American political systems, Etzioni notes the divide within 
conservativism between laissez-faire non-interventionists (such as Milton 
Friedman and David Frum), the libertarians (the Cato Institute) and what he 
terms “new-style” conservatives (Robert Nozick and Richard Epstein). Etzioni 
then characterises an opposing camp as “social conservatives”, those who 
want the State to uphold the moral order imposing restrictions on abortion, 
instituting prayer in schools and discrimination against homosexuals (the 
Christian Coalition, John Neuhaus, Charles Colson and William Bennett) 
(Etzioni 1997 [b]: 11). This issue will be elaborated upon in Chapter 6. Some 
would argue that the election of the George W. Bush administration, with its 
faith-based emphasis, demonstrates that an approach that accommodates 
these competing interests has been adopted by the Republicans, most 
probably borrowing from the impetus for ‘third way’ strategic alliances 
introduced by Bill Clinton. This matter will also be explored in Chapter 6. 
 
Similarities and Differences: Giddens and Etzioni 
 
Not unlike his European counterpart, Etzioni believes that communitarian 
“ends” can be established through informality rather than coercion, that 
persuasion against “errant members” would be more constructive than 
government intervention (Etzioni 1997 [a]: 3). Further, communitarians 
believe that individuals, “... including the most disadvantaged” should take 
responsibility for themselves – what Etzioni refers to as subsidiarity, a: 
 
….principle … in which the primary responsibility belongs to the 
individual nearest the problem, if a solution cannot be found, then the 
responsibility moves to the family, if there is still no solution, then the 
community, then and only then, when no solution is possible at all, 
should the State be involved (Etzioni 1995 in Arthur 1998: 355).  
 
According to James Arthur (1998), this concept of subsidiarity is “…a doctrine 
originating in Catholic social teaching” (Arthur 1998: 359). The point of 
departure with Giddens, however, would appear to be on the role of the 
State, wherein the political agenda, according to Etzioni, would be seen to be 
the endorsement of State power in the interest of social equality. Whilst 
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Etzioni asserts that a core element of the ‘third way’ is communitarian 
(Etzioni 2001: 25), Giddens has strenuously argued an opposing view 
(Giddens 2002 - Transcriptions: 47).  It needs to be assessed whether, in 
relation to the political imperative (Chapter 5) and the moral imperative 
(Chapter 6) these distinctions have become superfluous. The end, perhaps, 
justifies the means. The researcher will investigate this issue later in the 
thesis. 
 
The comparison of Giddens’ schemata to Burke’s conception of reason has 
already been discussed. In a mood reminiscent of the Stoics, it will be 
argued, the ‘third way’, from both an American and European perspective, 
has a predisposition to seek definition of morally acceptable behaviour within 
the context of reason. It also hones the sense of civic duty. Strong and 
Dingwell (1989) in speaking to the Stoic sense of active civic participation 
notes “... the wise should formulate laws and precepts for those less gifted 
but should always seek to persuade others to comply rather than coerce 
them” (Strong and Dingwall 1989: 56). The similarity to Giddens’ and 
Etzioni’s use of “persuasion” is compelling. It was Macintyre (1981) who 
pointed out that it was the Stoics who first sought to formulate the definition 
of moral behaviour within the material world (MacIntyre 1981) noting that it is 
the “wise person” who acknowledges his/her social obligations whilst pursing 
self-interest. This position reflects in the work of Adam Smith titled The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1976) in seeking to outline an ethical theory 
grounded in Stoicism which may not necessarily accord with his assertions in 
The Wealth of Nations (1979). It is also a common tenet for Giddens and 
Etzioni. 
 
A Further Comment on Religiosity, Morality and the ‘third way’ 
 
The data in relation to the ‘third way’ in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom have a significant undercurrent of themes about morality, which will 
be explored comprehensively in Chapter 6 (and which has been alluded to in 
the Giddens and Etzioni approach within this chapter). A further, albeit 
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abridged, rendition of this issue will be dealt with at this point in order to set 
the scene more appropriately for subsequent chapters. 
 
It is understood that Blair is courting churches of all denominations with a 
government report on how faith groups can contribute to urban regeneration. 
This may well be an attempt to colonise ‘official’ religion and harness it to the 
government’s agenda.iv According to Birnbaum, Blair invokes the solidaristic 
doctrines of British social Christianity (Birnbaum 1999: 437), citing Labour 
thinkers such as R.H. Tawney, William Temple and the Archbishop of York, 
drawing historical succour from the doctrines of utilitarianism from the 
Evangelical Protestantism of the 19th Century. Similarly, Birnbaum suggests, 
like Thompson before him, Methodism was as “... important as Marxism 
itself” (p. 438) within the British union movement. Certainly contemporary 
‘third way’ approaches have advanced beyond the idea of the “value” of 
solidarity to a new institutional form – workers, by example, should “... have 
the opportunity of sharing the rewards of success with employers” (Blair and 
Schroeder 2000: 56) with government “... transform(ing) the safety net of 
entitlements into a springboard to personal responsibility” (ibid: 62), perhaps 
raising the engagement of the worker, as a “worker” within the governance 
process, to almost a spiritual level.  
 
Indeed both Blair in the United Kingdom and Clinton in the United States 
(and reflected in pronouncements by George W. Bush) extol the virtues of 
“playing by the rules” and “keeping the faith” in the context of  “personal 
responsibility”. Whilst in many respects the drawing together of disparateness 
of systems to a common goal of ‘third way’ thinking (in the United Kingdom 
and the United States) would seem to be anomalous (it spite of the existence 
of these common goals), the drawstring of religion may provide a reasonable 
explanation to its occurrence. 
 
                                                 
iv  The writer is indebted to an Anonymous respondent in the United Kingdom who first raised 
this observation in an email correspondence. 
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Norman Birnbaum in commentating on the American version of the ‘third 
way’ likens it to “American progressivism”, equating its antecedents to the 
concept of American Protestantism which, he argues, contributed in no small 
measure to the moral and intellectual debates that inspired the anti-slavery 
movement, abolitionism, and social reform “... inscribed in Progressivism, the 
New Deal and the Great Society” (Birnbaum 1999: 441). His analogy of 
social change being a “theology”, even suggesting that socialism (or its 
American equivalent, social reform) is a religious movement, may provide a 
more palpable explanation for the embracing of ‘third way’ equivalence in the 
United States: the elements of a belief in human capacity particularly in the 
context of human capacity for moral self-transformation (reflected in the 
Continental ‘third way’ concept of “social-ism”v).  
 
Some view the inscription of social norms through morality (that they view as 
emanating from third way philosophy) as being in opposition to that which the 
‘third way’ purports to accomplish. In his article Community, citizenship, and 
the third way, Nikolas Rose characterises the American ‘third way’ as:  
 
… the shift towards community as a means of moral reformation for 
lone parents, feckless idlers, drug addicts, and so forth … (giving) 
civility a definite shape, that of a civil religion, a secular and civic 
Christianity of respectability, moderation, charity, probity, fidelity, and 
the like. Although it purports to govern while respecting the autonomy 
of individuals and associational life, this strategy to sustain civility 
through community actually seeks to inscribe the norms of self-control 
more deeply into the soul of each citizen than is thought possible 
through either disciplinary technologies such as mass schooling or 
through social technologies such as those of welfare states. Rather 
than recognising the possibilities and ethical dilemmas presented by 
the contemporary pluralisation of cultures and ethics, this version of 
the politics of community seeks to foreclose the problems of diversity 
by propagating a moral code justified by reference to values that 
purport to be timeless, natural, obvious, and incontestable. In 
operating at this moral pole of ethopoliticsvi, the third way sets itself in 
                                                 
v  British Prime Minister Tony Blair coined the term “social-ism” invoking socialist goals in 
terms of the relations between people, with mutualism as its guiding ideology (Latham 1999: 
9) The recrafting of familiar social democratic language by third way advocates will be 
canvassed at a later stage in the thesis. 
vi Rose, borrowing from Foucault, coined the term “ethopolitics” as the new politics of 
behaviour working through the values, beliefs and sentiments thought to underpin the 
techniques of responsible self-government – as an adjunct to Foucault’s concept of biopower 
(Rose 2000: 1409). 
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opposition to the very autonomy it purports to respect (Rose 2000: 
1409). 
 
Irrespective of its aetiology or its apparent moral predisposition, the ‘third 
way’ is now a government style that has impacted and will continue to do so, 
on political and social systems throughout the world. In spite of the many and 
varied critiques on the nature of this model, there is singular under-
development of what impacts this phenomenon is having, or will have,  in 
practice, specifically in relation to the core of its ideology – the active 
engagement of civil society. 
 
Relevance of the Research 
 
The research is guided by the following question: 
 
What does the ‘third way’ mean in practice? 
 
In answering this question, the project looks at just one aspect of ‘third way’ 
activity. It seeks to explicate the scope and nature of civil society (specifically 
its exemplar, the nongovernmental sector) to maintain its historical advocacy 
role in the development of social and political policy in a ‘third way’ 
environment. Should the proponents of new social democracy be correct 
then one would expect that not only would this role be maintained but also 
enhanced and enlarged as the sector assumes greater responsibility. On the 
other hand, should the arguments of its theoretical opponents on the left 
have some veracity, one would expect to find systematic difficulties for those 
who present a challenge to government.  
 
The research will also raise the specific question of social control in the 
context of established moral preconditions; the utilisation of religious or other 
moral tenets to reinforce government policy, and acquiescence to prevailing 
and dominant ideology (market forces).  
 
Finally, the research will explore whether partnerships and strategic alliances 
that combine the energies of government with nongovernmental and 
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corporate sectors are constructed for the purpose of extending democracy or 
as a device to contain debate across the political and moral parameters 
assigned externally to them. These are contested notions, but ones that form 
the underlay of an emerging set of social relations, potentially for decades to 
come. 
 
In seeking to answer these questions this research has drawn on the 
perceptions of line managers and significant others charged with the 
implementation of ‘third way’ styled interventions as well as assessing the 
nuances that exist between inferred ‘third way’ “types” across three 
Continents (the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States of America and 
Australia). Through a process of inference to ‘third way’ “type”, the 
researcher acknowledges that this is not an investigation into case studies 
per se but rather a study into systems that either implicitly or explicitly exhibit 
a ‘third way’ character based upon an interrelationship between the theory of 
the phenomenon, assertions by governments (overt ascription to ‘third way’ 
principles), the use of terminology by respondents (latent ascription to ‘third 
way’ principles), the apparent transmogrification of ‘third way’ principles (in 
both directions, left to right and right to left) and other available historical or 
contemporaneous material. This matter will be more fully explored at other 
points in this chapter and throughout the dissertation.  
 
Of supplementary interest to the research is whether the ‘third way’ is 
transportable across divergent political systems, why that should be the case 
and how that transportability occurs, either overtly or covertly. Should the 
implementation of the ‘third way’ as a dominant paradigm be established, i.e. 
that the political forces of both the “left” and the “right” are competing for 
ownership of the process, the further question of how the phenomenon would 
manifest within each political sector is of considerable interest. In addition, 
the future of sectors other than government would be of some importance 
since the opposing views of supporters and detractors of the ‘third way’ 
would have this future cast in radically opposing ways.   
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The Research Approach 
 
In the pursuit of answers to these questions, the research design employed 
the strategies of constructivism and interpretivism in the context of critical 
theory (the elements of which will be expanded upon in Chapter 3).  
 
The perceptions of significant respondents in the context of their 
understanding of the ‘third way’ were examined, i.e. as they exist in the 
everyday life, within specific contexts and social conditions. Constructivism 
and interpretivism in tandem provide the impetus for theoretically explaining 
the relationship of respondent opinions and worldviews within the context of 
the social interactions that inform them (Crotty 1998; Schwandt 1998), whilst 
a critical theory approach was adopted to locate these opinions and 
worldviews in the broader social context characterised by power structures, 
vested interests and limited resources. 
 
The concept of “active interviewing” was deployed with an elite group of 
respondents representative of all government levels, trade unions, 
nongovernmental organizations, academics and significant others, producing 
narratives of perception of the ‘third way’ from both a theoretical and practical 
perspective. These narratives flow from recursive questioning within and 
across interviews creating category-centred accounts similarly within and 
across all interviews. Ultimately these interpretive accounts within a critical 
theory perspective will be examined and theorized to present a critical 
sociological representation of the ‘third way’ within the social and political 
systems in which respondents reside. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
In the chapters that follow, a dialogue will be produced concerning the 
ideological underpinnings of the ‘third way’ with respect to the perceptions of 
significant persons responsible for the distillation of that ideology into 
practice.  
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The following chapter The ‘third way’: literature, discourse and data 
comprehensively reviews the available literature on the ‘third way’ and is 
divided into two distinct parts. The first part of Chapter 2, titled The 
“philosophy” of the ‘third way’, will introduce the construct of the ‘third way’ 
with a review of the literature in relation to both Giddens and Etzioni, the 
views of their supporters and detractors and the historical antecedents to its 
development. It will also explore its precursors and its philosophy, thereby 
setting the scene for subsequent chapters. The second part of this chapter 
titled The “armature” of the ‘third way’ ” will interrogate the literature on those 
structural features of the ‘third way’ that manifest in the everyday experiences 
of respondents, those being civil society, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) and partnerships. Subsequent chapters will place the data 
conceptually within the framework of this philosophy and having regard to 
this armature. 
 
Chapter 3, titled The research method – Approach and Process, will give 
expression to the theoretical and methodological underpinnings that inform 
the research. The method applied in drawing data engaged in-depth, 
unstructured and semi-structured recursive (within and across) interviewing 
techniques of lead (or elite) members across (and within) various 
constituencies as previously described. Respondent perceptions were then 
placed within an interpretivist and constructivist theoretical perspective (in the 
context of critical theory) through narrative categorization to produce a critical 
sociological representation of the ‘third way’. 
 
The three chapters that follow the methods chapter (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) 
explicate the data across the headings The meanings of the ‘third way’ in 
practice, The political imperative, and The moral imperative. The first of 
these, Chapter 4, explores the data on the philosophy and armature 
established for the ‘third way’ (in Chapter 2) in the context of the perceptions 
of respondents. The chapter begins by explicating those parts of the data, 
which investigate respondents’ understanding of the concept, their use of 
terminology and jargon, and their understanding of what the ‘third way’ 
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means to their constituencies. An anomaly (at least to the researcher) that 
surfaced during the initial pilot project for the research - that of a general lack 
of knowledge of Giddens or the ‘third way’ by respondents with a 
corresponding use, notwithstanding, of ‘third way’ language - was in 
evidence. This was explored in the other sites. What emerged was that this 
anomaly was generalised across all sites. This phenomenon is examined in 
Chapter 4 by referencing the usage of “familiar” social democratic language 
by ‘third way’ theorists, albeit with differing definitions (explored as a concept 
within the “philosophy” of the ‘third way’ [Part 1 of Chapter 2]) and in the 
context of Polyani’s theorem of “tacit” knowledge (and Giddens’ “practical” 
knowledge proposition). At the conclusion of this chapter we are left with the 
question as to why the paradox should exist whereby a lack of direct 
knowledge was not matched by the apparent application and usage of ‘third 
way’ terminology in the real world experience. In seeking to explain this 
peculiarity, the themes of power and control were then examined by isolating 
two key dimensions, those of the “political” and “moral” imperatives, linking 
these to respondent’s perceptions. 
 
Chapter 5, titled The Political Imperative, introduces the first of what this 
writer asserts are the critical issues that distinguish the ‘third way’ and which 
provides the principle elements of testability for the research. Drawing from 
the literature, section 1 of this chapter will define the notion of the “political 
imperative”. The latter part of this chapter interrogates the data from 
respondents in relation to this phenomenon. 
 
The second of these principles, the moral imperative, is introduced in 
Chapter 6.  
 
The final chapter, Chapter 7, will provide a review and set of conclusions 
based upon the outcomes from the research project. 
 
A series of background “contexts” within which the research will reside will 
now be developed. This activity is necessary to set the scene for the more 
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focussed data and analysis that follow. 
 
Background Contexts 
 
Within this research project, and explicit to an understanding of the relevance 
of what the researcher terms the moral and political imperatives, is their 
place within an economic environment. As a thorough explication of global 
capital would produce numerous theses in its own right, for the purpose of 
this research a cursory overview will follow, with an apology for its inclusion 
at this point for, to place it elsewhere, would significantly interfere with the 
flow of argument. It will be treated as a “context” (Globalisation) within which 
the body of research will be placed. It is noted, nonetheless, that various 
terms such as global capital and globalisation will be used throughout this 
thesis, since they are pivotal to ‘third way’ philosophy. 
 
As this research has been conducted across numerous national sites, an 
explication of the rationale for site selection is also necessary and will follow 
as the second of the “contexts”, National Arenas, into which the elemental 
arguments of the research will be placed. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to articulate, albeit briefly, the historical context in 
which the ‘third way’ arises. This will be treated in the third part of this context 
discussion under the heading, Historical Development. Whilst this matter will 
be elaborated upon in Chapter 2, a summary position will be useful in terms 
of introducing the dialogue between history, theory and practice. In the first 
instance, the discussion will briefly interrogate the notion of globalisation. 
 
Context 1: Globalisation 
 
In extending a theatrical metaphor; if the ‘third way’ is the stage, partnerships 
and strategic alliances are the actors and the moral and political imperatives 
are the plots, then surely global capitalism is the unseen director.  Global 
capitalism, or third wave transformations (Toffler 1981), has radically 
impacted on social, political and economic systems in ways likened by 
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Durant (1998) to the movement from an agricultural (first wave) to an 
industrial (second wave) society (Durant 1998: 212). According to comments 
by Joanne Barkan (in Blair and Schroeder 2000: 53-54), globalisation, to 
‘third way’ proponents, is the “changed reality” that makes mid-20th Century 
social democracy redundant. Yet, she argues, unfettered globalisation is 
“accepted” unconditionally as the necessary and unalterable context for the 
‘third way’. She appropriately asks that if nation-states have lost power over 
the economy, who then has it? 
 
Critics are divided on the embrace of globalisation by ‘third way’ 
administrations. Jeffrey Isaac (2001), for example, notes that the task of the 
‘third way’ “... is neither to stop nor to master the forces of globalisation, but 
to contain them and to insulate vulnerable social groups from their most 
harmful effects, thereby freeing individuals to pursue their potential benefits” 
(Isaac 2001: 65). In contrast, John McMurtry (1999) suggests that, following 
upon a meeting of the Trilateral Commission of 1973 [comprising the world’s 
leading CEOs, academics, government officials etc.], an argument that there 
was an “... excess of democracy” developed in tandem with an advocacy for 
the “... legitimacy of hierarchy, coercion, discipline, secrecy, and deception, 
as well as the non-involvement of a governable democracy” (McMurtry 1999: 
58).  Peter McLaren and Ramin Farahmandpur (2001) recommend “... 
mutagenic capitalist values have transmogrified into a social ethos, making it 
easier for flim-flam financial ventures to proliferate, breaking the tenuous 
accord that has long existed between labour and capital” (McLaren and 
Farahmandpur 2001: 3) where “... self-determining governments only get in 
the way of the goal of transnational corporations” (ibid). The agenda of these 
transnational corporations, McLaren and Farahmandpur argue, is “... to 
create an anti-welfare capitalism with a human face while drawing attention 
away from the paradoxical congeniality of capitalism and its repressed 
underside” (ibid).  They assert that global capitalism has won the battle over 
ideology declaring “... the triumph of privatisation over socialisation, 
individualism over collectivism, life-style identity politics over class politics, 
cynicism over hope, and barbarism over civilisation” (ibid: 4).  
 21
 
 
Willie Thompson (1997) notes, “... the trend (away from growing economic 
democracy) is precisely in the opposite direction, towards intensified 
polarisation, the concentration of misery, suffering, deprivation and 
accumulation (of capital) at the other pole” (Thompson 1997: 224). Critics are 
unambiguous in either their praise or concern about the interplay between 
political process and economic globalisation. As will be seen in chapters 5 
and 6, critics are similarly concerned about the interplay between political 
process and the role of religion. Data from respondents will interrogate these 
relationships from the standpoint of the political and moral imperatives as 
either liberalising or retarding democratic governance. 
 
For almost three decades the orienting framework by social scientists has 
reformed from a concern for development processes embedded in the 
nation-state to global systems of accumulation and regulation (McMichael 
1996) exemplified by Trade Agreements such as the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Trade and Tarrifs 
(GATT) which, of themselves, have assisted in the deconstruction of 
processes otherwise associated with the nation-state (Nadar and Wallach 
1996). A corollary development to this process has been the emergence of 
an analytical and spatial debate orientation by social scientists centred upon 
the “local” and the “global” (Tolbert et al. 1998: 402).  
 
This new mode of capitalism, William Robinson (2000) suggests, is one 
where nations are no longer linked by external flows and relations but 
integrated organically through the globalisation of the production process 
itself, “... along with the integration of the whole social, political, juridical, and 
cultural superstructure” (Robinson 2000: 90) arguing further that the 
emergence of a global economy brings with it the “... material basis for the 
emergence of a single global society, including the transnationalization of 
civil society, (writer’s emphasis) of political processes, and of cultural life” 
(ibid), what Giddens would characterise as breaches (fissures in civilization’s 
cultural foundation) caused by contradictions in the structural principles upon 
which they are founded (Giddens 1979: 131-64). There is nothing new about 
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the ideological principles of the global economy, other than the apparent 
suborning of national and cultural uniqueness en masse, a phenomenon that 
Helena Norberg Hodge (1996) describes as the development of a “global 
monoculture” – the homogenisation of culture, lifestyle and technological 
immersion coupled with the dismantling of local traditions and self-sufficient 
economies (Norberg-Hodge 1996: 90, see also Robinson 2000: 93).   
 
As outlined, this research has been conducted in various locations to take 
account of the global nature of the ‘third way’ as a movement and as a 
response to global capitalism. The interrogation of the data will, however, be 
substantially blind to specifics of these locations, given that the phenomenon 
under investigation has elements that resonate with a degree of commonality 
irrespective of location (note ‘third way’ inferred nature of site selection 
discussed previously). For the purpose of justifying the choice of sites in the 
first instance, however, a brief description of these sites will follow.  
 
Context 2: National Arenas 
 
The United Kingdom 
 
The election of Tony Blair and his party to power in the United Kingdom in 
May 1997 signalled the end of almost 18 years of Conservative rule in that 
country. During this period Thatcherism (or what Giddens’ refers to as neo-
liberalism) had encouraged the “de-industrializing” of the British economy 
(Lappin 2000: 16), with policies that witnessed the sustained underfunding of 
education, social security and health with the collapse of organised unionism, 
privatisation of essential services and the creation of increased levels of 
poverty. More important is the fact that these measures were insufficient to 
unseat the Conservative Government. Giddens suggests that this 
phenomenon relates to a “... shift from scarcity values to post-materialist 
values” and to a “... changing distribution of values, which fits neither class 
lines nor the left/right dichotomy” (1998: 21). According to her critics, 
Thatcher may have dismantled many left institutions but also, and 
simultaneously, projected a positive ethos with “new individualism” at its 
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epicentre – a phenomenon that transcended her governance and was 
subsequently taken on board by Blair and his exponents (Hinkson 1999).  
 
The decline in the blue-collar working class, an emerging lack of confidence 
in politics in general, the rise of the “... non-party of non-voters” (Beck, 
Giddens et al. 1994 in Giddens 1998: 20) and the movement into the 
workforce of more women, has, according to Giddens, led to the demise of 
the historical Labour support base. In tandem with Inglehart’s thesis that 
values of economic achievement and growth fade with increasing prosperity 
– the emergence of what could be termed the “new” middle class devoid of 
working class affiliations and hedonistic in outlook and expectation is noted 
(Inglehart 1990 in Giddens 1998: 22, 81). The political voting intentions 
resulting from social surveys undertaken by Blundell and Gosschalk and the 
clustering of these results, suggests that the Labour Party prior to the 1997 
election and under the helm of Blair’s ‘third way’ was ahead in all but one 
category (that being conservative), capturing “libertarian”, “socialists” and 
“residual”; which result, according to Giddens conformed to Ingelhart’s thesis 
on the basis of age (Blundell and Gosschalk 1997 in Giddens 1998: 21). The 
consolidation of support across these various political categories reflects in 
Blair’s reworked definition of “social-ism” which has the following tenets: 
 
(1) A dynamic knowledge-based economy founded on individual 
empowerment and responsibility. Where governments enable, not 
command, and the power of the market is harnessed to serve the 
public interest; 
(2) A strong civil society enshrining rights and responsibilities, where 
the government is a partner to strong communities; 
(3) A modern government based on partnership and decentralisation, 
where democracy is deepened to suit the modern age; 
(4) A foreign policy based on international cooperation (Blair and 
Fabian Society [Great Britain] 1998 in Kelly 1999: 26). 
 
One is struck by the simplicity (and vagueness) of the terminology used by 
Blair, a matter canvassed previously in terms of Gidden’s use of words such 
as “persuasion” and “community standards”. For example Blair speaks of  “... 
economic dynamism and the unleashing of creativity and innovation” (Blair 
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and Schroeder 2000: 51). He also speaks of social justice, liberty and 
equality of opportunity being “... timeless… values” [p. 51). He enunciates 
employment “flexibility” [p. 54], which appears to refer to the ability to fire 
workers (note the comments of Joanne Barken in Blair and Schroeder 2000 
at p.4). [In response to his critics, Giddens plays particular attention to the 
concept of “flexibility” in his 2000 publication but without adding any new 
definition other than to emphasise training and retraining [2000: 7, 73, 75-78, 
107]. Blair also emphasises “... a go-ahead mentality and a new 
entrepreneurial spirit at all levels of society” [p. 55]  (necessary for the “... 
new politics to succeed”) noting the “... need (for) specific measures for those 
most threatened by marginalisation and social exclusion” [p. 55] (no 
definitions provided) (Blair and Schroeder 2000).  
 
Tony Blair and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder jointly signed a ‘third 
way’ declaration that encapsulated economic deregulation and increased 
support for business in 1999. Schroeder was later to recant saying this was 
an error when he was roundly criticised by left-wing traditionalists in his 
Social Democratic Party (Andrews 2000: 1.8). 
 
The United States of America 
 
Jeff Faux (1999) contends that the American origins of the ‘third way’ were 
not so much the articulation of a grand political philosophy as much as a 
tactical response to the Democratic losses at elections held in 1980 and 
1984, an argument that could also apply in the United Kingdom. It could be 
argued that at least in the United States there is a pragmatic 
acknowledgement of the significance by non-conservatives to their need to 
redefine themselves as a credible alternative for the purpose of government. 
The “New Democrats” in the USA arose substantially from the southern 
factions of the Democratic Party with a view that “extreme” left wing “liberal 
fundamentalists” (Fauxs’ terms) characterised by “... a coalition of minority 
groups, labour unions, feminists and white collar elites who were 
unsympathetic to middle class interests and values”  (Faux 1999: 68) were 
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out of touch with the upward mobility of the citizenry whose centre of interest 
shifted from “class warfare” or economic justice to a concern for crime rates 
and distancing from the poor. When comparing United States research with 
the social surveys undertaken by Blundell and Gosschalk in the United 
Kingdom, Robert Worcester concludes that: 
 
... characterizations of today’s labour and conservative parties … as 
‘left’ and ‘right’ disguise how events affecting both parties over the 
past two decades have blurred the semantics of yesterday in 
describing their roles of today … the comparison figures between 
those found in America and New Labour’s Britain are remarkable in 
their consistency, somewhat surprisingly as the ideologies of the two 
countries have been for the most part very different over the past fifty 
years (Robert Worcester: “Introduction” in Blundell, 1997: 3). 
 
Historically, Faux argues, Democratic campaigns had been run on “centrist” 
platforms (1960s-1980s) and that the New Democrats had ignored this 
history. The emergence and subsequent success of Clinton’s ‘third way’, 
although acknowledged as failing in its ambition to be an alternative pathway 
for the democratic left, critics would suggest, does nonetheless demonstrate 
the potency, at least in the relatively short-term, to achieve electoral success. 
 
‘Third way’ advocates reject state ownership of the economy and, as Robert 
Reich asserts, it has no statement of principles (Reich 1999). As a hybrid 
political entity, the ‘third way’ has no pre-existing parentage lacking a 
“natural” constituency (Reich 1999: 48) [a matter borne out by the electoral 
failure of the third-wayer Clinton at the 2000 election in America (Kahlenberg 
and Teixeira 2001)] and as such it is, arguably, vulnerable to political 
opportunism, either from the left or the right of the political spectrum. Other 
than the rejection of state ownership Reich suggests that the points of 
commonality for both continental and American versions of the ‘third way’ 
are: global trade is “inevitable”; labour markets should be “flexible” [which, as 
previously noted of Barkan, could be defined as “code” to be able to fire 
people more easily, and lower wages – she also questions whether the 
concept makes any sense before it is established how to create good jobs in 
these economies (comment on Blair, Blair and Schroeder 2000)]; social 
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safety nets should be trimmed and; budget deficits should be slashed (Reich 
1999: 47).  
 
The case for the rejection of state ownership in the American situation is, 
critics assert, taken as given. In arguing the similarity of the American system 
with that of the Continental ‘third way’, Reich suggests that deregulation is 
comparable – in telecommunications, banking and electricity. The 
endorsement of NAFTA by the Clinton administration in 1992 credentials 
American resolve on the matter of globalisation (note: the endorsement by 
George W. Bush and the republicans of the World Trade Agreement (WTA) 
for the Western Hemisphere [Quebec 2001] illustrates a lack of difference 
between the parties on this issue). Following upon Barkan’s observations on 
“flexibility” in the workforce, some say that American workers have long 
suffered under such conditions and consequently present as a significantly 
different constituency to that of Europe where the labour movement has won 
more employment security. It is noteworthy that Blair and Schroeder raise the 
issue of “flexibility” yet apparently manage to sidestep its definition and 
qualification on the method by which it would be adopted (Blair and 
Schroeder 2000: 59). Reich suggests that Blair’s program is intending, in his 
view, to make the welfare state more flexible rather than smaller.  The Reich 
thesis is that if this was all there was to the ‘third way’, then there would be 
no ‘third way’, rather an extension of the second way or neo-liberalism.  
 
Canada 
 
The Canadian electoral system has been characterised by two pan-Canadian 
parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives (later the Progressive 
Conservatives after absorbing a western protest party) since Confederation 
in 1867 (Pammett and Vickers 2001).  Pammett contends that Canada for a 
considerable period had a two-and-a half party system (given the emergence 
of the New Democratic Party) with Coalition governments being a feature. 
The lack of an elected Senate, they assert, has meant that the composition of 
the House of Commons is key to how government functions.  
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Canada’s New Democratic Party (NDP) was formed in 1961 with the merging 
of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and the Canadian Labour 
Congress. The first leader of this newly formed Party was a Baptist Minister, 
Tom Douglas, who instilled the moral precepts of the social gospel (Grace 
2001).  Grace argues that the party's religiosity dissipated under subsequent 
leaders Lewis and Broadbent. Nevertheless, the NDP flourished under these 
men, as Canada embraced the welfare state and the NDP was regarded as 
the country's "conscience". By way of example, it introduced the Canadian 
Medicare system. 
 
It is argued by some that a new consensus began to emerge; that Canada 
had as many social programs as it needed or could afford. This consensus 
continues with Jean Chretien and is reflected in the budget-balancing efforts 
of all provincial governments in the 1990s. Chretien is acknowledged as an 
avid ‘third way’ supporter. Ironically Chretien is a Liberal so the embracing of 
centre left political model by a Liberal government, whilst not anomalous 
(consider George W. Bush in the United States of America, explored 
elsewhere), lends weight to arguments that will be advanced in Chapters 2, 5 
and 6.    
 
The Canadian political system has, unlike the United Kingdom, a three-tier 
arrangement for governance - the federal government, the provincial (state) 
government, and civic (or municipal) government. These can assume 
differing political complexions that can be at odds with each other. In the 
case of the provincial government of British Columbia, which is the specific 
location of one of the research sites, the Liberal Party now holds government 
after ten years of NDP government in that province.  
 
As will become evident in the following Chapter, a significant part of ‘third 
way’ implementation has its roots in a concern about crime as an important 
manifestation for the decline of civil society (Giddens 1998: 78). As Nick 
Cohen (2000) suggests: 
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… (third way) regimes have an impatience with anyone who gets in 
their way and a willingness to use the state to punish them or bully 
them into work. … Giddens fails to justify or explain the packed jails … 
It hasn’t struck him that, if a substantial proportion of young men are 
behind bars, the unemployment figures tend to look good. Nor does he 
ask why “progressive” governments need mass coercion and 
incarceration. To discipline the poor? To keep the workforce docile 
and maintain profits? (Cohen 2000: 54). 
 
An argument will be presented later in this Chapter to suggest that the 
earliest example of the ‘third way’ is to be found in Australia. Furthermore, 
the earliest example of ‘third way’ styled partnerships in that country – Safer 
Australia (1995) – a National Crime Prevention platform (replicated in 
Canada) was concerned with crime issues. Accordingly, in this section (and 
that which follows), cursory reference will be made to crime and criminal law 
issues in both Australia and Canada, specifically in relation to demonstration 
Projects reviewed as part of this research in both those places – the 
Downtown Eastside Revitalization Project (DTES Vancouver, Canada) and 
Safer Cities (Victoria, Australia).  
 
Canada has ten provinces and three territories. One of the key authorities of 
the federal government is to protect the rights and safety of Canadian 
citizens. It has exclusive rights over the enactment of criminal laws as well as 
in inter-provincial trade areas (telecommunications, immigration etc.) whilst 
the provincial governments make laws in relation to education, property and 
health services. In Canada the National Crime Prevention Council was 
formed in 1994. This Council includes stakeholders from across various 
sectors: community crime prevention experts, law enforcement specialists, 
children and youth service providers and academics. The creation of the 
Council emerged from a Canadian Parliamentary Committee Report (the 
House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs) 
published in 1993 which recommended that the federal government in 
cooperation with other levels of government: develop a national crime 
prevention policy; encourage a partnership approach to prevent crime; foster 
community involvement and; concentrate on addressing the root causes of 
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crime (Canadian Government 2000). The principle objectives of the 
Canadian National Strategy are to:  
 
... promote integrated action of key partners to reduce crime and 
victimisation … (which) requires building strategic alliances with other 
federal government departments, provincial and territorial 
governments, municipalities, non-governmental organizations, 
associations, communities and the private sector; develop and 
implement community-based solutions to problems that contribute to 
crime and victimisation …; (and) increase public awareness and 
support for effective approaches to crime prevention (Canadian 
Government 2000: 3). 
 
At its core the strategy seeks to increase the development of broad 
community-based partnerships. Under the rubric of the Safer Cities Initiative 
there are four funding programs: Community mobilisation ($CDN 17 
million/annum); the Crime Prevention Investment Fund ($CDN 7.5 
million/annum); the Crime Prevention Partnership Program ($CDN 2.3 
million/annum) and; the Business Action Program on Crime Prevention 
($CDN 2 million/annum). One of the sites under investigation falls under this 
program and is situated in Vancouver, British Columbia. 
 
Australia 
 
Under the Australian Constitution, principle responsibility for law and order, 
law enforcement and the protection of citizenry is vested with its States 
(provinces) and Territories. The federal Australian government has a general 
power to execute and maintain Commonwealth laws, which include those 
powers that create criminal offences, and to provide for related enforcement 
action. The Australian federal system, reflected in its constitution however, is 
bound by State (provincial) control over its own affairs. Such was the 
competitiveness of the early colonies in Australia that any national unity (to 
provide contingency for defence for example) was conditional upon the 
retention of powers by the constituent colonies (which were to become 
States).  
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It wasn't until particular decisions of the High Court of Australia (the highest 
Court of Appeal in the country) based upon external powers provisions within 
the Australian Constitution, that the federal government could over-ride 
provisions and challenge State laws enacted. In its simplest terms, when a 
state law is in contravention of an international covenant to which Australia is 
a signatory, the federal government can act to circumvent that State law. To 
standardise legislation (as in the case of corporate law) “mirror legislation” to 
be enacted across all state and territory jurisdictions is required. 
 
In Australia the concept of the ‘third way’ is not novel having, “avant la lettre”, 
underpinned the reform program of the Hawke and Keating Governments 
forming part of Australian political orthodoxy for almost two decades. A 
generation of Australians has grown up experiencing no other type of 
economic policy than free trade and deregulation. Whilst not formalised as 
‘third way’, the Hawke and Keating governments were the first social 
democratic style governments to practice ‘third way’ economic approaches, a 
matter elaborated upon in the following chapter. Indeed, their government 
style was investigated by both Bill Clinton from the United States and Tony 
Blair from the United Kingdom prior to their electoral success in their 
respective countries (Kerr 2002 - Transcriptions: 517). It could be argued that 
the subsequent Liberal governments in Australia have substantially endorsed 
elements of ‘third way’ thinking (note the use of “mutual obligation”, for 
example, by Liberal Minister Tony Abbott in relation to employment [Abbott 
1999: 2]). Certainly there is considerable debate within the Australian Labor 
Party about ‘third way’ implementation should it return to government [see, 
for example, Mark Latham (Latham 1999; Latham 2000 [a]; Latham 2000 [b]; 
Latham 2001) and Martin Stewart-Weeks (Stewart-Weeks 1999)]. The 
comments by the Australian President of the Fabian Society in relation to this 
discussion are also mentioned (and will be elaborated upon in a subsequent 
chapter) (Yungwith 2002 - Transcriptions: 437). 
 
The specification of location and the discussion on globalisation are 
invariably linked to the historical preconditions to which both apply. What will 
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follow is a broad overview of those preconditions, some of which will be 
explored in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
 
Context 3: Historical Development 
 
The decomposition of the Eastern European bloc, which was metaphorically 
symbolised by the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, lent weight to 
academic discourse that was asserting that “... communism and socialism 
have passed away” (Giddens 1998: 1). Jeremy Bransten suggests that this 
collapse was seeded in historical events as early as 1956 (preceding the 
construction of the Wall by five years) with Hungary’s uprising (Bransten 
1999).  He also cites the birth of Solidarity in 1980, and the implementation of 
glasnost by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev as significant precursors to the 
end of the Cold War.  
 
The Giddens scenario that socialism has passed away, yet “…remains to 
haunt us” (1998: 1) lies in tandem with the notion that social democracy is 
similarly moribund and in need of “renewal”. Giddens characterizes social 
democracy as “... moderate, parliamentary socialism” (1998: 4) whose 
principle focus was the consolidation of the welfare state. Giddens asserts 
that the “... economic theory of socialism was always inadequate, 
underestimating the capacity of capitalism to innovate, adapt and generate 
increasing productivity” (ibid:  4-5). 
 
James Petras (2000) aids in our understanding of the historical development 
(pre-Giddens) of the ‘third way’ (from a left [or “social democratic] 
perspective) suggesting two streams of thought; one emanating from “reform 
socialists” which phenomenon, he suggests, dominated from the turn of the 
19th Century to the end of the Second World War; the second he labels 
“welfare capitalism” which runs from the end of the War to the 1980s – each 
in their own way arguing against “extremes” formulating an alternative that 
was contemporary to their point in history (Petras 2000: 22-25).   
 
During the first period of transformation, Petras argues, the “reform socialists” 
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failed to recognise the propensity for capitalism to crisis; the underlying 
premise of negotiation and legislation to meet the vision of an expansive 
capitalist system “... gradually incorporating different layers of society into 
productive life and citizenship” (p. 23) were belied by the economic 
depression of the 1930s; the failure to “homogenisation” in society (the 
anticipated growth of the “middle class”); their failure to understand the 
“authoritarian nature” of the capitalist classes which were to lead to the rise of 
fascism; and their flawed view of an inter-dependent world economy which 
ignored “inter-imperialist” rivalry (or the earlier versions of globalisation) (p. 
24). Petras argues that this evolutionary movement sided with capitalism 
against revolution (on the basis of political democracy), failing to ally with the 
“... revolutionary forces against fascism and authoritarian capitalism” (p. 25). 
 
Petras distinguishes the second phase of ‘third way’ development (post 
World War 2 to the end of the 1980s, “welfare capitalism”) by the welfare 
state – the “... product of their own ingenuity, pragmatism, and skill in 
organising labour and negotiating with labour” what he refers to a “... 
historical compromise between capitalism and reform capitalists” (Petras 
2000: 26). Their success, he argues, rests with the post World War 
discrediting of capitalism (given its ties to fascism) and the “prestige” 
attending the conditions attaching to workers in emergent “communist” 
countries (which tended to undermine the “reform socialists”). Cold War 
spending, cheap materials and the increase in “demand-side” economics 
(consequent from the post war renewal programs) ensured high profits for 
capitalists with social democracy seen as the “lesser evil” to communism. 
Petras concludes that the end of “communism”, the post-war consolidation of 
capitalism (through global expansion), the decline in radical labour 
organisation and the economic crises that signalled the dramatic decline in 
welfare payments heralded the entrée of neo-liberalism (the shift from 
demand-side economics to supply-side economics) with the emasculation of 
“social pacts” between labour and government that epitomised welfare 
capitalism (see Petras 2000). 
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Further Discussion on the significance of the welfare state 
 
The concept of a “welfare state” has been mentioned and will resurface 
during discussion. An overview of what is implied by the welfare state is 
therefore desirable. The welfare state derives from pre-democratic 
Bismarck’s Germany (Rimlinger 1993) but finds a more natural place within 
social democratic systems resonating with “rights” or access to opportunity 
across a range of servicing including health, education, income, employment 
and so forth. Implicit to an understanding of the welfare state is the 
interrelationship between the preceding elements (state-derived for the 
benevolence of citizens) and “subsystems” that generate “welfare goods and 
services”, what Roche defines as “voluntary organizations”, the family and 
capitalism (Roche1992). The un-costed value of the traditional “family” 
(implying a male “breadwinner” and a female “caregiver”), combined with a 
“common culture”, an effective nation state system (democracy, political and 
legal institutions, effective government administration) in tandem with full 
employment and labour-intensive mass production systems are viewed as 
the distinguishing features of a modern welfare state (1992: 41-42). Social 
democrats, recognising that massive distribution of wealth proposed by 
socialists was not a feature of modern economies embraced the welfare state 
as a way to achieve greater levels of social justice. The most significant 
influence on the rise of the welfare state can be found in the writings of John 
Maynard Keynes, a British economist, who developed his ideas during the 
Great Depression (the 1930s). Certainly not a Marxist, Keynes nonetheless 
emphasised an important element of social democracy, full employment, 
arguing capitalism would remain in a depressed condition (suffering 
sustained unemployment and low growth) without the intervention of 
government. Keynes argued that the market ideology was indifferent to the 
concepts of high unemployment and poverty (Theophanous 1994). The post 
World War 2 version of the welfare state finds its source from the writings of 
William Beveridge (Beveridge 1942). The Liberal Beveridge, who advocated 
for a “free society” and a “market economy”, proposed a system of social 
rights that citizens had to unemployment, disability and retirement income as 
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well as to health services. His system was to be funded by employers and 
employees with only contributors being eligible to benefits (1942: 11), was 
dependent upon full employment (1942: 12).  The work of Richard Titmuss 
(1963) reflects the ideas of Beveridge from a “left” perspective (Titmuss 
1969). In his book Rethinking Citizenship (1992), Roche notes the similarities 
of the “social liberals” and the “left collectivists” to acknowledge and preserve 
some version of the state-civil society welfare pluralism. The departure of 
third way thinkers from this style of pluralism places state safety nets for 
those at risk in society, some suggest, under a cloud, as well as the non-
state welfare sector (which previously had been viewed by both the left and 
right as “valuable” with the state seen to be enabling this sector rather than 
disabling (cf. Wolfenden 1978).   
 
In this chapter, I have briefly touched upon some of the issues that 
encapsulate debate on the current ‘third way’, a model that finds 
considerable political currency throughout the world. Formalised by Anthony 
Giddens in the United Kingdom, drawing from the work of Amitai Etzioni in 
the United States and having regard to the ‘third way’ experience in Australia, 
this phenomenon has been the subject of vigorous intellectual discourse by 
both its supporters and detractors over the past few years.  These are 
matters that will be significantly expanded upon in subsequent chapters. In 
considering the orienting issues to this thesis, I have introduced a series of 
“contexts” into which this research has been placed – globalisation, National 
arenas and historical development. Furthermore, the structure of the thesis 
has been explained. The following chapter will explore the literature and lay 
the path for the specific examination of those imperatives (both political and 
moral) that appear to impact on the phenomenon and influence its 
implementation.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
 
The ‘third way’: literature, discourse and data 
 
 
 
This chapter will set the scene by: discussing the importance of the ‘third 
way’; exploring its origins and antecedents; addressing the critics of the 
phenomenon; reassessing the linkages to globalisation and economic 
liberalisation literature; reviewing the specifics of Giddens and Etzioni’s 
influence in shaping the ‘third way’; particularising issues from Giddens and 
Etzioni as they relate to methods of operation for the ‘third way’; and; laying 
the path for the specific investigation into the notions of the political and 
moral “imperatives” that appear to impact on the phenomenon (which will be 
canvassed in Chapters 5 and 6).  
 
It will be argued that many “third ways” have developed over the past century 
and a half seeking to integrate the competing interests of the “left” and the 
“right” – free market philosophy versus the welfare state; capitalism versus 
socialism. It will be suggested that Giddens’ and Etzioni’s third ways 
formalise this synthetic tradition, a dialectic progression that attempts to 
amalgamate social democracy with neo-liberalism. The chapter will also 
indicate the research agendas and questions that will inform this inquiry. The 
chapter will be organised in two parts, the first outlining the “philosophy” of 
the ‘third way’, the second exploring the “armature” of the ‘third way’. 
 
For the purpose of definition within this chapter the “philosophy” of the ‘third 
way’ is deemed to be a set of norms, expectations and moral values together 
with narrative, which in combination produce an ideology. The “armature” of 
the ‘third way’ is deemed to be those concrete policies and institutional 
relationships that determine what happens on the ground (those being the 
mechanisms or sub-systems of civil society, NGOs and partnerships). 
 The ‘third way’: Inclusion at a cost
 36
 
 
 
Part 1: The “philosophy” of the ‘third way’ 
 
 
The elements of the ‘third way’ are becoming increasingly important to 
political government models, particularly in the context of the latest wave of 
thinking emanating from Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1998; 2000; 2002). 
Theorists such as Giddensvii and Mark Latham (Latham 1999, 2000 [a], 2000 
[b]) have squarely put the ‘third way’ on the political agenda. Similarly, 
Michael Sandel, George Will, Amitai Etzioni, Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor 
and others representing the “communitarians”, have influenced its 
development. Some have argued that the beginnings of this ‘third way’ can 
be traced to the political machinations of the Hawke and Keating 
governments in Australia (Kennedy 2002 - Transcriptions: 102; Kerr 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 516-517; Low 2002 - Transcriptions: 30; Yungwith 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 437). Gary Yungwith and Duncan Kerr are quite emphatic 
about this possibility, Yungwith, the Australian President of the Fabian 
Society declaring: 
 
I am not really sure that you could say that the Hawke and Keating 
Governments weren’t the third way … where Blair then gave a term 
and rebadged it for his election purposes” (Yungwith 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 437). 
 
Kerr argues that Clinton’s principal advisor, Dick Morris, coined the phrase 
“the triangulation theory of politics” whereby Clinton sought to position 
himself in a centrist role between the left of the liberal wing of the Democrats 
and the Republicans, and further, that this process was substantially 
influenced by the sustained electoral success of Bob Hawke and Paul 
Keating in Australia. He suggests that the British Labour Party was similarly 
                                                 
vii  British Prime Minister Tony Blair refers to Giddens as his “guru” (dustcover 
pronouncement on Giddens’ 2000 publication) and, according to Sam Pryke, American 
President Bill Clinton interrupted a presidential crisis to fly out of Washington to attend a 
Giddens’ lecture in New York City (Pryke: 1999). Giddens is a member of the Blair “inner 
circle of advisors”. 
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predisposed by the way that Hawke and Keating maintained electoral 
success in years when they (the British Labour Party) were “barren”. 
 
With the apparent “death” of socialism (Giddens 1998: 3) and the exponential 
growth in the influence of economic globalisation (as evidenced by the 
electoral successes by neo-liberals such as Margaret Thatcher, Ronald 
Reagan, George Bush and George W. Bush), the language of the ‘third way’ 
may emerge, according to some, as a viable alternative for formerly 
“socialist” oriented administrations. It may also provide, according to others, 
an ideology of compliance to “capitalism” for these administrations as much 
as for their neo-liberal counterparts. We begin with a brief overview of the 
historical beginnings of this ‘third way’. 
 
The ‘third way’ Precursors 
 
Conceptually the idea of a ‘third way’ has an historical basis and we need to 
trace this to fully understand the issues at stake. Consider for example Karl 
Mannheim’s (1936) idea of a ‘third way’ between liberalism and communism 
(Uson-Perez 1993) or Celestin Bougle’s third way (1925) between classic 
liberalism and centralistic collectivism progressing Emile Durkheim’s 
conception of a transforming capitalist economic order or the “troisieme voie” 
(third way) of the 1930s as an alternative to anarchic capitalism and social 
collectivism (Bourdieu 1976). Right wing advocates also used it in the 1920s. 
It was also revisited during the interwar years (claiming to provide an 
alternative to both Soviet communism and moribund western capitalism and 
its revitalisation by neo-fascists as the “third force” (Barnes 2000: 59, on 
Bardeche, deriving from Pierre Drieu la Rochelle and Robert Brasillach). 
Pope Pius XII also coined the term in calling for a third way between 
capitalism and socialism as early as the end of the nineteenth century (John 
Browning, The Economist in Halpern and Mikosz, 2000: 3).  
 
Theorists like Ota Sik were drawn to a third way as a matter of historical 
necessity palled by the need to understand the “... causes of social ills” (Sik 
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1976: 4). Having seen his friends murdered in Nazi concentration camps as a 
youth and not regarding “... social reform as an end in itself” (ibid), Sik initially 
turned to socialism then to communism as a reaction to the “... revulsion 
against the oppression and exploitation of working people” (ibid: 7-8). The 
secret speech of Khrushchev, at the Soviet communist party’s 20th Congress, 
in which the crimes of the Stalinist regime were exposed, “... the mass terror 
which differed in no way from the methods of fascism” (ibid: 10), convinced 
Sik to abandon communism in turn. Sik’s thesis is based upon his belief that: 
 
... to recognise and criticise the defects in one order of society does 
not oblige me to overlook or blandly deny the imperfections in the 
other. The thing is to eradicate the flaws in both (1976:10).  
 
Whilst acknowledging the Marxian concept that the conflict between the 
owners of capital and wage-earners persists, Sik refutes the Marxian 
proposition that the:  
 
... inevitable emergence of insuperable and ever-deeping economic 
and social contradictions …. would, of necessity, lead to the 
revolutionary overthrow of capitalism (1976: 402).  
 
Sik’s solution is “scientific socialism” or the third way. His conception of this 
third way was to always have the interest of the working person in mind and 
to modify those elements of the social and political system that do not work in 
the interest of those workers (or which cause conflict “... which hinder the 
advancement of these interests, to explaining why this is so and in seeking 
viable solutions” [1976: 408]).  
 
References to a third way can even be found in Eastern European countries 
– the alleged bastion (pre-Soviet collapse) of classlessness. Prussian, Polish 
and Hungarian intellectuals (such as Istvan Bibo and Ferenc Erdei, preferring 
to call themselves “central”) saw themselves sandwiched between the “... 
greedy and anarchistic capitalism of the west and the traditionalism and 
despotism of the Orient (Russian or, even worse, Mongol or Turkish)” 
(Szelényi and Manchin 1988: 16). Szelényi and Manchin’s concept of a “third 
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road” or “socialist embourgeoisement” challenges the presumption of 
achieving pure forms or ideal types arguing that mixed economies can 
reproduce themselves:  
 
... that more complex systems adapt more effectively to economic 
challenges, and that systems where there are two masters may offer a 
more balanced distribution of power, with more room to manoeuvre for 
the powerless (Szelényi and Manchin 1988: 5).  
 
The development of third way political thinking in the United Kingdom also 
has historical equivalence having been the subject of discourse in Harold 
Macmillan’s “The Middle Way”, originally published in 1938, in which the 
author sought to chart a passage between free-market liberalism and 
Marxist-based socialism (Macmillan 1966).  The elements of Macmillan’s 
middle way, which were pervasive until 1979, involved a social democratic 
consensus applying Keynesian economics (capitalism plus state regulation of 
market forces), a welfare state and an attempt to integrate private enterprise 
with a more equal society (Kelly 1999). Ironically when Macmillan proclaimed 
in 1959 that we are “all workers now” in acknowledgement of the “traditional” 
struggle of the working class and his victory over Hugh Gaitskell, Blair 
asserted in 1997 that “... we are all middle class now”, in acknowledgement 
of Labour’s new constituency of small business, public servants, professional 
and technical employees (Birnbaum 1999: 440).  Having reviewed the 
historical underpinnings for ‘third way’ development, we now turn to the 
evolution of Giddens’ variant.  
 
The evolution of the Giddens’ variant of the ‘third way’  
 
It is important in the first instance, to understand the political situation in the 
United Kingdom prior to the ascension of “New Labour” (the revitalisation of 
the Labour party under Tony Blair), which is contained in the Labour party’s 
Policy Reviews established by its Annual Conference in October 1987. If we 
are to accept Giddens’ own analysis, the almost unshakable hold on British 
politics by Margaret Thatcher needed to be countered by a reinvention of 
Labour emphasising individual freedom and personal choice. In a shake-up 
 40
 
 
of traditional labour principles, public ownership of industry was to be 
discarded, Keynesian demand management was to be explicitly abandoned 
and the reliance upon the union movement was to be reduced (1998: 17). 
The policy framework of the British Labour Party was also modified to include 
“low key” ecological policies. The earlier rebirth of the Italian communist party 
refecting similar changes (to the Democratic Party of the left during the 
1980s) and the economic growth of Germany following the implementation of 
similar environmental considerations provided an impetus for the reshaping 
of UK politics along similar lines.  
 
According to some, Giddens does not appear to bring anything new to the 
political table preferring instead to combine elements of political and 
philosophical debate prevalent during most of the 20th Century. Not unlike the 
classic movie “The Fly”, these elements (a new mixed economy, the 
elevation of “family values”, equality of opportunity, democratisation, a more 
efficient welfare administration, governance dictated by “responsibility” and 
“obligations” and so forth, together with the concepts of “free enterprise” and 
“free market forces”) are placed in a chamber by Giddens and transmogrifies 
into the ‘third way’. Not unlike the plot in “The Fly”, some would argue, a 
further element slips into the chamber – a lack of definition, particularly with 
respect to the concept of “partnership”, the principle method for driving social 
change under a ‘third way’ model. The previously dominant gene of “free 
enterprise” and “free market forces” remain unaffected, accommodate and 
appear to flourish. Citizens are no longer viewed as “rational” (in the neo-
liberal sense) and not “social” (in terms of social democracy) but somehow 
writers of their own life narrative. 
 
In justification for the adoption of his ‘third way’, Giddens asserts that  “... pre-
existing ideologies have lost their resonance” (alluding to the demise of 
socialism) (1998: 1). Giddens recommends, however, that the ideals of 
Marxism are nonetheless worthy of retention with the caveat that these ideals 
need to be reconstructed given, in his view, the discrediting of socialist 
economic management theory (1998: 2). His precept for such a conclusion 
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stems from a view that socialism has failed to deliver a society that has 
generated greater wealth, but it is capable of more equitable distribution. 
Capitalism, conversely, has demonstrated its capacity to be “... efficient” 
(1998: 4) but creates inequality.  
 
He is careful not to opt for a totally unregulated market system independent 
of government authority whose principle goal, he asserts, is to redistribute 
wealth and counter what he describes as “... large-scale inequality (which 
would) produce widespread disaffection and conflict” (1998: 42). He argues 
strenuously that the untenable neo-liberal model of “meritocracy”, upon which 
rests the principle of “equality of opportunity” is more likely to exacerbate 
social division with “... deep inequalities of outcome” (1998:101). He chooses 
rather not to disturb “social cohesion” (or the status quo) recognizing the 
outcome from a loss of cohesion to be what he terms, undesirable 
consequences such as the provocation of higher crime rates. Whilst the 
expressed need to maintain social cohesion is enunciated at length by 
Giddens (1998: 12, 37, 42, 97) his method for achieving this end is less clear 
other than in his views on the “democratisation” of the family which is to be 
characterized by emotional and sexual equality, mutual rights and obligations 
in relationships, co-parenting, life-long parental contracts, negotiated 
authority over children, obligations of children to parents and what he terms 
the “socially integrated family”viii (1998: 95, 97). The democratic family is, to 
Giddens, the “... basic institution of civil society” (1998: 89). It is the question 
of implementation of ‘third way’ policies to achieve or maintain social 
cohesion beyond the family that this researcher considers problematic in the 
absence of a prescribed methodology. If, as some suggest, there is nothing 
entirely new about the approach by Giddens, then perhaps an explication of 
                                                 
viii Compare these notions with Novak’s (and the neo-Conservative’s)  ‘social duties” agenda 
which three main elements are: the defence of parents “rights” (supporting the imposition of 
“duties”); males have duties to support the children they father and; the parent’s duty to work 
to keep their children (Novak 1987). – the nub of welfare and family policy that “…must insist 
upon personal responsibility and social obligation” (1987: 18). Novak and his group advocate 
that: 
 
…it is essential that all able recipients should be enrolled in work, duration-limited 
education, or short-term training programs in return for collecting welfare benefits …. 
an obligation to society, as important to future work experience and as an occasion 
of self-development (1987: 112). 
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his earlier work may help explain the emergence of his ‘third way’. I now turn 
to this work. 
 
Giddens has a history of synthetic incursions, as I suggested in the 
introduction of this thesis. His 1971 publication Capitalism and Social Theory 
went beyond Parsonian sociology to draw together the ideas of Karl Marx, 
Max Weber and Emile Durkheim highlighting the strengths and weaknesses 
of Marx’s class struggle, Weber’s account of rationalisation and bureaucracy 
and Durkheim’s analysis of social symbols and religious forms – the net 
result being a view of sociology that centred upon the concepts of capitalism 
and modernity (Isaac 2001: 62). His formulations were extended in his 1973 
publication The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies. From his 
subsequent works, New Rules of Sociological Method (1976), Studies in 
Social and Political Theory (1979) and Central Problems of Social Theory  
(1979) emerged his “theory of structuration” which brought together the ideas 
of Foucault, Habermas, Gadamer and Lévi-Strauss in which he proposed 
that social life consists of numerous ‘social structures’ that are, according to 
Jeffrey Isaac (2001): 
 
... both the conditions of and the (typically unintended) outcome of 
ordinary interaction. These structures exert a causal power on the 
conduct of social agents, something typically obscured by 
interpretivisits; and yet they are also sustained or altered by 
reproduction (Isaac 2001: 62).  
 
Influenced by Ulrich Beck (1992) (The Risk Society: towards a new 
modernity), Giddens also appears to borrow the concept of “sub-politics”, 
located in civil society, engendered from dissatisfaction by citizens engaged 
in social movements and borne out of ecological concern. His arguments, 
articulated in Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (1994) set 
the mood for his proposition for “social order” to replace capitalism within his 
‘third way’ in the wake of failed “communism” in Eastern Europe and the 
paralysis of social democracy in Western Europe (Isaac 2001).  
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Giddens himself positions his work as being transitional, in that: 
 
Before about (the) early 1990s I didn’t have much involvement directly 
with politics and I used to write about particular issues in a very diffuse 
way and I was more of a straight down the line sociologist. Then I 
became a bit involved with British politics and joined up with an 
organisation here (the LSE) …. there are lots of things like that 
including the notion of active welfare for example that I feel has close 
connection with previous writings yes, but there’s also a transition in 
what I decided to do too (Giddens 2002 - Transcriptions: 45). 
 
Regardless of its origins, the ‘third way’ purports to amalgamate elements 
from both social democracy and neo-liberalism. Accordingly, a brief overview 
of both may help illuminate later discussion on the phenomenon of this ‘third 
way’ as a form of what he now calls new social democracy (Giddens 2002; 
see also footnote ii). 
 
On social democracy 
 
The rise of “social democracy”, with its pre- and post-war variants as 
illuminated by Petras (outlined in the Introduction), owes its legacy to the 
writings of Karl Marx and later Eduard Bernstein (Bernstein 1909) the latter 
writer promoting a non-violent transformation of capitalist society. With a 
clear commitment to equality, social democracy emerged some fifty years 
after Marx wrote his Manifesto at a time in which improvements were taking 
place in “bourgeois” society, contrary to what Marx had predicted.  
 
Certainly there was an acknowledgement by all socialists at the turn of the 
19th century that their movement was contingent upon capitalist society 
(Sassoon 2000). Those who advocated social democracy did so in the 
knowledge that capitalism was expanding, not contracting and that the 
fastest growing of the capitalist economies (the United States of America) did 
not have a viable socialist movement.  
 
These socialists (influenced by Bernstein) sought rather to regulate 
capitalism with a vision of political democracy, pluralism and human rights – 
with a base centred upon individualism rather than class. Those other 
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socialists who proceeded from Marx were more authoritarian, were intolerant 
of dissent and in some cases “... exceeded capitalist authoritarian regimes” 
(Sassoon 2000: 57). Donald Sassoon describes the differences further by 
saying that developmental socialism (that is, communism) was never liberal, 
while social democracy was never dictatorial. Finally, in arriving at a clearer 
distinction about the two forms of socialism, Sassoon concludes that Social 
Democrats prevailed in developed market economies whereas Marxian 
socialists (or as he inappropriately calls them, “communists”) prevailed in less 
developed societies.  
 
In her assessment of the emergence of this second phase, Susanne 
MacGregor (1999) characterises it as “... a compromise and a response to 
the traumas of depression and world wars: its ambitions were good, stressing 
security, citizenship, universalism and equity. ….. in practice it did not live up 
to its high ideals” (MacGregor 1999: 93). On the other hand, T.H. Marshall 
(1977) conceptualised the welfare state as the way in which citizenship was 
extended and strengthened (Marshall 1977). His critics have suggested that 
it fostered excessive concerns with “rights” rather than “duties” (Mead 1986) 
encouraging passivity and a “... culture of dependence” among the poor 
(Banfield 1974 in Goldberg 2001: 289). Chad Goldberg (2001) claims that 
these critics have sought to redefine the welfare state as a “... threat to 
democratic citizenship rather than a more complex realisation of it” (ibid:  
289) arguing, with Marshall, that the welfare state fostered social “inclusion”. 
 
Buoyed by successes in the battle for civil and political rights in developed 
economies, those socialists in the ascendency - the Social Democrats - used 
these entitlements to their advantage (Broadbent 1999). With time the social 
democrats took as given that social equality was synonymous with the 
advancement of some aspects of the market economy. Broadbent writes that 
the post-World War 2 period led to the rise of strong trade unionism with an 
impetus for social reform generated by the impact of the war. This was to be 
the birth of the “modern welfare state” – a collateral system engaging market 
logic with universal social and economic conditions for all citizens.  
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The goals of social democracy can be summarised thus: democratising 
capitalist society; regulating the labour market and; socialising the costs of 
reproducing labour (the welfare state) (Sassoon: 2000). Whilst it was not part 
of the original ideology of socialism to regulate capitalism, some suggest that 
in established economies that is what occurred.  In an attack on those 
socialists who sought to regulate capitalism, Sheri Berman (2000) views the 
term social democracy as an “epithet” more than a meaningful designation. 
She suggests it as “... an unstable halfway house between Marxism and 
liberalism … socialists without the courage of their convictions” (Berman 
2000: 66). She continues by suggesting, nevertheless, that it is a “... full-
fledged alternative” (ibid) to both Marxism and liberalism. 
 
In an analysis of phase 3, the ‘third way’, Petras isolates four variants of ‘third 
way’: that espoused by Blair, Clinton and Schroeder; the rejection of liberal 
capitalism by President Juan Peron in Argentina in the 1940s (and his impact 
on Nasser in Egypt, Nehru in India, Tito of Yugoslavia, Nkrumah of Ghana, 
and Sukarno in Indonesia); the movements in the Middle East which have 
rallied against “... western decadence and atheistic communism” and the 
strategies espoused by non-government organizations (NGOs) arguing for 
“... civil society against neo-liberal capitalism” on the one side and “statism” 
on the other, opting for community-based development based upon self-help 
and reciprocity (Petras 2000: 28).  The significance of NGOs within this 
schematic will be comprehensively dealt with in part 2 of this chapter as both 
an exemplar of civil society and the vehicle for social democratic policy 
implementation through “partnerships”. 
 
What will follow is some historical and ideological background to the ‘third 
way’ partner of social democracy, neo-liberalism. 
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On Neo-liberalism 
 
When we speak of neo-liberalism we come to reflect upon the 
pronouncements and praxis of Western leaders such as Margaret Thatcher, 
Ronald Reagan, George Bush and George W. Bush. At the same time we 
can consider the genesis of conservatism and the contributions of David 
Ricardo and Adam Smith and the New Liberals such as Graham Wallas, J. A. 
Hobson and L. T. Hobhouse. The forerunner of neo-liberalism (or neo-
conservatism in the United States) or la penne unique (France: the dominant 
or single mindset) was known as laissez faire. What is generally not 
accepted, some suggest, is that neo-liberalism is as far removed from the 
political economic doctrines of Smith as ‘social-ism’ is removed from Marx. 
 
Neo-liberalism was spawned from the writings of Richard Weaver (1948: 
Ideas Have Consequences), Friedrich von Hayek (who founded the Mount 
Pelerin Society in 1947 and who found an ally in Thatcher) and Milton 
Friedman. The common thread of each, it has been claimed, was “... freedom 
for business but repression for labour” (George 1997: 48). The development 
of neo-liberalism was not an ad hoc occurrence having apparently incubated 
its “credo” over a fifty-year period. As Susan George suggests, the roots of 
neo-liberalism begin with the founding in 1943 of the American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI) by anti-New Deal businessmen and has spread worldwide 
during the intervening period. This is evidenced by the creation of other 
“think-tanks”. In the United States the Heritage Foundation was formed (the 
“brains” behind Reagan and George Bush which delivered its thousand page 
“Mandate for Leadership” document to Ronald Reagan upon his election), 
the Hoover Institution, the Cato Institute and the Manhattan Institute for 
Policy Research (founded by William Casey, later to become the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency) were also created. In the United Kingdom, 
George notes the parallel development of the London houses for the Centre 
of Policy Studies and the anti-statist Institute of Economic Affairs and the 
Adam Smith Institute (this one, George asserts, having contributed to the 
privatisation policy more than any other – its “Omega Project” having been 
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substantially put into practice by Thatcher). She argues that the doctrines of 
the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) “... are indistinguishable from those of neo-liberal 
credo” (George 1997: 49).  
 
The discussion will now consider the synthesis of social democracy with neo-
liberalism as the cornerstone of ‘third way’ theory. 
 
The ‘third way’ as a “synthesis” of social democracy and neo-liberalism 
 
In his paper on the ‘third way’, Richard Kelly (Kelly 1999: 27-28) compares 
three central ideological concepts (class, state intervention and the nation) 
from a neo-liberal (which he defines as “modern conservativism”) and social 
democratic (which he defines as “old labour/old tory”) perspective to arrive at 
a “substance” for the ‘third way’. On class, he notes that neo-liberals deny 
class conflict as either relevant to political debate or to the makeup of society, 
extolling theories of “... class dealignment” (Sarlvik and Crewe 1983 in Kelly 
1999: 27), whereas social democrats view class as central to both politics 
and society for the improvement of social conditions through strong and 
effective trade unionism. On the issue of state intervention he notes that neo-
liberals refute the validity of large-scale economic planning 
(macroeconomics) with the supremacy of market forces whilst social 
democrats apply the opposite logic being highly sceptical of unfettered 
market forces with governments applying a plan geared towards fairness and 
stability. In relation to state intervention, Kelly notes the hostility of neo-
liberals to state welfare viewing the taxing required to fund it as an attack on 
enterprise, whereas social democrats extol the welfare state as crucial to the 
creation of a more just society. 
 
The synthesis of neo-liberalism and social democracy is, according to Kelly, 
measured in the ‘third way’ approach to each of these three critical issues. 
On class, the ‘third way’ accepts class dealignment creating a “... cohesive, 
mutually respectful community of disparate individuals” (Tucker 1998 in Kelly 
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1999: 27) under the umbrella of “civic responsibility” and “citizenship”. On 
state intervention the ‘third way’ promotes, in accord with neo-liberals, that 
national governments have proved unsuccessful at macroeconomics, 
however, in accord with the social democrats, should be revisited in the 
context of “pooled” supranational considerations across Europe (Hutton and 
Goldblatt 1999). Further, third-wayers reject the minimalist view on welfare 
promoted by neo-liberals but accept that the nature of state welfare needs to 
be contemporised as indicated by the Blair government’s “workfare” 
proposals. The ‘third way’s’ approach to state intervention is also reflective in 
its decentralised stance (“democratised”) to ensure that state action is more 
accountable and sensitive to consumer needs. Finally, on the issue of the 
nation, the ‘third way’ rejects the neo-liberal concept of nation whilst 
remaining keen to maintain national identity highlighting elements in British 
society as multiculturalism and “artistic creativity”, whilst downgrading 
militarism and tradition. 
 
In their analysis of the phenomenon of the ‘third way’, Andrew Gamble and 
Gavin Kelly (1999) view it as either a “revision” of social democracy or:  “... a 
new and heterodox alignment of ideas (which some are bundling under the 
rubric of the radical centre) which recognise that there has been a sharp 
break in political continuity which may render many former certainties 
obsolete” (Gamble et al. 1997 in Jacobs and Fabian Society 2000: 1). As 
Michael Jacobs notes, social democracy would need significant revision to 
become a viable alternative to neo-liberalism given that a more equal society 
is the intended outcome for social democracy and given that radically 
changed circumstances (implicit to Gamble and Kelly’s analysis) denies the 
history (and varying interpretations) of social democracies (particularly on the 
Continent) to incrementally alter social conditions. The rise of the ‘third way’ 
as a viable alternative to social democracy would therefore seem justified 
under this analysis. 
 
In speaking of the political implementation of the ‘third way’ in the United 
Kingdom, Philip Gould (1999) suggests that the long-term political program 
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for Blair is to create a permanent coalition shaped by a revamped electoral 
system that marginalizes both social democrats and neo-liberals (Gould 
1999). Norman Birnbaum goes further arguing that the ‘third way’ is not a “... 
modernisation of … European socialism: it represents their liquidation” 
(Birnbaum 1999: 446). In their analysis of the ascendency of the ‘third way’, 
Giddens’ and Pierson assert that broad appeal for their thesis will emerge 
from the looming global recession which, they argue, will weaken neo-
liberalism in much the same way as the collapse of communism in the 1980s 
discredited Marxism (their view) and the recession of the 1970s weakened 
social democracy (Giddens and Pierson 1998). This is a view that is not 
shared by others who suggest that a global crisis will “... reveal the third 
way’s intellectual vapidity and its political dishonesty” (Minford 1998, in Kelly 
1999: 28). The defining difference of the ‘third way’, according to Reich, is to 
move from a distribution of wealth mentality to a process whereby the 
opportunity to obtain jobs is spurred by economic growth consequent from 
free market forces (Reich 1999: 48). The method by which this is achieved 
(and the remaining vestige of social democracy) is through the broadening of 
opportunity for improved education (what in Australia is called the “smart 
society”) via greater access to lifelong learning opportunities and retraining.  
 
Whilst some reference has been made to views and opinions of the ‘third 
way’ in the context of social democracy and neo-liberalism, some exploration 
of Giddens’ model is appropriate at this juncture, specifically in relation to the 
views of its proponents and opponents. 
 
The” Pros” for the ‘third way’ - the positive view of its proponents 
 
Proponents of the Giddens approach have given wide acclaim to his works 
saying (on dustcover pronouncements on his books) that “... the debate 
about the ‘third way’ is vital to politics in the twenty-first century … (Giddens’) 
book is an important contribution to the debate” (Tony Blair, Prime Minister of 
the United Kingdom). Further, Romano Prodi, President of the European 
Commission asserts that,  “... this is a crucial period for the European Union. 
We need new thinking about democracy and economic development. Tony 
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Giddens gives us some vital clues about how to achieve these aims”. 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, President of Brazil tells us that “... The ‘third 
way’ debate has become a truly world-wide one, affecting all countries … 
This book marks a major further development in the evolution of the left” and, 
according to Joesph S. Nye Jnr., Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, “... How can democracies gain the benefits 
that flow from market forces while pursuing a community that cares for those 
who fall behind? Anyone interested in fresh approaches to such questions 
will have to read …Giddens’ book. It is a feast of fresh ideas”. Former United 
States President Bill Clinton declared: “We have moved past the sterile 
debate between those who say government is the enemy and those who say 
that government is the answer. My fellow Americans, we have found a ‘Third 
Way’ ” (Halpern and Mikosz 2000: 2). Al From, the leader of the conservative 
United States Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) describes the ‘third way’ 
as “... the worldwide brand name for progressive politics for the Information 
Age. In America, the local brand name is New Democrat; in Britain, it is New 
Labour” (Faux 1999: 67). Faux argues that this  “franchise” has been applied 
by “... virtually every new leader in the Western World” (ibid),  (including 
Chretien of Canada, Pordi of Italy, Jospin of France, Salinas and Zedillo in 
Mexico, Schroeder of Germany, Cardoso of Brazil and Menem of Argenita).  
 
Jeff Faux, speaking on this “third” way variant, asserts that “... (it) promises 
social democrats instant liberation from the political baggage of the past and, 
therefore, electoral success in the future” (Faux 1999: 67). Giddens’ ‘third 
way’ has been described as the political centre ground unencumbered by 
antiquated ideological co-ordinates (Pryke 1999). In other words it is a model 
that gives the appearance of being the synthesis of the competing ideological 
positions driven by the left/right dichotomy. The Giddens proposition that 
developing a ‘third way’ is a requirement of modern politics, implies the 
deconstruction of the left/right continuum that globalisation, some would 
argue, imposed upon political administrators.   
 
In a joint manifesto on the ‘third way’ by Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder 
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(2000), the idea of the abandonment of the “dogmas of left and right” is taken 
as given. As Joanne Barken, an editor for the Journal, Dissent, notes (on 
questioning what these dogmas are) market liberalisation does not appear to 
have substantially changed for European conservatives, which raises the 
possibility that the basic values of the left still fundamentally hold [hand 
written notes in Blair and Schroeder 2000]. 
 
The “Cons” against the ‘third way’ and negative view by detractors 
 
Notwithstanding the praise for the ‘third way’, other critics of the ‘third way’ 
have described Tony Blair and his government as being “... ideologically 
vacuous, standing for nothing save the acquisition and retention of power” 
(Kelly 1999: 26). Some go further describing the ‘third way’ as a “... screen or 
fig leaf for the Labour Party’s abandonment of its traditional values and 
policies” (Ryan 1999: 77), and this is the view of Labour Members of 
Parliament (Tony Benn and Dennis Skinner). Others, less charitably, 
characterise Blair as a “... comic figure” an “... overgrown schoolboy” whose 
“... project (the ‘third way’) is “blather” (Pryce-Jones 2000: 30), a “Bobo” 
(alluding to the David Brooks publication “Bobos in Paradise” in which Bobos 
are defined as the new elite that sets the tone for the new millennium) 
(Ordone 2000). Others, such as Martin Stewart-Weeks (1999) muse over the 
quality of the number three within the ‘third way’ construct: 
 
Part of the attraction, presumably, is the strange lure of the number 
three that seems to have almost magical qualities. Whether in the Holy 
Trinity or the dialectic in which the third phase of synthesis resolves 
the contradictions of thesis and antithesis, we seem to respond to 
things in threes. In fact, it often seems as though the third way is seen 
as intrinsically good simply because it is the third and not the first two 
(Stewart-Weeks 1999: 1). 
 
The inherent dangers for the ‘third way’, according to Stewart-Weeks, is that 
it may fail to transcend its current “... status as something of an intellectual 
curiosity” (ibid) or it evolves as nothing more than a middle way in a 
repudiation of socialism (either state socialism or statist social democracy) 
and neo-liberalism thereby relegating it to the ranks of an “intellectual 
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firmament” (ibid).  
 
Likewise, in his analysis of the ‘third way’, Norman Birnbaum notes three 
elements: 1. that a “culture” of the ‘third way’ is conspicuous by its absence, 
i.e. that there is no cultural project or notion of human possibility attaching to 
its economic and social policies (I disagree with this to some extent and 
discuss a distinctive “cultural imperative” in this thesis); 2. The omission of 
systematic internationalism with the global economy threatening the nation 
state and reducing its powers and; 3. The ‘third way’ is not a project for 
humanising or tempering capitalism – rather it is a Project that adapts to the 
capitalism of the economic boom of the 1990s (Birnbaum 1999: 444-446). 
The adoption of a ‘third way’ that dissolves the distinction between social 
democratic “types”, whilst at the same time assimilates market ideology 
evokes, to some, a system that renders class-based struggle as irrelevant. 
 
James Petras (2000), for example, suggests the current version of ‘third way’ 
argues that free-market capitalism is “inhumane” and “exclusive-based” on a 
“... class-bound establishment” that inhibits access to opportunity to all 
classes and groups whilst statist socialism impedes the individual choice and 
limited incentives to engage in entrepreneurial enterprise (Petras 2000: 29).  
 
In essence, Petras argues, the ‘third way’ offers a society and economy “... 
that combines the individual choice of the marketplace and the social 
opportunities of the welfare state” (ibid 30). He suggests that the sociological 
premises for the emergence of the new ‘third way’ rely upon the proposition 
that historical developments have dissolved class-based politics thereby 
rendering class struggle considerations irrelevant. An information-driven and 
global economy, Petras continues, has created producers concerned with 
higher productivity and competitiveness with the role of the state to facilitate 
conditions and incentives to encourage entrepreneurship, innovation and 
equal opportunity. It does this, he concludes, by way of advocating personal 
responsibility rather than welfare dependency. The goal of ‘third way’ 
theorists, it would seem, is not to advocate to redistribute income, but rather 
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to insist that it is better to increase income for all. Society will, supposedly, 
continue to experience inequality but concurrently develop equal opportunity.  
 
 
In addressing this issue, Robert Reich (1999), raises the question about 
whether the rise of the latest edition of ‘third way’ politics is less of a 
synthesis of social democracy and neo-liberalism (as it is characterised) than 
a cynical political manoeuvre by the “left” to mollify conservatives in a never-
ending global movement to the right (Reich 1999: 46) in a grab for political 
power and in acknowledgement of the proposition that governance by nation-
states is a “fiction” (Ohmae: 1995 in Giddens 1998: 31), with effective power 
by politicians being lost.  
 
Beyond the views of its critics, the ‘third way’ has influenced public policy 
both in that country and elsewhere to embrace neo-liberal elements in what 
is, some could argue, almost acquiescent acceptance that free-market 
philosophy has won and that socialism is obsolete. Its implementation 
proceeds, according to some, upon the presumption that the marketplace is 
superior to government and that technological changes and globalisation 
have aided in the redundancy of socialism. John Quiggin (2000) suggests the 
emergence of a curious paradox, in that this acquiescence sits uncomfortably 
with the high levels of government expenditure (thereby affecting the levels of 
taxation) (Quiggin 2000: 6). He points out that in those places where 
advocates have argued for radical cuts in public administered expenditure, 
governments have been defeated (citing examples such as the State of 
Victoria and New Zealand).  
 
We now need to turn our attention to the writings of Amitai Etzioni in the 
United States. As discussed in the Introduction, the writings of Etzioni 
predate the Giddens’ model by some ten years yet share elemental features 
that require an explication. Some argue that Hobhouse, Durkheim, Dewey, 
and Habermas significantly influenced Etzioni and the communitarians (Flora 
1999: 590). Other prominant communitarians include Michael Sandel, 
George Will, Michael Walzer, and Charles Taylor. 
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Amitai Etzioni: the third wave 
 
The work of Anthony Giddens has a great deal with in common with that of 
Amitai Etzioni, a matter that has been explored in the Introduction and will be 
reviewed in the empirical chapters as well. Yet, at least from Giddens’ 
perspective, the two are not related since, as Giddens asserts, “I am not a 
communitarian” (Giddens 2002 - Transcriptions: 47). Herein lies the first 
distinction. What will follow is an overview of Etzioni’s communitarian model. 
Before proceeding, however, two further distinctions will be raised for 
contextual purposes, but will be explored at other parts of this thesis.  
 
Firstly, a difference can be discerned between the two scholars in relation to 
the use of citizenry for the constructive conduct of government, a matter that 
will be explored comprehensively in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. According to 
Bradley Watson (1999), Etzioni favours the concept of “community spirit” with 
its inherent social and individual virtues: 
 
... but he has not learned the Aristotelian lesson that ethics is a subset 
of politics. One must ultimately lay down certain coherent political 
principles - a coherent political science - to speak intelligently about 
community "values" and their encouragement. And one must also be 
able to define, in more coherent terms than Etzioni's, the regime - or 
"supracommunity" - that one is talking about whenever the word 
"community" is used. Without such a definition, it is impossible to know 
the nature of the community that is ultimately to be protected from the 
excesses of individualism or other forms of self-seeking, and it is 
therefore impossible to know what must be done to protect it (Watson 
1999: 215). 
 
The second distinction rests on the idea of entitled needs (pensions, benefits 
and so forth) being replaced by the notion of giving something back, not 
through altruism, according to Etzioni, but because “... people who serve 
good causes feel ennobled rather than coerced” (Etzioni 1997 [c]: 21). 
According to Etzioni, the amended Constitution for the British Labour Party 
(at clause 4) squarely requires a structural change in the United Kingdom in 
the culture and structure of society. Alluding to this amendment, which 
recognises the importance of community, of a society “... in which the rights 
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we enjoy reflect the duties we owe” (ibid), Etzioni asserts that Blair’s 
approach is communitarian, a view not shared by Giddens, as mentioned 
earlier. In more recent times Etzioni has proposed that his communitarian 
approach is indeed the third way (Etzioni 2000: 25).  
 
Etzioni’s vision for the development of his communitarian paradigm arises 
from his view that we need to “... make sense out of the social world that 
surrounds us (Etzioni 1988:  ix). His position is based upon the premise that 
we are in the midst of a “paradigmatic struggle” wherein the:  
 
... entrenched utilitarian, rationalist-individualistic, neoclassical 
paradigm which is applied not merely to the economy but also, 
increasingly, to the full array of social relations, from crime to family 
(ibid: ix). 
 
In refuting the economic concept of individuals maximising “utility” for 
personal pleasure, Etzioni draws upon a deontological position that suggests 
that people pass moral judgements over their urges in a way reminiscent of 
Charles Fried (1964) who suggested that moral commitments are a cause 
(Fried 1964 in Etzioni 1988: x). In extending this proposition, he argues that 
people’s satisfaction of wants, arbitrated by the economic mechanism of 
price in determining the effective allocation of resources, is not merely 
militated by “self-happiness” as the only “utility” but by notions such as “... the 
commitment to live up to their moral values …. (which) cannot be neatly 
ordered or regulated by prices” (ibid xi). The matter of morality in this model 
will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 6.  
 
Etzioni denies that people always make rational decisions but rather are 
primarily driven by emotions and value judgements in relation to decision-
making. Finally, Etzioni tells us, the notion of free-standing individuals 
rendering decisions should be replaced by people as “social collectivities”, 
which shape individual decisions. Etzioni promotes the idea of a “responsive 
community” which accords status to both the individual and their “shared 
union”, seeking to reconcile the competing forces of individuals and the 
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community in which they are members. 
 
In writing on his concept in the context of the ‘third way’, Etzioni defines 
communities as “... groups of people who share bonds of affection” with 
“mutuality” at the core of those bonds (Etzioni 2000: 25).  The Etzioni view of 
civil society will be discussed in Chapter 6 however for the purpose of this 
discussion he defines it as “... the critically important mediating institutions 
that stand between the state and the person” (Etzioni 1996: 8). 
 
Henry Tam (1998) suggests that there are three communitarian principles: 
cooperative inquiry; common values/mutual responsibility; and citizen 
participation (Tam 1998 in Flora 1999: 590). Drawing on the work of 
Durkheim, according to Jan Flora (1999), Tam argues that communitarianism 
should foster both social cohesion and individual autonomy in the 
achievement of these principles (ibid:  591). He suggests that strengthening 
of civil society and their engagement in that process does not imply that this 
engagement should take over state functions. Accordingly, he argues a 
position that advances participatory decentralization rather than the 
devolution and privatisation of government services. Herein lies another 
distinction between the Giddens and Etzioni approaches. 
 
According to Flora (1999), Tam asserts that, through cooperative inquiry, 
apparently irreconcilable interests can be resolved through appeal to 
common values. In his opinion, this view ignores the importance of struggle 
for achieving community and mirrors Durkheim's refusal to incorporate 
struggle into his theory of social solidarity (Flora 1999: 591; cf. Collins 1994). 
This issue will be examined in Chapter 6. 
 
In Roger Connor’s view (2002) the Etzioni, or communitarian, approach 
constructs a “new robust paradigm” designed to supersede the Liberal 
paradigm and the conservative paradigm by which people can analyse 
problems (Conner 2002 - Transcriptions: 304). His thesis rests on the 
proposition that the two former paradigms were constructed at particular 
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points in history when, as he puts it, most of the social and economic issues 
and the cleavages confronting society aligned along a similar divide as the 
left and right. Further, he argues, the need for the communitarian construct 
arose because the emerging social problems no longer fit the bipolar 
description: 
 
… because they are identified as being conservative, Liberals reject 
them even though in fact they’re superior ways of achieving Liberal 
ends and vice versa…… A whole variety of individuals have come 
forward to say that there’s a third way in response to a particular 
problem such as crime or education and that sort of thing and they’ve 
attempted to pull a particular problem out of the left/right dispute that’s 
going on so that it might be seen more on its own merits so that 
Liberals and conservatives wouldn’t have a knee-jerk reaction as 
they’re currently having (Conner 2002 - Transcriptions: 304-305). 
 
In essence Conner argues that some people would present a ‘third way’ that 
is a unified field theory of some sort with a coherent worldview that once 
applied, will yield better solutions. At the same time he suggests that: 
 
…(people say) that there is no unified field theory there is only 
appropriate and pragmatic responses to issues and problems as they 
come up and in a sense the third way is to withdraw from a politics 
that attempts to construct any paradigm and enduring coalition of left 
and right but instead says that the third way is a politics of pragmatism 
(ibid: 305). 
 
The net effect of such thinking (according to Connor) is that pragmatists who 
seek to influence politics from both the left and the right create an intellectual 
archipelago. In turn, it could be argued, the principles of the ‘third way’ 
become secondary to the economic and political agendas of specific interests 
or classes, a matter that will be elaborated upon in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
At the same time Gordon Raley (2002) suggests that the communitarian 
vision is potentially more about the abrogation of social responsibility by 
government through the advancement of volunteerism at the expense of 
political intervention: 
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I think the communitarian part sounded a little too much like 
communist (laughter). So the right wing could bang away if they begin 
to do too much with communitarianism, people could play on that word 
but he was saying in effect the same thing that has been picked up 
well by George Bush senior with the points of light movement which is 
really looking at volunteerism and I am all for it. And on the other 
hand, because who can be against volunteerism, and on the other 
hand there are some folks that see, who look at human service and 
the role of government and human service, as slowly turning that into 
community business and if they can even turn it into volunteer 
business so that taking care of people who are hungry or poor no 
longer becomes a role of government, no longer becomes a 
professional obligation of government but rather becomes something 
that volunteers can do (Raley 2002 - Transcriptions: 322). 
 
In summary of part 1, it can be established from the literature that: 
 
o The ‘third way’, as a median point between social democracy and neo-
liberalism, has been recursive throughout history but finds current 
political favour from the formalised version crafted by Giddens, 
influenced by Etzioni (and inspired by Labor electoral successes in 
Australia). 
 
o Whilst purporting to be a synthesis of left and right ideologies, the 
‘third way’ appears to draw more substantially from neo-liberal 
ideology than from social democracy. 
 
o It is a system, therefore, that is likely to be favoured by both the left 
(from where it emanates) as well as the right of politics. 
 
o Opponents of the ‘third way’ are as vigorous as its supporters. This is 
a debate in need of resolution. 
 
Conclusions (Part 1) 
 
Thus far in this chapter, a literature review of the combination of elements 
that encapsulate what has been referred to as the “philosophy” of the ‘third 
way’ has been explicated. At the beginning of the chapter this philosophy 
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was defined as the set of norms, expectations and moral values together with 
narrative, which in combination produce an ideology. In seeking to explain 
this philosophy (during the course of this part of the chapter) the following 
cultural implications were iterated: the historical antecedents to the 
development of this model including a review of its synthetic qualities (those 
being social democracy and neo-liberalism); the historical evolution of ‘third 
way’/ “middle way” versions; the evolution of the Giddens’ variant; an 
exposition of the views of its proponents and detractors, and; a review of the 
Etzioni variant. In Part 2 of this chapter, a review of the literature will be 
undertaken as it relates to that “armature”, which epitomises the concrete 
manifestations and institutional relationships of the ‘third way’ (civil society, 
NGOs and partnerships). this is the end of the chapter
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Part 2: The armature of the ‘third way’ 
 
 
As outlined in the Introduction, this research will interrogate respondent views 
of the ‘third way’ in practice. As such, some of the armature of the ‘third way’ 
(civil society, NGOs and partnerships – i.e. those mechanisms or sub-
systems that do the work of the ‘third way’) needs to be assessed in the 
context of the Giddens/Etzioni models and in light of other literature. It is 
noted again that this research is not inclusive of all elements of the ‘third way’ 
but seeks to capture an understanding of a small corner of the ‘third way’ 
picture from the perspective of elite respondents working on the ground.   
 
In assigning some significance to the armature of civil society, NGOs and 
partnerships, it is acknowledged that other armatures or institutions have not 
been specifically looked at. These include “the State”, “Markets”, 
“Entrepreneurs” and “Politics”. There is a bigger canvas and the ‘third way’ is 
much more than just community development, however explication of these 
other institutions was seen to be beyond the reach of this research project. 
 
In the area of community development, this part of the chapter will review the 
history and nature of the concepts and then interrogate Giddens’ 
appropriation of each within his ‘third way’. Firstly, we turn our attention to the 
concept of civil society.  
 
Civil Society in history – its relationship to the ‘third way’ 
 
The interest by sociologists and political scientists in the linkages between 
voluntary associations and civic engagement (the amalgam of which defines 
civil society) is well established (Tolbert et al. 1998). According to Charles 
Tolbert et al, the principle attribute of democratic society for Tocqueville was 
the ability for the association of citizens and their preparedness for political 
participation through that association (Tocqueville 1862 in Tolbert et al: 405). 
From the sociological perspective, Tolbert asserts, the work of Goldhamer 
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(Goldhamer 1964) (from the early Chicago School), Putnam et al. (1993) and 
Etzioni (1997) view associations as imperative for integration and cohesion 
“... in an otherwise fragmented urban world” (ibid).  To this list we must surely 
add Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1998; Giddens 2000; Giddens 2002). Later 
theorists, according to Tolbert, (particularly Etzioni, Putnam and Giddens) 
refined the earlier compartmentalisation of social and economic spheres (i.e. 
the discrete treatment of both without reference to the other) to synthesise 
both in the study of their relationship integrating the disciplines of sociology, 
political science and economics.  
 
The ‘third way’ is inexorably linked to the notion of civil society. Peter 
Edelman (1999) suggests that “... the third way,.. involves the superiority of 
neither the government nor the corporate sector, but the partnership of both 
with a third force, civil society” (Edelman 1999: 14). He further suggests that 
the ‘third way’ heralds the end of entitlement politics, an end to the 
“something for nothing” philosophy in a belief structure that “... 
(encapsulates) the dynamism of the free market with a commitment to social 
justice” (ibid).  
 
In drawing on the work of Alexis Tocqueville (1835), Chad Goldberg (2001) 
suggests that the ‘third way’ shares affinities with Tocqueville’s theory of 
democracy in that the emphasis on a partnership between government and 
civil society, social investment strategies, and more community-based, 
democratic and participatory welfare programs are shared notions (Goldberg 
2001). Goldberg’s “reconstruction” of Tocqueville does not collapse the 
distinction between risks inherent to the labour process “... and risks that are 
peculiar to an undemocratic organisation of that process, nor is it limited to 
social investment strategies to manage these risks” (Goldberg 2001: 311) 
which would appear to be (in Goldberg’s opinion) in opposition to the ‘third 
way’ view which “... obscures the distinction between risks that are ‘inherent 
in any labour-process’ and those that arise from the social organisation of 
economic activity, thereby making capitalism appear as ‘a second nature, the 
inescapable horizon of social life in the modern world’” (ibid: 312). 
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Antonio Gramsci (1971) referred to civil society as a cultural-economic 
apparatus of ongoing “persuasion” (note the similarity to Giddens). Where he 
digresses from Giddens is that he views civil society in conflict with the state 
(or political society). In Giddens’s view the state has control over civil society 
but to Gramsci the representation of force and coercion explicit to political 
society was in constant conflict with civil society:  
 
“… when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at 
once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there 
stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks” (Gramsci 1971: 
238). 
 
To Gramsci, civil society is the place of ongoing struggle organised around 
voluntary associations, trade unions, churches, schools and NGOs, a 
struggle that clarifies ideological, religious and cultural differences. 
Undergirding both civil society and the state is a socio-economic condition. 
According to Gramsci, the free associations within civil society act to 
neutralise the full force of a state’s authority on personal choice. Therefore, to 
Gramsci, harmony, in the Hegelian sense, occurs as a consequence of a 
balance between the competing aspirations of civil society and the state 
(Gutmann 1998; Rosenblum 1998; Shils, Grosby et al. 1997).  This position 
is not inconsistent with that of Benjamin Barber (1995) and Michael Sandel 
(1996), who view the voluntary association as the nexus between state and 
economy, with civil society constituting the linchpin between personal and 
public identity in the institutional infrastructure of society (see also Soltan and 
Elkin 1999).  
 
The evidence that strong national civil society institutions are directly related 
to effective and sustainable development is compelling (see, for example, 
Edwards 1999 and Uphoff, Esman et al. 1998). Luis Roniger (1998) provides 
a reasonable (and contemporary) working definition of civil society 
suggesting it “... alludes to the existence of organized public life and free 
associations beyond the tutelage of the state, yet oriented towards the public 
sphere and toward influencing public policies” (Roniger 1998: 67). The 
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arenas and sectors vary, according to Roniger, but include social movements 
and voluntary organizations The scrutinising of government through 
citizenship, civil libertarianism and civil participation has historical roots and is 
predicated by a process of struggle and change from the late 18th Century 
(Calhoun 1992; Habermas 1989).   
 
Others have argued that civil society comprises not one, but many public 
spheres and communities and that a focus on institutions should embrace 
overarching symbolic codes and narratives (Alexander and Smith 1993, 
Jacobs and Smith 1997 and Smith 1998). This latter approach, the semiotic 
(or “deep culture”) explanation of civil society development stems from 
particular discursive histories, which result in the inclusion (or not) of those 
deserving, based upon classification. It follows that this process creates 
organisation reliant upon a “... bifurcating discourse of citizen and enemy” 
(Jacobs 1998 in Alexander 1998: 139), which in turn cements a “common 
code” for participants. In this context one can reasonably explain the 
persistence of civil society conceptually across varying political codes: 
opponents of authoritarian regimes use it to denote “rights and liberties” 
associated with liberal democracies; radical democrats use it to signify an 
engaged and active citizenry; libertarians relate it to a market economy; 
communitarians evoke the network of voluntary organizations and the virtues 
they extol (Schmidt 1998) – each political code setting a plot, the characters 
vacillating according to their perception of their role, the enemies exposed.  
 
Bound to the notion of civil society (and NGOs) is the concept of social 
capital. Originating with Bourdieu (1986) who stipulates that social capital is 
the aggregation of “... the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships 
of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu 1986: 248) and taken up by 
James Coleman (1990) and creatively reengineered by Robert Putnam 
(2000) in terms of government performance, the concept is viewed as the 
building block for collective action. Coleman’s concept, similarly, evolves 
from Tocqueville in that he believes that civil society is characterised by an 
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actively engaged and public-spirited citizenry imbued with a sense of trust 
and who reside within egalitarian political relations (Coleman 1990). Put in 
more simple terms, social capital is whatever facilitates individual or 
collective actions (Edwards and Foley 1997). Francis Fukuyama (1996) has 
also taken up this idea of trust (borrowing from Hegel who married the 
concept with “viable ethical life” with “social capital” (Kaufman 1997: 809)) as 
the epicentre of social capital.  
 
In likening Mark Granovetter’s “... concrete personal relations or structures” 
(Granovetter 1985: 490 in Silverman 2001: 244) with Velez-Ibanez’s (1993) 
“bond of mutual trust” (ibid), Robert Silverman (2001) notes the “boundaries” 
of social capital which, he asserts, grounds social capital in an observable 
context and enables social capital to assume many forms “... as it is the 
product of a range of possible values that are embedded in various settings” 
(ibid) – thereby enabling it to be identified when it emerges. As 
embeddedness connotes decreased social capital as personal relations 
become less regularised, Silverman speculates that social capital will be 
more evident in the internal operations of organizations rather than across 
organizations. This is of significance in any discussion on partnerships 
(extended later in this chapter and taken up in Chapter 4).  
 
“Entrepreneurship” as a concept within social capital has been raised by 
Leadbeater and Goss (1998) via the Demos think-tank (Edwards 2001), who 
link the term, according to Charles Edwards, to New Labour thinking on the 
modernisation of public management and a ‘third way’ of constructing private 
and public sector relationships. 
 
Social and community entrepreneurship has been the subject of discussion 
by other commentators (Waddock and Post 1991; Leadbeater 1998), the 
former addressing social entrepreneurs who act as catalysts in changing the 
public sector agenda, the second concerned with community entrepreneurs 
seeking to deliver public policy objectives with public service organizations – 
this latter group who “... harness social capital” (Edwards 2001). 
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In summary thus far of views of civil society in the literature, we conclude 
that: 
 
o There is a synergy between the association of citizens and their 
participation in the political process. 
 
o Strong national civil society is related to effective and sustainable 
development. 
 
o Civil society and social capital are linked. 
 
As foreshadowed, the discussion will now turn to Giddens’ use of the concept 
of civil society within his ‘third way’. 
 
Giddens’ appropriation of civil society in his ‘third way’ 
 
The recasting of the concept of civil society by Giddens (1998: 11-12, 69, 78-
86, 87, 127, 140; 2000: 16, 18-19, 20, 24, 29, 51-52, 56, 63-65, 78, 82, 84, 
164, 123, 147, 157) reignites a discourse, as suggested previously, that 
tracks from Hobbs through Locke to Rousseau and Hegel to Tocqueville 
each of themselves adding to an “... inclusive, umbrella-like concept referring 
to a plethora of institutions outside the state” (Alexander 1998: 3) endowed 
with moral and ethical connotations in its first stage, its dramatic reformation 
under market capitalism in stage two; and evolved to a “universalising 
community” which exemplifies solidarity cast in journalistic and legalist 
“codes” through “public opinion”  (ibid: 97-98).  
 
Giddens asserts that there are “... no permanent boundaries between 
government and civil society” with the notion of civil society being “... a basic 
part of the politics of the third way” (1998: 78). Married with his argument on 
civil society is his view about “community”. Whilst asserting that the concept 
of “community” is not an “abstract slogan” and that “State and civil society 
should act in partnership” he defines “community” as the “practical means of 
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furthering the social and material refurbishment of neighbourhoods, towns 
and larger local areas” (1998: 79). At the same time, he decries the notion of 
“community” in terms of local solidarity implying that such a proposition 
evokes little more than nostalgia. This position would appear to be at odds 
with earlier commentators who link the concept of civil society (and its 
exemplars, NGOs, discussed in the next section) with the characteristics of 
accountability (Edwards, Hulme et al 1996) and policy change (Alverez 1998; 
Keck and Sikkink 1998), both of which imply an active civil society that 
oversights government and keeps it honest as well as contributing to the 
development of social policy.  
 
The disassociation of “community” from civil society would also appear to be 
in conflict with Touqueville’s assertions of a community-like compact being 
elemental to civil society. It would seem that globalisation, according to 
Giddens, conceptually alters the nature of relations between government and 
the community and somehow creates the environment for a differing 
interpretation. In essence, Giddens claims that globalisation requires a 
community focus in order to achieve its aims (through the “downward 
pressure it exerts”) but that the partnership required in the furtherance of 
social renewal (that being the State and civil society working collaboratively) 
requires each partner to both “facilitate” and “control” each other, apparently 
only in terms of the material and social refurbishment of neighbourhoods, and 
not in the context of broader political decision-making. It would be quite 
difficult to conceive of the Hegelian “balance” for civil society and the state to 
be met in these circumstances yet it does appear to endorse the Gramscian 
notion of civil society being used as a mechanism to balance bourgeois 
capitalism.  
 
The ‘third way’ uses mutualism as the conduit to its implementation 
redefining socialist goals in terms of the relations between people (Blair’s 
‘social-ism’) (Latham 1999). According to Latham, the elements of ‘social-
ism’ are strength and trust within communities with the work of the 
community providing the “authority” for the State – this authority growing out 
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of a civil society. He argues that mutual trust amongst citizens engenders 
altruism as well as self-interest with commonly shared values leading to 
collective action, which in turn strengthens civil society – producing 
government of “a different kind”.  
 
Overlaying Giddens’ position on the renewal of social systems is his view on 
economic theory. In rejecting both pre-existing versions of “old” mixed 
economies (the first that advocated the separation of State and private 
interests, the second the “social market”), he opts rather for what he terms 
the “new mixed economy” (1998: 69, 99-100), which he defines as “... a 
synergy between public and private sectors, utilizing the dynamism of 
markets but with the public interest in mind” (1998: 100).  Giddens advocates 
for a decentralised system, which replaces the “welfare state” with the 
“welfare society” (1998: 117) arguing that more localised distribution systems 
should be implemented with programs for the active development of “civil 
society” (1998: 118) with a view to creating a more egalitarian system. This 
review of the welfare state (from an “undemocratic” top-down approach which 
is “... bureaucratic, alienating and inefficient” [1998: 113]), Giddens asserts, is 
not a “... signal to dismantle (it) but as part of the reason to reconstruct it” 
(1998: 113). He continues suggesting that: 
 
Welfare is not in essence an economic concept, but a psychic one, 
concerning as it does well-being.  ……. Not only is welfare generated 
by many contexts and influences other than the welfare state, but 
welfare institutions must be concerned with fostering psychological as 
well as economic benefits. …… counselling, for example might 
sometimes be more helpful than direct economic support (1998: 117). 
 
Again, civil society is recrafted by Giddens towards a style of individual self-
actualisation (with a collective responsibility for its attainment) that de-
emphasises the role of the individual in political processes.  On this issue of 
the role of ‘third way’ politics on individuals Giddens suggests that the ‘third 
way’ exists “... to help citizens pilot their way through the major revolutions of 
our time: globalisation, transformations in personal life and our relationship to 
nature” (1998: 64) preserving a “... core concern with social justice” (1998: 
 68
 
 
65) with an accent upon “no rights without obligations” and “no authority 
without democracy” (1998: 66). He suggests that the emergence of a 
pluralistic population with its importance on individualism and “... lifestyle 
diversity” has created a “’me’ generation” to which both neoliberals and social 
democrats have been unable to respond (1998: 34-35). He notes “post-
materialist values” which imply a changing distribution of values, which, 
according to Giddens, fits “... neither class lines nor the right/left dichotomy” 
(1998: 21). Further he reflects upon the disenchantment of citizens with 
political process (1998: 20-23). In essence, Giddens views “new 
individualism” as a “retreat from tradition and custom” linked to globalisation: 
 
Rather than seeing ours as an age of moral decay, then, it makes 
sense to see it as an age of moral transition. If institutional 
individualism is not the same as egoism, it poses less of a threat to 
social solidarity, but it does mean that we have to look for new means 
of producing that solidarity. Social cohesion can’t be guaranteed by 
the top-down action of the state or by appeal to tradition. ….. We have 
to find a new balance between individual and collective responsibilities 
today (1998: 36-37). 
 
One concludes that modernisation processes have moved away from 
“tradition” to create a revitalised concern for individualism. The idea of 
individualism has, itself, a pervasive nature. As Alexander (1998) and Taylor 
(1989) note, individualism has, at various times, acted as a “moral force”, an 
“institutional fact” and a “set of interactional practices” having a legacy in 
Christianity (with its emphasis on conscience), the Renaissance (“self-
fashioning”), the Reformation (man’s renewed relationship with God), the 
Enlightenment (reason) and Romanticism (“restoration of expressive 
individuality”) (Alexander 1998: 6). These are matters that will be returned to 
in Chapter 6. The accent on individualism by Giddens is an interesting one 
and contrasts with the view of Jürgen Habermas (1989) who argues that 
there has been a marked depoliticization of civil society as a result of state 
intervention. The process, by which this occurs, to Habermas, is through the 
loss of rationality for critical debate within an associational environment as 
private institutions are absorbed by the state. This connotes with the state 
taking power away from civil society. Having regard to the Gramscian 
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position, discussed previously, this would require the deliberative 
deconstruction of associational networks such as unions and NGOs. The 
‘third way’ appears to work towards both this deconstruction (note the Blair 
assertion at the Cardiff Convention that unions are “wreckers”ix) and de-
emphasising the contributions by NGOs in favour of new partnerships. This 
latter issue will be raised in the following sections of this chapter. 
 
In summary of Giddens’ view on civil society, we can conclude that: 
 
o Collaboration between civil society and government requires 
facilitation and control each upon the other, but only at a local level 
and mostly in the context of community development.  
 
o Civil society equates with decentralisation, with engagement by civil 
society in broader political decision-making not being supported. 
 
o Individualism based upon a moral order directs the nature of civil 
society, that is, civil society is the collective of individuals rather than a 
community-like compact. 
 
o It is tied to life-style politics and self-actualisation. 
 
We now turn our attention to a mainstay of civil society, the nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), initially interrogating their position in history and then 
placing them within Giddens’ ‘third way’ construct. 
 
 
 
                                                 
ix  As Peter Oborne from The Spectator (2002) points out, the term “wreckers” is one 
favoured by New Labour to describe its political opponents and is one that was used by 
Josef Stalin to describe the kulaks, gypsies, Jews and other ‘undesirable elements’ who 
allegedly sought to block his five year plans. Oborne notes that Stalin executed his 
“wreckers” or sent them to gulags (Oborne 2002: 8). The labelling of unions as “wreckers” 
fits well with Howard Becker’s (1997) theory of outsiders, a matter that will be elaborated 
upon in Chapter 5. Certainly, the characterisation of unions by Blair in this manner would 
never have occurred at a time when the union movement was more powerful. 
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NGOs in history – their relationship to the ‘third way’ 
 
Whilst civil society provides the notional interface between government and 
the community, it is NGOs that provide a functional conduit through which 
these abstract relations may be expressed. 
 
The nongovernmental sector (NGO) has commanded attention in its role in 
areas such as accountability (see Edwards, Hulme et al. 1996); effectiveness 
(Meyer 1995); its relevance to important social movements (see Alvarez 
1998; Arellano-Lopez and Petras 1994; Keck and Sikkink 1998); and civil 
society (see Tvedt 1998).  John Keane (1988) writes of “... non-market non-
state organizations” typified as churches and professional organizations”, as 
“civil society” (Keane, 1988: 20, 12). Alan Wolfe (1989) expands this 
definition by including communities, friendship networks, spontaneous groups 
and movements. NGOs are, therefore, instrumental to ‘third way’ praxis. 
NGOs differ, however, from governments in terms of public purpose. 
According to Henry Hansmann (1996), government has legally defined 
powers nestled in constitutive documentation, acts of Parliament, statutes 
and appropriation laws whereas NGOs exist to benefit society at large. 
Nonetheless, Theda Skocpol et al (1999) suggest that, “... throughout most of 
American history, active democratic government and a vibrant civil society 
centred in federated associations went hand in hand” (Skocpol, Ganz et al. 
1999: 33), a point not lost to Giddens, albeit with a differing methodology for 
their ‘utility’ within ‘third way’ theory (as will become evident later in this 
chapter and in Chapters 5 and 6). Certainly the sheer number of NGOs 
demands attention.  
 
Alex Demirovic (2000), reporting on the Commission on Global Governance, 
notes that the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) grew from 
176 in 1908 to around 29000 in 1993 with a membership in the 1980s of 
about 100 million persons (Demirovic 2000), (see also Drabek 1987; Salmon 
1994; Simmons 1998), making them a highly significant political and social 
force.  At the same time, Alan Fowler (2000) suggests that the period during 
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the 1950s and 1960s moved NGOs away from a concern borne out of 
compassion for those who were suffering to a motivation towards 
development as a political project. His thesis rests on the proposition that 
processes of decolonisation informed this change in that the ideas that 
informed anti-colonial and liberation thinking within NGOs were outgrown. In 
terms of the current research it will be argued that there now may be a 
resurfacing of colonisation utilising NGOs as tools for its implementation. This 
matter will be elaborated upon in Chapters 5 and 6. Certainly, the idea of 
NGOs forming part of a political project is anathema to ‘third way’ 
implementation, a matter that will be developed later in this chapter and 
pursued in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
Under globalisation this emergent NGO structure is, to Demirovic, not bound 
by the institution of the NGO per se, “... but rather their social function in an 
altered historical context, their political role, and the new expectations of 
them” (Demirovic 2000: 135). As a consequence, NGOs as a direct result of 
their interlinked and transnational operations contribute to the recreation of 
civil society in their own right – in some respects an almost state character is 
assumed by NGOs. This proposition is not inconsistent with the Gramscian 
notion of civil society as an element of an expanded state – NGOs become 
the apparatus via private initiative for the continuation of the state. In 
circumstances where inequality exists, it is within civil society that lifestyle 
choices and goals are generalised through a hegemonic struggle between 
the categories in which the social system is believed to belong – the “shared 
reality of social actors” which delineates the private and the public. The 
struggle is, in essence (and according to Demirovic), assumed through the 
dialogue of unequal forces where “... a consensus is established about 
collectively shared social relations, which include the political institutions 
where short-term conflicts can be resolved and long-term goals (e.g. stable 
expectation horizons) can be pursued” (Demirovic 2000: 137). 
 
It is noted that in spite of fairly vigorous discourse in the literature on NGOs, 
there are limited detailed studies of what NGOs do in specific contexts, nor 
how the activity of NGOs impacts on power relations within their spheres of 
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activity (see Fisher 1997). This issue of power sharing is significant to this 
discussion in that the concept of partnership as a paradigm for development 
rests upon the principles of equity and mutual benefit (International Council 
for Voluntary Agencies 1992; Kajese 1987). Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke 
(2000) note from recent analyses of social movements that they are 
characterised by a complex set of interrelationships and conflicts between “... 
actors in civil society and actors within the state” (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 
260). These conflicts become significant within the ‘third way’ model, which 
seeks to contain dissent for the purpose of political government at all costs 
(Chapter 5). 
 
In recommending that NGOs should be “policy entrepreneurs” whose primary 
mission should be advocating for social change, Adil Najam (1997) presents 
confrontation (against government policy), complementary (development with 
government) and supplementary (arrangements with government) as the 
strategies of pursuit for NGOs (Najam 1997 in Young 2000: 150). In this 
model supplementary outcomes presume that nongovernmental 
organizations fill a void created by government in terms of demands for 
public goods and services (which implies, in Dennis Young’s analysis, “... an 
inverse relation with government expenditure” (ibid) whereby increased 
provisioning by government leads to a corresponding decrease in the need 
for private financing) (note also the work of Weisbrod [1977] in addressing 
government “failure” in this area); complementary relations are those that 
exhibit a “partnership” arrangement between nongovernmental organizations 
and government whereby a direct relationship exists in the delivery of public 
goods by nongovernmental organizations, financed by government (note also 
the work of  Salamon 1995); adversarial (or confrontation) approaches are 
those taken by nongovernmental organizations to “prod” government on 
matters of public policy.  As will become evident, in Chapters 5 and 6, ‘third 
way’ administrators do not sanction these adversarial approaches. 
 
In an expansion of Najam’s work, Dennis Young explores the role of 
economic and social factors in the development of differing forms of 
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nongovernmental-government relationships arguing that the three streams 
are not mutually exclusive (and are all based upon rational choice models in 
economics), suggesting that nongovernmental organizations can “... finance 
and deliver services where government does not, deliver services that are 
financed or otherwise assisted by government, advocate for changes in 
public policy and practices and be affected by governmental pressure and 
oversight”, (Young 2000: 151). 
 
Young’s considerations provide an enabling environment for the new mixed 
economy to which Giddens refers. It should be borne in mind, however, that 
the nature of this relationship (be it bilateral or multilateral between the for-
profit corporations and the NGOs) in terms of praxis requires analysis – the 
basis of this thesis. It is being suggested that there is an historical 
progression for these relationships that finds momentum in the laissez-faire 
market environment of the neoliberal administrations of George Bush and 
Margaret Thatcher during the 1980s (discussed in a previous section) to the 
redefined inclusiveness proposed by the ‘third way’. Not unlike the refinement 
of argument for social democracy (as articulated by Giddens), NGOs are 
being reassessed in terms of their “utility” (again, in economic terms) rather 
than for their advocacy or adversarial role (either for historical constituencies 
or against government policy).  Such a fundamental shift in logic behoves a 
more clearly articulated discussion centred on these relationships. 
 
Whilst suggesting that a tripartite arrangement (which is inclusive of NGOs 
with government and the market) is a “mirage” (according to Grzybowski 
[2000]), the Edelman study (2001), Strategy One, lends some weight to the 
proposition of including such Agencies for the purpose of their own legitimacy 
(consider, for example, the inclusion of Earthshare [an environmental arm of 
United Way – a nongovernmental organisation in the United States] in an 
American Airlines strategy) (Anonymous 2001[d]: 6). Such a proposal is 
endorsed by Michael Edwards, who, whilst stating that NGOs are “... self-
selected, unaccountable and poorly rooted in society” (Edwards et al 2000 in 
Johns 2000: 30), nonetheless suggests that they should be involved in a 
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“new deal” involving them with government in global governance – a new 
deal that gives NGOs a voice, not a vote; minimum standards for NGO 
integrity and performance; and, a level playing field for NGO involvement – 
thus echoing Giddens’ approach.  
 
According to Fowler (2000), the present scenario for NGOs is one in which 
their former motivations and legitimacy are ending in favour of market 
discourse – where the homogenising forces of economic globalisation 
establish the normative modes of individualism, competitiveness, exploitation 
and rivalry between “... people and between people and nature” (Fowler 
2000: 644). Ironically this progression for NGOs nurtures the destabilising of 
social relations and, according to Fowler, erodes social capital, undermines 
values such as trust, reciprocity, mutuality, cooperation and tolerance of 
difference – the antithesis to that which the ‘third way’ proponents (including 
Giddens) promulgate. Fowler is also concerned about the effects in the 
accumulation of power within a few corporations. 
 
In summary of the literature on NGOs, we note that: 
 
o They exist in significant numbers to advance the “public purpose”. 
 
o They have developed a political project since the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
o Studies on power relations engaging NGOs are limited. 
 
o They assume various roles to complement, supplement or confront 
government policy and practice. 
 
The discussion will now iterate Giddens’ usage of NGOs within his ‘third 
way’. 
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Giddens appropriation of NGOs in his ‘third way’ 
 
Giddens uses NGOs and other similar issues-oriented groups to argue a 
position for holistic “governance”: “Agencies which either are not part of any 
government – nongovernmental organizations – or are transnational in 
character contribute to governance” (1998: 33); “NGOs and other 
associations of citizens surely will play a part in politics on a continuing basis 
… Governments have to be ready to learn from them” (1998: 53); “There is 
already global governance and there already is global civil society …. NGOs 
have taken up the rallying call” (1998: 140-141). Note, however, the benign 
role given by Giddens (to NGOs) to monitor corporate activity globally for the 
purpose of sanctioning businesses to reduce their profits when they 
(corporations) infringe on, for example, ecological needs (2000: 144-145).  
 
Giddens issues warnings about such organizations to government: “Markets 
cannot replace government in any areas, but neither can social movements 
or any kinds of non-governmental organisation (NGO), no matter how 
significant they have become (writer’s emphasis)” (1998: 48); “… the idea 
that such groups (NGOs) can take over where government is failing, or can 
stand in place of political parties, is fantasy” (1998: 53). One cannot escape 
the inevitable schism that emerges from such disparateness of argument, 
particularly in the context of the notion of “partnership” and in the context of 
“civil society” that he promotes. Whilst he does qualify his concern through 
the panacea of “government” responsibilities (1998: 47), the “responsibility” 
for free associations of like-minded people (through NGOs and issues-
oriented organizations) to address such matters is to be curtailed or 
restrained. These would include such issues as divergent interest 
representation, reconciliation, the opening and debate on policy issues, the 
fostering of social peace through articulated discussions on policing and law 
enforcement, debate on matters of law and legislation and the reasoned 
development of norms and values. These are matters that are inherent to 
free associations. This is a dramatic departure from Tocqueville. Giddens 
speaks of “Challenger Parties”, those who “attack orthodox parties directly”, 
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who “flex their muscles” (1998: 50-51) and who operate from a “sub-politics” 
position – these movements arise from the free association of citizens, one 
would have assumed, where government “failure” was becoming problematic 
to their collective interests – the “green movement” with its concern about 
ecology would be one such area that Giddens refers to at length (1998: 54-
63, 67). One is left to ponder which NGOs would find favour in a model 
espoused by Giddens – presumably these would be “welfare delivery” 
organizations, which by conventional or historical definition would be religious 
in nature and bound to government by virtue of their distribution role rather 
than by any sense of ideological “rightness” borne of reasonable discourse 
that would seek to advocate for legislative or political change on behalf of 
dispossessed or aggrieved constituencies (note observations about “political 
activism” referenced in the Chapter 5).  
 
To summarise Giddens’s view of NGOs, we note that: 
 
o They contribute to governance. 
 
o Nonetheless, they cannot take over the role of government. 
 
o In contrast to the dominant theme in the literature, they should be 
engaged only in non-political, non-advocacy functions. 
 
We have already seen glimpses of the proposition that the vehicle for ‘third 
way’ implementation is the partnership. The discussion will now centre upon 
the concept of partnership. As with the other two armatures, the position of 
partnerships in history will be initially reviewed. 
 
Partnerships in history – their relationship to the ‘third way’ 
 
The concept of “partnership” has its roots in business law. Beckett (2000) 
defines partnership as “... a cooperative, profit-motivated effort of living, 
breathing people” (Beckett 2000: 195). In public administration literature the 
 77
 
 
usage of the term is not consistent and may be used as a “... euphemism for 
dispersing or shifting responsibility, a type of agency relationship, and a 
technique” (ibid 196).  
 
Sheri Berman (1998) sees partnerships as a management strategy for the 
achievement of goals (Berman 1998), whilst others such as DiIulio (1994) 
see its usage as a method of reducing government (DiIulio and Brookings 
1994). Edelman questions the nature of the “partnership” and the division of 
responsibility fearing an abdication of government’s responsibility to “... an 
amorphous group of people and institutions in the private sector” (Edelman 
1999: 14). The literature is expanding on partnerships (Huxham and Vangen 
1996) on the complexity of managing inter-organisational relationships; 
(Tilson et al 1997) on their impact on community involvement and 
participation; and on the domination by business and private sector interests 
within partnerships and their correspondingly questionable commitment to 
the social objectives of partnerships (Martin 1998). 
 
In the context of partnering within the social/political context Starr (1990) 
suggests that rather than struggling to redefine the boundaries between 
public and private, partnering works to “blur” them (Starr 1990), suggesting 
further that the creation of an “... elaborate overlay of administrative law on 
public sector activity, and a burgeoning (of) regulatory apparatus to protect 
the public interest from the private ones” was designed specifically to inhibit 
cooperative ventures” (which can be extrapolated to NGOs) (Starr 1990 in 
Linder 1999: 36). Brian Jacobs (1997) suggests that the resultant partisan 
alignments are “... contests over the hegemony of one sector over the other” 
(Jacobs 1997 in Linder 1999: 36). Collaboration theorists suggest key 
facilitating factors for effective partnerships as: the development of trust 
amongst the parties (Ring and Van De Ven 1994); cooperative interpersonal 
relationships; and behaviours such as active communication, mutual 
influence and joint learning (Lewis 1998, in  Ashman 2001:  78).  
 
The promotion of a partnership project engaging NGOs with government 
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along economic rational lines can be seen during the late 1980s under 
Thatcher in the United Kingdom (Deakin and Edwards 1993, Hastings 1996). 
More than a decade earlier, Stephen Linder (1999) suggests partnerships 
were deployed in the United States (federally) as “... the epitome of a new 
generation of management reforms, especially suited to the contemporary 
economic and political imperatives for efficiency and quality” (Linder 1999: 
35). Dennis Young (2000) believes that the application of a  “complementary 
lens” is useful to consider in relation to government / nongovernmental 
relations in the United States during the post World War 2 period (which 
coincides with the proliferation of NGOs and the era of neo-liberalism leading 
to the ‘third way’) arguing that this was a period in which government sought 
to deal with social agendas without expanding its own structure following 
upon a period in that jurisdiction during the mid 20th Century when a style of 
“welfare state” emerged in which government “partnered” with NGOs not only 
in the provision of welfare services but also in the arts, education, health, 
environment and other fields (Young 2000).  
 
In advancing the historical antecedents charted by Deakin and Edwards, 
Hastings and Linder, John Clarke and Janet Newman (1997) note the 
development of a “transformational project” in the UK, whereby conservative 
administrations (late 1980s to early 1990s) sought to erode the distinction 
between the state and the private sector in terms of service provision thereby 
reshaping historically bound concepts of governance. They further argue that 
this project was less about organisational change as it was about attitudinal 
(and practice) change (Clarke and Newman 1997 in Hastings 1999) – a 
matter taken up in the late 1990s by Giddens. 
  
In her research Marilyn Taylor (1998) suggests that there is a rhetoric of 
partnerships that doesn’t match reality – that barriers exist that impede both 
the relatively inexperienced community organisation but also the excluded.  
In her analysis she opts for March and Olsen’s “garbage can” theories of 
decision-making, noting that strategies require flexibility in dealing with 
unstable balances and which exploit the tensions in policy making. Further 
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she argues that policy change is likely to occur when there are “insiders” and 
“outsiders” in tandem with the development of social capital. Finally she 
asserts that a fresh approach to concepts of representation based upon 
citizenship rather than consumerism is required. Clearly there are significant 
and unresolved issues at play in relation to partnership arrangements. 
 
This is a view shared by Annette Hastings (1999) who asserts that research 
into multi-sectoral partnerships, particularly in relation to power relations, is 
lacking.  Whilst research is in evidence with respect to the effectiveness of 
regeneration and the improvement of policy outcomes (see for example 
Geddes, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living Conditions 
1997), and “empowerment” of community partners in terms of the processes 
of partnerships (note Hastings, McArthur et al. 1996 and Atkinson and Cope 
1997). Hastings argues that studies have fundamentally ignored issues of 
power in partnership relations specifically in terms of influence and resistance 
between the range of stakeholders “... including central and local 
government, community and voluntary groups, private sector organizations 
and government-funded quangos” (Hastings 1999: 91). Stuart Hall et al. 
(1996) do, however, provide taxonomy of partnerships based upon the 
“control” by the dominant partner (Hall, Birmingham et al. 1996). Such 
analyses are highly relevant to the current research. 
 
Following upon the work of Clarke and Newman (1997), previously discussed 
(and Deakins and Edwards [1993]), Hastings elaborates that “partnership” 
can be understood as part of the “transformational project” (and therefore 
political in nature) whereby “... government support … may derive as much 
from the presumed capacity of partnerships to challenge and change the 
bureaucratic nature of public agendas, as it does from the anticipated 
efficiency and effectiveness” (Hastings 1999: 91). In effect, “transformation” 
can become a new aspect of the “... micro-politics of power relations within 
partnership” (ibid: 92) in which active (and at times conflicting) collaborations 
can lead to culture changes. The adoption of a “partnership” concept by 
government, of itself, can infer political advantage (in purely politically 
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determined outcomes) in terms of the perception of government working 
collaboratively with the community (Begg: 1994; 1998; 2000 – in unpublished 
notes).  
 
In conclusion to his Study on a “City Challenge” Project in London, Peter 
Smith (1995) notes that “... too many interpretations and understandings of 
partnership give rise to conflict, competition, distrust and scepticism .. 
(Competition) compounded (an)… imbalance of power and money which 
created a climate where voluntary agencies are likely to be less interested in 
creating partnerships and more interested in ensuring their organisational 
survival and the flow of resources” (Smith and Rochester 1995: 14). Fowler 
(1998) is suspicious of the term “partnership” believing that its initial usage in 
the 1970s (as premised upon moral and political solidarity) has been usurped 
and has become devoid of what exactly is meant (Fowler 1998). Likening 
current “partnerships” in the South to the “social contracts” in Europe and 
Canada, Fowler argues that as a framework partnerships provide an 
“innocuous cover” for a deliberative process that reconfigures relations 
across different societies into the same mould, a flawed notion that ignores 
individual historical trajectory (Fowler 2000). 
 
In summary of the literature on partnerships, we can conclude that: 
 
o Their more recent promotion surfaces with the rise of neo-liberal 
administrations in the 1980s. 
 
o This development eroded distinctions between the state and private 
sector in the provision of services. 
 
o Barriers exist that impede the praxis of partnerships. 
 
o Research into power relations between partnership members is 
lacking. 
 
We will now briefly review the Giddens’ approach to partnerships.  
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Giddens appropriation of partnerships in his ‘third way’ 
 
As has been previously noted in the preamble to this chapter, Giddens 
references the use of the term partnership without specifically defining its 
usage or intended method for application. This deficiency will be dealt with 
both in the context of the literature review and respondent perceptions (the 
latter to be dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6). The use of the term “partnership” 
by Giddens appears liberally throughout his publications (whether directly or 
inferred through his concept of the “new mixed economy”): (1998: 33, 48, 53 
[specifically]; 69, 99-100 [on the “... synergy between public and private 
sectors”], 78-86, 127, 140 [in relation to civil society] 140-41; 2000: 123, 144, 
157 [generally]; 52, 119-120, 165 [on his “new social contract”]; 51 [on “key 
areas of power”] 20 [on public/private interface]; 2002:  79 [on devolution of 
power], 56-58, 60, 63-64). He does not, however, provide procedures for 
partnership deployment nor address the issues that arise as a consequence 
of that deployment.  
 
In some respects, the use of the term partnership for Giddens is unequivocal. 
Consider its usage in relation to his “new mixed economy” where he asserts, 
“Government can act in partnership with agencies in civil society to foster 
community renewal and development” (1998: 69), alluding to the “new” role 
for partnerships in a decentralised and local mode. Whilst not extrapolating 
on the process required for this “renewal and development” to occur, it could 
be argued that there is a degree of self-evidency that attaches to that 
process. In other areas though, there is an ambiguity both in terms of 
definition and lack of process. His umbrella thesis for partnership is that 
“government and civil society (should work) in partnership” (1998: 79). What 
does this mean? Regrettably we (or more importantly, governments 
responsible for implementation) have to assume meaning  - which is a 
dangerous proposition to say the least. On the important issue of crime, 
Giddens asserts: “In order to work, partnerships between government 
agencies, the criminal justice system, local associations and community 
organizations have to be inclusive” (1998: 88). This is a fine parenthood 
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statement but offers little by way of praxis. At another point in his publication 
he speaks of “persuasion” (1998: 87, also discussed elsewhere in this thesis) 
as a device to engage local citizens to act against miscreants. The latitude 
for vacillation between extreme right and extreme left interpretations of this 
notion of “persuasion” becomes extremely problematic. 
 
The failure by Giddens to provide the taxonomy necessary for partnership 
implementation lends weight to negative arguments against his ‘third way’ 
within the literature, specifically with respect to power relations between 
partnership members. One could speculate, with Fowler, that the political 
project of NGOs during the 1950s and 1960s and the electoral successes of 
the green movement during the 1980s (that Giddens believed denied social 
democratic parties government across Europe) created sufficient angst 
against certain types of organised groups, including NGOs. This angst is 
reflected in Giddens’ writings (note for example his assertion that 
“[governments]…find themselves outflanked by new social movements” 
[1998: 47]) and extends, by omission, to the relations of such groups 
(historically) in partnership arrangements with government that traditionally 
dealt with social justice issues, at least within social democratic styled 
governments. Should Fowler be correct that the former motivations for 
partnership engagement (by NGOs) has moved towards acquiescence to 
market forces, then one would expect to see this reflecting in Giddens’ 
writings – which is indeed the case, as cited previously “...the new mixed 
economy looks instead for a synergy between public and private sectors, 
utilizing the dynamism of markets but with the public interest in mind” (1998: 
99-100). As noted, Giddens promotes a model for partnerships that is devoid 
of operational substance for local level engagement. This model appears to 
exclude organised groups such as trade unions, the media and NGOs (the 
media are not even mentioned). A directive for partnerships that appears to 
define areas for discreet engagement (within market ideology, for example) 
to the exclusion of broader political issues has the capacity to contain debate 
and potentially act to neutralise those organised groups who otherwise would 
have been protagonists for progressive government policy within civil society.  
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By default, a new range of potential new partners emerge from within local 
communities whose agendas are not global in perspective and who therefore 
present as a lesser risk to government. The questions raised by Giddens flag 
the potential demise of specific interest NGO groups: “What happens when 
local activist groups have very different versions of the community’s future? 
Who decides where ‘the community’ ends and others begin?” (1998: 85)  The 
outreach by organised groups obliged recognition by Giddens, yet it would 
seem that the style of partnership promoted by him in his ‘third way’ similarly 
demanded a reorientation of partnership negotiations away from policy 
development by government per se and towards benign local regeneration 
projects (for example consider Giddens’ view that “The renewal of deprived 
communities presumes the encouragement of economic enterprise as a 
means of generating a broader civic recovery” [1998: 82]). The adoption of a 
neo-liberal framework that expropriates the political values of NGOs 
(historically the major partner with government) towards policy 
entrepreneurship (in Najam’s terms) begins in the 1980s and is substantially 
borrowed by Giddens in the 1990s.  
 
The “mirage” of inclusive partnership that Grzbowski asserts finds a position 
within the Giddens’ scenario – Caveat NGOs indeed, at least in terms of their 
former motivations. The inhibition of cooperative ventures at a local level 
occurs with the bureaucratic “burgeoning”, in Starr’s terms, which may serve 
to distract partnerships from a concern with government policy-making – 
perhaps an intended outcome. In line with Taylor’s view, the paucity of 
procedural definition by Giddens relegates the notion of partnership to 
“rhetoric” with considerable barriers in evidence to impede partnership 
development, a point that will surface progressively throughout this thesis. It 
would seem that the idea that partnerships could be cooperative and 
inclusive without a defined contractual relationship (in line with business law, 
for example) and without power relations being specifically determined (in 
line with Hasting’s assertions) is flawed. According to Hall et al (1996), such 
omissions invariably lead to “control” by a dominant partner over others. 
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In summary of the literature on Giddens’ view of partnerships, we can 
conclude that: 
 
o The term is liberally used throughout his writings yet is not 
accompanied by a corresponding set of procedural protocols. 
 
o Partnerships within local communities are supported in the quest for 
community renewal and development at the expense of the broader 
political project. 
 
o Significant partnership players such as unions, NGOs and the media 
are excluded from the formulation. 
 
o Some might say his definition skews power relations and that the lack 
of procedural definition opens the door for power abuse. 
 
In summary of part 2, it can be established from the literature that: 
 
o The ‘third way’ is inexorably linked to the armature of civil society, 
NGOs and partnerships. 
 
o The construct of civil society invokes the Touquevillian synergy of 
associations of citizens with government, but that Giddens’ treatment 
narrows the responsibility of civil society in practice to the furtherance 
of material and social refurbishment of neighbourhoods at the expense 
of political engagement generally. 
 
o The exemplars of civil society, NGOs, representing a broadly based 
constituency are characterised by their constructive set of 
interrelationships and conflicts between civil society and the state, but 
that, under a Giddens model, they should not engage in political 
debate that would interfere with government. 
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o Partnership relations between civil society and government that 
engage NGOs are unclear in that power relations are undefined as are 
other procedural mechanisms for their deployment. Giddens is mute 
on this subject. 
 
Conclusions (Part 2) 
 
This part of the chapter interrogated the literature on that “armature” that, 
appear to be elemental to the praxis for the ‘third way’, those being civil 
society, NGOs and partnerships. This interrogation has been informed by a 
cursory historical iteration of this “armature” considered against an 
assessment of their use within ‘third way’ theory. Each of this armature has 
an historical basis. Drawing from Tocqueville’s theory of democracy, civil 
society was shown to be a partnership between government and civil society. 
The Giddens’ reconstruction of civil society appears to negate the distinction 
between risks that are inherent to the labour process and those that surface 
consequent upon economic activity, thereby elevating capitalism to become 
the typical manifestation of social life. In so doing the community-like 
compact of Tocqueville gives way, under the Giddens model, to a notion 
whereby political decision-making is removed from civil society in favour of 
social and material regeneration decision-making at a local level. The 
development of NGOs with broad constituencies that historically recreate civil 
society in their own right gives way to a sector that is meant not to be political 
nor interfere with government, under the ‘third way’. Finally we considered 
the construct of partnerships which is relatively new but which formalises, 
from the literature, the process by which government and civil society 
interact. Whilst Giddens refers to partnerships and their necessity within ‘third 
way’ theory, he fails to articulate the processes by which partnership relations 
are negotiated or sustained.  
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Chapter Conclusions: the need for data 
 
What emerges from the literature is a process called the ‘third way’ that 
appears ill-defined and contestable but which purports to reconcile the 
competing interests of the left/right, social democracy/neo-liberal divide. The 
literature abounds with examples in history where writers have sought to find 
this median point. All have failed or have been proven wanting by history. 
The Giddens model has, however, found support from political leaders in the 
Western world. Those who support this ‘third way’ are as vigorous in their 
defence of the model as those who oppose it. Although emerging from within 
the left of politics as a synthesis of both the left and the right, the ‘third way’ 
appears to borrow more substantially from neo-liberal ideology than from 
social democracy. In these circumstances it is a model that is likely to be 
favoured by both ends of the political spectrum, a matter demonstrated by 
recent ‘third way’ incursions by neo-liberal administrations.  
 
Further, there appears to be two ‘third way’ types, one emanating from the 
United States, and one specific to the Continent. What these two types seem 
to have in common, in the political arena, is they have been apparently 
embraced consequent upon a concern about the lack of electoral success by 
formerly social democratic governments and a potential method for reversing 
this trend. If we accept the arguments of some, the aetiology for this 
pragmatic stream of thought - that is the ‘third way’ - has its beginnings under 
the leadership of Prime Ministers Hawke and Keating in Australia. These 
leaderships recognised the need to contemporise Labor Party politics fearing 
the consequences of “capital flight” from Australia in the absence of a degree 
of compliance to free market forces. According to some this recognition was 
not based upon intellectual discourse but rather upon political necessity in an 
almost ad hoc manner.  
 
The core features that emerge from the ‘third way’ philosophy are its 
implementation strategies - its armature - that have been defined as civil 
society, NGOs and partnerships. The literature would suggest that the 
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application of the concepts by Giddens might be at odds, in some 
circumstances, with aspects of historical development for each. The synergy 
implicit between the association of citizens and their engagement in the 
political process, for example, is not necessarily matched by a corresponding 
view by Giddens. The issue that arises is whether the application of this 
armature in practice enhances Touqueville’s theory of democracy or whether 
the opposite is the case; that is whether the implementation of ‘third way’ 
policies lives up to expectations. Furthermore, it is important to understand 
whether its armature has been reoriented towards a model of control of 
citizens or towards their liberation. To answer this question we can start by 
inquiring of those responsible for its implementation in practice whether they 
understand the concept and what impacts, if any, implementation is having 
for their constituencies.  
 
Certainly, the relationship of underlying theory to practice needs exploration. 
Whilst the critics clearly are in dispute on the merits of the theory for the ‘third 
way’, and given that the model may prove to be transportable across political 
ideologies (and thereby further affirm third wave praxis), data on the practice 
of the ‘third way’ is needed to substantiate a position one way or the other, 
particularly as this movement gathers momentum. The following chapter will 
introduce the methods by which this information will be garnered from 
respondents, and data analysed.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
The Research Method – Approach and Process   
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will give expression to the theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings that inform the research. Data will be introduced in the 
following chapter, and subsequent chapters. As a consequence, an 
explication of the approach and process in method that will inform the 
investigation is necessary at this point. 
 
This project sought to determine the impacts of this ‘third way’ in practice, to 
explain how the phenomenon is constructed, articulated and implemented by 
significant social actors.  The data derived from these actors comes from 
their engagement in four research sites across the world and encapsulates 
their views, their concerns, their opinion of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the processes personified in their work and contingent upon a ‘third way’ 
implementation. Further, their opinion for the propensity for ‘third way’ 
philosophy to transmogrify across governance types was interrogated. As 
socially constructed actions, these views required a methodological and 
theoretical position into which a consistently applied qualitative approach can 
be established.   
 
This research explored the methods by which ‘third way’ praxis occurs within 
a social justice programming and behavioural context utilising the constructs 
of civil society and partnerships to engage government-civil responsiveness. 
In-depth qualitative interviewing (providing an option for absolute anonymity) 
utilised opened ended questions and otherwise unstructured interviewing of 
lead (or elite) members of each corner of the partnership matrix (government, 
NGOs, community, business). This was complemented by an historical 
 The ‘third way’: Inclusion at a cost
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overview, analysis of political structures and comprehensive literature review 
across the relevant areas of research.  
 
This investigation was undertaken in an environment where partnership 
dealings were likely to be ill-defined, relations between constituent members 
may be strained or where economic or social considerations may otherwise 
inhibit disclosure by respondents. As a multi-site study, variations were 
anticipated in terms of implementation of what may be perceived as similar 
interventions that are nonetheless ‘third way’ influenced.  Notwithstanding, 
the research is not one that explores the whole ‘third way’, merely the 
perceptions of significant respondents in relation to elements of the 
phenomenon. 
 
Constructivism and interpretivism in the context of critical theory have 
considerably informed this research. Constructivism and interpretivism in 
tandem provide the impetus for theoretically explaining the relationship of 
respondent opinions and worldviews within the context of the social 
interactions that inform them (Crotty 1998; Schwandt 1998), whilst a critical 
theory approach sought to inform these opinions and worldviews in the 
broader context of a social critique.  
 
A General Rationale for Qualitative Analysis Approach 
 
An important goal of social sciences, as much as with the other sciences, is 
to build knowledge (Worrall 2000). Whilst the worlds of the qualitative and 
quantitative researcher may be significantly distanced, both seek to add to 
the knowledge base. 
 
The conceptualisation of research implies the development of knowledge 
involving “... the gradual reduction of uncertainty” (Sofaer 1999: 1103) which 
is, in Shoshanna Sofaer’s view, attained by a careful consideration of the 
questions posed, the range of potential answers and to whom those 
questions are raised. According to Abraham Kaplan (1964) a higher level of 
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confidence through enquiry, based upon this process, moves the research 
from the context of discovery to the context of justification (Kaplan 1964 in 
Sofaer 1999: 1103) as the level of confidence that all potential questions (as 
understanding increases) have been asked and all potential answers have 
been exhausted. Sofaer notes that qualitative inquiry is useful in the context 
of developmental and historical processes within institutions, communities 
and markets in that it entails a process that enhances both the capacity to 
describe events and “... to understand how and why the ‘same’ events are 
often interpreted in a different, sometimes even conflicting manner, by 
different stakeholders” (Sofaer 1999: 1106). This proposition is particularly 
incisive in the context of the current research where the perspectives and 
interactions among multiple stakeholders were sought to inform policy 
making and policy implementation.  
 
As Frank Hagan (2000) observed of qualitative researchers, “... (they) hope 
to immerse themselves in the subject matter and develop ‘sensitising 
concepts’ that enhance their understanding and explanation of reality” 
(Hagan 2000: 19) or Weberian verstehen or understanding. Using the 
process of analytic induction, or what Charles Ragin (1994) refers to as the 
systematic examination of similarities that seek to develop concepts (Ragin 
1994: 93), qualitative researchers build and advance theories (Worrall 2000: 
359). On the matter of whether to pursue qualitative or quantitative methods 
some suggest the persuasiveness of both enjoying equal status (eg. King, 
Keohane and Verba [1994] in Worrall 2000: 359), unlike John Worrall, and 
others, (see for example Babbie 1998 and Nagel 1979) who argue that 
qualitative research enjoys a “secondary” position within the research arena 
in that it sets the scene for quantitative analysis. However, some 
phenomena, “including historical events” are inherently unique and by the 
time they can be quantified, they have either changed or disappeared (Sofaer 
1999: 1102).  
 
Michael Patton (1997) argues that qualitative work supports an 
understanding of complex, dynamic, and multi-dimensional ‘wholes’ with a 
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“theory of action” (Patton 1997 in Sofaer 1999: 1115). Certainly, in the 
context of the present research where complex political, economic and social 
agendas across and between levels of government, civil society and 
business converge, intersect and conflict, a methodological approach that 
seeks to create a multi-dimensional “whole” (or understanding), in line with 
Patton’s assertion, is required. At the same time, to borrow from Clive Seale 
(1998) an appreciation of the complexities of language in use can guard 
against the simplistic notion that the interview is an unproblematic window on 
the social world. Conversely, interviewees are usually constrained to make 
their accounts relate to reality. Examining how interviewees deploy different 
versions of reality should not blind us to the fact that only certain versions are 
likely to be plausible (ibid: 215-216). 
 
The use of interpretative, naturalistic and qualitative methods in research is 
widely canvassed in the literature (e.g. Labianca, Gray and Bass 2000, 
Lincoln and Guba 1985, Marshall and Rossman 1999, Yin 1994). The goal of 
“good” qualitative research is to “... identify clear and consistent patterns of 
phenomena by a systematic process” (Marshall and Rossman 1999: 140), 
having regard to the criteria of internal and external validity, reliability and 
objectivity (Winn 2001). According to Yvonna Lincoln and Egon Guba (1985), 
the “trustworthiness” of systematic approaches in qualitative research is 
assured by attention to the further criteria of credibility (by maintaining a 
chain of evidence), transferability (matching the intent of the methodology for 
the research to theory building), dependability, and confirmability (these latter 
two refer to the precision of the data, their interpretation, evidence building, 
inquiry audits and so forth to enhance the accuracy of the interpretation 
(Lincoln and Guba 1985 in Winn 2001: 142). Monika Winn, in speaking on 
Robert Yin (1994), suggests that prerequisite to these criteria is the 
maintenance of transparent, explicit and retrievable sets of records, a case 
study database (of all types of data gathered) and a case study protocol 
(ibid).  
 
Trust, at a microscopic level (face-to-face interviewing as proposed in the 
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current research), is argued to flow from pre-existing professional and 
personal relationships between the researcher and respondents, according to 
Seale, in much the same way as participant observation would be expected 
to elicit (Seale 1998). The mutuality of this transaction (intimacy of personal 
interaction) borrows from Oakley’s (1981) view that “... personal involvement 
is more than just a dangerous bias – it is the condition under which people 
come to know each other and to admit others into their lives” (Oakley 1981: 
41, 58). 
 
Interpretivism and Constructivism and its relationship to Critical 
Theory: The theoretical orientation 
 
Constructivism and Interpretivism 
 
The proposition that meaning demands interpretation is central to both 
interpretivism and constructivism requiring an analysis of people’s actions 
within their life-world (Schwandt 1998). Schwandt elucidates that as these 
meanings are constructed both in the life-world and throughout the research 
process they cannot be separated from each other in spite of the tensions 
that exist between them. His view of social constructivism is that of the 
collective generation of meaning shaped within language and other 
conventions which accords with the interrelatedness of agency and structure 
as the means for alternative life-world engagements (Crotty 1998, see also 
Wolff [1964] and Gadamer [1976; 1979]).  
 
The Pathway for Contextualisation: Critical Theory 
 
In this research the methodological tools of constructivism and interpretivism 
were contextually placed within a critical theoretical framework.  
 
Critical theory is not so much a research method but a worldview that 
encapsulates both an epistemology and a purpose for conducting research. 
Critical theory can be viewed as a complex set of strategies that are united 
by the commonality of sociopolitical purpose (Bernstein 1985; Hoffman, 
1987; Whitford and Lennon 1994). According to Lisa Zanetti (1997) conflict 
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theory has a practical intent, “…to help reveal the socially constructed nature 
of the world, to explain that reified social constructs passing as reality are not 
immutable, and then to transform society as the expression of an 
emancipatory vision” (Zanetti 1997: 148). Mats Alversson and Kaj 
Skèoldberg assert  “…empirical material which points unambiguously toward 
deep structures does not exist” (Alversson and Skèoldberg 2000: 137). As 
Kathryn Rentz comments: 
 
Nevertheless, they believe that critical theory helps counter “... naive 
notions about the neutral nature of research" (p. 145) and about social 
phenomena in general. While critical theorists are, by definition, 
subversive of dominant/dominating cultural paradigms, they 
nevertheless can be said to be epistemologically conservative by dint 
of their faith in the representational power of language (that is, the 
power of language to represent a certain reality "out there”) and in the 
power of the speaking subject (that is, the power of an author to find a 
critical perspective outside dominant paradigms and to control the 
meaning of the language he or she uses (Rentz 2002: 152). 
 
Broadly speaking, critical research can be classified as that which has as its 
major objective social critique, “…whereby the restrictive and alienating 
conditions of the status quo are brought to light” (Klein and Myers 1999: 69). 
Critical research seeks to be emancipatory in that it aims to help eradicate 
the causes of unnecessary alienation and domination, thereby enhancing the 
potentiality for realizing human capacity (Alvesson and Willmott 1992; see 
also Hirschheim et al. 1995).  According to Stanley Deetz (either explicitly or 
implicitly in critical work) there is a purpose in demonstrating and critiquing 
elements of domination, asymmetry, and distorted communication by 
showing how social constructions of reality can favour certain interests with 
alternative constructions being obscured and misrecognised (Deetz 1996: 
202 in Klein and Myers 1999: 77-78). According to Klein and Myers this 
approach goes beyond an understanding of the meaning of the data in that it 
directs the researcher to ‘read’ the social world behind the words of the 
actors which, in their view, is characterised by power structures, vested 
interests and limited resources to meet the goals of various actors who 
construct and enact this social world. This has been the major thrust of this 
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research project. 
Understandings are, nonetheless, generated through a hermeneutic process, 
and therefore entail unresolvable tensions between subject and object, which 
inevitably cannot be separated. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1976; 1979) 
emphasized the embeddedness of language in our understanding of our 
world (note also the work of Paul Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas). Gadamer’s 
work extended philosophical hermeneutics to critical hermeneutics by 
acknowledging the importance of tradition, background, and history to our 
method of understanding (Byrne 2001). Gadamer believed that 
understanding comes from interpretations embedded in our linguistic and 
cultural traditions, which contribute to our inherent prejudice.  
One is inevitably drawn to the Marxian thesis of false consciousness in which 
real interests are sometimes distorted and mystified through ideological 
obfuscation. Wilfred Carr and Steven Kemmis (1986) suggest, through their 
reiteration of Habermas that,  
... [w]hat is required ... is a method that will liberate individuals from 
the causal efficacy of those social processes that distort 
communication and understanding [whether from a positive or 
interpretive reading] and so allow them to engage in the critical 
reconstruction of suppressed possibilities and desires for 
emancipation (Carr and Kemmis 1986: 137),  
which they view as "ideology critique" (p. 138) through reflection and critical 
dialogue. In the current investigation the need to present theory and data 
together through the use of dialogue in a manner consistent with this critical 
reconstruction and “ideology critique” was considered the best approach in 
order to fully explore the possibilities of the data.  
 
The research has utilised key respondents’ observations and insights of the 
‘third way’ to explain the particulars of their own experiences in order that a 
logic (or set of logics) may be extracted that are transportable, relevant and 
with social explanations that have wider resonance. Consistent with William 
“Lawrence” Neuman (2000), an interpretivist perspective that shifts from the 
notion of one truth to recognise the importance of developing an 
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understanding of the experiences, phenomena or processes that are 
contextual and grounded by the knowledge of those who have had the 
experience was applied (Neuman 2000). Further, the poststructuralist 
position in which reality is viewed as a social construction (reflected by 
language) was considered whereby multiple layers, multiple truths and 
multiple voices helped inform contradictory discourses (or stories) and make 
sense of the personal experiences of the respondents (Cheek 1999). Finally, 
the objectification of the data in the context of overarching political, economic 
and social mechanisms, in line with the analysis of the critical theorists, 
provides a critique that will shed light on dominating or alienating conditions 
should they be in evidence. 
 
Sample Selection and Interview Techniques 
 
In this particular research, specific respondents were chosen because of their 
positions, both political and social, within organizations that have an active 
engagement in partnership theory and practice, either (or both) from a 
political or organizational perspective. An “Elite Interviewing” technique (as 
described by Catherine Marshall and Gretchen Rossman (1995: 83) and 
Jerome Platt (1981) was undertaken that targeted individuals who are well 
informed in their fields with specialized information and experience in areas 
of research. This style of respondent is normally inaccessible due to work 
commitments, operating under severe time limitations, thus normally creating 
a major impediment to their availability for research. Many of the key 
respondents who would constitute an “elite” are either known personally to 
the researcher or were accessed as a consequence of a collegial 
connectivity across common fields of endeavour. 
 
Given that the researcher knows a substantial number of these respondents 
(as well as being an active participant in the field of investigation), a degree 
of active reflexivity will be necessary (Mason 1996), a matter dealt with by 
way of a reflexive comment in Appendix 3. As previously indicated, the 
choice of research endeavour was predicted by the researcher’s own 
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worldview and engagement in the nongovernmental sector over many years. 
As such, the researcher is detached neither from the research topic nor from 
the respondents from whom observations have been gleaned. As a 
“knowledgeable social actor” the researcher has invariably created and 
reproduced frames of meaning in conditions not of his choosing (Giddens 
1979). To Giddens, the purpose of understanding these frames of meaning is 
to “... generate descriptions of them that are potentially available to those 
who have not directly participated in them” and that the researcher can 
reinterpret these frames of meaning into the “... technical terminologies 
invented by social scientists” (Giddens: 1982: 13 in Minichiello et.al, 1995: 
181). 
 
The problem of subjectivity leading to bias in data collection and 
interpretation (Zinn 1979: 213), needed to be a consideration of the 
researcher. To do otherwise would validate that observations of outsiders are 
themselves value-free - which of itself suggests that social science is based 
upon a perspective that sees “... the logic of knowledge construction” as 
being neutral (Minichiello 1995: 184). Victor Minichiello asserts further that, 
following Feyerabend, should one accept the view that as all observation is 
“theory-laden”, such a view seems “logically and politically” impossible. It was 
necessary, nonetheless, to guard against assuming meaning to respondents’ 
observations based upon the researcher’s own stance. This has required an 
avoidance of, in Merton’s terms, “... the corrupting influence of group loyalties 
upon the human understanding” (Merton 1972 in Minichiello et.al., 1995: 
185). In these circumstances and whilst there may be some question about 
the “insider” status of the researcher, the role of researcher became that of a 
“stranger” not that of an “outsider” (Simmel 1894 in Minichiello et.al. 1995: 
211). 
 
This research utilised the intimacy of “insiders” (or “elites”) representative of 
the following sectors: four academics; municipal (or local) government (13); 
one provincial (or State) government; two central (or federal) government; 
two unions; nine nongovernmental organizations or non-government sector; 
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one consultant; two business; and one citizen. A list of respondents appears 
as Appendix 1. 
 
Many of these respondents are highly skilled in public relations and have 
expansive knowledge in the content area of investigation. Accordingly, 
priority was given to the utilization of open-ended questions designed to elicit 
a provocative response that enabled them the freedom to explore their 
knowledge. Marshall and Rossman suggest that to do otherwise may 
frustrate the respondent and cause resentment from the “... restrictions of 
narrow or ill-phrased questions” (Marshall and Rossman 1999: 83), a position 
echoed by Lawrence Neuman who cites the misuse of summative yes/no 
questions when formulative questions are deemed more appropriate 
(Neuman 2000:105). A diagrammatic representation of the research design 
will follow at Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Elements of the Research Design 
 
Research Question 
 
1. What does the third way mean in 
practice?  
 
Theoretical Perspective
Interpretivism and 
Constructivism in the 
context of critical theory
• In line with both interpretivism and 
constructivism is the notion that 
meaning requires an understanding of 
the constructed process embedded in 
people’s life-world. 
 
• Consistent with critical theory there is a
social world behind the words of the 
actors which is characterised by power 
structures, vested interests and limited 
resources to meet the goals of various 
actors who construct and enact this 
social world. 
Methodology 
 Social constructivism 
• In this approach the perceptions of 
significant respondents of the 
phenomenon of the third way are 
examined as a practice, i.e. as they 
exist in the everyday life within specific 
contexts and social conditions  
• Interviews with an elite group of 
respondents representative of all  
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Methods 
• Active Elite 
Interviewing – 
including 
deliberative 
confrontational and 
collaborative 
techniques 
• Narrative Analysis 
and Categorization 
• Literature and 
Document Review 
government levels, trade unions, the 
non-government sector, academics 
and significant others, producing 
narratives of perception of the ‘third 
way’ from both a theoretical and 
practical perspective 
• Narrative Analysis producing category-
centered accounts within and across
the interviews 
• Interpretive accounts within a critical 
theory perspective in which these 
accounts will be examined and 
theorized to present a critical 
sociological representation of the ‘third 
way’ 
• Review of social and political systems 
in which respondents reside.
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Collection of Data 
 
Pilot Program 
 
During August of 2001 a pilot program was undertaken in Victoria, Australia. 
This site was selected because a cross-government project, which was 
established by a former provincial (State) government and retained in a 
modified version by a new government, had structural elements and 
terminology that resonated with ‘third way’ rubric. It was also selected as it 
provided a low-cost local environment for pilot work. 
 
Respondents were selected on the basis of their intimacy with the design and 
implementation of this project. Accordingly two respondents who were 
acknowledged as the architects of the program were selected; three 
respondents who were then working with municipal government were chosen 
who had previously worked with the first two respondents (one of whom 
elected to remain anonymous) within the provincial (State) government and 
an unnamed consultant who evaluated the first round of this project was 
invited to participate. Other respondents included a Mayor (and Australian 
President of the Fabian Society) of a Victorian City Council, which had 
participated in the program; an anonymous businessperson with knowledge 
of the program; and a community development worker. 
 
The data gleaned from this initial pilot enabled a honing of the questioning 
regimen to be undertaken both offshore and within Australia some six months 
later. One issue that arose from this pilot included a poor understanding of 
the ‘third way’ in a definitional sense. Whilst all respondents utilised ‘third 
way’ terminology and “jargon” and were more than capable of providing 
consistent definition at this level, the majority were unable to place this 
terminology conceptually within a theoretical framework. Most had not read, 
or even heard, of Anthony Giddens. As a consequence the researcher had to 
provide a thumbnail sketch of the ‘third way’, a construct, within which the 
terminology used could apply. This added, at times, significantly to the lead-
time necessary prior to interview in terms of clarification, and indeed, during 
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interview.  Some respondents disclosed that their knowledge of the ‘third 
way’, in the context of both their understanding of the project and their 
employment within the provincial (State) government, was influenced by a 
“cut and paste” exercise in the first instance from the UK Home Office 
website of ‘third way’ type programming. Others became aware of the 
terminology through colleagues. This latter disclosure is not inconsistent with 
the proposition that managers undertake their work in consultation with 
others who in turn shape conceptual understanding (Gron 1983; Boden 
1994).  
 
The broad areas for later questioning that emerged from the pilot included: 
 
o Meanings of key terminology (‘third way’, civil society, community 
development, partnership); 
o Practical implications of the phenomenon; 
o Future of participant sectors; 
o Effectiveness of theoretical constructs in practice; 
o Relations between and across participant members; 
o Political and moral imperatives; 
o Potential for transportability of the model 
 
The original research proposed was intended to be program focussed, i.e. 
interviewing would be specific to programs in place on the ground that 
purported to be ‘third way’ in character. The lack of conceptualisation by 
respondents in Victoria, many of whom were practitioners engaged in 
program delivery and implementation, necessitated a review of research logic 
to determine whether this issue was problematic in other sites. Accordingly, 
later respondents were selected because of their seniority within 
organizations and government, rather than necessarily drawn from the ranks 
of those responsible for day-to-day administration of projects. It was felt that 
a more global perspective would assist in an understanding of how 
information on the phenomenon is transmitted as well as placing it in a 
political context. The issue of flexibility in research design will be expanded 
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upon under the General section of Research Sites later in this chapter. 
 
For the purpose of discussion of the research, the observations and 
information from this pilot will be included as part of the overall research 
project. Accordingly, future reference to the project will be inclusive of these 
respondents. 
 
Principle Data Generation 
 
Subsequent upon clearance by the Behavioural and Social Sciences Ethical 
Research Committee at The University of Queensland, Australia (Clearance 
Number B/531/SS/01/M/ACRO) in June 2001, the conduct of the pilot project 
in Victoria, Australia in August 2001 and a successful verbal and written 
presentation to the relevant School at The University of Queensland (School 
of Social Science) in October 2001, potential overseas and future 
respondents were contacted, initially by e-mail, inviting their participation in 
the research. Attached to this invitation were copies of the Research 
Information Sheet and Informed Consent Form, the latter of which was based 
upon Neuman (2000: 96). These appear as Appendix 2. 
 
Upon consent to be involved, interviews were arranged and conducted in the 
United Kingdom, Canada and the United States of America during February 
2002. Subsequent interviews were conducted in Australia during March and 
April 2002. 
 
In total, 35 respondents participated in the research, 27 of whom were 
interviewed in their normal place of work. Of the remaining eight 
respondents, three were engaged in the researcher’s hotel room, two in the 
respondent’s own home, one person over breakfast at the Hotel Vancouver 
and two interviews were conducted by telephone (one from London and one 
from Hobart). All respondents were afforded the opportunity to review the 
transcript from the interview (and make corrections, amendments and 
additions) and some were engaged in follow-up discussion via e-mail for 
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clarification purposes. 
 
Choice of Participants 
 
As already discussed respondents to the research project were chosen 
because of the significant positions within government, nongovernmental 
organizations, grass-roots and issues-oriented organizations across several 
jurisdictions. They were also selected because of their intimate knowledge of 
the phenomenon under investigation and/or as a consequence of their active 
involvement in the field of investigation. Other respondents were selected 
because of their academic or other qualifications relevant to the research 
project. It was expected that at least one respondent from each of the 
partnership nodes (NGO, federal/state/local government, business, 
community etc.) would be interviewed across all jurisdictions. As a limited 
research project, as noted previously, the ‘third way’, in its entirety, was 
beyond the scope of the present study. As a small project, it sought rather to 
examine the perceptions of respondents in one small corner of this expansive 
tapestry – other potential players in the broader picture such as politicians, 
entrepreneurs and religious leaders were excluded from the scope of the 
study. 
 
Of the 35 respondents interviewed, nine were located in Vancouver, British 
Columbia, Canada, seven were located in Washington, D.C., United States 
of America, nine were located in the United Kingdom, and 10 were located in 
Australia. Of the number, 23 were male and 12 female. 
 
It is to be noted that in all categories other than “academics” and “citizens”, 
the respondents comprised: chief executive officers/managers/directors (11); 
nine non-government representatives; two federal representatives; one State 
representative; two business owners/operators; two unionists; and one 
Member of Parliament.   
 
It is to be further noted that the majority of respondents (23) have had 
engagements, at varying times, with more than one level (or sector), which is 
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under scrutiny through the research, e.g., one respondent who is the Head of 
a government unit was formerly a principle researcher with a 
nongovernmental organisation; two community development workers with 
municipal government were formerly program development personnel with a 
provincial (State) government; several managers and chief executive officers 
have been political advisors (and/or have held positions cross-sectionally 
over levels of government, or from nongovernmental organizations to 
government and vice versa). The respondents, therefore, bring to the 
research high levels of cross-sectional experience and high levels of insider 
information from several sources. 
 
Summary of Interview Process 
 
Respondents were involved (voluntarily and, in some cases, anonymously) in 
a face-to-face interview of approximately one-hours duration in their office or 
a place nominated by them. Their observations were recorded by use of a 
DAT recorder (Digital Audio Tape-Recorder), transcribed (identified or de-
identified according to participant instructions) with all data secured by 
encryption (in the case of digitised material) or in a locked location (in the 
case of transcriptions or other “hard” material).  Supplementary information 
from respondents was sought, as required, in the light of additional issues 
raised by subsequent respondents in a manner that sought to exhaust 
potential questions and answers. The following sections detail this process. 
 
Active and Elite Interviewing 
 
Principles 
 
In relation to the specific strategy of interview, an active interviewing stance 
was adopted. Consistent with the assertions of Holstein and Gubrium (1995), 
the interview transaction in this research became an interactional 
accomplishment between researcher and respondent whereby knowledge 
was mutually constructed and transmitted during the interview, a style of “... 
limited ‘improvisational’ performance (where) the production is spontaneous, 
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yet structured – focussed within loose parameters provided by the interviewer 
who is also an active participant” (Holstein and Gubrium 1997: 124). 
Furthermore, and in line with the view of Margaretha Jarvinen (2000), the 
researcher has sought to demonstrate that both he and his respondents have 
used the interview process as sites for knowledge with respondents 
fashioning their stories according to interpretive frameworks with meaning 
assigned via a process of collaboration and at times in conflict with the 
researcher (Jarvinen 2000: 384-85). These notions resonate with the 
objectives for this research, which were, in essence, to examine the global 
worldviews of well-informed people in the context of academic discourse. At 
the same time the approach met an epistemological agenda of 
constructionism whereby the interview itself became a constitutive interface 
(Holstein and Gubrium 1997). 
 
As Marshall and Rossman (1995) argue, the respondent’s perspective on the 
subject matter should “unfold” as the participant requires it and not according 
to the worldview or opinion of the researcher (Marshall and Rossman 1995). 
Jennifer Mason (1996) characterizes these interviews by their relative 
informality whereby data are generated via the interaction with the 
interviewees. The ontological position adopted for this research suggests that 
people’s knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations, experiences, 
and interactions are meaningful properties of the social reality which research 
questions are designed to explore. Furthermore social relations, political 
structures and social and cultural practices are similarly important (Mason: 
1996). In the case of the current investigation the relationships that 
respondents have within and across various levels of interaction (from the 
social to the political – government to nongovernmental and community) 
provided the milieu in which outcomes were assessed. It is not always in that 
which is contracted (in the case of specific program parameters or 
“confidence” documentation) or published material that informed this 
research but rather the experiences of the actors in tandem with this material 
(linked invariably with their position within history). Often it is in the subtle 
“pre-contractual” negotiations and nuances of interpersonal relationships 
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(together with the expressed political or social needs of the moment) that 
meaningful realities are constructed; meaningful to the extent that whatever 
did not exist previously takes shape because of those transactions.  
 
According to Mason, ‘qualitative interviewing’ refers to in-depth, semi-
structured or loosely structured forms of interviewing. In-depth interviewing 
has been described as a “... conversation with a purpose” (Kahn & Cannell: 
1957: 149; Burgess: 1984: 102), these “conversations” being different from 
“... formal events with predetermined response categories” (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1995: 80) but with a range of topics, themes or issues which the 
interviewer wishes to cover. Steven Taylor and Robert Bogdan define in-
depth interviews as “repeated face-to-face encounters between the 
researcher and respondents directed towards understanding respondents’ 
perspectives in their own words” (Taylor and Bogdan 1984: 77). This 
definition implies both an egalitarian relationship between the researcher and 
the respondent devoid of a power relationship, “rapport enhancement” 
through “repeated” encounters and, finally, that it is the respondent’s view 
that is of greatest significance (Minichiello 1995: 68). Clifford Geertz (1973), 
whilst not specifically arguing for in-depth interviewing, nonetheless captures 
a view that is consistent with the proposition:  
 
Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs 
of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, 
and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in 
search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning (Geertz 
1973: 5).  
 
There is no escaping the polarity that has emerged in the literature with 
respect to interview techniques, from the structured to the unfettered flow by 
respondents. As Ray Pawson (1996) observes, the language of unstructured, 
semi-structured and structured is ubiquitous (Pawson 1996) but it ignores the 
intent of the process, i.e. to arrive, through transparency of the researcher’s 
intent to the respondent, through a partnership, to a point where data can be 
accounted for in light of the researcher’s theoretical position.  
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A recursive model of interviewing (questions following from the response of 
the last question) was applied to enable both a more conversational model, 
which treated each interview as unique. Minichiello et al (1995) recommend 
that this interaction in each interview direct the research process. Catherine 
Seaman suggests that the interviewer needs to determine the extent to which 
experiences from previous interviews “... be allowed to determine the 
structure and content of current interviews” (Seaman 1987: 45). In effect this 
allows flexibility for the interviewer in determining how recursive the interview 
process will be (Minichiello 1995: 81). A legitimisation for the use of in-depth 
interviewing can be found from Schutz (1962) who asserts that:  
 
The thought objects constructed by the social scientist in order to 
grasp …. social reality, have to be founded upon the thought objects 
constructed by the commonsense thinking of men living their daily life 
within their social world (in Minichiello, 1995: 68).  
 
Not unlike Bacon’s mirror analogy the observations of respondents were 
treated as reflections of particular conceptions of reality (Bacon 1970) albeit a 
“distorted reflection” which, as Remmling asserts, changes the perceptions it 
receives in terms of its own particular construction (in Curtis and Petras 
1970: 7). James Curtis and John Petras note of Bacon that whilst he claims 
that all knowledge is derived from observation, he acknowledges that these 
observational experiences “... never speak for themselves” – his central 
thesis relies upon recognition of the relationship between the mind and the 
sociocultural environment (Curtis and Petras: 1970: 7-8). The testable 
moment for such a proposition lies in the experiences of “elite” respondents 
to the extent that they coordinate the “realities” of those whom they choose to 
inform and the basis upon which they believe they can derive support – both 
political and social. 
 
According to Lewis Dexter (1970) elite interviews provide an opportunity for 
the investigation of policy and politics with the use of such respondents 
generating reliable and valid data (Beamer 2002: 86; see also Reeher 1996, 
Beamer 1999, Morehouse 1998). Glenn Beamer suggests that interview 
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subjects could be any style of “…actor directly involved in the political or 
policy-making process who have the desired information” (Beamer 2002: 87). 
The emergence of a style of non-governmental proto-Keynesian elite, 
according to Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle (1989), emerged as early as the 
1920s and extended its influence during the Great Depression in the 1930s 
when, as a consequence of underconsumption, “… this new political elite … 
seized a portion of state power” (Fraser and Gerstle 1989 in Rogin 2002: 90). 
The significance of this development is, to Michael Rogin (2002), the creation 
of a New Deal state “engaging mass-consumption oriented businessmen, 
industrial engineers and social science foundation executives” who: 
 
... supported union organization in order to increase the capacity of working-
class demand, generating a symbiosis between a consumer culture that 
created demands and the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) unions 
that provided the wherewithal to satisfy them” (Rogin 2000: ibid, based upon 
the observations of Fraser and Gerstle 1989: xi – xvi, particularly xiii). 
 
The issue for researchers when dealing with these elites – who evolved as a 
significant feature throughout Keynesian-influenced political systems - 
resides with what Kogan (1994) has referred to as “the truth problem” which 
invariably relates to power, and power-knowledge relationships (Deem 1994). 
Thus, according to Robert Phillips (1998), “Research conducted in elite 
settings should start from the premise that interviews only reveal a picture 
which is partial and incomplete” (Phillips 1998: 10) arguing, with Fitz and 
Halpin (1994), that the constraints of elite respondents has to do as much 
with “… the situated knowledge and power of the interviewee, which 
contrasts with the relative vulnerability of the interviewer” (ibid), or the “ritual 
humiliation of the researcher” (Furlong cited in Kogan 1994: 73, in Phillips 
1998: 10).  
 
Consistent with the assertions of Ball (1994), the current research recognised 
that the elite political interview is “political” in the literal sense with the 
researcher as part of the political “game”. Accordingly, the interview 
approach became deliberatively confrontational and collaborative 
simultaneously – a matter to be developed as a new interview “treatment” 
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later in this Chapter. To paraphrase Allan Cochrane (1998), the researcher 
adopted a form of “committed scepticism” in that what was being told in 
interview was not necessarily taken as “truth”. A caveat was placed upon this 
scepticism, nonetheless, that suggested a set of changed circumstances for 
the positions held by these elites which may see them with a diminishing 
engagement in the political process consequent upon ‘third way’ 
implementation. With Cochrane, this research recognised that ultimately an 
understanding of the ‘third way’ would not be found exclusively in the 
worldviews of elites “… but in the broader systems, processes, and 
structures of which they are a part” (Cochrane 1998:2131). Having said that, 
it can be reasonably argued that elites perform an important role as cultural 
and political intermediaries between government and communities and that 
their insights may provide evidence of the degree to which ‘third way’ 
concepts trickle down or become routinised.  
  
Explicating the Interview 
 
In undertaking this study, the research questions were initially posed to 
respondents during a pilot study (as already outlined) with the material 
garnered from these used to inform the process for the main interviews. 
Whilst the structure of conduct for the main interviews did not vary 
significantly, the information obtained from this pilot did yield certain 
constraints (discussed earlier), the resolution of which, when applied to the 
main study, aided in the efficient process of investigation. 
 
All interviews, irrespective of location, were conducted in a friendly, non-
threatening manner. All but one respondent were extremely cooperative and 
provided extensive responses to questions posed. The exception was a 
senior government official who was extremely uncomfortable about “political” 
questions. In his case the researcher did not persist with the line of 
questioning choosing instead to canvass issues more familiar to the 
respondent. If respondents were unfamiliar with concepts being used by the 
researcher, some time was given for clarification and explanation.  
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The researcher was aware of the limitations with respect to the amount of 
time available for interview, particularly given the significant role of 
respondents in their respective organizations. Accordingly interviews were 
conducted, in the main, of approximately 30-80 minutes duration. This matter 
significantly influenced the researcher’s exploration of discrete issues and 
questions, drawing upon the wealth of expertise of particular respondents. 
Consistent with the assertions of Charles Briggs (1986), and Holstein and 
Gubrium (1995), as well as others outlined previously, the researcher was 
sensitive to the cultural and ‘ethnographic background’ within which the 
interviews were embedded and utilised background information and 
previously disclosed information to recursively inform both the process of 
interview and the pathways through which outcomes were reached.  
 
Most times the relationship between researcher and respondent was 
‘interactional’ (Holstein and Gubrium 1995) citing shared experiences and 
understandings providing what Holstein and Gubrium describe as “... 
concrete referents on which inquiries and answers can focus” (p. 45). At 
times this approach was empathic, at others confrontational and, but at all 
times, respectful – what Holstein and Gubrium describe as “incitement” or 
“provocation” (p.39). Interview topics were not introduced in any particular 
order but formed part of a “conversation with a purpose” or a narrative 
incitement for the purpose of narrative elaboration (Holstein and Gubrium 
1997). In line with this proposition is Habermas’ concept of ‘communicative 
competence’ wherein an ‘ideal speech act’ enables all participants in a 
dialogue to have equal opportunity to argue rationally and completely for their 
position in which the only thing that counts is the better argument. Anything 
that blocks or distorts such communication is, therefore, ruled illegitimate 
(Habermas 1974).  
 
This view accords with that of the existentialist Jack Douglas (1985) who, in 
speaking of creative interviews, asserts that they should be strongly 
committed to mutual disclosure, a process whereby, at times, emotional 
underpinnings will be revealed beyond a question and response scenario 
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(Douglas 1985; see also Johnson 1975).  
 
A new proposed treatment for ‘elite’ respondents – deliberative 
confrontational and collaborative interviewing 
 
In recognising the need to construct an interviewing “performance” (Holstein 
and Gubrium) and acknowledging the constraints, both political and 
professional that potentially inhibit frank and open disclosures by elite 
respondents on a set of issues that has contemporary currency, a further set 
of interview techniques were applied in this research project beyond what 
Jarvinen delineates as “collaboration” or “conflict”. These constraints will 
initially be canvassed with an explication of a method for dealing with these 
to follow.  
 
From the researcher’s experience, two formidable impediments to the 
interview transaction engaging elite respondents exist. The first of these is 
what will be termed ‘deference’, which, of itself, inhibits the progress of an 
egalitarian transaction (in Taylor and Bogdan’s [1984] terms) or partnership 
(in Pawson’s [1996] terms).  The willingness of the interviewer not to 
challenge the responses from elite interviewees as a consequence of esteem 
held of the person being interviewed can act against the interest of the 
interview transaction itself. This occurs when the interviewer perceives that 
the response is “closed” and, rather than offend the respondent (or seek 
clarification if the response is not understood in fear of seeming uninformed 
or foolish), fails to pursue or probe the response. What is being described is 
a style of intimidation that can significantly weaken the efficacy of the 
“performance” between interviewer and interviewee, particularly if this lack of 
probing fails to accomplish a “conversation with a purpose”.  
 
The second, perhaps more important, impediment relates to defensive 
interview techniques acquired (and utilised) by elite respondents as a 
consequence of what will be described as “media training”. This phenomenon 
will be referred to as “interview contagion”. Most elite respondents have to 
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present a public face for the organizations they represent and most 
undertake “media training” designed specifically to control the interview 
process. Although intended to deal with problematic journalists (or to quickly 
present an argument in ten to thirty second “grabs” for electronic media 
consumption), these techniques act as a contagion to all interview settings. 
As part of this training, elite respondents are taught to defer to a “seven point 
scenario”, a strategy whereby a person answers a question with reference to 
“points” that are pre-scripted prior to interview. The use of the “seven points” 
has a dual purpose – the first is to amplify a point that the person wishes the 
media to report, the second is to provide a rote answer (that does not relate 
to the question) in circumstances where the question is deemed to pose a 
threat. These “points” are generic and their usage becomes automatic in all 
interview settings. In a situation of ‘threat’ those trained will immediately defer 
to a “points” strategy. As indicated previously, the environment in which the 
current research was undertaken where partnership dealings were likely to 
be ill-defined, with relations between constituent members likely to be 
strained, a ‘threat’ could easily be inferred.  
 
At the end of the day, the problem with deference is a matter of attitude. For 
this researcher it never presented as an issue. For others this would not be 
the case and, for the sake of research outcomes, qualitative investigators 
need to be cognizant of its existence as a phenomenon and devise strategies 
to limit its impacts. The matter of “interview contagion” is, however, far more 
problematic and this researcher would like to recommend strategies that 
were applied successfully in this research project. 
 
Firstly, the researcher engaged in dialogue with respondents, which was both 
confrontational and collaborative simultaneously. There were respondents 
who knew exactly where the discussion was going but who refused to be 
drawn on responses that they believed posed a “threat” in terms previously 
described. In these circumstances the researcher took a confrontational 
position to that which would have been expected in order to elicit a response 
beyond the “seven points”. An example of this approach follows from 
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interview transcriptions (the respondent will not be identified): 
 
…Q. Now if you wouldn’t mind, I would like to ask you what your 
working definition of the third way would be? 
 
A. Oh right! I thought you were going to ask questions about crime. 
Well I suppose in strict terms it’s a route between social democracy 
…. Actually I’m not going to be very good on this subject, I don’t 
operate, I don’t think, I don’t work in those sorts of areas. Be best if 
you ask me more practical stuff. 
 
Q. Uhuh. All right then, in terms of government policy what would be 
the elemental features that you think the government has borrowed 
from third way thinking? Is that a question that you could look at? 
 
A. This is not really my bread and butter stuff Clive. It is not the sort of 
thing  … I don’t write about this… (Unnamedx [a] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 10). 
 
And later in the same interview: 
 
….Q. I am alluding to issues that you’re not choosing to field, that are 
embedded within Giddens’ thinking. The question is whether or not the 
substance of Giddens model has been advanced at a policy level. It’s 
not a question you can answer but in terms of the programmatic 
response that you’re taking, and others within the government, there 
would seem to be some changes…. 
 
A. Well I would have thought that basically this government is an 
active government, it believes in active intervention. That’s probably 
the main distinction between this and the conservative philosophy. It’s 
about actively intervening, it’s also about which of course makes it 
open to criticism of being too dogmatic or not letting people get on with 
it out there, but there’s a justification in that in that if you’re serious 
about making the kind of impact that we want to make…. (ibid: 17). 
 
A further example of challenging a respondent who indicated a concern 
throughout the interview but who was reluctant to articulate it but was 
ultimately obliged to as a consequence of the challenge presented by the 
interviewer follows: 
                                                 
x  In the section that follows, in relation to this interview strategy, the use of the term, 
“unnamed”, will be applied to protect the identity of respondents in circumstances where 
such disclosure is considered, in the opinion of the researcher, to be potentially detrimental 
to them professionally. It is noted that other quotes from these respondents, in differing 
contexts, may be used elsewhere and acknowledged in another manner. 
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…Q. You said that there is no legislative attack on unionism in this 
country but isn’t the net effect of all you’ve said with privatisation 
exactly the same? You neutralise the support base, you have workers 
who understand that there’s a large pool of people who are 
permanently unemployed who can be brought in to take over their 
jobs, who won’t seek employment benefits through union membership 
or affiliation. Isn’t it odd or strange that a Labour Government should 
be fuelling a process almost as a contrivance to neutralise the union 
movement. 
 
A. That is what why the government and ourselves are at loggerheads 
at the moment and we are digging in for a desperate, we are digging 
in desperately for a fight against private government involvement 
extending any further than at present and it is an absolute key fight for 
the biggest public service union in the country and it’s a key one for 
the government actually for reforming public services so it’s an 
incredibly live issue with an enormous amount at stake…. (Unnamed 
[e] 2002 – Transcriptions: 29). 
 
A further devise that was employed took the form of either a “shared joke” or 
explication of, what must have seemed, bizarre “speculations”. As a 
consequence, responses followed that were more representative of the 
respondent’s true feelings on the issue. The technique removes both the 
interviewer and the interviewee from the immediacy of the conflict – retuning 
them both to a childlike state where the import of their discussion is less 
conflicting as it is instructive or benign. In essence the transaction moves 
from being a formal exercise to a “coffee-shop” discussion. An example of a 
“shared joke” follow (note that tonal inflection is fairly important in this 
process): 
 
…Q. It creates somewhat of a conundrum for established civil 
libertarian groups as you suggests or community organizations or 
even for trade unions – we’ve seen in Cardiff in the past few days with 
the Prime Minister speaking of Unions as “wreckers”. 
 
A. Some trade unions can play a good role but sometimes  … I don’t 
want to criticise too much the trade union movement … but you know 
some unions have sometimes been corrupt, they have been male 
dominated, they have been part of the problems of areas not 
necessarily the solution to them but I freely accept that if you get 
progressive union leaders they can certainly help a lot. 
 
Q So there needs to be a quit pro quo if government is going to fund 
organizations to promote its work within the community. One would 
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expect a degree of compliance to government policy in the first 
instance not criticism. 
 
A. Yeah. And it’s also quite hard to negotiate as you know (laugh) 
because you’ve got to give a fair amount of autonomy but as you say 
you don’t want the money just to be swallowed up in local 
organizations that are not accountable to the wider public purpose 
yes. It’s a difficult route to tread that one…. (Unnamed [b] 2002 – 
Transcriptions: 48) 
 
An example of a “speculation” will now be presented: 
 
….Q. So a theory of sectoral elimination is reasonably sound, this idea 
that if someone is in your way whether it be Local Government, 
whether it be citizens, whether it be organised groups, whether it be 
the Trade Union movement, if you can eliminate them as Blair’s 
started to talk about “wreckers” in the union movement and starts 
defunding organizations that are critical and has effectively neutralised 
the power and control of the Local Governments which historically are 
in opposition to whoever happens to be in government – the whole 
theory of eliminating by stealth or systematically the opposition is 
something that you could see progressed here in Canada? 
 
A. Absolutely. Absolutely. There’s a lot of examples of it happening. 
The ones that I have just outlined. All of the Labour movement were 
united in supporting the election of the NDP in 90, then in 95 we had 
some splits but in spite of the splits Harris spoke right over our …. We 
didn’t oppose the NDP but in 95 we were all united in election of the 
NDP over Harris, we’d had four years of them and it was an absolute 
disaster and then in 99 we took the position that, we were the only 
union that did it the rest were united in supporting the NDP, we said 
we must use strategic voting, the key should be to defeat Harris not 
necessarily to elect the NDP – support the NDP where it makes sense 
but support anyone else who can beat a Tory candidate and in spite of 
that, I mean our people didn’t even respond to that, our people voted 
for Harris, even though we’re ahead they voted for him. The same 
here in B.C. The Labour movement were united in supporting the re-
election of the NDP but they ended up with two seats. It’s not clear 
that the structures we have are working and I don’t know what’s 
happening in London with Ken Livingstone. Is he, I mean he is a pretty 
powerful guy if you … (Unnamed [c] 2002 – Transcriptions: 219-220). 
 
I hasten to mention that all respondents received a copy of their transcript for 
comment and review prior to use of quotations in this study. Interestingly, few 
amendments were requested and no substantial modifications were recorded 
as a result of this process. Many did disclose their surprise at what had 
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transpired in interview (indicating their removal from the formal interview 
process) with one significant respondent noting that this was the first time 
that he had crystallised his views on the various issues discussed - with a 
specific request for a copy of the transcription for further other use. Had the 
researcher not applied specific new strategies, the depth and quality of 
material would not have transpired given the constraint of “interview 
contagion” previously discussed. The use of what will be termed deliberative 
confrontational and collaborative interviewing has, I believe, added a new 
dimension to qualitative research and as such, of itself, has contributed to 
knowledge.   
 
Narrative Accounts and Interpretation 
 
The interviews conducted in this research formed narratives that 
encapsulated the experiences and feelings of respondents in relation to the 
phenomenon known as the ‘third way’. These narratives, therefore, 
constructed accounts of respondents’ understanding based upon these 
experiences and feelings. As previously asserted, these accounts are 
transactions engaging both the respondents and the researcher. For the 
purpose of clarification, given the array of differing meanings to the term 
“narrative” within research methodology, a brief explanation of its usage will 
be discussed at this point.  
 
Narratives are concerned with how questions that intersect with the what 
concerns, with social scientists increasingly concerned with a comprehension 
of how stories about experience are presented (and their plots [the whats), 
structured and made to cohere (the hows) (Gubrium and Holstein 1997). 
Both Donald Polkinghorne (1988) and Catherine Riessman (1993) delineate 
between narrow and broad distinctions for narratives, Reissman outlines a 
number of storytelling genres, including those without a story whilst 
Polkinghorne uses the concepts of narrative and story, interchangeably as 
processes for commenting on events. Emden (1998), progresses this 
description by exploring collective narration as narratives within a schemata.   
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Since the themes of the subject interviews in this research were substantially 
recurrent, albeit with differing interpretations at times, this notion of collective 
narration is of some considerable interest. It is at the points of commonality 
and shared consciousness amongst and between respondents that a 
testable consideration of consequential outcomes from ‘third way’ 
implementation have been gleaned. Having regard to Riessman and 
Polkinghorne’s views of narrative and consistent with that of Emden, the 
purpose of the narratives was to accord coherence with illumination, i.e. that 
the stories are meaningful in the context of the research and value-add to the 
debate. It will be from Holstein and Gubrium’s account of narratives, 
previously discussed, that this research has drawn inference, i.e. accounting 
for the comprehensiveness of respondent opinion and views with coherent 
structure and purpose. Ultimately, according to David Walsh, the production 
of “truth” or validation rests on three issues: the plausibility of the claim given 
our existing knowledge; the credibility of the claim given the nature of the 
phenomenon; and the circumstances of the research and the characteristics 
of the researcher (Walsh 1998 in Seale 1998: 232).  In line with Martyn 
Hammersley (1992) such truths are said to be partial, contingent and 
challengeable (Emden 1998). 
 
Analysis 
 
The material from responses given across topic categories was subjected to 
what Joseph Maxwell (1996) refers to as a categorizing strategy focussed 
upon the dissection of the data with rearrangement based upon broader 
themes, categories or issues which were then analysed and compared in 
greater detail (Maxwell 1996). In the context of this research, the broader 
themes centre on the “political imperative” and the “moral imperative”. A 
further categorisation was achieved on the basis of “affiliation” i.e. whether 
respondents were managers, chief executive officers, union representatives, 
representatives of the various levels of government and so forth. Beyond the 
research questions discussed elsewhere and the pathways to their testability 
(the moral and political imperatives), other issues arose as a consequence of 
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this research: the transportability of the logic, the political environment within 
which each system is located and the general experiences of respondents in 
the application of the logic of the ‘third way’. These issues are generally 
canvassed throughout.  
 
Analytic Rigour 
 
The matter of rigour which takes account of transparency and reliableness 
within the evaluation of research was addressed at all stages through the 
research project. Drawing from Norman Denzin (1989) the matter of 
transparency and rigour have been made as public as possible in terms of 
the publication of interpretive materials and methods. 
 
Consent 
 
Each interview was mutually arranged at a time and location that was 
suitable to the respondents. As a precursor to interview, all respondents were 
reminded of their rights and responsibilities with respect to the conduct of 
both the interview and the research as outlined in the Informed Consent 
Form. This was deemed absolutely necessary given the ethical issues 
inherent to in-depth interviewing, and given that public disclosure of 
information by these particular respondents might be detrimental to either 
their personal professional standing or their representative sector. As part of 
that process respondents were reminded of their right to confidentiality and 
anonymity and were encouraged to exercise that right. This matter was 
restated at the conclusion of each interview and prior to signing of the 
Informed Consent Form.  Nine respondents elected to remain anonymous 
and another requested to see the context of quotes intended for use in order 
that a judgement on anonymity could be made.  
 
The Interview Transaction 
 
Respondents were invited to participate in the research on the following 
Terms of Engagement (other than in relation to anonymity discussed above): 
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Guarantee of Confidentiality: The researcher warranted to respondents that 
all records in relation to respondents would remain confidential. 
 
Statement of Participation: Respondents undertook an involvement in the 
research on the basis that this involvement was completely voluntary. 
Respondents were at liberty to terminate their involvement at any time during 
the interview process without penalty. 
 
Remuneration: Respondents undertook an involvement on the understanding 
that no financial or other remuneration or compensation (in any form) would 
be forthcoming for that involvement. 
 
Summary of Findings: The researcher gave undertakings that, within a 
reasonable time following publication, a summary of findings would be 
provided to respondents. 
 
Storage of Data 
 
As indicated previously, all interviews, which ranged in length from 30 
minutes to 80 minutes, were digitally recorded on a Sony DAT (Digital Audio 
Tape) recorder. Respondents were made aware that these DAT tapes and 
resultant transcriptions would be retained for a period of five years to ensure 
verification of the research outcomes. These DAT tapes were initially 
transferred to the researcher’s personal computer and were then burnt on to 
CDs within hours of interview. The DAT and CD recordings are stored at the 
researcher’s home in an encrypted format (requiring password access), with 
identifiers removed for those wishing anonymity.  
 
Post-Interview Process 
 
Upon conclusion of the interview, respondents were requested to complete 
an Informed Consent Form. The researcher is holding these completed 
consent forms in a secure location. The researcher subsequently transcribed 
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all interviews personally (and verbatim) with copies sent to respondents by e-
mail for correction, modification and inclusion of additional material if they 
wished. Some respondents made minor changes, specifically with respect to 
spelling of names, with one making significant changes, this person being 
ethnic Chinese with a concern about the translation of spoken to written 
language presumed to be the reason. The data thus obtained comprises 548 
pages of single spaced typed A4 sized documentation that has been bound 
and is referenced in the body of this Thesis.  
 
Research Sites 
 
General 
 
Originally case studies were proposed for investigation. These were chosen 
as a consequence of their position along a notional continuum from “mostly 
‘third way’ influenced” (a UK example) to “least ‘third way’ influenced” with 
other programs in the process of transition: either ‘third way’ influenced to 
neo-liberal influenced (a US case study); or neo-liberal influenced to ‘third 
way’ influenced (a Canadian case study). The Canadian case study was 
viewed as a blend of conflicting ideological perspectives across tiers of 
governance. 
 
The implementation of ‘third way’ programs in Australia was viewed as either 
covert or in its early stages – certainly they are underdeveloped. The use of 
overseas sites was deemed necessary in the original research proposal 
given this underdevelopment.  
 
Having said that, the research proposal was modified away from specific 
case studies to encompass a comparative study involving Australia, the 
United Kingdom, Canada and the United States of America; these 
involvements premised upon their historical connection to the concept of the 
‘third way’, rather than their position along a notional continuum. Given the 
background of the respondents selected, as discussed elsewhere, the 
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perceptions of line managers of the phenomenon of the ‘third way’ were 
seen, by the researcher, to be of greater relevance, particularly given the 
experience from the pilot project conducted in Victoria (discussed 
elsewhere). 
 
Further, the formulation of research questions in the first instance, i.e. for use 
during the Pilot study, was based upon parameters significantly crafted from 
information gleaned during the initial review of the literature. As discussed 
elsewhere in this chapter, an unexpected outcome from the conduct of this 
pilot study was that respondents were unable to provide a definition of the 
‘third way’, in some cases had not heard of the phenomenon, yet applied 
‘third way’ terminology at interview. This matter will be more fully explored in 
Chapter 4. However for the purpose of this discussion it is important to note 
that the research strategy had to be modified at two levels prior to collection 
of the main data set, the first with respect to choice of respondents, the 
second in relation to the questioning regime applied. This issue of 
modification will be explored at this point. 
 
The modification of research strategies is appropriate and desirable. Yvonna 
Lincoln and Egon Guba (1995) suggest that flexibility of research design 
enables the research to “... unfold, cascade, roll and emerge” (Lincoln and 
Guba 1985: 210). Marshall and Rossman (1995) argue that the researcher 
should reserve the right to design the research as it evolves” (emphasis in 
original) with flexibility being crucial to the research design (Marshall and 
Rossman 1995: 142). By demonstrating the logic of qualitative methods for 
this research and through the conduct a Pilot study in data collection, from 
which modification of the plan (if required) could occur prior to the main data 
collection period, the researcher has satisfied the criteria isolated by Marshall 
and Rossman for flexibility. In line with Blanche Geer’s observation of “first 
days in the field”, these earlier investigations into the phenomenon 
demonstrated the benefits of maintaining some flexibility (Geer 1969). 
 
The expectations of the research were met as a consequence of this 
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flexibility and in fact significantly aided in the exploration of data collection 
strategies with respondents following the pilot study. What may have 
presented as impediments, or at the least distractions, proved to be enabling 
in terms of conceptual exploration with respondents - in crafting and 
recrafting concepts in an active transactional mode to extend the possibilities 
during interview. This issue is expanded upon in some detail in this chapter, 
in that section dealing with the principles underlying interviewing principles.  
 
Specific Issues in relation to research sites 
 
The peculiarities of National differences have been introduced in Chapter 1 
and were explored further in Chapter 2. The purpose of this section is to 
provide a brief rationale for jurisdictional selection and to explicate the 
background of the participant respondents to the research in each 
jurisdiction. In the first instance it may be useful to introduce, briefly, some of 
the complementary research approaches (and historical different-ness) in the 
context of these selections. 
 
Linked with the reporting strategies suggested from the interviewing regime 
being conducted in this research (discussed elsewhere) an Historical–
Comparative approach has been applied to examine any combination of 
social factors that produce an outcome within the parameters of the 
investigation (Neuman 2000: 383).  Borrowing from the nineteenth century 
founders of sociology and blending knowledge across history, political 
science and economics, this Historical-Comparative approach has sought to 
examine commonalities across social systems within the context of 
developmental change or evolution. Writers such as Stinchcombe (1978) 
McDaniel (1978) and Calhoun (1996) suggest that the expansion of enquiry 
beyond a single historical time or single culture and “...  rounded in the 
experience of people living in specific cultural and historical settings” is less 
restrictive on concepts and may indeed generate new ones (Neuman 2000: 
384).  Neuman’s three-dimensional schematic for the examination of social 
research in its relation to social life (at p. 385) presents the various potential 
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permutations of Historical-Comparative analysis (Neuman 2000). The 
present research would sit as Model 11 in his schematic (few nations, across 
time, qualitative).  
 
The investigation has been an intensive examination of a limited number of 
cases in which social meaning and context have been deemed critical. At the 
same time and consistent with what critics have suggested, the overarching 
ideologies of capitalism and globalisation have led to a convergence of 
principles that may, it will be argued from the data in this research, be 
transportable and which have resonance in the face of differing historical, 
political and economic beginnings. Consistent with those features for 
Historical-Comparative research isolated by Neuman, the present 
investigation has been interpretive with certain elements (historical analysis 
in particular) limited and indirect; approaches to causality being more 
contingent than determinist, utilizing “combinational explanations” (cf. Max 
Weber’s multicausal approach); the “whole” will be dealt with as if it has 
multiple layers; integrative, in that micro-level and macro-level processes will 
not be isolated without reference to each other; and a shift from the specific 
to the general will enable the transportability referred to elsewhere. 
 
As suggested earlier, research sites were selected on the basis of their 
historical connection with the ‘third way’ and not upon the specifics of case 
studies. In arriving at a choice of sites for this project the range of historical 
contexts from local to dispersed settings were, therefore, taken into account. 
From the literature, various characteristics were isolated to infer a ‘third way’ 
nature within the sites that were ultimately chosen for investigation. These 
have been summarised in Table 1 below. I have sought, through this 
investigation, to emphasise the range of ‘third way’ experiences, not to 
perform a controlled comparison.  On the basis of the characterisation 
disclosed in Table 1, it becomes evident that there are points of commonality 
between the sites that make the perceptions of respondents across those 
sites of considerable interest, particularly in shaping an understanding of 
what this ‘third way’ means in practice. It could be argued that some of these 
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characteristics are not unique to the ‘third way’.  Indeed, it would be expected 
that a model that purports to blend ideology from the left and right would 
share space – a matter that reflects in the literature and, as will be disclosed 
throughout this investigation. Many of the characteristics isolated in Table 1 
will be expanded upon throughout this study. 
 
  
 
i. In the circumstance where third way principles were applied in Australia by a social 
democratic government much earlier than its formalisation in the Untied States and the 
United Kingdom, elements of ‘third way’ approaches appear to have been applied by a 
succeeding conservative government in that country (as discussed elsewhere). Whether this 
makes this government ‘third way’ is a moot point. 
 
A cursory discussion on the selected sites has already occurred in Chapter 1, 
 
 
Site by Country 
 
Characteristics 
Australia United 
Kingdom
Canada United 
States 
Local (Municipal)  !   
State (Provincial)   In transition  
 
Third Way 
Government Federal (Central) ?1. ! ! In transition
Contest for ‘third way’  !  ! 
“Faith-based” connections ! !  ! 
“Rights and Responsibilities” - 
mutualism 
!        !  ! 
Strategic Alliances (cross-
sectoral): partnerships 
! ! ! ! 
‘Third way’ terminology !        ! !        ! 
Indicators of transmogrification ! ! ! ! 
Privatisation of Public Services !        !        !        ! 
Integrated global society ! ! ! ! 
Market ideology !        !        ! ! 
Table 1: Choice of sites by ‘third way’ characteristics  
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however it is appropriate that we review this selection in the context of those 
characteristics disclosed in Table 1 at this point. 
 
1. United Kingdom. 
 
The choice of the United Kingdom is somewhat self-evident in that it is the 
country that pursues an openly disclosed ‘third way’ agenda. Further, 
Anthony Giddens, the Head of the London School of Economics and Politics, 
has been a significant advisor to the Blair government in the adoption of the 
‘third way’ in that country. Respondents in this location include Professor 
Giddens; the Head of the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit; a senior Policy 
Advisor to UNISON, the largest public sector union in the United Kingdom; 
three senior Managers within a local government Authority (two of whom 
elected to remain anonymous); one anonymous academic and two Chief 
Executive Officers of non-government organizations.  
 
2. The United States of America 
 
This selection stems from the development of ‘third way’ politics (influenced 
by Giddens and Etzioni) by former President Bill Clinton in that country. The 
inclusion of the United States was deemed to be of some additional interest 
given the 2000 election of a republican President (George W. Bush) in that 
place and the potential, as a consequence, for the study of the Clinton 
democratic approach of strategic alliances in transition to the Bush faith-
based initiatives discussed in Chapter 5. Respondents in the United States 
included six chief executive officers of non-government organizations (two of 
whom elected to remain anonymous), three of whom held advisory roles 
within the Clinton Administration; and one academic. All hold, or have held, 
multiple roles within government and the nongovernmental sectors.  
 
3. Canada 
 
The Prime Minister of Canada, Jean Cretien, is an avowed third wayer. In 
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1998 his government implemented a National Strategy on Crime Prevention 
engaging a strategic alliance between the national, provincial (state) and 
municipal (or civic) governments together with corporate and 
nongovernmental organizations. One such demonstration project is located in 
Vancouver, Canada – the Downtown Eastside Revitalization Project (DTES). 
Whilst the federal government in this jurisdiction has a ‘third way’ flavour, this 
is not necessarily reflected at either provincial or municipal level. As a result, 
the interplay within this project is of some significance to this research. 
Respondents in Vancouver include two civic government Councillors (one 
electing to remain anonymous); two civic government managers; one union 
head, two businesspeople (both of whom elected to remain anonymous); and 
one citizen. A brief summary of the DTES will follow for contextual purposes. 
 
The views of respondents from within the Downtown Eastside Revitalization 
Project are of particular interest as this is a Project that is funded by three 
levels of government (civic, provincial and federal). The federal government 
is a declared ‘third way’ administration, albeit a Liberal (or non-social 
democratic) government. Until recently, the provincial government was a 
social democratic administration (the NDP). The environment of the project 
has now changed with the election of a Liberal government. The attitudes of 
respondents within this jurisdiction across and between levels of government 
will, therefore, assist to establish the nature of change in the context of the 
assertion about a political imperative.  
 
The Downtown Eastside of Vancouver, Canada, is one of the oldest 
communities in that city and considered, by residents, to be the historical 
heart of Vancouver. The region lies immediately adjacent to the port and 
comprises the geographically distinct precincts of Gastown, Chinatown and 
Strathcona. The Vancouver City Council report that it has been a stable 
community for most of the 20th Century and comprised older single men, 
immigrants and urban First Nation peoples but that during the period from the 
late 1980s and during the 1990s the “... streets have been taken over by a 
younger, rougher, meaner crowd attracted by a very active drug trade” 
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(Vancouver City Council Caucus 1998: 6). The reasons for this change is 
attributed to a “... rampant drug trade” following the introduction of cocaine in 
the area, the housing of “... mentally disturbed persons” (ibid) following 
deinstitutionalisation and the proliferation of all-night cafes and convenience 
stores (which, it is argued, operate as fronts for the drug trade). The area 
also holds the highest concentration of licensed liquor establishments. It is 
further reported that half of those arrested for criminal activity in the area live 
outside the area. In 1997 the Mayor of Vancouver and the Chief Constable in 
that city formed Canada’s first Coalition for Crime Prevention and Drug 
Treatment which comprises 45 members from Simon Fraser University; 
business consortia; the University of British Columbia; the United Way; the 
Board of Trade; the Port Authority, community groups, NGOs and others that 
adopted a community development approach along a partnership model. 
This coalition became a successful co-applicant with the City of Vancouver 
Council for National Crime Prevention funds to advance their strategy. 
 
On 25 February 1999 the federal government of Canada (through the 
National Crime Prevention Program) provided the City of Vancouver with a 
five-year, $CAN 5 million grant for the Downtown Eastside Revitalisation 
Strategy.  
 
4. Australia 
 
The specific program selected in Australia, which became the research pilot 
and which is considered an exemplar of ‘third way’ implementation, is located 
in the State of Victoria. This project was established in the lifetime of what 
was considered a neo-liberal government; Insights from this program are 
considered to be of significance in either establishing or not the veracity of 
the transportability notion. Respondents include one academic; two local 
government managers; three community development workers (one of whom 
remained anonymous); one Mayor; one consultant (anonymous), and; one 
businessperson (anonymous). Subsequent to the conduct of the Pilot an 
additional interview was conducted in Australia with a Member of the 
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Australian Parliament. In spite of the fact that the study was modified from a 
“case-study” approach, a brief summary of the environment in which 
respondents operate will follow. 
 
The VicSafe Framework for Safer Cities and Shires is a model that is borne 
out of a neoliberal administration in the State of Victoria, Australia (and 
subsequently subsumed under a non-conservative Labor Government in that 
State) which asserts its overriding objective to “... improve the living 
standards of Victorians, by making Victoria a better place to live, to invest, 
and to do business” (Butten, Abbey et al. 1997: 7). VicSafe is Victoria’s 
community safety and crime prevention strategy with Safer Cities and Shires 
being one component of that strategy. This Program is defined as a 
partnership with the Victoria Police, State and Commonwealth government 
agencies, nongovernmental agencies, the business sector, schools and the 
local community “... to pioneer, develop, adopt and adapt international best 
practice” (ibid:  8).  
 
A central issue to the “rediscovery” of crime prevention in Victoria is how or 
even whether law enforcement should be involved in the process (Sutton 
2001). Sutton notes that the first crime prevention scheme introduced in 
Victoria was the Good Neighbourhood scheme that was introduced in 1988, 
which was phased out because of too little police involvement. Its successor, 
according to Sutton, the Police Community Consultative Committees under 
the VicSafe banner was too police dominated. During the 1990s a revitalised 
process that devolved responsibility to Local Government and other 
community groups (Safer Cities and Shires) was implemented. Sutton argues 
that the development of a complementary policing strategy (to Safer Cities 
and Shires) was devised in response to their exclusion from Safer Cities and 
Shires. 
 
The VicSafe Project Group (the forerunner to the VicSafe Safer Cities and 
Shires Project) was formed in July of 1993 with a responsibility to “... 
evaluate and recommend on options for the restructuring of the VicSafe 
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Project to ensure that it will support a partnership approach between the 
Police, Community and Government to enhance community safety and 
security” (Victoria Police 1993: 2). 
 
Methodological difficulties – Overseas Research Component 
 
General: Reported lack of knowledge of the ‘third way’ 
 
As foreshadowed from the pilot project in Australia, many respondents, 
particularly in the United Kingdom and Canada, were unfamiliar with the 
literature in relation to the ‘third way’. As with their Australian counterparts, 
respondents used ‘third way’ terminology (eg. “partnership”, “active 
engagement”, “social exclusion”, “new deal for communities”, “mutual 
obligations”, “entrepreneurship” and so forth) and appeared to be engaged in 
implementation processes that were ‘third way’ in character, but were not 
aware of either the formalised literature or the philosophy. This was far less 
problematic in the United States where the ‘third way’ (or as they 
interchangeably refer to it, the third wave) was well understood, indeed, 
institutionalised to a significant extent.  The matter of informing respondents 
of generic ‘third way’ principles through pre-interview (and during interview 
discussion), as undertaken during the pilot project, significantly resolved the 
tension of “ignorance” that otherwise would have impaired the interview 
process. 
 
The implication from this is that the ‘third way’ has latent and manifest 
impacts, which was explored in Chapter 2 and will be revisited in Chapter 4. 
 
A brief discussion on why ignorance of Anthony Giddens and his ‘third way’ 
by elite respondents was deemed unexpected and unusual will be presented 
at this point. Certainly, some could argue that it is unacceptable to inquire of 
informants about sociological concepts and theorists. Whilst this criticism 
may have merit in an historical context, it loses validity with a model that has 
immediate currency, has been the subject of populist media speculation and 
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review and which has inspired leaders from diverse political persuasions to 
implement programs – such as the ‘third way’.  
 
The centrality of Giddens to contemporary social policy and political culture 
cannot be understated. He is a leading public intellectual who has 
significantly popularized debate on community partnerships, urban renewal, 
welfare reform and so forth. Accordingly, he has commanded the attention of 
intellectuals across the disciplines of economics, sociology, social 
psychology and political science to name a few. His publication The third 
Way (1998) has been translated into 25 languages (Davidson 2000) and, 
according to Alex Callinicos, has become “… a more or less canonical 
statement of the ideology transforming New Labour” (Callinicos 2001: 3). It 
should be a matter of some concern, therefore, if those responsible for ‘third 
way’ implementation (the elites in this Study) had no knowledge of its 
underpinning philosophy – or indeed have not even heard of Giddens. It is 
reasonable that such people would at least have a scant knowledge of 
Giddens’ name, work and key concepts. As will be discussed elsewhere in 
the thesis, the American respondents were familiar with the name of Etzioni 
(the American equivalent of Giddens – a matter to be discussed in greater 
depth in subsequent chapters), his ‘third wave’ and its key concepts. Why 
would there not be a comparable knowledge-base amongst the English, 
Canadian and Australian elites?  
 
Bearing in mind the anomaly that presented to this researcher through the 
lack of knowledge of Giddens in Australia and the subsequent inquiry to test 
the generalisability of this phenomenon across other sites, it is noted that the 
researcher was seeking evidence of the degree to which Giddens’ crafted 
concepts trickled down or had become routinised rather than administer a 
sociology quiz. This is an important distinction in seeking to clarify what the 
‘third way’ means in practice across the research sites. 
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Differing ‘third way’ approaches 
 
The existence of communitarian (United States of America) and reportedly 
non-communitarian (United Kingdom) ‘third way’ approaches became evident 
during the interview process offshore. This was not a major issue since the 
differences appear to be nuances rather than chasms, however the 
discernment is noted for the record. The issue did, however, lead to a 
reworking of interviews and a refinement of material in the literature review 
(at Chapter 2) to make it less Giddens focussed. 
 
Issues specific to Canada 
 
Initial Difficulty in securing Respondents 
 
When the researcher made initial contact with the relevant Council selected 
for investigation in Canada, specifically to obtain respondent contacts in 
anticipation of the research Tour being conducted in September 2001, there 
appeared to be a degree of resistance. Whilst the City Manager’s Office was 
more than helpful in offering to provide civic government contacts, they were 
unhelpful in providing the names of potential citizen-based, business-based 
or partnership-based respondents. The arguments presented were threefold: 
firstly that the intended period for research apparently coincided with “key 
respondent interviews” with a belief that respondents would be “confused” 
about two projects running concurrently; secondly, that respondents may feel 
“researched to death” and; thirdly, the assertion that research in the subject 
community is a negotiated process with insufficient time allocated for that to 
occur. 
 
It was the impression of the researcher that some within the Council 
Manager’s Office may have been concerned that the research project was an 
audit of the program. In spite of repeated assurances that this was not the 
case, no further support was forthcoming on the matter of contacts with 
potential community respondents. It is to be noted that the researcher did 
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meet with two managers attached to the engaged City Council when 
interviews were subsequently conducted in February 2002. It is further noted 
from the comments by respondents from within the community who did 
eventually participate in the research project that to their knowledge no such 
“key respondent interview” process had occurred in September of 2001. 
 
Biased Respondents 
 
As a consequence of this lack of responsiveness, the researcher was left to 
secure interviews via other sources. What became apparent from the 
comments of respondents was that there was an apparent division between 
the Mayor, supported by the City Manager’s Office, and other Councillors 
with respect to the implementation of their partnership strategy.  Further it 
became apparent that these divisions also manifested within the community. 
A Councillor recommended some of the respondents interviewed. It is 
believed that, contingent upon this recommendation that a bias emerged in 
one direction of the debate.  These may have been people who had been 
disillusioned by what they perceived to be a lack of process in consultation 
on matters that they believed directly affected them and their community. It is 
not the opinion of the researcher that this bias worked to demerit the value of 
their contribution since the interviews, in general, canvassed broader 
structural issues in the context of an understanding of ‘third way’ logic. 
 
Lack of Representation in research by Provincial and Federal Government 
 
In spite of the best efforts, the researcher was unable to find willing 
respondents from either the provincial (state) or federal government level. 
This is regrettable since both are important partners to the engaged project 
and their insights would have been extremely useful for the purpose of the 
research. This matter was somewhat balanced by the observations with 
respect to those levels by significant others engaged in the research. It is 
noted that one respondent is a worker for the provincial government at a 
management level, however his observations were sought as a resident of 
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the area in which the project is situated. 
 
Issues specific to the United Kingdom 
 
Concern of Central Government Respondent 
 
In spite of sending multiple copies of the research sheet to a senior 
government official, which clearly outlined the nature of the investigation, 
upon interview this person feigned ignorance of the purpose of the interview 
and refused to be drawn on discussion about the ‘third way’. After the 
transcript of the interview was forwarded to this person he responded by 
requesting that questions and responses that related to the ‘third way’ be 
deleted. Further, and in spite of several requests for same, no other 
respondent senior within the British Government was nominated for interview 
with the comment that “... Life is very hectic in government with a heavy 
focus on delivery” (Unnamedxi 2001: 1) The impediment was that the only 
person within the framework of the Blair ‘third way’ government who was 
made available was unprepared to discuss the ‘third way’ because it was 
“political”. This matter was, nonetheless, balanced by insights from significant 
others outside the government. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The articulation of a research process can appear rote and, at times, tedious. 
Notwithstanding, the process of refining the action of the research within the 
interpretive milieu in which this action is constructed, is, of itself, a dialectic 
that yields substantive investigation in which “truth” is exposed though 
description, elaboration, refinement of argument, data dissection and, 
ultimately, theorising. It may be common sense that ultimately produces this 
“truth” however in the absence of process, the phenomenon under 
investigation becomes nothing more than either an assumed “fact” or an 
anomaly.  This research seeks to fill a void. The contestable space that the 
                                                 
xi  This respondent has been designated as “unnamed” to protect his identity. Quotes from 
this person may be used elsewhere in the document. 
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phenomenon of the ‘third way’ has elicited in the literature by its proponents 
and its opponents offers little by way of explanation about the consequences 
of its implementation and even less by way of meaning. What struck this 
researcher more than anything else was the willingness by respondents to 
engage in a debate that they felt was beyond their reach and their need to 
understand what others in similar situations were thinking and experiencing. 
The application of what has been called by the researcher deliberative 
confrontational and collaborative interview techniques (as a new device to 
counter what the researcher has called interview contagion) to elite 
respondents has, arguably, provided the enabling method for this disclosure 
to occur.  It is their stories that are of relevance to policy makers and a naive 
citizenry - stories that will be told in the following chapters. Ultimately this 
research will enlighten and inform a process that is emerging as a dominant 
political and social paradigm.  
 
The following chapter will turn attention to the perceptions of the ‘third way’ 
from the perspective of significant players, the majority of whom have been 
charged with its implementation. The discussion that follows will substantially 
set the scene for discourse in Chapters 5 and 6 that particularises the notions 
of the “moral” and “political” imperatives (or agendas) that in turn influences 
the style of implementation for ‘third way’ government through strategic 
alliances and partnerships, the elements of which were introduced in Chapter 
2 and which will be pursued in Chapter 4. 
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   CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
The Meanings of the ‘third way’ in practice  
 
Up to this point, the thesis has explored the concept of the ‘third way’. In 
Chapter 2, the literature on the ‘third way’ was expansively reviewed across 
its core features, those being isolated by the researcher as its “philosophy” 
(part 1) and its “armature” (part 2). The discussion will now proceed along 
lines established from that chapter. The “philosophy” of the ‘third way’ will be 
iterated through the data. Secondly, the elemental “armature” (civil society, 
NGOs and partnerships) will be explored, through the perceptions of 
respondents. In crafting the debate in this manner, it is hoped that the data 
will inform a more intimate interrogation in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
The format of the chapter will: 1. interrogate knowledge of the ‘third way’ 
through the data; 2. focus on the key notions within ‘third way’ thinking (civil 
society, NGOs and partnerships) from the Giddens perspective and; 3. 
present a narrative on each from the data. Data across all the sites will be 
utilised for this purpose.  
 
Firstly, we should turn our attention to the understanding (or lack thereof) by 
respondents to the general concept of the ‘third way’. 
 
Knowledge and Interpretation of ‘third way’ among respondents 
 
As foreshadowed in the Methods chapter and briefly summarised above, the 
data from the Australian research pilot suggested a singular lack of 
knowledge about the ‘third way’ and its author. As this was unexpected (for 
reasons outlined in the previous Chapter), the researcher sought to 
determine whether this was a generalized feature of respondents across all 
sites. This was to prove to be the case. Whilst it was predicted that 
academics and senior administrators would be familiar with the philosophy of 
 The ‘third way’: Inclusion at a cost
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the ‘third way’, it was found that many such respondents were either 
unfamiliar or vague about the concept. In order of ranking of familiarity, the 
Americans displayed knowledge, the UK respondents demonstrated varying 
degrees of knowledge and, by and large, the Australian and Canadian 
respondents were not familiar with the ‘third way’. In spite of this 
phenomenon, respondents from all sites were either familiar with, or using, 
vocabulary and concepts attaching to ‘third way’ philosophy, albeit with 
differing interpretations about what was meant by the terms being applied, a 
matter that will be explored through the data. A little later in this discussion 
this latter curiosity will be reviewed, drawing from earlier writings by Giddens 
and referencing the theorems of Michael Polanyi. In the first instance, 
however, a review of respondents’ knowledge of Giddens and the ‘third way’ 
will be assessed through the data. 
 
In so doing we need to briefly return to a definition of the ‘third way’. For the 
purpose of this definition, we go directly to its author, Anthony Giddens, a 
respondent to this research, who described his ‘third way’ thus: 
 
…(as) simply a label….for a debate going on throughout the world 
essentially about …. making some sense … (of) these two previous 
political orientations that have now become, I think, largely obsolete – 
traditional Keynesian State-based social democracy on the one hand 
and market liberalism on the other of the Thatcherite variety. So it is 
an attempt to find an effective left of centre philosophy when you’ve 
got beyond those two political orientations of the past (Giddens 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 44).  
 
 and; 
 
…many of the policies associated with Keynesianism depended upon 
the national State, depended upon a fairly insulated economy and 
dependent upon a kind of passive version of the welfare state and I 
think the new package is quite different. It has a kind of moral ethic I 
think of responsibility and rights, it adjusts to the need to have 
governance below the level and above the level of the nation, it has a 
strong emphasis on devolution, it emphasises active welfare 
measures, emphasises active labour market policies, it still tries to 
secure redistribution but not simply to passive income redistribution 
more through redistribution of life-chances via the labour market and 
other mechanisms. All in all it’s a pretty big change, it also I think 
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every left of centre government has discovered the need for fiscal 
discipline and I think that is generally acknowledged to be crucial now 
that you can’t just spend willy nilly and expect future generations to 
pick up the tab so you have to have pretty disciplined economic policy 
(Giddens 2002 - Transcriptions: 44-45). 
 
Interestingly, one of several senior government bureaucrats contacted in the 
United Kingdom, when asked to define the ‘third way’, became extraordinarily 
defensive stating (this quote has already been used but is revisited in a 
differing context): 
 
I thought you were going to ask (other) questions ….. Well I suppose 
in strict terms it’s a route between social democracy …. Actually I’m 
not going to be very good on this subject, I don’t operate, I don’t think, 
I don’t work in those sorts of areas. Be best if you ask me more 
practical stuff (Unnamedxii [a] 2002 - Transcriptions: 10). 
 
When questioned on whether the British Government had adopted a ‘third 
way’ approach, the same respondent answered in the following way: 
 
 Well it depends what you read. It did and then other stuff I read is that 
it’s abandoned it and I leave all those sorts of discussions to people 
who are the think tanks and the policy wonks and all of that. It’s not 
something I’m directly engaged in at all. I just don’t have the time for it 
(Unnamed [a] 2002 - Transcriptions: 11). 
 
The unqualified subtext within this answer is whether it implies a lack of 
understanding about the ‘third way’ or whether it reflects a fear to answer 
“inappropriately”, that is, against the government “line”. The matter of the 
latter contention will be explored in the following chapter. Certainly a view 
was progressed, by one academic, that the ‘third way’ was not a coherent 
ideology:  
 
…what it does (is) it picks up bits and pieces Bower Bird-like so 
therefore again if there’s not a strong movement in a practical sense 
and also a theory informed one which can provide an alternative on 
the left, it means then that it’s more likely to side with the right…..to 
me my main concern is their vacillation, they’re slippery and they were 
far too much influenced by Thatcherism and economic rationalism, 
                                                 
xii  Again, the use of the designation “unnamed” has been used in relation to this quote and 
the one that follows to protect the identity of the respondent. Quotes from this person may be 
used elsewhere citing his quotations in a different manner. 
 137
 
 
they internalised far too much of that ideology and therefore one has 
to wonder to what extent any viable alternative ….is genuine (Abbey 
2002 - Transcriptions: 401). 
 
Other respondents, whilst according an understanding to the elemental 
features of the ‘third way’, were far less circumspect about their impressions 
of it: 
 
My understanding of the term the third way is that it has become a 
joke to describe formerly redistributative political parties who wanted 
to find a way of redistributing that nobody would know about. But since 
its application by particularly the British Labour Party it has become a 
joke because it’s turned out to be, in spite of the best efforts of 
Anthony Giddens at the London School of Economics, it’s turned out 
to be empty of content (Stern 2002 - Transcriptions: 4).  
 
or: 
 
My understanding of the third way is that it is pretty nebulous; it sets 
whatever one wants to do (Anonymous [b] 2002 - Transcriptions: 89). 
 
Other respondents captured partial comprehension (or jaded comprehension) 
of the ‘third way’, apparently dependent upon their particular professional or 
political position. One nongovernmental administrator viewed it as a method 
of engaging his sector in economic relations between government and his 
sector in delivering public services (Wisken 2002, Transcriptions: 31; see 
also Anonymous [e] 2002, Transcriptions: 79), another, a Union policy 
advisor, seeing it as a process “... to reformulate social democracy to be 
compatible with capitalism and to make sure capitalism is tempered with a 
human face that is both fair and efficient in the operation of markets” (Low 
2002 - Transcriptions: 20). Others, such as a Municipal Government 
administrator, view the concept of markets “…. as something that actually 
can be used to provide improved quality of life for citizens provided it is 
appropriately regulated” (Wright 2002 - Transcriptions: 52) with a 
psychologist within Municipal government defining the ‘third way’ as an: 
 
…associat(ion) with the New Labour Government’s policies … moving 
…towards something which is a blend of traditional labour policies and 
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also policies of the conservative parties so it’s a much more 
pragmatically based approach rather than ideological approach 
towards managing the country I suppose and managing the public 
services of which I am a part (Anonymous [f] 2002 - Transcriptions: 
65). 
 
Other respondents who clearly could articulate ‘third way’ process, chose 
rather to couch their definition in terms of electoral impact rather that 
definable social outcomes. Consider, for example, this response from a 
senior Union official in Canada: 
 
They’ll always talk about working families or something – it’s almost 
impossible to get anybody to talk about the labour movement as a 
movement per se so the centrist way was to dump all the baggage of 
the past and embrace what happens to be the most popular at any 
given time with the population is probably the best way I would 
describe how people saw it in Canada (Hargrove 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 214). 
 
The paucity of understanding of the ‘third way’ and Anthony Giddens for the 
majority of Australian and Canadian respondents can be summed up by the 
following exchange: 
 
Q Tell me have you heard of Anthony Giddens? 
 
A. The name rings a bell but I’m not quite sure why it does. 
 
Q The concept of the ‘third way’? 
 
A No (DiSanto 2002 - Transcriptions: 414). 
 
If we consider the comprehension of respondents as a polling exercise, we 
can characterise Giddens’ approach to the ‘third way’ (based upon the 
definition of the ‘third way’ as deployed by Giddens himself) in the following 
way: 
 
Complete understanding (all characteristics mentioned):   22 percent (7) 
Partial understanding (some characteristics mentioned):   39 percent (14) 
No understanding (no characteristics mentioned):       39 percent (14). 
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It needs to be borne in mind that this is an interpretive exercise that seeks to 
find whether the respondent satisfied the criteria established by Giddens. 
Nonetheless, an exercise that finds almost 78 percent of respondents, who 
represent the highest levels of administration, government, unions, 
academics and practitioners, who show either partial or no understanding of 
the ‘third way’, raises a question as to why this should be the case.  In terms 
of those who had either both demonstrated knowledge of who Giddens was 
and who had read his work, only 22.2 percent met this criterion. Given the 
credentials of the respondents, the ‘third way’ nature of their work and the 
fact that the ‘third way’ has become, and will continue to be, a pivotal 
ideology for their elected leaders, (as argued in Chapter 2) this is an amazing 
result. An explanation for this will be posed in Chapters 5 and 6 (and 
conceptually dealt with below). In fairness to the American respondents, they 
did, by and large, have an understanding, or had heard, of Etzioni. 
 
The definitional problems were not restricted to the broad concept of the 
‘third way’. There was evidence that respondents were liberally using specific 
‘third way’ jargon without either knowledge of the philosophy that drives these 
concepts or of the intended definition of the terms. Consider this comment 
from a Victorian respondent for example: 
 
I might use some of the language that the third way is using but …. I 
am (not) at all aligned with it. The problem I see, … (is that) I actually 
think that people don’t understand, and they’re still using …(third way 
words)…. and they are using it as a buzzword and the articulation and 
the reality are two different things. …. people get into little favourites 
about oh this fashionable at the moment so they might articulate the 
words but the reality is that they don’t understand it. I’m happy to say I 
haven’t done any reading on the third way …. (Coleiro 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 450). 
 
On speaking on the problem of definition another respondent despairingly 
noted “... the world is full of semantics” (Harberts 2002 - Transcriptions: 487). 
Consider the subtext from the following interplays: 
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Q So how do you translate a program in the United Kingdom for 
example that runs across two levels of government to one that has 
three levels of government? The parlance is the same isn’t it – New 
Deals for Communities you spoke about, I suppose there is talk about 
social inclusion and exclusion 
 
A1 Yep 
 
Q The New Deal for Communities is a relatively new initiative, that’s 
the current government … 
 
A1 Yep yep (Anonymous [j] 2002 - Transcriptions: 443). 
 
And, later in the same interview: 
 
Q. What do you know about the ‘third way’? 
 
A1 Nothing much until you spoke about it.  
 
Q You are using words that are resonating with ‘third way’. … 
 
A2 So what kind of words? 
 
Q For example, the New Deal for Communities is very much a ‘third 
way’ term. Inclusion/Exclusion, …..So, it seems that the jargon shift, if 
it is only a jargon shift, …... 
 
A1 The current policy comes straight out of England and I was in the 
Department, we analysed the policy when there was the change of 
government – I moved into the program at the time and had to 
research their policy to make sure where our direction was in the 
program – it came straight out of the English model… (Anonymous [j] 
2002 - Transcriptions and Coleiro 2002 - Transcriptions: 450).  
 
In fleshing out this issue further, the following section will iterate some 
quotations from those who constitute that bottom third of the respondent pool 
who had no understanding of Giddens or the ‘third way’ but who nonetheless 
used terminology that is pivotal to ‘third way’ approaches. For the purpose of 
the exercise, the ‘third way’ components will be italicised: 
 
As in, to focus on social exclusion? … it’s always that kind of process 
where if we hear the whispers then OK well hey let’s look, and 
program, around social exclusion and I guess particularly with Hume 
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City Council we do take that on board (Di Santo 2002 – Transcriptions: 
412). 
  
…there were no clear guidelines as to what that sponsorship could 
entail, what the mutual obligations were on each (Anonymous [c] 
2002: 496). 
 
And the triple bottom line was the new buzzword that kept coming out 
of the corporate planning  - so they were the main flavours (Di Santo 
2002 – Transcriptions: 421). 
 
…in an urban renewal kind of way (Anonymous [k] 2002 – 
Transcriptions: 465). 
 
…the players have changed but you have western diversification just 
all kinds of players in there trying to do economic development but as 
far as I can see they’ve spent the first part of their time trying to build 
community capacity they call it and that’s to empower groups 
(Kennedy 2002 – Transcriptions: 104). 
 
In terms of recognition of the need for social enterprise, like we didn’t 
even think in terms of economic development or social enterprise we 
didn’t even know any of those words, but the academics kind of saw 
us doing this and said oh that’ what you’re doing. (Lyotier 2002 – 
Transcriptions: 135). 
 
…we are also trying to find some ways to look at that whole, in a more 
strategic way, bringing government together so that we don’t duplicate 
our funding, a better understanding of how we fund and looking at how 
you know the purpose, the most strategic targeting so to speak of 
specific services or areas and looking at outcomes (Au 2002 – 
Transcriptions: 191). 
 
…and then building the social capital, building the caring for each 
other, the camaraderie to do problem-solving and really the 
importance of having … the goal is to help the person as much as 
possible to become self-sufficient to do more of a support group type 
of thing as opposed to a helping industry that reinforces the need and 
reinforces the help (Au 2002 – Transcriptions: 210). 
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The Victorian approach of cloning ‘third way’ styled programs in a “cut and 
paste” exercise and applying its terminology without definition of this 
terminology supplies some explanation for this phenomenon and is 
demonstrated throughout the data (other than those quotes cited above – 
note, for example, Yungwith 2002 - Transcriptions: 436 and Anonymous [k] 
2002 - Transcriptions: 457.)  Further, this application, as discussed earlier, 
does not even acknowledge the initiating authors in spite of its liberal usage, 
as exemplified by this comment from a prominent businessperson engaged 
at a programmatic Board level:  “... I’ve got to say Clive I haven’t read any 
books by them (Giddens, Blair and Clinton). Do you want to explain it to me 
quickly” (Anonymous [c] 2002 - Transcriptions: 500). 
 
In the Canadian site chosen for research, Vancouver British Columbia, 
discussion on the ‘third way’ appears to be at an earlier stage of 
implementation development. In spite of the support nationally for the 
concept (Chretien, heading a Liberal [conservative] government), the tri-
tiered government structure that dominates in that place (city, provincial and 
federal) coupled with the previous dominance of the NDP (social democratic) 
government in British Columbia, has, in the opinion of this researcher, 
contained much of this debate. The relatively recent election of a Liberal 
government at the provincial level in British Columbia significantly raises the 
bar for ‘third way’ adoption. Certainly all respondents alluded to a changing 
methodology consequent upon the election of this government: 
 
I suppose the whole thing could be thrown out with the bathwater with 
the new Provincial government. I would say we are not, we’ve heard 
verbal commitments that there’s a commitment to the Vancouver 
Agreement. I don’t think the jury is back in on that on their side. They 
may have another view of how to do business. Certainly it’s a major 
impact. Someone said that at our level when the government changed 
it’s someone pushed the pause button, everything sort of stopped 
while the Province, who is a major player in all this stuff, while they did 
their internal stuff and we’re all, we had a lot of momentum built up so 
we’re on a roll and then suddenly boom, things stopped. That’s the 
perception, I mean work kept going but boy it’s slowed down 
significantly (MacPherson 2002 - Transcriptions: 223). 
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This same respondent, somewhat despairingly of the move by the new 
provincial government towards “efficiency models” reflective of ‘third way’ 
philosophy (although admitting not to have read Giddens) lamented the 
prospect of fewer agencies engaged in partnership problem-solving (another 
‘third way’ feature): 
 
So I think in terms of restructuring, I think it will force agencies to come 
together; I think there will be fewer agencies. If I were an agency I 
would be looking for alliances and partnerships but I think that’s going 
to be forced by the government. Government saying fewer agencies 
will exist (MacPherson 2002 - Transcriptions: 235). 
 
The idea of harnessing the energy of the community to a political purpose (to 
be expanded upon in the following chapter) through partnerships is also 
being openly discussed in this jurisdiction, i.e. there appears to be a degree 
of acquiescence to ‘third way’ approaches, albeit without a corresponding 
debate about the sourcing of this discussion: 
 
I think that’s what it comes down to. We need to build other than 
agencies. The agencies will not have credibility in this government’s 
eyes so we have to bring in either the voice of the people, the 
residents, ….. You always have the two extreme ends; the extreme 
left lobbyists and the extreme right lobbyists. What we need to work on 
is the middle ground (Au 2002 - Transcriptions: 202). 
 
In summarising the results thus far on the knowledge of the ‘third way’ by 
respondents it is noted that: 
 
o The majority of respondents had either no, or only partial, knowledge 
of Giddens and his construct of the ‘third way’; 
 
o Subsequently there is a lack of understanding of the terms embedded 
within the philosophy of the ‘third way’ based upon definitions provided 
by Giddens himself; 
 
o In spite of the lack of “explicit” or “discursive” knowledge (discussed 
below) by respondents not familiar with Giddens, the data across all 
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sites demonstrates the application of “tacit” or “practical” knowledge 
(also raised below) in accommodating conceptually the notions implicit 
to ‘third way’ thinking. This appears to flow from definitions 
representative of familiar or “common sense” approaches by 
respondents.  This matter will be explored below. 
 
The application of “tacit” or “practical” knowledge by respondents to 
explain the phenomenon of the ‘third way’ in practice 
 
In seeking to understand why it would be the case that an influential model 
such as the ‘third way’ should exhibit such a paucity of knowledge by those 
empowered with its implementation, we need to explore both the earlier work 
of Giddens (on “discursive” and “practical” knowledge) and the notion of tacit 
knowledge (versus explicit knowledge) from Michael Polanyi. It is from the 
observations of the latter that a conceptual backbone will be laid upon the 
data from this research. In the first instance let us review Giddens’ 
conceptions. In drawing from Freud’s formulation of “conscious” and the 
“unconscious”, Giddens distinguishes between consciousness as sensory 
awareness, memory as the temporal constitution of consciousness and recall 
“... as the means of recapitulating past experiences” (Giddens 1984: 49) as a 
method of focussing upon what Giddens refers to as “... the continuity of 
action” (ibid). In extending the Freudian metaphor, he distinguishes between 
discursive and practical consciousness, the former relating to that which an 
actor can verbally articulate, the latter referring to that to which the actor has 
access to as a consequence of what he or she “knows” based upon their 
durée of action and without necessarily being able to express it – the 
cumulative sum of knowledge based upon experience. In furtherance of this 
principle Giddens, like Erikson before him, views day-to-day life as governed 
by “ontological security” expressing ”autonomy of bodily control” within 
“predictable routines”. In essence, this theorem engages feelings of trust in 
others (as the deepest level of the “security system”) predicated by 
“predictable and caring routines” established, Giddens asserts, by parental 
figures (my emphasis) (ibid: 50).  
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The cognitive activity model introduced by Michael Polanyi proceeds initially 
from a distinction between focal and subsidiary awareness, the former 
referring to issues that the knowing subject is aware of by virtue of the fact 
that attention is drawn to them, the latter of which subjects are aware of 
without there being focus placed upon them (Gill 1999). According to Jerry 
Gill, subsidiary awareness can shift focus on the basis of relative distinctions, 
for example, the letters in words rather than the words themselves, or the 
spelling of words. The second distinction that emerges from Polanyi’s 
writings is between bodily and conceptual activity, a polarity tension engaging 
an activity dimension through experience. Finally, and by application of these 
two elements, emerges his third distinction, that being the difference between 
tacit and explicit knowing. Where, Gill argues, the first distinction involves an 
awareness dimension (or “continuum of experience”) and the second derives 
from an “activity dimension or continuum”, the final invokes a “cognitive 
continuum” In his analysis Polanyi explains explicit knowledge as that which 
can be objectified whereas tacit knowledge involves value judgements, 
intuitions and insights. In defining tacit knowledge, Polanyi summarises thus: 
 
When we are relying on our awareness of something (A) for attending 
to something else (B), we are but subsidiarily aware of A. The thing B 
to which we are thus focally attending, is then the meaning of A. The 
focal object B is always identifiable, while things like A, of which we 
are subsidiarily aware, may be unidentifiable. The two kinds of 
awareness are mutually exclusive: when we switch our attention to 
something of which we have hitherto been subsidiarily aware, it loses 
its previous meaning. Such is briefly, the structure of tacit knowing  
(Polanyi 1964: x). 
 
In equating tacit knowledge with a legitimate form of cognition and the 
“primordial”, Polanyi suggests that it emerges directly from the subject’s 
desire to pragmatically make concrete, aspects of one’s world, whereas 
explicit knowledge belongs in the realm of theoretical enquiry and 
explanation to answer informational and technical questions.  Fundamentally 
all knowledge flows from tacit knowing, according to Gill in commenting on 
Polanyi: 
 
All of this is another way of saying that in any cognitive context there 
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must be elements which are not made explicit but which are 
nevertheless taken as known, since without such elements or 
assumptions one could never get started knowing anything. Although 
it may often be possible to step back and explicate some or all of 
these tacit factors, the fact remains that in order to do this one must 
rely on yet other unexplicated factors, and so on. Thus in principle it is 
not possible to articulate everything that one claims to know, and thus 
tacit knowing is logically prior to explicit knowing (Gill 1999: 432). 
 
Thus, according to Murray Jardine (1998), tacit knowledge is “… knowledge 
that (normally) does not reach consciousness but nonetheless supplies a 
foundation for the explicit knowledge we pursue” (Jardine 1998 in Thiele 
2000: 581). Following Polanyi, Jardine argues that there can be no 
exhaustively specified knowledge since our understandings are grounded in 
our subsidiary awareness of the world. We can type on a word processor, but 
few would be able to explain precisely how we do that. Our problem solving 
from which “solutions” evolve arise from “leaps”, in Polanyi’s terms, that are 
guided by past experience, analogies and other such clues - what Lowe 
(2000) refer to as  “non-rational act(s) of ‘imagination’” (Lowe 2000: 327). 
 
In applying Polanyi’s theorem to the current research, we can explain the 
lack of a general comprehension of the ‘third way’ by respondents through 
their application of tacit (or practical, to use Giddens term) knowledge to 
clarify “familiar” terminology within their life-world of experience. Perhaps, to 
them, the specification of “explicit” knowledge, drawing upon academic or 
political projections by government, is less important than their pursuit of 
objectives grounded in these life experiences. In Chapter 2, the matter of 
usage of “familiar” language by ‘third way’ proponents was canvassed. The 
application of intuitive knowledge by respondents, embedded within their 
experiential understandings, gives a new dimension to the use of this 
language in the first instance. Needless to say, the perceptions of 
respondents in this particular research were limited to their knowledge of the 
phenomenon within the sector to which they belong and, as such, reflected 
the view of a relatively small sample of people. It is reiterated that this has 
been a small study enquiring into a relatively small part of the ‘third way’ – 
specifically those elements that relate to development within the community. 
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Certainly the application of tacit knowledge by respondents in this research 
was more in evidence (and therefore stronger) on issues of community 
development and weaker on macro-political themes. 
 
During the course of the balance of this chapter we will explore the adoption 
of this language (and its meaning) by (and for) respondents (and their 
perceptions of the implementation of the ‘third way’), albeit with differing 
interpretations to ‘third way’ “authors”, in the absence of more formalised 
definition (explicit knowledge). The discussion will also return to this anomaly 
in Chapters 5 and 6. This discussion will be couched in terms of the 
“armature” of the ‘third way’, established in part 2 of Chapter 2, those being 
“civil society”, “NGOs” and “partnerships”. The conversation will initially turn 
to the notion of civil society. 
 
Respondent knowledge: interpretations of civil society 
 
We saw in Chapter 2, part 2, that civil society is a pivotal concept for ‘third 
way’ theory. What emerges from the data are that the concept of civil society 
is nebulous from the perspective of operatives in the real world. Unlike the 
view of Giddens and other theorists that the notion of civil society is 
ideologically constructed in history and grounded in tangible relations, most 
respondents weren’t able to communicate its specific relevance to their 
immediate reality. Further, it appeared that respondents had not given great 
thought to the concept of civil society yet many advocated, demonstratively, 
processes that are reflective of the concept. Certainly all recognised the 
potency of communities to problem-solve on social issues.  
 
As with other notions within the ‘third way’, comprehension of the concept of 
civil society came more from engagement, based upon perception in 
application, rather than to theoretical or philosophical rubric (see, for 
example, Anonymous [e] 2002 - Transcriptions: 83; Anonymous [f] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 75; Anonymous [j] 2002 - Transcriptions: 440-41; Anonymous 
[k] 2002 - Transcriptions: 470; Bright 2002 - Transcriptions: 13; Butten 2002 - 
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Transcriptions: 336; Conner 2002 - Transcriptions: 308; Harberts 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 496; Low 2002 - Transcriptions: 21,25,27; Lyotier 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 132-33; Travis 2002 - Transcriptions: 286; Wisken 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 39; Wright 2002 - Transcriptions: 54; Yungwith 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 408). Most respondents could relate instinctively to the idea of 
civil society, but seemed confused about the way in which governments 
sought to make real, within the context of their policy, this concept. Consider, 
for example, this observation by a respondent from the United Kingdom, who 
has spent most of her working career as a senior administrator within 
nongovernmental organizations: 
 
It has certainly proved much more difficult than this government 
expected to involve people…..I think they’re making a genuine effort to 
find where civil society is and involve it in all its different aspects but I 
think that’s been one aspect of the failure of the first Labour 
administration that they failed to find the community and connect with 
it in any way that led to good outcomes (Stern 2002 - Transcriptions: 
7). 
 
In fairness, it should be noted that whilst there appeared to be either 
confusion about what government meant by the notion, or disquiet about its 
potential application, most respondents recognised the need to try and 
“connect” what, at times, were viewed as disparate stands of their 
communities – to imbue them with a sense of solidarity in spite of their 
differentness. Thus one Canadian respondent used the following metaphor to 
capture his perception of the lack of community connection and its impact: 
 
….the disconnect is that people don’t see that the lane that runs 
behind our place here connects to other lanes that run eventually up to 
a lane that goes by their house, right. That sense of being able to 
separate off, that isn’t a part of who we are, is I think a loss not just to 
people here who struggle with where they’re at but a loss to people in 
other parts of the city who if they were able to dig deep into their own 
circumstances and see how they’re a part of that would be richer for it. 
Part of the job is to create the environment that allows all of us to be a 
part of that and that includes those folks that are living up in 
Shannessey and West Point Grey and other parts of lower and 
mainland who are poorer for not connecting (Lyotier 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 133). 
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In seeking to attach practical meaning to the term, other respondents linked 
civil society with social capital, conceptually imbuing social capital with 
catalytic properties in the realisation of civil society. This view finds 
expression across jurisdictions. Nigel Wisken in the United Kingdom 
expresses it in these terms: 
 
I think that government’s policy is very muddled between seeking to 
engage people in reclaiming their communities which has got out of 
hand because of thugs and bullyboys and neglect by local authorities, 
… I think there is a real confusion about genuine grass-roots 
community activity, everybody says if you’re going to be successful in 
any regeneration program, health, education, crime there has to be 
rooted into the community and you have to involve people from the 
community. Everyone is agreed that we’ve got to build the capacity of 
local communities because that’s the only way that improvements will 
be sustained (Wisken 2002 - Transcriptions: 39). 
 
The idea of social capital being harnessed by government (and the 
community) to reconstruct civil society is demonstrated throughout the data. 
Some, like the UK respondent below, are apprehensive about the policies of 
the British government, however, and its capacity to engage: 
 
I don’t see them really stimulating any ground level community activity 
or generating any more social capital. I haven’t seen it, which is not to 
say it won’t happen. It might happen further down the line because a 
lot of them are in a stage of trying to get top level plans together and, 
well there’s another issue, I mean they have to start spending some 
money quite quickly, so the whole process doesn’t really lend itself to 
building up civic involvement (Anonymous [b] 2002 - Transcriptions: 
95). 
 
Others, particularly those in Canada recognise the need for building social 
capital but feel constrained by the limitations that a money-oriented 
philosophy overlays on its development. As one Civic Manager noted: 
 
We need to work on more of building social capital and we don’t do 
that very well at all. Some of the frustration I have is also because the 
whole kind of norm of the DTES has gone skewed to the extent that 
people will participate in meetings and all that get paid. (Author’s 
emphasis) (Au 2002 - Transcriptions: 209). 
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In the American situation, the nexus between social capital and community 
empowerment was a consistent theme in the data: 
 
…for empowerment to really take place in local communities 
Foundations have to have a greater sensitivity to what the capacities 
are in local communities …(to help them)… build the infrastructure 
that’s responsive to your particular community and even with 
sensitivities to governance issues that often take place in 
neighbourhoods, that are different from the corporate model or a 
historical Foundation model. I’m not sure yet those Foundations have 
figured that out. There’s a lot of talk about it but when it really comes 
to operationalise and the ability of grass-roots groups to access those 
resources and those resources then to be able to come back to the 
local community…. (Copple 2002 - Transcriptions: 243). 
 
The proposition that the development of social capital and “empowerment”, in 
tandem can occur places considerable rigour on the part of government to 
perform. This appears to be well understood in the United States, particularly 
in the context of helping to shape policy. As Jeremy Travis noted: 
 
….the common core idea is that communities have within them the 
assets that can be very useful in developing their own resiliency and 
that organising the community to harness those assets also provides a 
political point of leverage for increasing government accountability. So 
it really has two strands to it; one is inward looking, which is to say 
communities have strengths and that a strong society builds on those 
strengths and the second is in essence a governance question, which 
is how to strengthen the voice of communities in the making of policy 
(Travis 2002 - Transcriptions: 284). 
 
In line with Giddens’ apparent fear of organised community groups 
(discussed in detail in Chapter 5), the development of social capital was seen 
to be more akin to strengthening local communities rather than encouraging 
their political interventions. This was particularly noted from the data in 
relation to Australia. Nonetheless, respondents from that jurisdiction, in 
accord with others, recognised the importance of social capital in the 
development of civil society: 
 
….(one of the key principles is) …. enabl(ing) both in an economic 
sense, wealth creation in a social sense creation of social capital hand 
in hand so that you are actually growing the capacity and the value, 
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intellectual, human social, economic, at the local level and providing a 
capacity to do that (Butten 2002 - Transcriptions: 359). 
 
There was, however, a stream of thought that permeated the data that 
suggested that the idea of civil society was far removed from a world for 
individuals who struggled on a day-to-day basis just to survive. Respondents 
with this view were cynical of the notion of capacity building when structural 
impediments existed that worked in an opposing direction to that which 
engaged capacity building sought to achieve. Note the comments from one 
community development worker in Australia:  
 
... if you are talking about citizenship it’s a long way from the concept 
of people being able to contribute to citizenship, …..They have no 
motivation to worry about anything other where the next cigarette is 
coming from and what sort of food they will have for lunch … There 
are a lot more people in the community like that or barely elevated 
beyond that working their guts out just to survive and indeed probably 
would be better off economically on welfare than trying to continue in a 
job that pays very basic wages with family commitments and all the 
rest. How can they worry about citizenship and what they give when 
they need to sustain whatever lifestyle they have regardless of how 
poor and horrible that might be. …. and talking about citizenship to 
people like that is just more rhetoric and they would not respond to it  
(Coleiro 2002 - Transcriptions: 452). 
 
There was a view, nevertheless, that recurred throughout the data (and 
across sites), that equated the development of civic consciousness with a 
corresponding development of shared consciousness, expressed thus by this 
Australian respondent: 
 
Community development in my view works when the person has a 
need. That’s when it happens. It just doesn’t come from nowhere 
(Anonymous [k] 2002 - Transcriptions: 472). 
 
In summary, respondents did not know much about civil society in the 
abstract. However there was consensus that community engagement and 
empowerment are necessary and some saw these as features of civil 
society. This is demonstrated, throughout the data, specifically in the 
discussion on social capital. There is a general view by the majority of 
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respondents that the community is fragmented, lacking a sense of 
connectedness which in turn impedes the development of social capital. 
Some have argued that this arises as a consequence of the pragmatics of 
day-to-day survival for individual participants, whilst others maintain that this 
fragmentation surfaces as a consequence of government policy. 
Nevertheless, the importance of the “sense of community” is, to many, to 
both provide an extended worldview for the development of government 
policy and to act as an agent for accountability for government in the design 
and implementation of policy. 
 
The discussion will now focus on the second of the ‘third way’ “armatures”, 
that being NGOs. 
 
Respondent views and knowledge on the role of NGOs in the ‘third way’ 
context 
 
As outlined in part 2 of Chapter 2, NGOs are seen to be the exemplar of civil 
society. The state of play for NGOs in the conduct of their work is therefore 
(and in the absence of other defined “empowered” civil society 
manifestations), of some importance to this debate about the ‘third way’. 
 
In the following chapter the problematic status of NGOs in the context of 
‘third way’ theory will be explicated within the notion of the “political 
imperative” to be advanced by the researcher. Having foreshadowed this, a 
cursory review of respondent perceptions of the sector should be articulated 
at this point both as a way to introduce the concepts that follow in Chapter 5, 
but also in acknowledgement that the sector is universally agreed by 
respondents to be of relevance to any discussion on the ‘third way’. This 
latter issue is of particular significance, given the abstractions inherent to the 
concept of civil society (from the perspective of respondents, discussed 
previously) and the need to link the notion to a real-life framework.  
 
As was found in the data on civil society, the data in relation to NGOs 
exposed a number of issues that are proving to be problematic to the sector. 
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Given the importance attaching to the application of ‘third way’ theory for 
NGOs and for the purpose of explication, these will be discussed under the 
following headings: fragmentation, suspicion and containment; history of 
“anti”-community development, and; affiliations with government. 
 
Fragmentation, suspicion and containment 
 
According to respondent perceptions, the emergent trend across all sites is 
that NGOs are now apparently being viewed with suspicion by government. 
Some respondents view this sector as not being democratic (Yungwith 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 438 and Kerr 2002 - Transcriptions pg. 520). Some have 
argued that the role of the sector should be confined to welfare service 
delivery rather than advocacy (its more traditional role, some respondents 
argue). This view accords with that of Giddens who states: 
 
Well I am in favour of third sector groups playing an active welfare 
policy and in delivery of some kinds of social goods in which 
government collaborates with those agencies (Giddens 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 46). 
 
In narrowing the responsibilities of the sector to non-advocacy roles, it will be 
argued in the following chapter, government seeks to control dissent. As 
government significantly funds the sector, the capacity to achieve this goal is 
heightened, particularly, according to respondents, by utilising market 
philosophy, specifically “competitive tendering”. Not only does this have the 
effect of ensuring conformity, it also removes from the field any NGOs that 
may be perceived as problematic for government. As one former Mayor in 
Australia noted:  
 
Sometimes the NGOs are in competition with local government in the 
service delivery area …..some NGO sector child care agencies folded 
on the basis that they couldn’t remain in the market place and its partly 
because the Council won with the newest building etc. – knocked 
them out – and our rates subsidised the service and I am not a great 
one for competition policy but given competition policy is so much at 
the forefront of thinking discussion these days we weren’t on a level 
playing field, we were able to offer lower rates in a newer building and 
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what does that do to our community infrastructure if, as a result of 
what we’re doing, we knock and close a couple of NGOs. They may 
not be as efficient as us and a whole lot of other things but I wonder 
what it does to your community welfare sector with that occurring 
(Yungwith 2002 - Transcriptions: 438). 
 
Another Australian respondent suggested that competitive tendering 
achieved the goal of compliance to government policy by those agencies that 
became successful contractors through legal arrangements that reinforced 
fragmentation: 
 
This fragmentation is at a State level and Commonwealth levels. 
They’re imposing or using their programs unilaterally through funding 
sources be they through grants or services and particularly in a 
competitive tendering climate where NGOs and those delivering them 
are actually have limitations on how they work together in partnership 
because of economic pressures, confidentiality and all that sort of stuff 
– contract arrangements (Butten 2002 - Transcriptions: 341). 
 
The emergent trend to corporatise the sector, according to another 
respondent, detaches the sector from its constituency. The concern moves 
from dealing with the impoverished and displaced to a process that 
legitimises the roles of various governments in dealing with this constituency, 
without criticism: 
 
I think we become very, at the grass roots level, either very 
entrepreneurial or you don’t continue – that’s what happens. Because 
if you are not entrepreneurial and don’t have the skills, and this 
sounds very cynical, but if you can’t market what you are doing and 
make the links to the broader strategic directions of local government, 
state government, big business, then in fact it doesn’t matter how 
effective and how good you are and how experienced you are, 
someone won’t agree to fund your project next year or your ongoing 
position (Coleiro 2002 - Transcriptions: 449). 
 
In line with this argument, harnessed with the corporatisation of the sector, 
one respondent in the United Kingdom noted a move to cluster NGOs to 
create a more efficient “industry”.  Whilst acknowledging the secular or other 
peculiarities of this sector not to amalgamate along “industry” lines (asserting 
the independence of each), what emerges from what this respondent 
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suggests is that economic circumstances eventually may force this 
occurrence at some point in the future: 
 
Lord Warner when he did this work for the Prime Minister about 
shaping the voluntary sector he said at one point really you’ve got to 
think of merging with the four or five other organizations in order that 
you can deliver a Nationwide service – you’re too small….If I were to 
mention that to my colleagues just as an idea I would get jumped on – 
my Board wouldn’t sanction it, because the only point of a private 
sector merger is either one company is going under and the other 
wants its assets cheap, or that there’s a strategic reason in the 
marketplace why one brand is better than two or why one company 
delivering one product is better than two etc. etc. There’s no incentive 
in the voluntary sector, we’re not going broke, we teeter on the edge 
all the while, but there’s no incentive for us to merge with another 
organisation at the moment (Wisken 2002 - Transcriptions: 40). 
 
The concept of financial patronage of nongovernmental organizations by 
government is not new. It does, however take on a new perspective under 
‘third way’ government models. Seemingly the sector is becoming, according 
to the majority of respondents, an adjunct to government in the delivery of 
specific services, not an independent sector which can help to make 
government accountable which, it has been suggested, was a significant role 
for the sector historically. This can be evidenced by the views of respondents 
in the United States where, under the Bush “faith-based Program”, non-
sectarian organizations are perceived to be under threat and may become 
redundant: 
 
…when Bush said what shall I pick first to do right? One of the groups 
that he clearly wanted to recognise, affirm and say yes I’m taking care 
of you is this muscular emergent Evangelical Christian community that 
I’m describing -  I mean it is part of his base, and he’s going to take 
care of them (Conner 2002 - Transcriptions: 310). 
 
I certainly have heard, I’ve certainly heard many stories where non-
sectarian groups are concerned and I suppose it’s right for them to be 
concerned because it can certainly look, appear, that something like 
the faith-based initiatives could get a steam-rolling effect and all of a 
sudden everyone is jumping on that bandwagon and neglecting the 
other side of it (Thomas 2002 - Transcriptions: 301). 
 
 156
 
 
Perceived history of “anti”-community development 
 
Generally speaking, in those places where there had not been a social 
democratic government for a considerable period, there was angst about the 
future of the sector. This period was typified by neo-liberal agendas, as 
discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 2, which significantly curtailed the 
capacity of nongovernmental organizations, according to respondents, in 
terms of social debate. This is what the researcher refers to as an “anti”-
community development approach, which the promise of the return of social 
democratic governments was meant to reverse. The emergence of the ‘third 
way’ (as a social democratic government replacement) has not, according to 
the respondents, been reconstructed to enhance the capacity of the sector 
towards greater community empowerment: 
 
What worries me is whether you just go, we went for such a long 
period without being able to, without these kinds of organizations 
being empowered and without being able to talk about the things that 
were important. The new generation of practitioners and policy makers 
and civil servants and so on just don’t think like that anymore 
(Anonymous [b] 2002 - Transcriptions: 97). 
 
In essence, ‘third way’ governments were seen as seeking to extend the neo-
liberal process of “neutralising” debate, a matter that will be elaborated upon 
in Chapters 5 and 6. What emerges from the data in tandem with this 
“neutralising” effect (within the sector) is a new emphasis within the sector 
based upon esoteric and market-based approaches. In line with Canadian 
critics, discussed later, albeit for differing reasons, some respondents in the 
United States alluded to the “industry” of welfare as a rationale to sustain 
employability in the NGO sector: 
 
We tried throwing money at poverty and we found out that … we 
created a whole class of people who spent their professional lives 
spending money that we threw at poverty. This is not the way you deal 
with poverty. Hey, we’ve just bought 5000 people who are going to 
work to eradicate poverty. Now it dawns on them at some point pretty 
quickly, oh my Lord if we eradicate poverty we’re out of work. Panic. 
And it’s not a conscious thing. It’s an intuitive thing.….and you’re 
funding the industry instead of funding the solution to the problem 
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(Anonymous [n] 2002 - Transcriptions: 262). 
 
Others from the same jurisdiction suggested that the motivations for 
engagement in the NGO sector had a corollary motivation for players related 
to their passion and ideology (and theology) , a matter that, to them, accords 
to the principles being espoused in terms of faith-based support being 
developed through the ‘third way’ (to be expanded upon in Chapter 6): 
 
And there are some groups who will do fine and that doesn’t mean to 
say that faith-based is bad. The thing is it cuts right down the middle 
because you find many on the left and many on the right who would 
say well if you ask me yes I am faith-based. Much of the reason I’m in 
human services and much of the reason I have a passion for some of 
the philosophies of the left is because it comes from an upbringing 
where I talked about what I understood at least to be faith (Raley 2002 
- Transcriptions: 323). 
 
Certainly the “industry” is thriving at least in terms of the enterprise 
development by the sector, according to another American respondent who 
suggested: 
 
The last figure we have for the total revenues of the non-profit sector 
in this country was about $665 billion which is tremendous and we talk 
about the value of how strong private giving is in this country with the 
majority coming from individuals but still strong Foundation giving, 
strong individual giving, strong corporate giving. It’s a great success 
story but when you look at the $665 billion revenues and how much of 
it comes from contributions? 20 percent. How much comes from 
government? 31 percent. How much comes from dues, fees and 
charges? 38 percent (Thomas 2002 - Transcriptions: 297). 
 
Perceptions on NGO Affiliations with government 
 
According to respondent perceptions about NGOs and the ‘third way’, the 
affiliation of certain NGOs with government presented as a grave concern in 
Canada. The opinions of respondents in that place will be specifically 
canvassed at this point given that the changing political circumstances within 
that research site (formerly social democratic to a Liberal ‘third way’ 
orientation) provides considerable insight about such relationships, both 
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positive and negative. As outlined in the Methods chapter, a limitation to the 
research emerged in that a change of government occurred at the provincial 
level. This, subsequently, prompted what were believed to be exaggerated 
claims against certain NGOs in that site. It would be a matter of speculation 
as to whether these claims would arise in other jurisdictions given similar 
circumstances. Certainly emotions ran high in Canada about alleged agency 
affiliations with the former NDP government: 
 
….a number of agencies I guess (would be the beneficiaries of money 
from the public purse) you’d have to say. Not-for-profit agencies that 
again are like the Minister described the ones who are quite happy to 
tell us all we’re jerks, I mean Carnegie is a political organisation, it’s 
not a, it once was a community centre, but it is a hotbed of political 
stuff (Kennedy 2002 - Transcriptions: 108). 
 
I don’t know how you define the term user-friendly but because the 
NDP government has been in power for the last ten years so agencies 
that are getting funding from them, rightly or wrongly, whether they are 
pro-NDP policy or not, we don’t know, but the fact that an agency 
exists as in gets funding for the past ten years, it seems like that may 
be more reflective of those policies. ……. (Au 2002 - Transcriptions: 
191). 
 
Even from within the sector there was considerable disquiet. Consider, for 
example, this comment from a resident of the DTES who is a former drug 
addict and who operates a for-profit recycling organisation that generates 
money for the homeless in the region: 
 
If the motive is to build your organisation and your budget and keep 
your bureaucracy in place, what you see here is me and Stephanie, 
and Stephanie is fairly recent right? So it’s been a very lean 
organisation. The power of those organizations and their motives are 
different. If ours are well how do we grow things that are 
sustainable?…. In a community where professional agents were able 
to parlay before even that funding was available to the community, 
were able to portion off their chunks so that they were already sort of 
have sidestepped any community process (Lyotier 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 144). 
 
Another business operator in the district spoke directly about this apparent 
relationship between the sector and government: 
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They’re pretty powerful, the people who have control of them you 
know. Politically they’re pretty powerful or they were. Maybe not with 
the new government they’re not but with the NDP they were 
(Anonymous [h] 2002 - Transcriptions: 169). 
 
and further, from a former resident of the DTES and a current agency head: 
 
I think one of the things I’ve learned about the DTES, our Canadian 
Soweto, is that … it’s like Doctor Frankenstein. You create the 
monster; you love the monster kind-of-thing. There is a complete 
inability for the Social Planning Department at the City of Vancouver to 
step back and just shift a perspective no matter what they’re 
presented with. It’s impossible to create a change in that community 
because the community, the political system in that community, has 
been hijacked and hijacked by the bureaucrats at City Hall by the NDP 
Government that was in for ten years and then by the local groups 
(McCoy 2002 - Transcriptions: 150). 
 
A community activist and business representative was more tempered in her 
approach but nonetheless reflected the view of a significant number of 
respondents in Canada when she suggested that this style of relationship 
flies in the face of what she perceived to be the nature of government: 
 
I guess naively (I) trust that government represents all of us and will 
do the right thing for the masses, the general group as opposed to the 
elites at either end and so I guess with community I worry about that 
kind of lobbying or influence that might affect the government to not be 
general and widespread in its viewpoint (Anonymous [i] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 182). 
 
Certainly the data from other research sites infer either impediments or 
benefits from relationships between nongovernmental organizations and 
government sectors. In the United Kingdom, for example, Blair foreshadowed 
relationships prior to coming to power in 1997 as “third sector” engagements 
(Low 2002 - Transcriptions: 32). Since being in power, according to 
respondents, positive and negative aspects of these relations have 
manifested in a number of ways: via tender arrangements (Wright 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 53 and Anonymous [e] 2002 - Transcriptions: 85); in 
education (Anonymous [f] 2002 - Transcriptions: 73), and; though tensions 
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and power relationships between for-profit and nongovernmental 
organizations for service delivery funding (Anonymous [e] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 80,83,88). In the United States respondents similarly referred 
to “unresolved power relations” between nongovernmental organizations and 
government (Copple 2002 - Transcriptions: 255) with one respondent 
cautioning on the reliance by nongovernmental organizations for government 
funding (Thomas 2002 - Transcriptions: 297). Yet another respondent 
suggested that there had been a history in the United States for power to 
emerge from an antagonistic relationship between the government and 
community sectors, citing African American Ministers as an example (Travis 
2002 - Transcriptions: 289). In Australia, respondents noted a decreasing 
trust by government in the nongovernmental organizations (DiSanto 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 407) with opposition to government being perceived as a 
threat for the sector (Yungwith 2002 - Transcriptions: 431). 
 
In summary, the perceptions of respondents about NGOs (best exemplified 
by comments from Canadian informants) suggests that they are being 
treated with suspicion by government and that, under a ‘third way’ approach, 
they are being required to act as adjuncts to government in the provision of 
services, rather than as independent advocates in the development of policy. 
As noted elsewhere, the specific circumstances of a changed government 
type in British Columbia (Canada – social democratic to Liberal [in this case, 
‘third way’]) revealed an overtly hostile reaction by respondents in that place 
to a sector that many respondents believed was a “political arm” of the former 
government. Respondents from other research sites, albeit from differing 
perspectives, shared this concern for the sector as an advocacy sphere. The 
discussion will now turn to the armature of partnerships within the ‘third way’ 
– the pivotal mechanism for drawing together the, at times, disparate strands 
of civil society. 
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Respondent views and knowledge on partnerships 
 
If there were vague and confused understandings about civil society and 
emotions ran high over the new role of its exemplar, the NGOs, there was no 
corresponding confusion for respondents about the concept of partnership. 
Ironically, respondents did not reflect the wealth of material that Giddens 
developed on civil society in their general comprehension. This irony 
compounds when one considers that the very proposition that is pivotal to 
Giddens, that of partnership which is discussed at length, as noted in part 2 
of Chapter 2, lacks procedural definition on his part yet finds significant 
comprehension by respondents, albeit as “practical consciousness” or “tacit 
knowledge” based upon “common sense” interpretation. Definitions tended to 
be couched in terms of praxis, rather than theory.  
 
The idea of partnerships is strongly implied in the abstract notion of civil 
society. It would seem, however, that the “exemplars” of civil society, the 
NGOs have been left to distil meaning from the philosophical construct of civil 
society and place it in a practical context. This context, in turn, is influenced 
by the ideological concepts that guide the particulars of each NGO, whether 
that orientation is based upon religious models, social justice models or 
others. The ‘third way’ provides a formalised construct that seeks to drive the 
meaning of partnerships in a more cohesive or defined manner. The rationale 
for this standardisation, it will be argued within the following two chapters, is 
based more upon social control than the creation of more effective 
partnerships.  
 
In categorising the data on partnerships from respondents, the recurring 
themes that emerged across all jurisdictions related to power; patronage and 
control; and analysis. The perceptions of respondents will be interrogated 
across each of these headings during the following sections of this chapter. 
This iteration will provide the evidentiary insight that will guide discussion 
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throughout the following chapters on the “political” and “moral” imperatives.  
 
Partnerships and Power 
 
The literature on partnership relations, at various points, suggests a lack of 
analysis of power relations between partnership members. In this research, 
the matter of this distribution (or lack of) was raised consistently. As one 
respondent noted, the effectiveness of partnerships was linked to anticipated 
outcomes from constituent members based upon a distribution of power: 
 
They do work providing there’s an understanding of what a partnership 
is but normally they are simply ways of working where some dominant 
group wants to get others in to look good on the piece of paper so they 
probably do work but they are rarely tried (Stern 2002 - Transcriptions: 
7). 
 
And further; 
 
Who is the community? The community is comprised of communities 
of interest, the community is comprised of people who are literate in 
their own language … The community is a person who works at night, 
who is 16 and who is 86. … when you had your community 
consultation I would only be hearing …this really aggressive well-
formed voice associated with a lot of resources and these other little 
individuals from the little places who were just coming along because 
they were members of the community and they’d seen the form and 
they wanted to participate, they didn’t have that kind of background or 
experience to play the committee, they didn’t know how to work it 
(Anonymous [k] 2002 - Transcriptions: 471). 
 
One respondent, who is a senior manager in a Local Authority in the United 
Kingdom, suggested that partnership workings are incremental, that is that 
they take time for changes to actually happen. She continues, nonetheless, 
to suggest, “….we tend to talk them (partnerships) up and tend to pretend 
that there’s quite a lot of partnership working” (Wright 2002 - Transcriptions: 
56).  
 
Nigel Wisken, the CEO of a significant third sector organisation, views the 
contemporary definition of partnership as not efficient with its labyrinth of 
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Committees of “experts” and participants wearing “different hats” and with 
organizations living on a “... financial knife-edge” (Wisken 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 36). According to Wisken, third sector organizations are “... 
never the power broker … we are always at the end of a funding chain. We 
are the last to be consulted” (ibid). It is the opinion of Wisken that the sector 
seeks to influence, “shape and change bits of” government policy (ibid: 37). 
However, the pragmatics of the sector, according to him, err to the cynical in 
that: 
 
…. the trouble with the voluntary sector is that there is no sector. You 
are talking about five people meeting on a housing estate in north 
Birmingham to provide 30 kids with summer holidays each year, that 
give their services for free to organizations like our rivals NACRO 
whose turnover is fifty million pounds. To us, we are medium size fairly 
professional outfit, we pay in the top quartile of sector wages, have 
pension schemes, certain grades of staff have cars etc., we’re a 
business but we’re a not-for-profit business. So what are we talking 
about with the voluntary sector? You could buy some people off 
(Wisken 2002 - Transcriptions: 41). 
 
The need of the sector for job security and survival will be expanded upon in 
Chapter 5 as a device of the political imperative for ‘third way’ governments. 
In terms of the scenario of potential dissent by this sector (touched upon in 
Chapter 2 and which will be elaborated upon in Chapters 5 and 6), the ‘third 
way’ approach to control, not unlike its broad market approach is linked to an 
economic dependence by partnership and NGO constituencies upon 
government. As Giddens noted of such organizations in speaking on their 
relations with government, there needs to be a quid pro quo: 
 
….it’s also quite hard to negotiate as you know … because you’ve got 
to give a fair amount of autonomy but as you say you don’t want the 
money just to be swallowed up in local organizations that are not 
accountable to the wider public purpose yes. It’s a difficult route to 
tread that one (Giddens 2002 - Transcriptions: 48). 
 
The question of what constitutes the “wider public good” is, undoubtedly, a 
political question, at least to the Labour government in the United Kingdom. 
An argument against the deployment of power locally beyond what Giddens 
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asserts is “active welfare policy” development and the delivery of “... some 
kinds of social goods in which government collaborates” (Giddens 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 46) are the “unpleasant citizens” such as the neo-nazi groups 
“... who actually use modern technology to form coalitions and networks” 
(ibid). Blair himself, according to another respondent, has a “blind spot” which 
almost demands that he project as more right wing than he actually is (Wright 
2002 - Transcriptions: 60). By design or accident, partnership logic, 
appropriately enabled, creates a situation, as one respondent noted, where: 
 
….if you accept that community engagement is important then a 
corollary, a natural corollary, is that in those localities where there are 
particular points of view prevalent, however elitist divisive racist or 
whatever they might be, then you are accepting that those will get an 
airing (Anonymous [e] 2002 - Transcriptions: 84). 
 
The perception that elites governing the process of partnership was clearly of 
concern to the majority of respondents from nongovernmental organizations. 
The fears can be summed up by the view of Ken Lyotier in Canada who 
asserted that there was: 
 
…. a kind of social colonialism that can go on in a community of 
people where you’ve got a professional class that are maintaining 
themselves in a kind of exploitative way, of people that have very 
limited ability to get to the table and frankly a lot of the times not the 
energy or interest to be there not even analysing how that might be 
happening to them (Lyotier 2002 - Transcriptions: 133). 
 
Many other respondents spoke of both the connectedness of groups with 
government (from a lobbying, political or religious standpoint) and the in 
fighting between groups to gain the ear of government (or to secure funding) 
for their particular enterprises. This appeared particularly problematic to 
outlier organizations, the effect of which appears to be to divide partnerships 
and groups rather than to meet intended community outcomes. This issue 
can be summarised by the following quotes: 
 
You know there is such infighting between the groups receiving 
money. Some of them who we’ve actually spoken against because of 
the effect that we think its had on the community, have come to us 
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with information on other groups and provided us with stuff and it’s all 
to do with their own power thing. Why does this happen? I hate to 
think that people are just bad inside but I think that some people put 
aside what they’re doing, their mandate, or the good that they’re 
supposed to be doing for other reasons, for their own agenda, which 
has nothing to do with that (Anonymous [i] 2002 - Transcriptions: 178). 
 
 
I think that’s what it comes down to. We need to build other than 
agencies. ….we have to bring in either the voice of the people, the 
residents, and also to show that even if the three or four vocal 
opposition voices that there is a larger majority of people who agrees, 
…. You always have the two extreme ends; the extreme left lobbyists 
and the extreme right lobbyists. What we need to work on is the 
middle ground (Au 2002 - Transcriptions: 202). 
 
The belief of most government personnel, many of whom have fought hard to 
implement more inclusive processes, some of whom have moved from 
nongovernmental organizations to the government sector, is that the issue 
ultimately comes down to opportunism – to get things done. 
 
I guess from our point of view there are opportunities, there are 
political opportunities, there’s funding opportunities to deliver some 
stuff and we’ve done that in the past couple of years and often with 
little consultation, making deals with, not imposing, but making deals 
with certain groups of people and trying to be inclusive but when you 
have a limited time to deliver something and you’re seeing a 
community process that is fractured, whose chances of it moving 
quickly are very, very, well it doesn’t move quickly. ….So there’s a real 
tension with government trying to deliver, government trying to 
engage, government trying not to get bogged down, government not 
trying to impose, ….. (MacPherson 2002 - Transcriptions: 227). 
 
From the nongovernmental point of view there is a corresponding degree of 
opportunism: 
 
Well there’s a recognition now on the part of agencies in the 
community, social agencies in the community, that there may well be a 
need to get into the social enterprise mode somewhat partly in order to 
sustain their organizations and I’m not sure whether that again is a 
budget driven more than it is a social need driven motive where 
they’re looking to create employment opportunities for local people for 
example or whether they’re looking to figure out different ways to hold 
and own and steward the real estate of the community or the 
ownership of the enterprises themselves and one of the difficulties 
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there is that if the awareness level of the folks that are being served by 
those agencies as more like a pharaoh’s Egypt than it is like 
democracy or collective sharing (Lyotier 2002 - Transcriptions: 135). 
 
Respondent views on patronage and control of NGOs by government 
 
According to respondents, there appears to be an almost patronising view by 
government about the capacity of communities to deliver partnership models, 
in spite of the fact that partnerships have been utilised at local levels in 
jurisdictions for a long time. This issue manifested in differing ways 
dependent upon whether the respondent was affiliated to government, 
specific interest groups or trade unions. Consider, for example, the 
similarities between government personnel across the various jurisdictions 
about the capacity of partnerships to perform contained in the following 
quotes, from the following nations: 
 
Australia 
 
…while we are doing it for the community, and I don’t mean to sound 
….benevolent or patriarchal …, and I have worked at a local 
government level since and had it confirmed, that at a State and local 
level there is this over-emphasis on consulting the community, on 
consulting the average person whose knowledge of these issues, their 
awareness of these issues is very simple (Butten 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 336). 
 
…they (the community) usually look upon local government or any 
other person who’s required to develop a strategy, for example, to 
provide them with ideas and then they will choose from those ideas. 
For them to come up with the ideas themselves they sort of say well 
we don’t have any ideas (DiSanto 2002 - Transcriptions: 424). 
 
 
The United Kingdom 
 
…there is a shortage of skills and knowledge out there. People don’t 
know, professionals actually don’t know what works in reducing …. 
worthlessness or rather the knowledge is out there but it hasn’t been 
put together in a format that professionals and communities can begin 
to work with – it’s either written by academics and is simply 
inaccessible or there’s been no attempt to digest what researchers 
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have told us works best and to turn that into policy and practice. I 
mean, it’s happening in bits but by no means thoroughly enough and 
part of our job is to distil all this what works material and produce 
working menus so that people at the neighbourhood level and actually 
run with it and people at higher managerial levels can enable them to 
run with it (Bright 2002 - Transcriptions: 11). 
 
 
Canada 
 
I would like to think that we had constructive working relationships but 
somehow with the four pillars approach and the policy paper that was 
written, it drew a lot of support from people who are drug users and 
wished to be enabled in drug use and brought to the fore probably the 
most radical solutions to it and I think that the mistake that we made 
was not finding where we had consensus ….It’s been a whitewash 
here quite frankly. There’s this group called the Coalition that’s the 
Mayor’s Coalition. Council is isolated from that, we never meet with 
them, this is solely the Mayor’s deal, no question about that, solely the 
Mayor’s interest (Kennedy 2002 - Transcriptions: 102). 
 
 
OK first of all the City never wants to be the voice for the community 
because then that’s against the philosophy. What we’ve tried to do is 
to bring them into the process, to give them the voice and because 
every time they sit around the table there has been some situation 
whereby in a meeting with the three levels and them and the 
community saying that while the government is not doing this right and 
all that, the people get really pissed off especially the Federal people. 
They say how dare you, I’m the ADM are you telling me that I’m not .. 
(Au 2002 - Transcriptions: 198). 
 
Still other respondents, who perceived their potentiality for partnership 
engagement as being high, believed that they were alienated from the 
process as a direct result of pressure being exerted by government to control 
the outcomes of the partnership process. A prominent businessperson in 
Canada summed up this control by government as: 
 
Totally, totally top heavy. We are very seldom consulted. The fact that 
you’ve come and talk to me is a surprise because we’re very, very 
seldom consulted at what’s going on down here and we know better 
than anybody what’s going on. …..because we are here on a daily 
basis, we’re dealing with these people daily (Anonymous [h] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 161). 
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Respondent Analysis of Partnerships in action 
 
The majority of respondents were quite emphatic about their interpretation of 
partnerships and were prepared to provide cogent analysis of what they 
believed were the impediments and strengths. Some of this analysis follows. 
 
Most respondents from nongovernmental organizations exhibited significant 
cynicism about the current structure of partnerships. One respondent from 
the for-profit sector epitomised this cynicism by stating: 
 
There’s partnerships talk, there’s talk partnerships in place. That’s 
what’s in place – just the speaking of it, let’s get together and have a 
little talk about it and call ourselves partners, that’s what’s in place, 
nothing else is in place. I mean they can talk till they are blue in the 
face but that is the problem (Anonymous [h] 2002 - Transcriptions: 
160). 
 
The nature of cynicism of process militates against productive engagements 
being realised, a matter raised in a Canadian Report which alerts us to the 
challenges of balancing trust and accountability in both directions [Source: 
(City of Vancouver and Vancouver Coalition of Crime Prevention and Drug 
Treatment 2000: 16). 
 
The issue, it would seem to some, is not so much the failure of partnerships, 
but rather the failure to conceptualise the process by which partnerships are 
forged, the “one size fits all” scenario of economic rationalists (Abbey 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 385). 
 
The use of the term “partnership” is of itself, problematic, according to 
another respondent, who suggests that the style of partnership that 
nongovernmental organizations would like to see in place is not necessarily 
the one that government is prepared to put in place (Butten 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 344) for reasons of patronage and control discussed 
elsewhere. 
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Some respondents, particularly those within local government, referred to 
partnership arrangements as a “one-way” transaction suggesting that central 
government sets the parameters for local government to implement (see for 
example: (Anonymous [e] 2002 - Transcriptions: 82, 85). Others were more 
optimistic, with the qualification, nonetheless, that an effective partnership 
requires beneficial transactions (Anonymous [k] 2002 - Transcriptions: 467). 
 
The engagement of nongovernmental organizations, unfortunately, tends, 
according to some respondents, to be linked to sustainability for those 
organizations: 
 
I think agencies particularly in the DTES, obviously across society or 
across the community, are facing two problems; one is fiscal and one 
is credibility. I think they are interrelated. …. So there’s this sense that 
organizations are being scrutinised regarding inputs and outputs and 
outcomes and there’s also the message that there’s no more money 
and there’s actually going to have to be cuts and less money. …. We 
don’t have the know-how; we don’t have the pizzazz and the 
entrepreneurial abilities (MacPherson 2002 - Transcriptions: 235). 
 
This view accords with that of Jon Bright in the United Kingdom who 
suggests that the nature of ‘third way’ outcomes would appear to have more 
of an economic flavour than be pursuing a social change agenda (Bright 
2002 - Transcriptions: 19). 
 
This could explain the phenomenon of partnership without community 
engagement that became a recurring theme throughout the data, summed up 
by this anonymous respondent who suggests that: 
 
I think in some places there’s quite some effective cross-government 
working, cross-local government working between health authorities, 
local authorities and police but I don’t really, I’ve got to say I don’t 
really see much civic engagement. Probably the partnerships are at 
the wrong level in the main….but the idea that that’s going to engage 
the community or the voluntary sector is a bit of a nonsense. If you 
look at what those partnerships are saying, a lot of them have said 
well we didn’t even know where to start (Anonymous [b] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 95). 
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In summary and consistent with discussion on other “armature” encased 
within ‘third way’ philosophy (civil society, NGOs), respondents had varying 
definitions of partnerships (and its “utility”) dependent upon their worldview or 
position (either government employee, NGO or community etc.). 
Respondents iterated concerns about the power relations between 
government and particular segments of the sector and the potentiality for 
extreme elements of that sector finding favour with government based upon 
their political orientation. It would seem from the data that partnerships are an 
applied logic for the enhancement of government policy and market 
philosophy, which, at times, may not be in the best interests of the 
community.  
 
Summary 
 
The discussion in previous chapters sought to articulate the theory of the 
‘third way’, which, it has been suggested, assumes the proportion of a solid 
policy agenda embraced throughout the world by formerly social democratic 
governments. Further, the discussion alluded to the transportability of the 
model to neo-liberal or conservative government models. This chapter has 
further informed debate by interrogating respondent views about this ‘third 
way’ in the real world (albeit, not the entire ‘third way’), and having regard to 
the specific sub-topics of civil society, NGOs and partnerships. What became 
apparent from the views of respondents was a significant deficiency in 
understanding about this phenomenon. Not only do respondents, by and 
large, not know what the ‘third way’ is, but also they have generally neither 
heard of Anthony Giddens nor of his model. They have nonetheless, and 
paradoxically, integrated ‘third way’ terminology in their real world 
experience, seemingly as a consequence of its application by government as 
common use language. Hence ideas like “partnerships” and “accountability” 
can be found even among those without knowledge of Giddens. The 
researcher has sought to explain this anomaly through the Giddens 
conception of discursive and practical knowledge and Polanyi’s concept of 
tacit and explicit knowledge. With regard to civil society, NGOs and 
partnerships we found more concrete views expressing concern over reality 
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of their status in the current policy regime of ‘third way’ thinking. 
 
The key findings to date are summarised thus: 
 
o On civil society, respondents did not exhibit knowledge of the concept 
in the abstract, however they did equate it with community 
engagement, empowerment and social capital, believing, nonetheless, 
that social capital was impeded as a consequence of a fractured 
community. It is noted that respondents did feel that this fragmentation 
might arise as a result of government policy as much as from the 
requirements of citizens to satiate day-to-day survival needs. 
 
o On NGOs, respondents believed they were being treated with 
suspicion by government under a third way approach with their 
services being required as an adjunct to government service provision 
at the expense of their perceived advocacy role in the development of 
policy. Respondents also felt that this advocacy role was being 
neutralised by active government strategies such as competitive 
tendering and that this process to corporatise the sector acted to 
detach it from its constituency. 
 
o On partnerships, respondents disclosed varying definitions of the term 
dependent upon their professional or experiential background. 
Concern was raised about power relations between government and 
community sectors in the development of partnerships based upon 
favour or political orientation of the partnership members. It is 
suggested from the data that partnerships are an applied logic for the 
enhancement of market ideology (and government), which produces 
outcomes that may not necessarily be in the best interests of the 
community. 
 
o The application of Polanyi’s theorem of tacit knowledge to the 
research helped explain the lack of general comprehension of ‘third 
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way’ theory by respondents (and their subsequent deferral to 
explanations based upon their real world experiences).  
 
Taking a cue from these respondent perceptions, the following two chapters 
will further explore the themes of power and control by isolating two key 
dimensions. These can be thought of as “political” and “moral” imperatives 
that explain the colonial orientation of the ‘third way’ towards civil society and 
its institutions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
The Political Imperative 
 
 
The discussion on the ‘third way’ thus far has centred upon the construct; its 
historical underpinnings, its philosophical roots and the way in which it has 
been perceived by supporters and detractors. Further, this discussion has 
been augmented by a discussion on definition and understanding from the 
standpoint of those responsible for its implementation (in Chapter 4). In 
addition, it has sought to define its theoretical underpinnings in light of its 
propensity for ideological dominance across political “types”, either from the 
left or the right. As has been established, however, the ‘third way’ is a device 
that was utilised initially by social democratic styled governments. The 
discussion to date has, nonetheless, alluded to its transportability to neo-
liberal and conservative government models, a matter that will be extended in 
this chapter.  
 
The preceding chapter demonstrated that despite the ascendency of the 
model, with its elemental features evidenced across government “types”, 
there was a fundamental lack of explicit knowledge about the ‘third way’ by 
significant respondents from within the “real world”, and, similarly, across 
these government “types”. The lack of direct knowledge of the ‘third way’ was 
contradicted by the apparent application and usage of ‘third way’ terminology 
in the real world experience. It was argued in Chapter 4 that this is a 
consequence of its application by government as “common use” language – 
applying familiar terminology with differing meanings. This matter was also 
briefly touched upon in Chapter 2.  
 
The dialogue will now turn towards those issues that, in the opinion of this 
researcher, define the underlying intent of the ‘third way’ – the “political” and 
“moral” imperatives. During the course of this chapter (and that following), an 
 The ‘third way’: Inclusion at a cost
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argument will be advanced that will interrogate the influence of these 
“imperatives” in the everyday working lives of those most intimately involved 
with ‘third way’ realisation. Ultimately, it will be asserted, these imperatives in 
combination give expression to the uniqueness of the current expression of 
the ‘third way’ and underwrite its existence as a device to enable the 
maintenance of government “at all costs”. For the purpose of definition the 
“political imperative” in this research is connoted as being the combination of 
inferred (to the extent that these are not publicly debated) political dictates of 
a conservative nature designed to maintain power by governments. The 
nature of this political imperative will be explained through themes generated 
from the specific writings of Anthony Giddens in the section that follows. The 
first theme is that the ‘third way’ evolved and exists for the specific purpose of 
maintenance of political power at all costs by advocates of the ‘third way’ (or 
new social democracy). 
 
This theme has been alluded to at various points throughout Chapter 2 but 
will be expanded upon at this point. As outlined in part 2 of Chapter 2, the 
earliest manifestation of the ‘third way’ began in Australia. The “ad hoc” and 
“impressionistic” approach by Prime Minister Paul Keating, in particular, as a 
convert to market philosophy (Kerr 2002 - Transcriptions: 517) in that 
jurisdiction, was matched by an apparent ideological position that neglected 
allegiances from labourist or social democratic tradition in favour of these 
market forces. This was contingent, according to Duncan Kerr, upon a 
primary objective to maintain government at all costs: 
 
…so politics ceases being quite as explicable and there are more 
interest groups. The interesting thing is that everywhere around the 
third way tradition has tended to try to form broad coalitions but then to 
in a sense justify this by arguments that almost become circular; in 
order that governance becomes important, discipline becomes 
important in order to achieve governance and the rationale for 
governance becomes much more divorced from the traditions and 
roots of the social democrat or labourist movement (Kerr 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 515). 
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The significance of this approach, as noted elsewhere, by a social 
democratic government in Australia, which consistently won elections, was 
not lost on Blair in the United Kingdom nor Clinton in the United States: 
 
…certainly Clinton was interested in the Keating experience as the 
British Labour Party was. The British Labour Party was very influenced 
by the way in which Hawke and Keating were electorally successful in 
years when they were barren (Kerr 2002 - Transcriptions: 517). 
 
This assertion finds expression in other jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom, 
a significant NGO administrator, Dame Vivien Stern, noted that: 
 
I think people felt it was important they got a second term. They got it 
enormously and haven’t been as Thatcherite as they were in the first 
term, people can’t understand that at all….But they were prepared to 
forgive it in the first term on the understanding that it was time it 
needed to establish as a Labour government to govern but nobody will 
accept it now (Stern 2002 – Transcriptions: 8-9). 
 
In the United States, respondents consistently alluded to the need by Clinton 
to gain political power, at the expense of policy. The “pragmatics” of the 
Clinton approach is summarised thus by Gordon Raley: 
 
I think sometimes and that would be part of the joy of American politics 
is we were probably doing it and didn’t think well lets figure out a way 
to figure out a third way. It was probably a way for Bill Clinton saying 
gosh guys I want to win, how do we win? And beginning to figure out 
the politics of it and it became more centrist and as it became centrist 
then it was seen as an alternative (Raley 2002 - Transcriptions: 320). 
 
Giddens himself appears to allude to the need for government to self-
maintain politically, to retain power that is responsive to broader “populist” 
feelings, suggesting that: 
 
…the whole of Europe is turning back towards the right but not 
because of an ideological move, I think, because of political 
contingencies plus immigration (Giddens 2002 - Transcriptions: 49). 
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This approach is, in the opinion of this researcher, indicative of the true intent 
of the ‘third way’ to generate and maintain power in government, irrespective 
of the social costs that may attach to policies generated as a consequence – 
also regardless of substantive values and traditions of socialism and so forth. 
A similar rationale can be seen from the Howard government in Australia 
through its treatment of boat “refugees” in the lead up to a Federal election in 
that country in 2001. It has been previously argued that ‘third way’ elements 
are transportable and that, in the particular case of Australia, the 
conservative Liberal Party has embraced the Hawke/Keating approaches in 
this regard (Chapter 2). The adoption of a hardline approach on the refugee 
issue by this government appeared to pander to the beliefs of those who 
constituted the thin margins between government and opposition (a notion 
that will be developed later in this chapter). Similar approaches, albeit from 
differing perspectives, are in evidence in the data from other jurisdictions. 
The idea of accommodating “common ground” on centrist issues (in this case 
the matter of faith-based initiatives) proceeds, according to Jeremy Travis, 
upon political necessity: 
 
A reasonable prediction is that … this …faith initiative will end up 
being the size of a peanut because the left won’t like it for its 
Constitutional separation of Church/State reasons, the right won’t like 
it because of government intrusion in their practice of religion reasons, 
pragmatists won’t like it because they cant decide who is entitled to 
this benefit right without getting to the Farrakhan issue or the Wiccan 
issue. ….Because it’s not divisive. Because it is the common ground in 
terms of political rhetoric (writer’s emphasis) …inside Washington …, 
it might end up being divisive, may be hard to actually define that 
common ground – the actual common ground – but the rhetorical 
common ground is where we started. So it hasn’t been divisive in that 
sense, that’s been very useful to both parties in moving their political 
rhetoric closer to a sort of a common theme and it would be very hard 
for any of the major political leaders right now to say this faith 
institution stuff is a failure (Travis 2002  - Transcriptions: 291-292). 
 
It is in the writings of Anthony Giddens, in particular, that the issue of the 
political imperative finds expression. The matter of the moral imperative, 
whilst finding a comfort zone within the approach of Giddens, is more clearly 
manifest in the work of Amitai Etzioni. The latter assertion will be the subject 
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matter of Chapter 6.  It has already been suggested (in Chapter 2) that the 
differences between Giddens and Etzioni have become less significant, 
specifically within the context of ‘third way’ implementation, a matter that will 
be explored through the perceptions of respondents across this and the 
following chapter.  The theme of the ‘third way’ existing for the specific 
purpose of political power at all costs resides in the attitude by Giddens to 
political activism. Whilst this issue was touched upon in part 1 of Chapter 2, 
this matter will now be elaborated upon. 
 
Giddens and political activism 
 
What becomes evident from the literature is that Giddens’ model bears 
remarkable intolerance to political activism. Whilst acknowledging the 
commendable triumph of social discourse in seeking to ameliorate prejudice 
against homosexuality and single-parent families (1998:94), his view of 
interest groups, in particular NGOs, that seek to politicise their issues through 
Parliament is far less congenial. Under a Giddens style government there is 
the potential for considerable anxiety, some would say, about the future of 
such groups, which, many would argue, have historically been the 
conscience of social democratic governments. Giddens does, nevertheless, 
consider this sector an important “partner” with government and corporations 
in the application of policy. The question, it would seem, is whether these 
partnering arrangements are equitable and depoliticised. We have touched 
upon the nature of equitable relations in Chapters 2 and 4. We now turn our 
attention to the political nature of these partnerships. The paucity of 
procedural definition on the concept of partnership has already been dealt 
with in the preceding chapter. Some residual comments are necessary at this 
point in order to further inform the data. 
 
Giddens enshrines the concept of “partnerships” at all levels of his schema, 
(defining such partnerships as individual “experts” who are utilised to 
formulate social policy – what he refers to as the “... new mixed economy” 
[1998: 69, 99] which “... looks …. for a synergy between public and private 
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sectors, utilizing the dynamism of markets but with the public interest in mind” 
[1998:99-100]). Notwithstanding, as previously cited, he warns that these 
should not be allowed to develop a political presence that could threaten 
‘third way’ governance – “... markets cannot replace government … but 
neither can social movements or other kinds of nongovernmental 
organization” (1998:48).  
 
In laying the ground for his model, Giddens significantly addresses the 
specific areas of environmentalism and information technology in relation to 
“partnerships”, placing considerable emphasis on the former, particularly 
given their electoral successes in places like Germany. In fact, Giddens 
dwells on the issue of environmentalism arguing that “... market solutions are 
possible” through “sustainable development” and “modernisation” arguing 
further that ecological politics goes “... far beyond whatever influence green 
social movements might muster, or the proportion of the vote green parties 
might achieve” (1998: 54-55). [The idea that market forces can be regulated 
by government to achieve ecological equilibrium has, however, been 
significantly dented in the wake of the withdrawal of the United States of 
America from the Kyoto protocol (the 3rd Conference of the Americas)]. His 
position appears to assail the politicisation of green and environmental 
movements and their capacity to significantly influence, through Parliament, a 
legitimate social democratic agenda. Giddens does speak, however, of non-
natural environmentalism (the innovations of expressways, rubbish 
incinerator plants and so forth – i.e. the consequences of human activity) 
where decision-making should not be left to the ‘“experts” but has to involve 
politicians and citizens (1998: 59), implying that other environmental issues 
are the exclusive province of government. Giddens argues that organised 
movements should not have any mandate politically but that politicians and 
the citizenry should. This paradox is not sustainable unless politicians and 
the citizenry exclude political parties that purport to represent (via Parliament) 
the concerns of social movements – a confused notion to say the least. This 
proposition lends weight to the second theme whereby ‘third way’ 
administrations seek to depoliticise community-based social movements that 
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have the capacity to interfere with the maintenance of their political power. 
 
The impact of NGOs historically has been significantly canvassed in part 2 of 
Chapter 2. Similarly, Giddens’ views of this sector have been canvassed (in 
the same section). A brief review of these latter opinions would be useful at 
this point. It is recalled that whilst he asserts that NGOs constitute the milieu 
for “holistic government”, Giddens also strongly asserts that NGOs that 
purport to take over where government is failing or can even replace political 
parties is “fantasy” (1998: 53). The conundrum of viewing the sector as an 
important contributor to governance (in the context of the ‘third way’ armature 
of civil society and partnerships) but that it must not contribute to negative 
debate in the development of government policy is evident. In fact the role of 
NGOs, to Giddens, becomes extremely limited with the curtailing of matters, 
in addition to that of policy development, generalised to issues such as 
reconciliation, law and legislation and community “values”. It would seem that 
the concern that Giddens has about NGOs arises significantly as a 
consequence of the political success of the green movement in Europe, 
which, to him, denied government to social democratic parties. To Giddens, 
such movements that “... flex their muscles” (1998: 50-51) and who “... attack 
orthodox parties directly” (ibid) belies a covert intention to neutralise the 
sector against processes other than a welfare delivery orientation.  This 
assertion, consistent with the first, provides the second theme against which 
respondent perceptions will be tested, that the ‘third way’ seeks to 
depoliticise community-based social movements that have the capacity to 
interfere with the maintenance of political power by ‘third way’ (new social 
democracy) governments. 
 
Should there be some veracity to this proposition then one would expect to 
find some evidence of active intervention to dissuade advocacy and political 
engagement by such groups. The third testable theme that emerges from 
‘third way’ literature, which is associated with the first, is that such 
organizations need to be contained, i.e. What evidence emerges that 
government seeks to “control” these exemplars of civil society? The question 
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also arises as to whether this “control” has positive or negative 
consequences. This is the substantive issue for interrogation of respondent 
perceptions in the latter section of this chapter. In arriving at some 
conclusions about these qualities, respondent perceptions across a range of 
apparent strategies will be explored. These will relate to the broad issues of:  
the political shift left to right to capture middle ground voters; the methods by 
which the outreach and autonomy of critics is managed, and; the transfer of 
sponsorship relations from non-sectarian organizations to sectarian 
organizations (i.e. God in government) for the purpose of containing debate 
on government policy. 
 
The discussion will now amplify upon this notion of NGOs being potentially 
problematic for government in the context of themes 1 and 2. At a later stage 
in discussion, respondent perceptions will be interrogated to shed light on the 
manner in which they (the respondents) believe this containment of dissent 
actually occurs (theme 3). 
 
As previously noted, the historical importance of NGOs has been established 
(part 2 of Chapter 2). At various times, their social justice agendas have 
significantly influenced public opinion to bring pressure to bear politically 
(Alvarez 1998; Arellano-Lopez and Petras 1994; Dimirovic 2000; Fowler 
2000, Hansmann 1996; Skocpol et al 1999, and; Tvedt 1998). They therefore 
exist as both a useful tool for government and as a thorn in their sides. To 
Giddens, they seem to present as the latter for ‘third way’ governments. 
 
The nongovernmental sector: a “problem” for government? 
 
On the specific issue of governance in the context of civil society, Giddens 
speaks of nongovernmental agencies as having taken power unilaterally, 
without waiting for the politicians. According to Beck, Giddens et al. NGOs, 
not the politicians, have put ecological issues, and many other new concerns, 
on the agenda (Beck, Giddens et al. 1994; see also Giddens 1998: 36, 49, 
52). Others (notably those within Parliament) have gone further in their 
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analysis referring to the non-government sector as not “democratic” and 
therefore not “representative” (Kerr 2001).  
 
The concern that contemporary government would have about 
nongovernmental agencies (and alluded to by Giddens) becomes clearer in 
the context of post-Seattle reactions (the successful incursion against the 
WTO in December 1999 by NGOs) in the business community. An 
Anonymous article in the Journal Health Letter in February 2001 reports that 
Strategy One, a unit of Edelman Public Relations Worldwide (Edelman) 
undertook an inquiry on behalf of its corporate clients canvassing 500 opinion 
makers globally to arrive at an understanding of the perceived effectiveness 
of non-government organizations (NGOs). The findings of this Survey 
demonstrated that NGOs are trusted to “do the right thing” two to one 
compared with government, media and corporations.   
 
NGOs also consistently scored higher as “... sources of believable 
information on such issues as human rights, environment and health than did 
media outlets or companies in all countries surveyed (U.S., Australia, United 
Kingdom, France and Germany)”  (Anonymous [d] 2001: 6) [note, for 
example: on human rights NGOs were seen to be credible 59 percent of the 
time compared with 4 percent confidence with Corporations; on health, 
NGOs were seen to be credible by 54 percent of respondents compared with 
7 percent confidence with Corporations, and; on the Environment, NGOs 
were seen to be credible by 55 percent of respondents compared with only 6 
percent confidence with the view of Corporations). The reviewer concludes 
with the warning: “The bottom line: Caveat NGOs!” (ibid: 7). 
 
NGOs do present a challenge, it would seem, by virtue of the fact that they 
are autonomous, form networks at a grass-roots level and advocate on 
issues that form the objectives of government such as environmental 
protection, support of people in the Southern world and gender equality 
(Demirovic 2000). According to Demirovic, NGOs are associated with “new 
internationalism” with important interlinkages between the North and the 
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South taking on the “particularism” of national governments to mobilise 
against inappropriate political, social and ecological decision-making. Ulrich 
Beck (1995) [a colleague of Giddens] has argued that NGOs constitute a 
“global movement” (in Demirovic 2000: 132).  
 
In the context of Giddens’ assertion about social movements not being 
governed by NGOs (and in light of the Strategy One Survey), one is left to 
ponder the application of his notion of “partnership” in a political, social and 
economic sense. As noted, this issue has been already explored in Chapter 
2. Giddens recommends “partnerships”, however, in various other policy 
areas (1998: 69, 79 [which deals specifically with crime prevention], 88, 100, 
126). Robert Higgs, in speaking on the Giddens’ application of “partnerships” 
likens them to that of an alliance between Little Red Riding Hood’s 
grandmother and the Wolf (Higgs 2000). With this cautionary note arises the 
need to both assess the relevance of “partnerships” and to seek to map a 
future for the sector – the nongovernmental, issues-related and grass-roots 
organizations who constitute the historical centre for community partnerships. 
In an environment where both the left and right of politics appear to fear the 
consequences of social movements, the sector would seem to be under 
considerable threat of redundancy or worse, disestablishment. 
 
The discussion will now briefly review the Etzioni position in relation to the 
role of government with respect to the contributions of social actors, including 
NGOs. 
 
The role of government according to Etzioni 
 
In drawing on Stigler (1968) Etzioni asserts that in the neoclassical paradigm 
there is “... no room for the concept of power” (Etzioni 1988: 218), although 
he concedes that some have the power to control the market through price 
setting in one form or another, what he terms “industrial organisation”. In 
terms of government within this proposition, Etzioni suggests, with McConnell 
(1978), that government exists to provide the legal framework and services 
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prerequisite to the effective operation of the market economy and, secondly, 
to correct market failures. As such, government is not considered a primary 
source of “industrial organisation”, in Etzioni’s terms. He does not, however, 
share the view of the neo-classicists that government intervention is not 
politically focussed. In fact he defines political power as “... the ability of non-
governmental actors to guide the government” (Etzioni 1998: 221), 
suggestive that the political direction of government is externally manipulated 
in opposition to those factors that are internally constructed, such as values 
and goals (reflecting moral and ideological rationales) and the “self-interest” 
of politicians (ibid).  
 
Political power, in Etzioni parlance, is unevenly distributed with some actors 
having a greater or lesser degree of access to resources (such as 
information, education, persuasion) but who share the ability to “... mobilize 
the voters” (ibid). Further, these organizations often pull in opposing 
directions and often one group will have “... hegemony in one limited area” 
(for example, the National Rifleman’s Association)(ibid: 222). In arguing the 
scope of “political power”, Etzioni suggests that it is “vast” encompassing 
social agendas (such as abortion, women’s issues etc.), foreign policy and 
other non-economic issues. In order to make a distinction between political 
power as discussed and “political power” being used by “economic actors for 
economic purposes”, he refers to “interventionist power”. At the heart of his 
thesis on political power however remains the influence of nongovernmental 
organizations. This is a view that he shares with Giddens albeit for differing 
reasons, it would seem.  
 
The discussion will now return briefly to Giddens’ conception of civil society 
(the exemplars for which are NGOs), the milieu in which partnerships are 
placed. 
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Civil Society and Civic responsibility 
 
The notion of civil society from an historical and philosophical perspective 
has been elaborated upon in part 2 of Chapter 2, however its relationship to 
‘third way’ thinking, specifically in the light of its presumed political intent, will 
be briefly explored at this point. 
 
Giddens isolates the concept of an “active” civil society as a cornerstone of 
the ‘third way’ (1998:78) citing high levels of crime, a weakening sense of 
solidarity within communities and the break-up of marriages and families as 
“real and visible” manifestations of concern within communities. The 
elements of Giddens’ renewal of civil society are: government and civil 
society acting in partnership; community renewal through harnessing local 
initiative; involvement of the third sector; protection of the local public sphere; 
community-based crime prevention and; the democratic family. State and 
civil society should act “... in partnership, each to facilitate, but also to act as 
a control upon, the other” (1998: 79). The opportunity to engage in the civil 
process that Giddens speaks of is an integral part of left thinking (unionism, 
volunteerism, service organizations), but it would seem that the ‘third way’ 
difference is vested in the notion of “civic responsibility” whereby citizens 
should take responsibility for nurturing and providing for each other where the 
state “... as a matter of justice…. should clearly define and, where necessary, 
enforce the obligations which derive from these basic responsibilities” (White 
1998: 3) [cf. Etzioni, discussed elsewhere].  This notion could be applied (or 
mis-applied) inappropriately. 
 
It may be useful here to consider a definition of “community”, since 
conceptually the notion resurfaces in critical debate from the 1800s onwards 
and is inherent in ‘third way’ thinking in relation to the concept of civil society. 
Proceeding beyond the idea of community being enclosed in geographical 
space or a sociological space, Etzioni (1997) defines it through its bindings 
into “durable relations” which harness individual identities within emotional 
relationships, political and cultural objectification through government (Rose 
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2000: 1400): 
 
Community is defined by two characteristics: first, a web of affect-
laden relationships among a group of individuals, relationships that 
often criss-cross and reinforce one another (rather than merely one-
on-one or chainlike individual relationships), and second, a measure of 
commitment to a set of shared values, norms and meaning, and a 
related history and identity-in short, to a particular culture (Etzioni 
1997: 127). 
 
(The moral voice of the community) is the main way that individuals 
and groups in a good society encourage one another to adhere to 
behaviour that reflects shared values and to avoid behaviour that 
offends or violates them [Etzioni 1997: 124 in Rose 2000: 1401). 
 
This “moral voice” will be dealt with in Chapter 6 but its relationship to the 
political imperative is of some relevance to the present discussion. As noted 
in the Introduction, Giddens speaks of the improvement of community 
standards by use of “persuasion” and “counselling” by police working 
cooperatively with citizens The exercise of these methods, as mentioned in 
the Introduction, raises concerns about the potential for the misuse of such 
approaches in the hands of less enlightened members of local communities. 
Even ‘third way’ proponents recognise the inherent danger to the style of 
community-based “empowerment” they advocate: 
 
Stronger and more autonomous communities may offer many 
advantages, but they also sometimes act in ways that bring them into 
conflict both with minorities inside the community and with the wider 
community outside (Halpern and Mikosz 2000: 20).  
 
The concepts of “community” and “civil society” are pivotal aspects to the 
formation and maintenance of “partnerships”. Although reasonably defined in 
terms of tiers of governance working collaboratively, the lack of definition for 
community-based organizations is problematic. In Chapter 4 the issue of 
definition for “partnerships” was more fully explored with inference drawn 
from historical/ideological understandings of behaviour within notions of civil 
society and community (also from Chapter 2).  
 
In order to arrive, however, at some understanding of how this political 
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imperative (argued to reside within ‘third way’ thinking) manifests in practice, 
particularly in the absence of definition (the “meanings” discussed in the 
previous chapter), the data from respondents will now be interrogated within 
the confines of the themes previously speculated upon.  
 
Themes 1 and 2: The political imperative as the maintenance of political 
power at all costs, and; the de-politicisation of the NGO sector 
 
From the outset it should be restated that this research has not been 
concerned with the investigation of “case studies”. It has sought to 
investigate the perceptions of significant persons engaged in implementation 
processes either as government employees, nongovernmental organizations 
and for-profit contractors, engaged community participants and academics. 
Further, it is an investigation that has sought to infer a ‘third way’ character 
across research sites on the basis of a relationship between the theory of the 
phenomenon, the assertions of the governments that exist within these sites 
(whether they overtly ascribe to ‘third way’ principles), the usage of ‘third way’ 
terminology (covert ascription to ‘third way’ principles) by respondents, any 
apparent transmogrification of ‘third way’ principles from social democratic to 
neo-liberal governments (or vice versa) and data other than that provided by 
respondents.  
 
This said, it should be noted, however, that respondents, in some cases, 
operate within environments (or programs) that have more formalised ‘third 
way’ underpinnings. Specifically, respondents from within two sites were 
isolated for the investigation, those sites being Safer Cities and Shires in 
Victoria, Australia, and the Downtown Eastside Revitalization Project located 
in Vancouver, Canada. A brief summary on both of these Projects was 
covered in Chapters 1 and 3. Other sites have an element of self-evidency 
attaching in terms of selection (as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3), Blair (in the 
United Kingdom) being an avid ‘third way’ supporter, Clinton/George W. Bush 
(in the United States) reapplying social democratic ‘third way’ principles (as 
outlined in Chapters 2 and 4). 
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As previously determined, the emergence of the ‘third way’ as a mode of 
political thinking was formalised by Anthony Giddens. From the data, there is 
no ambiguity in relation to what Giddens views as its “base”:  
 
It has a kind of moral ethic I think of responsibility and rights, it adjusts 
to the need to have governance below the level and above the level of 
the nation, it has a strong emphasis on devolution, it emphasises 
active welfare measures, emphasises active labour market policies, it 
still tries to secure redistribution but not simply to passive income 
redistribution more through redistribution of life-chances via the labour 
market and other mechanisms (Giddens 2002 - Transcriptions: 44-45). 
 
This position alludes to the moral dimension of the ‘third way’, an issue that 
will be discussed in Chapter 6. When married with the “moral ethic” that 
Giddens asserts as subtext to his process of intervention, it will be argued, 
across this and the subsequent chapter, that the arguments of the detractors 
of the ‘third way’ gain ascendency particularly as a process to enshrine 
Labour (Social Democratic) government at whatever cost.   
 
In specifically addressing the question of positive outcomes for his ‘third way’, 
Giddens, a respondent to this research, is unambiguous. When questioned 
about the evidentiary basis for the success of ‘third way’ implementation 
(“from the programs”) in the United Kingdom, Giddens asserted: 
 
…..– as you know it is the first time the Labor Party has been in power 
for two terms – it’s quite likely, very likely, to be in power for a third 
term.  ….  If you went back to a Labour activist in 1992 who saw 
Labour out of power for several successive governments and losing 
again in 1992 as they did here they would be amazed with the current 
situation with Labour probably (in) the strongest position of any left of 
centre party in Europe and the Tories absolutely marginalised – I think 
they would have been amazed at that but the nature of politics is that 
people always want more than you’ve ever achieved at any one point 
…. that’s already something of some significance given the fact that 
every previous Labor government was only in power for one term and 
every previous Labour government including the 1945 Labour 
Government was in something like an economic crisis after four years 
and this one has avoided all that and the UK economically is 
recognised at the moment to be in the best position almost of any 
OECD country (Giddens 2002 - Transcriptions: 50). 
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The first indication of a “political imperative” is therefore given as an apparent 
justification for ‘third way’ approaches. Certainly, this position is not 
inconsistent with the assertions from Giddens’ latest publication (2002) in 
which he claims “... new social democracy (the ‘third way’) concentrates upon 
the conditions necessary to achieve electoral success” (p. 11) which 
addresses the “... real concern of voters rather than opting for impotent 
ideological purity” noting, to him, the shrinking working class, proudly 
extolling the “magical return” of social democratic governments in eleven out 
of the fifteen EU countries (p. 12).   
 
Data in support of the themes from the United Kingdom 
 
The realignment of traditional Labour thinking away from its social democratic 
roots which requires government for the Labour Party consequent upon 
acquiescence to market ideology has certainly caused angst for its 
supporters, according to respondents. The difficulty for many supporters of 
the British Labour government is that they feel constrained in criticising it. 
The conundrum that emerges in terms of balancing social democratic 
principles and market forces for those charged with the implementation of 
social justice principles appears profound as this respondent suggested: 
 
….In many ways it was far easier when they were conservative 
governments. Everyone knew what they were getting, we were far 
more vocal, the union movement far more united, it was far easier to 
operate. It’s been far more difficult to operate under a Labour 
Government about whether to openly criticise them to try and weigh 
off certain pros and cons of different government decisions in areas of 
interest (Low 2002 - Transcriptions: 22). 
 
In looking at the data from the United Kingdom one is struck, nonetheless, by 
the almost fatalistic attitude that pervades, particularly in relation to the 
emergence of the ‘third way’ and its embrace by the British Labour Party. 
According to respondents, the control of government by the conservatives for 
eighteen years, combined, it seems, with a need for change by Labour Party 
philosophy (to enable government) provided the emergence of non-traditional 
Labour approaches embodied in ‘third way’ thinking. This position is reflected 
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throughout the data. Consider, for example, the views of this respondent: 
 
… people were desperate for change and were prepared to accept, I 
think, anything but the conservatives. For the modernisers, the third 
way enthusiasts in the Labour Party and Britain was caught between a 
lot of admiration for President Clinton and the third way and the 
policies they devised to capture the American Presidency in 1992. We 
found leaders of the Labour Party keener to look to the American 
example and even briefly to the Australian Keating government. Paul 
Keating was a role model in the 90s. We found our leaders looking 
more to them than to social democratic Europe (Low 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 30). 
 
The British Labour government is now in the midst of its second term. 
Certainly there emerges from the data a belief that it was the acceptance of 
the philosophy of the ‘third way’ that led to, and sustained, Labour control of 
government in the UK (cf. Giddens, cited previously). It also emerges from 
some respondents that this fact (the attainment of government) may well 
have become the prime rationale for the continued maintenance of certain 
aspects of ‘third way’ principles and not others. One respondent put it this 
way: 
 
I think Giddens, charming fellow though he is, has been listened to by 
some of the people who were around the Prime Minister but as far as 
most of the British Government is concerned he would be regarded 
with humour (Stern 2002 - Transcriptions: 6). 
 
Having said this, according to respondents, there appears to be no indication 
that the ‘third way’ is going to be abandoned. Indeed, some suggested the 
development of a competition between Labour and Conservative parties for 
ownership of the ‘third way’ (not unlike their American counterparts, which 
will be addressed in due course): 
 
…actually a lot of moderate conservatives are very comfortable with 
what Blair’s doing (Wright 2002 - Transcriptions: 62). 
 
The competition that is alluded to between conservatives and Labour to 
define each of their respective policies in the context of ‘third way’ 
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approaches is, according to Low, responsive to public confusion about the 
traditional roles of both Parties: 
 
It’s very difficult for the public to distinguish between the Parties; large 
amounts of them are presentation or fought over the narrow bits of 
ground. The truth is …. the actual amount of difference between the 
Parties is very narrow indeed (Low 2002 - Transcriptions: 25). 
 
Sampson Low, a policy advisor to UNISON, the largest public sector union in 
the United Kingdom, suggests that the conservative opposition is actively 
seeking out ‘third way’ “solutions” in terms of their own policy development, 
or, to cynically speculate, to regain ground for the purpose of assuming 
government control at some future point [again the American experience is 
foreshadowed]): 
 
…the conservatives have started to, in this country, have started to try 
and think of third way solutions and approaches because they have 
very little credibility on the public services or amongst public service 
workers where thirty or forty years ago they enjoyed large amounts of 
support amongst teachers, doctors and other public service 
professions – they now have a universal antipathy to towards the 
Conservatives and so they recognise that there is a problem there and 
as such the Conservatives in the last three or four months have been 
on a tour of European countries …they are saying look your social 
democratic partners often use social insurance or a mixture of 
providers in providing care and they’re suddenly now where social 
democratic Europe was off limits to them they are now beginning to 
investigate these options [Low 2002 - Transcriptions: 24]. 
 
In summary of the UK experience, we conclude that the perceptions of 
research participants are consistent with the themes, that they suggest that: 
 
o A political imperative to maintain government for ‘third way’ 
administrations exists; 
 
o According to these same respondents, the ‘third way’ is unlikely to be 
abandoned; 
 
o It is the view of respondents that both conservative and non-
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conservative political parties are embracing the ‘third way’. 
 
These observations by respondents are broadly consistent with comments 
from critics of the ‘third way’ articulated in part 1 of Chapter 2, who assert, in 
part, that the model is only concerned with the retention of power (Kelly 1999: 
26), that it is an “intellectual curiosity” (Stewart-Weeks 1999) and that it is a 
cynical manoeuvre by the left to move closer to the right (Reich 1999: 46). 
 
We now turn our attention to data from respondents in the United States on 
the same themes. 
 
Data in support of the themes from the United States 
 
As foreshadowed, data in relation to political analysis from the United States 
appears more focussed than in other sites. It could be argued that the 
development of Etzioni styled communitarian approaches for almost a 
decade prior to the formalisation by Giddens of the ‘third way’ provides an 
explanation for this. Certainly, as discussed elsewhere, Giddens did learn 
from the Americans (and the Australians), that a form of acquiescence to 
market ideology, combined with elemental features of social democracy, 
including environmental concerns, did lead to electoral success, a view 
reinforced by this respondent: 
 
…(environmental) concepts became very powerful and they translate 
into social environments and again the research was beginning to 
show this as well so there was the fact basis, it wasn’t just somebody 
having a really fairly seriously bad dream….The thing is that 
Giddens……, I suspect that he had seen a great deal of this. He had 
seen these tiny little shoots come up out of the ground and he was 
sharp enough to realise that we were growing a whole new kind of 
grass and I don’t mean marijuana…. (Anonymous [n] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 270). 
 
Notwithstanding this acknowledgement that the ‘third way’ was formalised by 
Giddens, as this respondent reflects, as pieces of thread that are weaved into 
a “... picture that we can react to” (Anonymous [n], 2002 Transcriptions: 264), 
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Jeremy Travis crystallises the ‘third way’ equivalence across the Atlantic: 
 
It is clear that there is an affinity between let’s at least say the Blair 
approach to many social problems and at the time he was President 
the Clinton approach to many social problems that could be 
characterised as third way like and certainly there are German and 
Continental counterparts to that (Travis 2002 - Transcriptions: 283). 
 
Another respondent, whilst acknowledging the inevitability of history to 
progress change for the Democrats, argued that the matter of corporate 
intervention (and the nature of capitalism) played an important part in the 
reconstruction of the Democrats and the ascension of the Clinton 
administration: 
 
I think the corporate world is behind everything. … what Bill Clinton 
recognised for good or for ill, is that there had been a very clear 
delineation, … (that) had you asked people well OK business 
republican right? And you’d say yeah, that’d be right. White middle 
class college education Republican right? Yeah. Minority Democratic? 
Yeah right. Low income or lower income lower middle class Democrat 
right? Yeah right…I think what Clinton figured out was that maybe you 
could be Democrat and pro-business. …at that point I think maybe 
that became an attractive partnership between the two and then the 
corporations began to move with what we would maybe describe here 
as a third way, …. (and) the fact that NAFTA came during the Clinton 
administration and that Clinton supported it with the cooperation of 
some Republicans, with extreme conservatives and extreme Liberals, 
…. but those more on the outer boundaries of liberalism and 
conservatism actually voting together, this is a horrible thing. So 
there’s a certain pragmatic development and it was political and I think 
Bill Clinton and the Democratic Leadership Council probably had 
something to do with putting that together (Raley 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 320). 
  
The years of Republican government in the United States, not unlike the long 
years of the British Thatcher administration, created an environment where a 
shifting emphasis by the Democrats was necessary, according to 
respondents. This issue is noted from the data, with several respondents 
inferring an almost opportunistic approach in the development of ‘third way’ 
Clinton policy: 
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Well I think that what strikes me about … (third way development) is 
that it, again like a lot of these things, there’s the right people and the 
right time for the right reasons. The Democrats realised that people 
had shifted their thinking. Ronny Reagan was onto something. The 
man could communicate with a lamp, he was amazing, maybe people 
were putting words in his mouth, maybe they weren’t but he 
understood... (Anonymous [n] 2002 - Transcriptions: 261). 
 
This need to contemporise the public face of Party politics in the United 
States, was, it seems, a feature of both Democrats and Republicans, 
according to respondents. If this respondent is correct, then the Democrats 
learnt lessons from Republican Ronald Reagan and, similarly, George W. 
Bush learnt lessons from Bill Clinton. Consider, for example, this exchange 
from the interview transcriptions: 
 
And what I see at this point is that Bush is borrowing most all of these 
ideas from daddy’s friends.  That’s my take on it for whatever it’s 
worth. 
 
Q. He’s taking the spin of the Clinton Administration however in terms 
of strategic alliances? 
 
A. What’s he doing though is they’re borrowing a bit of the political 
necessity (Anonymous [n] 2002 - Transcriptions: 272). 
 
Most respondents in the United States spoke of the changed circumstances 
of politics in that country that found: 
 
…some larger forces at work (including) ….the fuzziness of the 
distinction between the Republican and Democratic parties. This 
Republican Party compared to the Reagan Republican Party is much 
less ideological, much less revolutionary in language than they were 
and so they’ve changed, the Democratic Party under the Clinton 
leadership ….. I think …. he was able to find that middle ground. 
There’s a debate within both Parties as to whether the sacrifice of 
ideological purity is worth the price right? So there’s a fuzziness at the 
middle, there’s a general rightward movement (Travis 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 287). 
 
The mainstreams (Democrats and Republicans) are much closer. 
(Social change requires the retention of power and control) … It’s kind 
of hard to do it from the benches (Anonymous [n] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 271). 
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The view of Jim Copple is that it was Bill Clinton who was largely responsible 
for narrowing this gap asserting that the liberal Democrats were marginalised 
within the Democratic Party during the 1990s. Furthermore, he suggests, 
Clinton was seeking to determine what works on the basis of pragmatism 
rather than an adherence to strict ideology: 
 
Frankly, NAFTA made sense. Even though labour, it was so clear why 
labour was opposed to it, but all ships are going to rise as a result of it 
and so from a policy perspective welfare reform made sense but at the 
same time it’s also created an underclass I think that people are 
ignoring but it’s interesting I’m not so certain, I mean a lot of George 
Bush’s economic policy is only exacerbat(ing) that in many ways 
(Copple 2002 - Transcriptions: 250). 
 
This pragmatism, at the expense, it seems, of ideology, moves the 
Democrats from a social agenda to a purely political agenda, reflected in part 
by the comments of this respondent: 
 
Part of the magic though is when you move into a Democratic 
administration that had divorced itself, and if you look at Bill’s 
campaign rhetoric all the way through, and even Gore’s, I mean they 
had totally disavowed the Lyndon Johnson and even Jack Kennedy, 
although people tend to forget that Jack Kennedy was more of a social 
engineer than Lyndon was, they totally disavowed that. That didn’t 
take it in the teeth, they just started talking differently and if they had 
done that in a vacuum the thud would have been heard around the 
world (Anonymous [n] 2002 - Transcriptions: 267). 
 
In alluding to the “fuzziness” between the Parties suggested earlier, and 
being cognizant of the “marketing mentality” in American politics several 
respondents recognised that that margins between the parties were 
narrowing and in order to capture the interest of this margin, traditional 
Republican/Democratic allegiances had to be modified: 
 
I look at a dot in the middle of a line. When Mondale and Reagan were 
there they were fighting from over here and it was fighting over 
everybody in the middle to see who could move them this way. I think 
what Clinton did was come to the centre and say if I can just get to 51 
percent, in other words if I can just get to this side of you, if I can be 
just a little more conservative, or confuse folks enough maybe all I got 
to do is get 51, I’m going to come to the centre and try to take 1 
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percent over here with me back over here and I’ll pick up all the lefties 
because they’re not going to run past me. Bush I think may be trying 
to play that same game but it’s moving over and I think it may be the 
competition for the ‘third way’ but it all fought in the centre (Raley 2002 
- Transcriptions: 330). 
  
Respondents repeatedly referred to the pragmatics of this development. 
Roger Conner suggested that the two political parties have been, and are, 
looking for symbolic issues to which ownership can be staked for the ‘third 
way’. He, like others, sees the main game as no longer being between 
Republicans and Democrats but between ‘third way’ nuances: 
 
…(to get) their competitors to take positions that appear to be entirely 
out of the third way so that you own it, you get the exclusive control of 
the third way and that any time that happens, whatever issue they pick 
to do that with, is going to get caught up in big “P” politics – the 
elephants start dancing, the mice get off the floor and the people who 
are interested in making progress are mice and they’ll get trampled 
until you can remove it from this realm of big “P” politics (Conner 2002  
- Transcriptions: 313). 
 
Respondents inform us that the relevance of marketing politics, in this 
context, should not be understated. The “persona” of leaders, from both sides 
of the Atlantic, was noted. In the United Kingdom, respondents spoke of Blair 
as being “presidential” in style. In the United States, according to Gordon 
Raley, the comodification of the position of the Presidency was specifically 
promoted in order to capture market segment for the purpose of obtaining 
government. Furthermore, he argues, the power of government is directed by 
“... the wealth and corporate wealth and those who own money” to 
manipulate messages to such a degree that the people are no longer voting 
for people, or for that matter, principles, but rather voting for an image given 
to them repeatedly without them “... even be(ing) aware of what the message 
is” (Raley 2002 - Transcriptions: 317]: 
 
…the public were polled and were asked to name the greatest 
Presidents both living and deceased and he said Abraham Lincoln did 
come up first overall, among African Americans Bill Clinton came up 
first and he says what did Bill Clinton do for African Americans 
compared to Abraham Lincoln? But there are people thinking these 
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kinds of market divisions, well what do African Americans think? And 
what do Latinos think? With George Bush the issue was well he was 
going to appeal to Latinos, he spoke Spanish and he had a son-in-law 
who was Hispanic and all types of things come over. How you get this 
market and how you get that market. It becomes one of formulas, 
almost mathematical formula. The pollsters’ rule. People say what 
they have to say to get something but after a while you don’t really 
know what people will do or what principles they stand for (Raley 2002 
- Transcriptions: 318). 
 
This idealisation of perspective that captures the thin margins that construct 
government, according to Raley, epitomise the pragmatism of American 
politics, that reflect, to him, this ‘third way’ approach: 
 
… it probably requires, I hate to use the word elite because I think the 
third way in this country was probably more … pragmatic, … in the run 
against Reagan (the campaign) was more of a classical contest 
between right and left, or at least right and liberal, … but here there 
was a pragmatic decision made that (said) look if we want to win it’s 
better to win and to have majorities and then we have a platform that 
we can speak from (Raley 2002 - Transcriptions: 319). 
 
This view accords with that of Roger Conner who suggested that the 
Democrats were keen to reclaim a territory that was lost to it during the 
Bush/Reagan years. However, he continues, the pursuit of this reclamation 
was knowingly at the expense of traditional support bases for that Party: 
 
…there’s one version of this that says we still want all the policies that 
we wanted before but the problem is that in our efforts to take care of 
the poor and the marginalised groups in society we’ve lost the political 
support of the middle class so what we’ve got to do is to put enough of 
a political colouration on this to disguise our real intentions so that the 
middle class, the lumpen proletariat, will follow us again and I think 
that the argument that we need to do this in order to win the middle 
class votes can shade if you are not careful – we need to learn how to 
sell old wine in new wine skins (Conner 2002 - Transcriptions: 305-6). 
 
Conner is, notwithstanding, sympathetic to a second view that suggests that 
the policies that were being pursued by the Democrats became single issue 
oriented, that the Party of the disenfranchised Americans in general adopted 
policies for these single interest groupings (“... disenfranchised white 
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Americans, disenfranchised homophobic Americans…”) that were “... harmful 
to the interest of the lower middle class which should be the heart and soul of 
what you should be concerned about” (ibid: 306): 
 
…people in this second group … like Marshall, who believe that the 
old policies were wrong who then tried to sell it to the moneyed 
interest in the Democratic Party by saying you’ll never win without it 
and if you moneyed interests want to get Democrats in control so that 
you can get the policies that you want, securities industry in New York 
for example, if you want Democrats in control rather than Republicans 
because they favour Wall Street instead of Main Street then you better 
start funding these new Democratic candidates and you’ll get 
Democratic policies (Conner 2002 - Transcriptions: 306). 
 
In summary of respondent perceptions in the United States on the issue of 
these themes, we have perception data which makes it seem possible that: 
 
o The ‘third way’ is a policy regime that benefits from the political 
necessity (imperative) to govern by both Democratic and Republican 
regimes. Indeed that acquiescence to market ideology coupled with 
social democracy provide the formula for electoral success; 
 
o The appeal of a ‘third way’ approach rests with: the economic support 
that arises from acquiescence to market forces (consider the 
commodification of the position of President aligned to market share 
philosophy) and; the capturing of the marginal interests, as best 
exemplified by overt support for faith-based organizations, often at the 
expense of the non-religious nongovernmental sector (consider, by 
way of example, the fate of funding to abortion clinics); 
 
o A bidding war for ownership of the ‘third way’ is in evidence for both 
Democratic and Republican administrations; 
 
o The ‘third way’ responds to the pragmatism of political agendas over 
social agendas. 
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It is indeed troublesome that respondents viewed the evolution of the ‘third 
way’ in this jurisdiction as somewhat of a cynical and opportunistic exercise 
devised for the specific purpose of gaining government. Whether pointing to 
the lack of distinction between the protagonists for political power or 
pragmatism devoid of ideology, respondents nonetheless appear to arrive at 
a consensual position whereby the contest for votes rather than principles is 
the prime motivation for a contest for the ‘third way’ model by both 
conservatives and non-conservatives.  
 
Discussion will now turn to the data from British Columbia, Canada. 
 
Data in support of the themes from Canada 
 
As noted previously, the interest for the inclusion of the Canadian site in this 
research project is that a professed ‘third way’ federal government (which 
emanates, interestingly, from a Liberal or conservative perspective) forms 
just one tier of a three-tiered governmental structure, the other two being 
provincial (or state) and civic (or local/municipal). Until recently the political 
flavour of the provincial government in British Columbia, in particular, was at 
odds with the federal government in that it was an NDP administration (social 
democratic) and with the civic government (the City of Vancouver Council) 
being allegedly Party non-aligned. The election in 2000 of a Liberal 
government in British Columbia after a decade of NDP government signalled 
significant change, according to respondents, to the character of the 
Downtown Eastside Revitalization Project (DTES), the environment within 
which respondents workedxiii. As will be disclosed and ironically, the debate 
on the ‘third way’, whilst initiated by the conservative Liberal government (at 
the federal level), was captured by the social democratic NDP in a manner 
that was the reverse to both the United Kingdom and the United States albeit 
for the same reason, that being the “road to power” as one respondent put it: 
 
                                                 
xiii As noted several times, this research was not “case-study” specific, however the 
disclosure of the environment within which respondents operate is worthy of a consideration, 
particularly given recent political changes in this specific jurisdiction. 
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…some of the what I call the control freaks around the Party (the 
NDP) have directed (the leadership) and not very well, they’ve 
directed (the leadership) towards the centre … to just try and kind of 
follow the Blair way. They went to Europe and had a tour of Europe 
and they ended up spending a lot of time with Blair’s people and came 
back convinced that was the road to power, totally ignoring that the 
history of the UK is much, much different. Firstly whether you could do 
that in Canada was the first question – that you could just transplant 
the third way, and then the next question is that really what we want – 
is that really what our life has been about, building a left Party that we 
now end up saying we want to change that to a centrist party so they 
didn’t even try to build a consensus and people just moved ahead and 
said this was where we’re going, follow us and so everybody started to 
splinter, a lot of people left the Party (Hargrove 2002 - Transcriptions: 
212]. 
 
It is to be noted in this discussion, sooner rather than later, that the resultant 
new tensions (emerging from a changed provincial government), which 
manifest in strong criticism by certain respondents against previous 
government/nongovernmental relations (specifically with the former NDP 
government) tend to colour the nature of respondent opinions. In many ways 
the change of provincial government in British Columbia becomes a bonus to 
the research, as will become evident. 
 
As raised in Chapter 4, knowledge of Giddens and his ‘third way’ was 
particularly problematic in both Canada and Australia. The three tiers of 
government in Canada with their differing political orientations (previously 
discussed) combined with their interrelatedness, particularly with respect to 
the DTES demonstration project, tended to confuse those with some 
knowledge of the ‘third way’ in the context of programmatic approach by 
each. As noted before, the federal government finds a Prime Minister who is 
an avowed third wayer with a provincial administration, which, until recently, 
was an NDP government. Having said that, respondents appeared to have 
some difficulty in defining a difference between the political “types”.  Consider 
this comment from a respondent to the research: 
 
…it’s sort of ironic because this isn’t the Campbell government (the 
newly installed Liberal administration). The previous government (the 
NDP) cut people’s welfare and cut their ability to earn while they were 
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on welfare and introduced some pretty draconian sort of measures 
and I guess that would have been a third way government if ever there 
was one, they would have styled themselves along those lines (Lyotier 
2002 - Transcriptions: 137). 
 
Nonetheless, a Liberal administration is now in place in British Columbia, 
which brings it in line with the federal ‘third way’ Liberal government. The 
passage to change within this jurisdiction exposed both optimism about the 
potential for future accountability mechanisms, according to respondents, for 
those funded by government but also a degree of cynicism about the change 
process per se, dependent, it seems, upon the political orientation of the 
respondent. Either way, this tended to indicate the use of political criteria as 
indicators to the maintenance of government control. One respondent 
described the change process in this way: 
 
… it’s going to change and is changing now with the new government 
but you know this new welfare policy could backfire on the new 
government too. The Eastside is a powerful lobbying force and there’s 
going to be a huge uproar when this comes to pass because all that 
money is going to be cut out of the Eastside (Anonymous [h] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 169-170). 
 
Still another respondent, echoing this sentiment, went further in articulating 
the nature and scope of this lobbying potential: 
 
The players have changed now. … it’s other people now that are 
involved from the Liberals because the NDP is no longer in power so a 
number of the players have changed … and quite frankly the Minister 
for Municipal Affairs who I met with in my capacity as UBCM said 
recently that they’re not going to be funding a lot of these groups 
anymore because they basically are just telling the Liberals they are a 
bunch of jerks and he said I have any number of people in the room 
here who can tell me I’m a jerk, why would I fund people to tell me I’m 
a jerk. So I feel that this Liberal government isn’t impressed with 
building community capacity in the way that it’s been going because 
they’re not advocacy groups, they’re criticism groups (Kennedy 2002 -
Transcriptions: 104). 
 
Whilst this particular respondent had not read about the ‘third way’, she had 
reviewed projects in the United Kingdom and was familiar with certain 
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elements of the ‘third way’. One of the specific comments about what she 
had heard and seen related to Blair’s apparent attitude about defunding 
critics of government policy: 
 
He (Blair) is very open about it and he said you’re not going to get 
your funding anymore if you don’t show some outcomes. Why didn’t 
we start with the same mindset here? (ibid: 104). 
 
It was a common view that, in the apparent interest of political stability (or 
control, dependent upon your position in the argument), organizations should 
be controlled or eliminated. Consider this comment from another respondent 
when it was suggested that critics in the United Kingdom were facing funding 
cuts if they became negatively critical of government policy: 
 
You know what? I’m hoping so and I am willing to tighten my belt and 
do without because I am just hoping that some of the funds get cut off 
down here and that the dust settles because there’s just a flurry of 
money …They have tremendous funding … (Anonymous [I] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 179). 
 
This attitude indicates a desire to pursue policy without government 
interference, and bound to purse strings. This concern about previous 
affiliations (raised above) presupposes that future beneficiaries of public 
funding will be compliant to government policy. For reasons discussed later 
in this chapter (and pursued in Chapter 6), this may only be possible if these 
new contractors are sympathetic to the “government line” or are governed by 
contractual strictures that make criticism difficult. Nonetheless the frustration 
for this particular respondent, in a less than satisfactory environment to her, 
was described thus: 
 
I’m busy doing my own thing. I work on the issues that I feel can make 
a difference there that don’t have anything to do with anybody trying to 
block me from doing them here at the city (Kennedy 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 112). 
 
The frustration for those engaged in Downtown Eastside Revitalization 
(DTES) processes, linked to the promise of change that is anticipated with 
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the altered political flavour (NDP to Liberal), was freely expressed: 
 
The Provincial government for the last ten or something years, for two 
terms and … just now the Liberal government took over. They (the 
NDP) seem to be working with a certain group of people and then their 
influence is right there…. Of course (the) NDP government appoint 
most of the people from their own supporters and some of the 
supporters are coming directly from the DTES…. So before now we 
have the Provincial government more or less tuned into a certain way 
to control the DTES (Anonymous [g] 2002 - Transcriptions: 118). 
 
On the other side of the argument there were those who believed that not 
only would the changed circumstances of the provincial government impact 
to demerit the work of the DTES, the changed attitude by the NDP and social 
democracy also created angst for respondents: 
 
…what concerns me … is that social democratic movements evolved 
out of I think some deeper human values that weren’t predicated on 
the economic sustainability only, they were predicated on people 
sharing common concern about those less fortunate, about having 
some sort of security in terms of health in terms of public education 
about some sort of idea of there being a progressive future for 
humanity and that we had together resources that we couldn’t bring 
together otherwise, to further our community aims. I understand the 
economic imperative to a degree but I’m not convinced that that’s a 
big enough motive to move my humanity. I think that there’s deeper 
stuff that keeps us going than the profitability of our economy?..  
(Lyotier 2002 - Transcriptions: 134). 
 
In a reflective mood of the future of the work of social justice advocates in the 
DTES and of the future for the area, Lyotier mused: 
 
Yes, we have won some victories (social housing, for example - not 
nearly enough but some) but there are still a lot of very difficult 
circumstances to be overcome.  I think our chances of forestalling 
redevelopment are not great and I don't think it is a terrific solution to 
try to maintain the status quo either because it is so awful, especially 
for those least able to do much to change things and especially trying 
to change things all alone (Lyotier 2002 - Transcriptions: 145). 
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In summary of respondent perceptions in British Columbia (Canada) on these 
themes, we note: 
 
o The political imperative appears to be “in play” by ‘third way’ and non-
’third way’ political aspirants; 
 
o There is a belief that a purge of NGOs is likely based upon their 
presumed political affiliations with a deposed administration. 
 
It is a sad indictment that social justice considerations within this jurisdiction, 
according to respondent perceptions, are of secondary consideration to the 
political imperative to engage policy without interference or critique. The 
Canadian example used involves a government in transition, from NDP to 
Liberal. This transition revealed emotionally charged disclosures that 
reflected the failure of the NDP government to produce definable outcomes 
but which also indicated a future government that would similarly fail to 
address problems, according to respondents. Both the NDP and the Liberal 
administrations were characterised by respondents as ‘third way’ in 
character. 
 
Discussion on these themes will now finally turn to data from Australian 
respondents. 
 
Data in support of the themes from Australia 
 
As has been suggested in the Introduction and Chapter 2, the ‘third way’ has, 
as its probable genesis, the political innovations of the Hawke and Keating 
Labor governments during the 1980s in Australia. These were social 
democratic governments that sustained political power when their 
counterparts in the United Kingdom, the United States and Europe had failed. 
It has been previously argued that the attention given to the style of these 
administrations, by Blair and Clinton, prior to their own campaigns, more than 
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likely was the most significant indicator to the formalisation of ‘third way’ 
processes espoused by both and reflected in the writings of Anthony 
Giddens. The germ of an idea - that of sustainability of government - reached 
across the Pacific and the Atlantic to become the model for the achievement 
of government in both those places. This then becomes the first indicator of 
the “political imperative”, the hallmark of new social democracy – a way to 
maintain governance. It has been noted in other places that the success of 
the ‘third way’ approach by social democratic administrations has found 
some equivalence within subsequent neo-liberal or conservative 
administrations in Australia. 
 
In addressing the issue of this political imperative, Duncan Kerr, a former 
Justice Minister under the Hawke/Keating governments and current Member 
of the Australian Federal Parliament, commented: 
 
I think that once people believe themselves to be helpless they can’t 
articulate that, they have to find language of potency to justify what 
they’re doing and it forces people who have accepted a retreat from 
the public sphere to find some other rationalisation for their conduct 
and they also have to deal with the fact that they leave behind large 
slabs of people who are extremely discontented by these kind of 
decisions, who feel alienated and excluded, who believe that their 
participation in the Labourist or Social Democratic tradition is being 
emptied out, betrayed. ….. The difference between winners and losers 
may be getting greater, identity politics may be becoming more 
significant, …these things are making for a much more complex and 
divided community with less immediate attachment to …whether 
you’re on the side of the workers or the side of capital. … The 
interesting thing is that everywhere around the third way tradition has 
tended to try to form broad coalitions but then to, in a sense, justify 
this by arguments that almost become circular; in order that 
governance becomes important, discipline becomes important in order 
to achieve governance and the rationale for governance becomes 
much more divorced from the traditions and roots of the social 
democrat or labourist movement (Kerr 2002 - Transcriptions: 515). 
 
According to Kerr there is considerable diversity within the community that, 
he believes, may not necessarily be encompassed in mass parties anymore. 
In sustaining this position he points to the decline in actual first preference 
votes for both Liberal and Labor Parties. He holds the view that any Party 
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that purports to umbrella the breadth of disparateness that exists within the 
community is proceeding from a fraudulent premise. As a consequence 
attempts to command the centre “... that becomes so voracious” without the 
traditional emotional attachments with the objectives of the Parties will lead to 
the emergence of a new style of politics (ibid), one which he asserts, will 
have the “... seeds of its own destruction” (p. 521). His concept of voters 
devoid of an enduring/authentic emotional attachment is one that appears to 
resonate in other jurisdictions as well as Australia. That emotion then 
potentially becomes a marketing contrivance. Consider, for example, the win 
by the Howard government in Australia in 2001 at a time when a win by that 
government was considered almost unviable. The contrivance of an 
emotional issue centred about the “boatpeople” refugees combined with the 
events in the United States on September 11th 2001 captured a support base 
for the Prime Minister that otherwise may not have been available to him. 
Ironically, the sympathetic treatment of refugees in Bosnia by Blair in the 
United Kingdom (Wright 2002 - Transcriptions: 61) in an opposing direction to 
that of Howard apparently secured him comparable support by electors. 
 
Respondents noted the similarity of government style between Liberal and 
Labor administrations. Safer Cities and Shires, a ‘third way’ style program, 
which was, as noted previously, a “cut and paste” exercise from the ‘third 
way’ UK administration, was embraced initially by a neo-liberal administration 
in Victoria and continued to be supported, with modification, by a subsequent 
Labor administration: 
 
Having worked for both governments, Labor and Liberal, at the policy 
development/social program level, I don’t note a lot of difference. 
There might be changes in priorities, which programs they are going to 
fund but the mechanisms are pretty much the same and the 
dysfunction is very much the same (Butten 2002 - Transcriptions: 
340). 
 
According to this respondent, the selection of this program was linked to a 
political need, as he puts it: 
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…it got on to the political platform – again, it was fortunate in that it 
was sufficiently into the term of government, in a policy vacuum 
coming up to the next election – what have we got? Nothing – nothing 
really new so SCS (Safer Cities and Shires) was there on the shelf, it 
looked good, it was politically safe – full of warm and fuzzy things and 
nothing really damaging about it politically (ibid: 347). 
 
This need, according to another respondent overrides any other 
consideration. To him, the political imperative is to gain government at any 
cost, irrespective of the good will or resolve to address structural problems 
that may exist in the community: 
 
…at the end of the day, there were some fundamental structural 
impediments as the very nature of governance and its inability to do 
anything other than be reactive rather than preventative, its inability to 
fragment recourses, policies and programs rather than be strategic 
and that strategies just end up becoming (after the boldness of vision) 
they just end up becoming – there’s a crack in incrementalism that 
enters into all of this - an inability to be quite serious and genuine 
about community capacity building (Abbey 2002 - Transcriptions: 393). 
 
Certainly respondents found the implementation of this particular program to 
be anomalous with the philosophy of the initiating government (note, for 
example, Anonymous [k], 2002 Transcriptions: 461), however the political 
need resurfaces to find organizations and communities given funding within 
this program for reasons apparently not linked to the “need” of those 
communities (see also, Harberts 2002 - Transcriptions: 490): 
 
Look I have sat on Committees where you’ve played off one against 
another for a variety of reasons that the public needn’t know about but 
it is profoundly obvious when somewhere with a major crime problem 
like Dandenong didn’t get funded. Don’t talk to me about the quality of 
their application – I mean give me a break, applications can be fixed, 
what are we funding here? Applications or problem-solving? That 
issue is an issue for discussion I think (Anonymous [k] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 465). 
 
In summary of respondent perceptions in Australia on the issue of these 
themes, we have perception data, which suggest that: 
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o The origins of the ‘third way’ in Australia predate Giddens by almost 
two decades; 
 
o ‘Third way’ processes are evident across conservative and non-
conservative government types; 
 
o Political parties in Australia appear to construct policies at the centre 
thereby abrogating the emotional attachments of political supporters to 
their cause – this would appear to affirm the political imperative to hold 
government at all costs. 
 
It has been discussed elsewhere (in Chapter 4) that Australian respondents 
(along with their Canadian counterparts) were the least informed about 
Giddens and his ‘third way’. Nonetheless, respondents did recognise that the 
distance between political parties had narrowed and that a political necessity, 
that of government at all costs, did appear to guide government policy. As 
noted from other jurisdictions, this is a troublesome proposition, as it may 
tend to colour the nature of political decision-making away from 
constituencies with real need. 
 
The discussion will now focus on the final theme with respect to this political 
imperative, that of the containment of dissent. 
 
Theme 3: The containment of dissent 
 
Having established from respondent perceptions and the literature that there 
is an evolutionary pathway for the ‘third way’ that invokes government 
specifically for the purpose of creating and maintaining political power, we 
now need to test whether a method exists by which critics of ‘third way’ 
government types are neutralised as a corollary development to this process. 
In the following chapter the threat of defunding will be specifically raised as a 
control mechanism over NGOs to neutralise debate as it more comfortably 
resides within the analysis at that point. In the context of the current 
discussion, various techniques that appear to aid in the containment of 
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dissent will be explicated from the data. These techniques will be broadly 
treated under the subheadings of “inventing dissent”, “pragmatism” and 
“centralisation of power”. We first turn our attention to respondent 
perceptions to explore the first of these techniques, the invention of dissent, 
which, for the purpose of this discussion will be dealt with as a speculation. 
 
The Invention of dissent 
 
The basic idea of the “invention of dissent” is that governments construct the 
parameters by which those who negatively critique their policies are judged. 
Dissent of government policy assumes a tangible form, which, in turn, 
justifies the need for the containment of its critics. The idea of the invention of 
dissent is, therefore, of some importance to validate processes that appear to 
guide the containment proposition – albeit the notion of invention of dissent 
will be treated, as mentioned previously, as a matter of speculation for the 
purpose of this study. Initially, the discussion will briefly explore the literature 
in relation to labelling theory as the skeletal basis for the concept of the 
invention of dissent. In essence - it will be suggested - the invention of 
dissent becomes the precondition to the labelling of those who deviate from, 
and present as a danger to, government policy. 
 
The literature in sociology abounds with examinations of “deviance” as a 
social construction that supports the established social order. Tracing from 
Tannenbaum (1938), the labelling perspective was substantially modified by 
Howard Becker (1963) who argued that deviance is created by social 
definitions of what constitutes acceptable behaviour. Those affiliated with 
low-status groups do not create the rules that govern them rather:  
 
Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction 
constitutes deviance, and by applying these rules to particular people 
and labelling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is 
not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence 
of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an “offender”. 
(Becker 1963: 9).   
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Accordingly, those who have the power to define the “acceptable qualities” of 
others, benefit from their ability to label (Unger 2000: 166). According to 
Rhoda Unger (2000), it is membership of a “deviant category” that creates 
penalty not the individual behaviour of group members (ibid). Once the 
“stigma” of deviance is exposed, outsiders are labelled with expectations and 
assumptions associated with the individuals from which patterns of response 
from others emerge during interaction (Becker 1963). Becker’s theory of 
outsiders resonates with the disassociation of the union movement by New 
Labour in the United Kingdom, as much as with others who would potentially 
pose a political threat to government. It would seem that the validation for 
labelling unions as “wreckers” (footnote ix.) relegates them to the rank of 
outsiders who no longer share the power of government formerly assigned to 
them under Labour administrations. As Becker asks: 
 
Who can, in fact, force others to accept these rules and what are the 
causes of their success? This is, of course, a question of political and 
economic power (ibid: 17). 
 
Becker views labelling as a social process guided by economic and political 
forces. Those with power determine the labels and further decide whom such 
labels will define. Further, powerful groups invent and label deviance as a 
control mechanism. Later labelling theorists imbue deviance with 
multifactorial causation including a “…wide variety of social, cultural, and 
psychological contexts” (Lemert 1972: 48). It is in the writings of John Lofland 
(1969) that we find a revisiting of deviance in the context of social conflict: 
 
Deviance is the name of the conflict game in which individuals or 
loosely organised small groups with little power are strongly feared by 
a well-organised, sizable minority or majority who have a large amount 
of power (Lofland 1969: 14). 
 
In reflecting underlying power struggles through the process of labelling 
deviance, Lofland’s proposition is suggestive of techniques of persuasion and 
pressure (note Giddens use of persuasion) as an intended outcome of the 
labelling. This view accords with that of Edwin Schur (1980) whose “moral 
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stratification” (Schur 1980: 7) suggests that deviance becomes a style of 
social typing that occurs when certain people feel threatened by others 
(notably a political process): 
 
… what is essentially at stake in such situations is the power or 
resource of moral standing or acceptability. Other appropriate terms 
for this would include propriety (and) respectability… Individuals on 
the receiving end of the deviantizing process face as a result the 
prospect of a significant lessening of moral standing, and often they 
vividly experience it (ibid: 6). 
 
The issue of government dealing with its detractors in a negative manner (the 
matter of funding strictures on NGOs to force compliance to government 
policy, according to respondents, will be comprehensively explored in 
Chapter 6) has already been canvassed in Chapters 2 and 4, be those 
detractors unions (“wreckers”) or nongovernmental organizations. This is an 
important element to the argument for the political imperative, according to 
respondents – to remove opposition. In the first instance, however, that 
opposition needs to be defined.  The outsiders, in Becker’s terms, need to be 
negatively labelled as a consequence of their perceived threat to government 
(in accordance with the assertions of Lofland and Shur). This notion reflects 
in comments from respondents to this research. Sampson Low, a respondent 
in the United Kingdom suggests that the vagueness of the ‘third way’ 
ideology results in the need for government to define itself by whom its 
enemies are: 
 
….(the government) has to keep constantly setting up mythical 
enemies to fight and to shoot down and they know what they’re not but 
they’re not very sure what they’re for – it creates this need to pigeon-
hole and demonise and set up people or groups of people as the 
enemies of progress or the forces of conservatism (Low 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 24). 
 
Another, anonymous, respondent characterises the same phenomenon, 
referencing the views of Labour Members of Parliament in the United 
Kingdom: 
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If you read Blunkett’s stuff, first in Education out of the Home Office, 
he talks loads about crusades and no one can possibly dissent from 
this line of policy, actually says that several times …(yet) another point 
of view (is) part of the bullying, what you’ve just described as kind of 
social control that comes out through government policy. I don’t think it 
comes from a view that necessarily Central government can control 
that, I think it comes from a belief in the strength of what they think 
they’re doing. It must be right for everybody to do it the way we want 
and they want people to get involved in that, that’s why they want us to 
believe what they believe (Anonymous [b] 2002 - Transcriptions: 91). 
 
In British Columbia we have a government in transition (NDP to Liberal [or 
‘third way’]). As a consequence, some respondents quite openly labelled 
organizations that were perceived to be supporters of the former NDP 
administration as a threat to the incoming administration (or to presumed 
supporters of that administration). This situation provides some equivalence 
to the ‘enemies’ that Sampson Low in the United Kingdom refers to:  
 
…why would I fund people to tell me I’m a jerk? So I feel that this 
Liberal government isn’t impressed …because they’re not advocacy 
groups, they’re criticism groups (Kennedy 2002 – Transcriptions: 104). 
 
The changing circumstances in this jurisdiction require a degree of 
circumspection on the part of those who would criticise government, a point 
articulated by this respondent who noted: 
 
So there’s a lot of like push and pull right? They will say that you are 
still not doing this right or wrong and I keep trying to say that, yeah, I 
understand that, you need to hold on to your principles and I’m not 
trying to coerce you into compromising your principles and what your 
needs are but at the same time we have to learn how to work together 
because ultimately you know, especially if you look at the political 
environment right now. The City is their best ally, is their best friend. 
We have to try to work together and try to choose your battles. Don’t 
fight every battle, if you fight every battle people are just going to shut 
off and they’re going to walk away. Choose the battle. Be strategic… 
(Au 2002 – Transcriptions: 197). 
 
Implicit in this statement is that those who would be critical of government 
policy are likely to be labelled as non-supporters who could be potentially 
punished as a consequence – punishment based upon lack of funding or lack 
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of favour with respect to the advocacy issues raised. Following Becker, 
Lofland and Shur and in the context of respondent assertions, there would 
seem to be some consensus that the enemies or outsiders are judged as 
threats on the basis of their affiliations with the former governmental 
administration.  It seems likely that the new Premier of British Columbia, a 
former real estate developer, will opt for “urban redevelopment” in the DTES  
(Anonymous [h] 2002 – Transcriptions: 159), rather than deal with organised 
criticism from within that district (Anonymous [g] 2002 – Transcriptions: 118). 
The new government determines (invents) its enemies in the first instance 
and deals with them, potentially by removing them from the equation. 
 
In the United States, the George W. Bush administration has apparently 
determined that organizations that don’t conform to a moral order are its 
enemies.  The ‘faith-based’ initiatives of that administration are finding both 
political and financial favour for church-based groups. At the same time, the 
administration is closing abortion clinics and reconstructing legislation that 
strike at civil liberties – these matters will be elaborated upon in Chapter 6. It 
would seem that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has become the 
perceived enemy of the administration who should be deemed as outsiders 
who threaten the government agenda in this debate. As Gordon Raley 
suggested: 
 
The fact that they’re politically unpopular (the ACLU) means that Bush 
will love it so the more people who will get up and make speeches 
about how Bush is trying to keep God in this country, that works to 
Bush’s favour (Raley 2002 – Transcriptions: 327). 
 
 
And further; 
 
But now the southern Baptists are right-wing and leading, and I say 
right-wing there intentionally I mean politically they have made a 
political move on that convention and the Churches are now very 
closely aligned with the right-wing agenda which says oh for gosh 
sakes yes we must get God back in this country, we must get God 
involved in our government, we must have prayer in the schools, now 
it’s their prayers and their God being in government but I think Bush 
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has managed to manipulate that and sees it as a way to get broad-
range support that almost invites people to attack him. In other words, 
please let the ACLU say this is bad, in fact the worse thing that could 
happen for Bush would be for the ACLU to say you know gosh we 
thought about it and having God in government is good (ibid:  329). 
 
In Australia, Duncan Kerr refutes that the Hawke/Keating governments 
sought to remove its critics, but asserts that this is what the John Howard 
government is now doing, in line with Tony Blair in the United Kingdom. He 
claims that, consistent with the concept of invention of dissent, enemies are 
being distinguished on the basis of potential threat to government and 
controlled (Kerr 2002 – Transcriptions: 521). 
 
In this discussion, I have speculated about a process that has been called 
the invention of dissent which has been viewed as the precursor process to 
the assignment of a “deviance’ label which, in turn, is used to consign 
enemies (those who threaten the government agenda) to an outsider status – 
thereby removing them as potential negative critics of government policy. 
Powerful groups invent and label deviance as a control mechanism. Certainly 
the ‘third way’ is only doing what has been done by every dominant ideology 
and is therefore not unique in this respect. What is specific to the ‘third way’ 
is that a movement that originates from the left is labelling its old friends as 
its enemies, or that this labelling is taking on a new direction being driven by 
pragmatism and current political needs, not doctrine. 
 
Having briefly considered the process by which dissent is invented, we now 
need to expand upon how governments proceed in a determination of which 
groups or organizations should be contained, or, correspondingly, supported 
based upon this definition. This phenomenon will be referred to as the 
pragmatism of governments.  
 
Pragmatism 
 
In arriving at a process by which dissent is invented, it is suggested that 
governments then apply the further technique of pragmatism as a method for 
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determining support for certain organizations over others, based upon the 
capacity of the former to enhance government policy and discounting the 
latter on the basis that they would negatively critique government policy. The 
matter of the pragmatics of the ‘third way’ has been touched upon during this 
chapter, but it is in the particular circumstance of containing dissent that the 
following argument proceeds. 
 
To explain this concept we firstly will turn to data from the United States. The 
nexus between business interests and political interests permeates the data 
from this jurisdiction. This nexus, according to most respondents, required a 
pragmatic realignment from policy geared to social justice consideration to 
that of economic rationalist acquiescence. The method by which the 
Democrats and the Republicans, in speaking a common purpose in the lead 
up to the election of 2000, could be seen to be inclusive of the social justice 
debate, centred upon volunteerism and support for faith-based organizations. 
The rationale, it seems, for this focus pivots on the margins previously 
discussed encapsulating the political imperative to gain government. As 
Conner explained of the phenomenon: 
 
The Evangelical Christians and the conservative lower middle class, 
white Protestants – people I come from so I am pretty familiar with 
them – they feel very keenly the slights of the mainstream media. … it 
is not lost on them that the American intelligentsia thinks that their 
religious faith is a Freudian projection. Those of them that are involved 
in active Ministry, where they’re actually out there feeding hungry 
people and helping drug addicts and pulling people out of prison, their 
feelings turn from withdrawal and unhappiness at being disrespected 
to something that has a bitter edge to it, …. you’re going to tell me that 
I don’t care about poor people and I’m just trying to get money? OK .. 
now you got me mad, now I am going to give money, now I am going 
to work for candidates and I’m going to do all the things that one does 
in politics (Conner 2002 - Transcriptions: 312). 
 
According to respondents, the understanding of the alienation of the religious 
“class” was not lost, it seems, on either Democrats or Republicans, each 
bidding for the support from within this sector. The combination of marketing 
and the slender margins that separate Parties that distinguish government 
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from opposition (discussed previously) provided the environment to use this 
class for political advantage. As Gordon Raley summarised: 
 
… one would think that when you talk about God in government you’re 
talking about a broad middle class audience and you may be but we 
have more and more minorities who enter into that and even some 
minorities who are in lower and lower middle class who also think God 
is good and some of those who are poor may believe that more 
strongly than others and there is the chance that there may be a way 
to coopt some of those people and bring them. If you can take that 
market that used to be 90-10, 90 Democrat, 10 percent Republican 
and make that 80-20, the thin margins we operate in our elections 
today, that’s a huge accomplishment and maybe they think they can 
do that (Raley 2002 - Transcriptions: 329). 
 
Roger Conner believes that George W. Bush was the more capable in 
massaging support from within the religious constituencies: 
 
So I am sure that as a political gesture to reinforce his base among 
Evangelical Christians and conservative Protestants, conservative 
white Protestants, and to appeal to a potential new base that he was 
trying to court, and it’s not really blacks that he was courting …. but it 
is the Methodists, it is the pragmatic, it was the people that are 
appealed to by third way politics (who) are pragmatic people in the 
middle ….he was able to frighten Democrats that he might drive a 
wedge between them and their democratic base, reassured the 
pragmatic moderate third way types that he did care about inner-city 
people and their problems unlike others – he was really a 
compassionate conservative and nailed down his base. You could end 
up losing the Bill and winning in the political sense (Conner 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 310). 
 
The net effect of courting support in this way from the perspective of 
respondents has a dual purpose. Firstly it ensures government, and 
secondly, it consolidates ongoing support for the implementation of policy 
that is not inconsistent with religious dogma but which also demerits social 
democratic tradition in favour of market forces. The great movements of the 
past that centred upon civil libertarian angst over rights for African 
Americans, and which was spearheaded by African American religious 
leaders, for example, are neutralised, probably never to resurface. Consider 
this response: 
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….maybe on a local level, that some of those critics (‘antagonistic 
Black Churches”) have been neutralised and some of those police 
chiefs have been, from the point of view of their supporters, 
neutralised or compromised by this movement towards the middle. I 
think that’s a good thing because I think there’s a lot of room for 
common ground here (Travis 2002 - Transcriptions: 289). 
 
An extension of the analysis in relation to faith-based initiatives will be 
presented in the following chapter in addressing that other component that 
the researcher believes resides within the construct of the ‘third way’, the 
“moral imperative”. 
 
Certainly in Australia, according to Kerr, those who would dissent from 
government policy face the prospect of defunding. He argues that this is in 
fact the approach by the Howard government, which he views as having 
some equivalence to the thinking of Blair in the United Kingdom and the NDP 
in Canada (pg. 520-21): 
 
Where it becomes dangerous and where I think it can actually be quite 
successful is where you link funding to social organizations to 
commitments in their contracts, that they will not be making public 
statements, and there I think Howard has been really doing that and if 
Blair’s doing the same thing well I think it can be quite successful in 
tamping down them as a source of commentary because Church 
organizations get drawn into the public/private provision and so do a 
range of other organizations that have historically been external critics 
and quite powerful ones of social inegalitarianism. But I suspect that 
you may be creating a very explosive mix underneath if you don’t find 
ways to liberate legitimate criticism (Kerr 2002 - Transcriptions: 521). 
 
In Australia, then, the ‘third way’ divisions between Labor and conservative 
governments become blurred, as elsewhere. But the rationale remains the 
same – adoption of market ideology combined with containment of social 
dissent to retain government with support for those most likely to assist its 
passage and containment for those perceived not to be capable of doing so – 
i.e. adherence to a pragmatic program. This phenomenon would help 
account for the emergence of a ‘third way’ project initially during the lifetime 
of a neo-liberal government in Victoria, Safer Cities and Shires. As previously 
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noted, one of the architects of this program (having regard to the “cut and 
paste” exercise from the British Home Office in formulating the project) 
suggested that there was little difference between the Parties in terms of the 
mechanics of program implementation (Butten 2002 - Transcriptions: 340).  
 
A co-architect of the project was similarly unmoved about the apparent 
differentness of political Parties in terms of the passage of the project through 
Cabinet: 
 
Our minister certainly, being a grassroots national party minister; he 
certainly was a contradiction…..a country based red neck political 
orientation and …(as well) a genuine grassroots sensitivity you know, 
the need for local government and local communities to be active… he 
was certainly influenced by us. Where the divergence emerged 
between our thinking and the thinking of the government would have 
been our more strategic approach and the short-termist imperatives.  
…over a time a polarity emerged which we were never really able to 
recover from between our more strategic capacity building and the 
focus of local government; …in the bureaucracy … alarm bells (rang).  
You know, they were fearful that we were building up the capacity of 
local government to come and bite state government on the bottom 
(Abbey 2002 - Transcriptions: 391). 
 
In seeking to explain this issue Abbey suggests that a new technocratic 
knowledge-based and more pragmatic period made alternatives seem 
“fanciful” (pg. 399).  
 
…if that means engagement with Blair and New Labor so be it, 
anything else is wishful thinking, get real and that of course belies 
itself with the Anglo positivistic pragmatic tradition where there’s no 
point in building meta-narratives or speculating or building grand 
designs for change, it’s a matter of making sure that the issues as they 
now present themselves have to be solved. … (Abbey 2002 
Transcriptions: 399). 
 
In concluding, with Giddens, that Marxism was in a doctrinaire, sterile state 
and therefore not a reigning alternative, Abbey suggests that the eclecticism 
of the 1960s and 1970s was flawed, which, in turn, accounted for the failure 
to develop an integral synthesis that could provide the foundations for good 
policy. 
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Whilst tailoring his Project around the buzzwords of efficiency tied to 
measurable outcomes that bolstered government electoral stocks, Abbey 
seemingly neglects the potentiality for the transference of risk from the State 
to Municipal levels, the pragmatics of deflecting criticism to others for policy 
failures. Consider, for example, the comment from a Community 
Development worker with a Municipal Authority: 
 
…it’s less responsibility, less onerous on them to actually have 
delivered the outcome and if it’s not delivered at the local government 
level then they can blame local government (DiSanto 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 423). 
 
The final technique isolated as being in play for the containment of dissent, 
as indicated from the data, is that of the centralisation of power, which will be 
now discussed.  
 
Centralisation of power 
 
The concept of the centralisation of power implies an hierarchical approach 
that limits the authority of those systems below the central authority to the 
extent that they are no longer perceived as meaningful players but are 
adjuncts to that central authority. 
 
Perhaps the most profound example of how the government actively seeks to 
contain criticism and radically realign the political system by neutralising 
authority below it can be found in the United Kingdom and is reflected in 
attitudes towards Local Authorities. According to one respondent local 
authorities in the United Kingdom are losing power and are being forced to 
assume the role of an “... implementation mechanism for Central government 
policy” (Anonymous [e] 2002 - Transcriptions: 81). This respondent asserts 
that primary power is being shifted from local authorities to health 
organizations that are, according to him, quangos. He suggests that whilst 
this has led to a large amount of disquiet amongst local authorities, this is not 
reflected by public attitudes: 
 
The public at large has sussed that local authorities now have very 
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little power and influence in reality and very few people vote at local 
elections so Central government could quite easily say well there’s a 
very small minority of people voting, you have no mandate and yes 
there’s considerable disquiet (Anonymous [e] 2002 -
Transcriptions:81). 
 
In seeking to explain this trend, another respondent quipped: 
 
Local government here is enfeebled and not very respected (Stern 
2002 - Transcriptions: 7). 
 
In suggesting that a degree of tension is necessary between Central 
government and local authorities, one anonymous respondent suggests that, 
whilst this has been eroded over the past decade or more, “... this 
government has continued to erode the influence and power base of local 
government” (Anonymous [e] 2002 - Transcriptions: 88).  Asked about 
whether this threatened redundancy for that level of government this 
respondent replied: 
 
Oh incredibly so. No doubt about that at all. For example the local 
education authority, ….is the single biggest bit – at the County Council 
it covers about half our budget; …The government is talking about 
closing down the local education authorities all together. Already 
around 90 percent of all local education funds have to be by statute 
delegated to individual schools so increasing percentages of the 
money have gone directly to schools. Schools are now cash rich but 
often idea and policy poor. …. So individual schools are now having to 
cluster together to be able to afford to respond in areas that were 
previously the job of local government and the key outcome is going to 
be that the government is actually talking about abolishing local 
educational authorities altogether. That will be, at a stroke, a massive 
reduction in what is already a thinned down role for local government. 
The same is true with social services which is the second largest area 
of expenditure and that is going off to be with Health under the new 
Primary Health Care Trusts, which are again not democratic but are 
directly answerable to the Secretary of State. So it’s the democratic 
control, the local democratic control element that’s being taken out of 
the equation (Anonymous [e] 2002 - Transcriptions: 82). 
 
The concerns about Local Authorities challenging Central government came 
to a head during debate on the privatisation of the London “tube” rail system. 
The Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, publicly berated the Blair government 
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with his highly emotive claim that such privatisation would mean, “people will 
die” as a consequence. The response by the Blair government has been to 
override the City. Given the number of local authorities throughout the United 
Kingdom, a potential plethora of claims against the Central government 
would certainly become problematic for Blair. Without doubt the centralisation 
of power by Blair is not novel having been a technique applied by the 
Thatcher government to weaken locally elected government during the 
1980s. Paul Lawless et al (1996) traces the history of this centralisation 
arguing that during this period it was one of “… the pervading features of 
English urban policy” (Lawless et al 1998: 162). Consistent with earlier 
findings (Lawless 1989, 1991; Atkinson and Moon 1994), they conclude that 
most initiatives of significance during the 1980s were controlled by the centre 
(ibid). Whilst not suggesting that the Blair government invented this strategy 
as a devise to contain dissent, it could reasonably be concluded, based upon 
the perception data from respondents in the UK, that his government has 
borrowed the practice – and extended it.   
 
Having previously said that Local Authorities are under threat in the United 
Kingdom, it is argued that a corollary disestablishment of certain elements of 
nongovernmental structures will follow as a consequence of the changed 
government circumstances at the provincial government level in British 
Columbia through a centralising or purging process (according to the data). It 
will be suggested that this may occur for the same reasons, that is, the 
neutralisation of dissent within the community. 
 
The assertion of a political imperative will, therefore, be reflected upon from 
within the data from the perspective of respondents who believe they have 
been frustrated by the application of this imperative by a former government 
during the past ten years. 
 
Our story starts with a comment from an unnamed respondent who muses 
over the effect of NDP prominence (and their alleged agenda with NGOs) in 
that province: 
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We had the NDP government which is the socialist type of 
government, legitimately for the poor, for the working people, for the 
union people, it’s got the union support and so on and they also work 
very closely with marginalised people like the people staying in the 
SROs and also they have the …(non-government organizations), 
other societies and ….. and the …. (resident groups).., they … more or 
less have a way of organising themselves. Now I hate to say that they 
… try to put .. those people together to have some .. control in the 
political way. That’s quite easy you know. If they have the control 
when the election comes, they can …. The Provincial government for 
the last ten … years, … seem to be working with a certain group of 
people and then their influence is right there …(with these groups) 
favoured by the NDP government for quite a while….. So before now 
(the change to a Liberal Provincial government) we have the 
Provincial government more or less tuned into a certain way to control 
the DTES… The people … controlling …most of those rental units 
…(are) more or less affiliated in certain ways with the Provincial 
government. So the power concentration is really tremendous 
(Anonymous [g] 2002 - Transcriptions: 118). 
 
A Manager of the Council who has responsibilities as an interface between 
the levels of government and the community in the development of the DTES 
partnership expressed a similar sentiment thus: 
 
I don’t know how you define the term user-friendly but because the 
NDP government has been in power for the last ten years so agencies 
that are getting funding from them, rightly or wrongly, whether they are 
pro-NDP policy or not, we don’t know, but the fact that an agency 
exists as in gets funding for the past ten years, it seems like that may 
be more reflective of those policies (Au 2002 - Transcriptions: 191). 
 
One respondent who is a long standing resident of the DTES, a former 
substance addict and now a successful business operator in the region 
lamented that: 
 
…if the people that are doing the advocacy are disconnected from 
what’s happening there, we become more and more vulnerable 
because they’re operating in that same sort of elite circle that the 
people that they’re advocating in opposition to are operating in (Lyotier 
2002 - Transcriptions: 132). 
 
Ken Lyotier holds the view that those advocating for the poor are, by and 
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large, a different class who manipulate “like pawns” the poor to maintain a “... 
poverty business” without discernable improvements (pg. 127). Whilst not 
suggesting that these advocates don’t care, Lyotier nonetheless asserts that 
these people are “... faced with the difficulties of maintaining a lifestyle that 
costs dollars”: 
 
…there’s the prospect of losing one’s livelihood as the result of 
restructuring social services that one works in, then even if one knows 
somehow in the dark recesses of one’s mind that changes are 
probably needed, perhaps it is difficult to maintain an unbiased 
perspective.  One has a conflict of interest, after all.  And even if one is 
making good decisions…the best decisions…those decisions and 
motives become suspect because of the conflicting interests (Lyotier 
2002 - Transcriptions: 129). 
 
Ultimately, Lyotier states, his concern is not for the organizations but for the 
impact on people who are his friends and neighbours “... that I see every day” 
(Lyotier 2002 - Transcriptions: 136). In line with the impression of a changed 
provincial government by other respondents, he feels that redevelopment is a 
more likely outcome, as noted previously, arguing that this proposition is as 
“awful” as the status quo (Lyotier 2002 - Transcriptions: 145) 
 
Another respondent from the for-profit sector with significant assets within the 
DTES echoed this belief stating of the nongovernmental engagement in the 
DTES: 
 
They’re pretty powerful, the people who have control of them you 
know. Politically they’re pretty powerful or they were. Maybe not with 
the new government they’re not but with the NDP they were 
(Anonymous [h] 2002  - Transcriptions: 169). 
 
This same respondent when asked why the Programs appeared ineffectual 
noted: 
 
The mantra I hear all the time is that it’s the other level of government 
that has to pay a part. They haven’t paid so we can’t go further 
(Anonymous 2002 [h] - Transcriptions: 166). 
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Another former resident of the district and a provincial government employee 
expressed his view about the intent for the development of social programs in 
the DTES when he stated:  
 
I believe that what’s happened with law and social programs in our 
country are they have lost the integrity they started out with and they 
have become, if you will, theatres for politicians. So when a politician 
wants to be appearing to be a social champion I bet you that if you 
went back and examined news clippings all of those social, shall you 
say, innovative or championship programs are to be found on the 
DTES (McCoy 2002 - Transcriptions: 148). 
 
Some in the United States have also alluded to this phenomenon, suggesting 
that centralisation of power has become more of an issue under the George 
W. Bush administration than that of Bill Clinton – inferring a process that 
seeks to control the debates in the furtherance of unspecified agendas. 
Consider this comment from Jim Copple: 
 
In the new administration I am not sure they’ve discovered the term 
cooperative agreement yet. It’s more of you’re a contractor and so 
here’s what we want done and how we expect it to be done and so the 
conversation of trying to problem-solve together isn’t as clear… 
(Copple 2002 – Transcriptions: 255). 
 
Others in the United States articulated the potency of this centralisation in 
terms of the ways in which particular interest groups were being alienated 
over the issue of religiosity in the Church/State debate on “faith-based” 
initiatives. Specifically, many mentioned the engagement in the debate by the 
ACLU. This matter will be more fully canvassed in the following chapter. For 
the purpose of the current discussion it would seem that adherence to a 
populist movement in the United States (that of “faith-based” engagement 
and volunteerism utilising “faith-based” organizations) galvanises a central 
policy direction by the George W. Bush administration to apparently discredit 
potential opponents to the government and gain the support of voters: 
 
I think he thinks that that’s an idea that’s terribly popular with 
mainstream Americans and that there is something that just like all of 
us think volunteerism is good, and (an) overwhelming majority of us, 
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now granted there’s ten or fifteen percent but generally if you said is 
God good most of us would say yes (Raley 2002 – Transcriptions: 
328). 
 
The final, humorous, word comes from the Canadian respondent Ken Lyotier: 
 
Anyway here we’re looking at potential funding cuts and it’s like the, 
maybe you don’t know this joke, about this great musical orchestra 
that went to play for the Crown Heads of Europe and they went to Italy 
and played for the King of Italy and their music was just so wonderful 
that the King opened up his Treasury and said help yourselves fellows 
and there was a guy filling up his Tuba and a guy filling up his Bass 
Drum and people were taking all the jewels and gold that they could 
and there was this little guy with this piccolo right. And then they went 
to Denmark and they played for the King of Denmark and they played 
lousy and at the end of it the King of Denmark said well OK stick it 
where the sun don’t shine and there was the guy with the Tuba, and 
there was the guy with the Bass Drum and there was the guy with his 
piccolo. So, it kind of cuts like that. If you don’t have a lot, you don’t 
have as much to lose (Lyotier 2002 - Transcriptions: 145). 
 
The assertion is that NGOs were, according to respondents, given financial 
largesse to become compliant. There was a strong perception that a changed 
government would see a new group of preferred NGOs similarly acquiescent 
to government policy, tied to purse strings.  
 
In summary of respondent perceptions in support of the themes of 
containment of dissent and in the context of those techniques applied 
analytically by the researcher (inventing dissent, pragmatism and 
centralisation of power), it can be suggested that: 
 
o A necessary element to the containment of dissent is to firstly define 
those who are problematic and invent the label that best fits. 
 
o Electoral pragmatism would appear to direct the rationale for 
containing those who would dissent against government policy. 
 
o The centralisation of power would appear to reduce the number of 
participants who could become problematic to government. 
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Summary 
 
Bearing in mind that this study is not an explication of all elements of the 
‘third way’, a body of data has been generated that has significance for 
further study. By referencing the data from respondents, it has been 
established that the application of ‘third way’ approaches perhaps has more 
to do with the maintenance of electoral control and power than it does to 
meld social democratic and neo-liberal ideals although this assertion could 
be construed to be an overstatement. Some could argue that the evidence 
presented could be suggestive of centralisation of power being a side-effect 
or unintended consequence of policy-makers in spite of the possible 
prescription implicit to Giddens’ theory. Nonetheless, respondents have 
articulated a predisposition by such administrations to neutralise criticism in 
the quest to maintain their government. 
 
This is a worrying proposition, as it appears to move the purpose of 
government away from democratic representation (the concern for, and 
dealing with constituent needs) towards a position that validates government 
power for its own sake. The idea that government, of itself, can provide 
solutions to community problems and that traditional critics of government 
policy need to be neutralised arguably flies in the face of democratic tradition. 
 
The notion of using the ‘carrot’ of funding nongovernmental organizations to 
encourage their compliance to government policy and the ‘stick’ of defunding 
for those who would choose to criticise government policy is not peculiar to 
the ‘third way’ with government displeasure with advocacy organizations 
(pre-‘third way’) in evidence. It could be argued that this method is a feature 
of both parents of the ‘third way’ – neo-liberalism and social democracy – a 
matter that will be taken up again in the following Chapter. Respondents 
have noted, however, that social democratic governments, in the past, have 
been more tolerant of social dissent to government policy - indeed have 
encouraged such debate (Kerr 2002 – Transcriptions: 521-22). The 
difference for nongovernmental organizations under ‘third way’ regimes – 
 226
 
 
specifically those regimes that have social democratic roots – is that 
nongovernmental organizations formerly considered “friends” of social 
democratic governments are now perceived as “enemies” if they are seen to 
dissent against government policy (as discussed earlier in this Chapter). In 
the past, it could be suggested, nongovernmental organizations endured a 
cycle of significance based upon what style of regime was in power – social 
democratic or neo-liberal. Within this cycle, such organizations prospered 
under social democratic governments and maintained the status quo (or 
diminished in significance) under neo-liberal administrations – at least those 
nongovernmental organizations substantially dependent upon government 
funding. Under ‘third way’ styled administrations the advocacy and policy 
critique roles for non-governmental organizations disappear completely, 
irrespective of the “favour” of the administration. 
 
Across the research sites, which range from conservative to non-
conservative, certain regularities or similarities have been observed by 
respondents that are consistent with the theme that the political imperative 
exists for the purpose of maintaining government at all costs and that devices 
appear to be in place that seek to contain dissent against government: 
 
o Respondents believed that there had been a political shift by the left 
and the right to capture middle ground voters through “parenthood” 
assertions related to civil society, values and partnerships. 
 
o Respondents believed that the realignment of social democratic 
principles by Labour/left political parties was designed to 
accommodate electoral success. 
 
o Respondents felt that a process by ‘third way’ administrations existed 
that equated dissent by critics with “enemies” of government. 
 
o Respondent perceptions appeared to suggest the implementation of 
strategies designed to impose restrictions upon the outreach and 
 227
 
 
autonomy of critics (eg. local authorities in the United Kingdom, the 
ACLU in the United States [which will be outlined in the following 
chapter], nongovernmental organizations in Canada and Australia). 
 
o Respondents believed that there had been an apparent transfer of 
sponsorship arrangements (government funding) from non-sectarian 
organizations to sectarian organizations [elaborated upon in the 
following chapter]. This is driven by a pragmatic orientation towards 
electoral success. 
 
In the following chapter, a second “imperative” will be explored, that 
pertaining to morality.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
The Moral Imperative  
 
 
In the previous chapter the matter of the “political imperative” was discussed 
and, based upon the data interrogated, would appear to have some veracity 
based upon respondent perceptions. If democratic government exists to 
enable communities towards a position of self-regulation and self-reliance as 
is suggested from ‘third way’ philosophy (discussed in Chapter 2), one is left 
to ponder the nature and scope of the processes by which these notions of 
self-sufficiency and self-regulation are determined, particularly within an 
environment where the political consideration of government dominates (as 
articulated in Chapter 5). It has also been argued that the distance between 
formerly social democratic styled governments and neo-liberal governments 
has indeed narrowed as a direct result of the rise of the ‘third way’ and that 
elemental features may now exist that are transportable one to the other. 
 
This chapter will explore testable indicators from the data that seemingly 
validate this possibility (again having regard to the limited scope of the 
research). The first of these arise as a consequence of moral considerations 
working as an impelling force to guide ‘third way’ governance at a local level. 
It is the blurred distinction between the left and the right, which both embody 
‘third way’ methods, that provides the environment for the deployment of a 
“moral imperative”. In considering what constitutes a “good society” (i.e. that 
which provides “social order”), an ongoing debate that is bound in history will 
be backgrounded.  This latter issue will now be canvassed. 
 
For the purpose of clarification, the writer will define the "moral imperative" 
discussed in this chapter as a series of moral dictates of a broadly 
conservative nature involving the imposition of narrow understandings of 
"family", "community" and "responsibility" upon citizens which may be 
 The ‘third way’: Inclusion at a cost
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threatening to cultural and lifestyle difference and/or political dissent. In the 
US context these are bolstered by religious forces and factors through 
George W. Bush’s "faith based initiatives”. 
 
Antecedent considerations to the concept of “morality” within the ‘third 
way’ 
 
In establishing itself as a median point between opposing ideologies, the 
‘third way’ distils elements of both for the purpose, it seems, of finding 
support for a style of philosophical consensus that presumably will be 
palpable to former opponents from both sides of the debate. This idea of 
“accommodating” competing forces within ‘third way’ philosophy has already 
been touched upon both from a political and philosophical perspective (in 
Chapters 2 and 4). For the purpose of this chapter a cursory review of the 
nature of these oppositional camps may assist in providing a rationale for the 
adoption of a moral overlay to what respondents (in Chapter 5) have clearly 
demonstrated is the “pragmatism” of the ‘third way’. 
 
In essence there is a debate in the literature engaging the view of libertarians 
and laissez-faire conservatives who fear the growth of government, religion 
and power elites and those in opposition to the libertarians who decry the 
notion of individualism and set about to create an ethos that seeks to counter 
what its proponents perceive as the moral decay of society. It was Michael 
Sandel (in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, published in 1982) who led 
the “moral” charge against the libertarians in the 1980s. In tandem with 
Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue) Sandel helped to launch the communitarian 
challenge to liberalism (Dagger 1999), which was to be considerably 
advanced by Amitai Etzioni. 
 
According to Dagger, Sandel departs from the evolved communitarians, 
however, in applying a republican stance in a debate commenced in his 
publication, Democracy’s Discontent (Sandel 1996). According to Sandel (in 
commenting on Rawl’s Political Liberalism [Rawls 1996]):  
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The term 'communitarian' is misleading. . . insofar as it implies that 
rights should rest on the values or preferences that prevail in any 
given community at any given time. Few, if any, of those who have 
challenged the priority of the right are communitarians in this sense 
(Sandel 1994 in Dagger 1999: 182-183).  
 
According to Dagger, Sandel proceeds upon the republican stance which 
requires government to cultivate qualities in its citizens that enhance the 
process of government rather than to a communitarian vision “... committed 
to the prevailing values and preferences in a given community at a given 
time” (Sandel 1996: 6 in Dagger 1999: 183), believing that negative values or 
qualities may be hostile to those required of self-government.   
 
It is, however, from the communitarians, epitomised by Etzioni, that Giddens 
draws succour in the formalisation of his ‘third way’. According to Bradley 
Watson (1999), Etzioni, in pursuit of a new moral order, calls: 
 
 
…for a moratorium on the minting of new "rights," the strengthening of 
responsibilities through family and community ties, and the reining-in 
of some extant rights, including especially those related to search and 
seizure (Watson 1999: 214). 
 
 
These are matters which will be explored in this chapter and which resonate 
with the writings of Giddens. It will be advanced that Giddens has sought to 
integrate elements of liberal and communitarian philosophy, as much as it 
has been argued he blends social democratic and neo-liberal philosophies. 
The development of a moral agenda by ‘third way’ style governments (either 
conservative or non-conservative), it will be argued, becomes a companion 
device to consolidate political “control” once the political imperative has been 
realised.  
 
As the current climate stems from communitarian/’third way’ philosophies, a 
brief review of the moral aspects of both, via the principle protagonists 
Anthony Giddens and Amitai Etzioni, is in order. In the first section of this 
chapter, the writings of Anthony Giddens and Amitai Etzioni will be revisited 
in terms of their position on morality and its significance to ‘third way’/third 
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wave interventions. Later in this chapter the impact of the moral and political 
imperatives, in tandem, will be assessed within the context of partnerships 
and strategic alliances, which are the acknowledged implementation vehicles 
for the ‘third way’ in the community development, social justice fields.  
 
The moral overlay of Anthony Giddens 
 
As foreshadowed in the Introduction and Chapter 2, the relevance of the 
moral imperative is well defined by Etzioni and the communitarians. Its 
articulation by Giddens appears less structured but requires explication within 
the confines of his arguments relating to “inclusion” and “exclusion”. In the 
exploration of the data that follows later in the chapter, it will be suggested 
that the layering of a moral imperative has been given greater prominence by 
those governments pursuing a ‘third way’ agenda.  
 
As outlined in the Introduction, it could be argued that the Giddens variety of 
‘third way’ has a deeply moral overtone and, further, that it has an historical 
imperative to moral predetermination (note, in particular, the assertions of 
Norman Birnbaum [1999], previously discussed). Certainly it would be an 
error to discount the relevance of “morality” in any model that seeks to 
influence social systems, and Giddens is not immune from this proposition. 
The question that arises is whether the political imperative discussed in the 
previous chapter is being used to drive moral agendas. As previously noted, 
one anonymous respondent in addressing this issue suggested that: 
 
Blair is courting churches of all denominations and there has been a 
govt report on how faith groups can contribute to urban regeneration.  
I see this as trying to colonise 'official' religion and harness it to the 
government's agenda, all through formal partnerships and funding 
arrangement, completely missing the point of individual 'faith-based' 
motivation and the community development/value the individual 
approaches of churches, which are actually directly contradictory to 
the urban regeneration partnership and funding model (Anonymousxiv 
[a] 2001).   
 
                                                 
xiv  This quotation formed part of an e-mail correspondence to the researcher from an 
anonymous respondent in the United Kingdom (prior to formal interview). 
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This same respondent noted on a later occasion that this colonisation of the 
moral appears to be developing in two main areas, one within education and 
the other within “Local Area Regeneration” (Anonymous [b] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 92). It is the view of this respondent that this process is being 
driven more by pragmatism than a religious moral imperative although, as 
this person says, “... I might be wrong because I know Blair is a religious 
man” (ibid). In asserting the potential “pragmatic rather than ideological” 
mask to this process the respondent nonetheless suggests that the 
government: 
 
...  (has) failed to notice the reasons why these organizations 
(sectarian) are successful in what they do which is their moral and 
ideological basis in terms of regeneration. In terms of schools it’s that 
but it’s also their ability to select people so it seems to me that 
because they’re so pragmatic, they’ve kind of missed the point and if 
they want Churches to be able to do their work better then they should 
allow them to do that in the way that they do it rather than try to bring 
them on board with quite prescribed partnerships funding and so on 
(Anonymous [b] 2002 - Transcriptions: 92). 
 
As has been suggested previously, the drawing together of disparateness of 
systems to a common goal of ‘third way’ thinking (in the United Kingdom and 
the United States) would seem to be anomalous. However, it appears that 
religion provides a reasonable explanator to its occurrence in that it links a 
pre-existing social order of solidarity and conservatism to the political 
imperative of maintaining government. This is a position that was taken up by 
Etzioni himself when, in response to a speech by Tony Blair referring to the 
Stakeholder society, he affirms the need to “regulate” social conduct through 
a “... reliance on the moral voice (my emphasis) rather than the law, and the 
scope of the law itself must be limited largely to that which is supported by 
the moral voice” (Etzioni 1997: 139 in Rose 2000: 1402).    
 
In blending the communitarian view with that of the libertarians, Giddens 
asserts that government exists, in part to “…have a civilizing aim – 
government reflects widely held norms and values, but can also help shape 
them in the educational system and elsewhere” (1998:47-48). An advocate of 
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Giddens, Mark Latham, in extending this position, suggests that the ‘third 
way’ has emerged to make sense of new economic and social relations that 
flow from communications and economic transformations, in turn stimulated 
by the seamlessness of globalisation. These changes, he argues, have 
impacted on civil society, what he views as the declining role of the traditional 
family unit (my emphasis) and community life (Latham 1999). In advocating a 
return to the moral, it would seem, according to Latham, that ‘third way’ 
politics will, in some unexplained way, lead to a “renaissance” in the moral 
foundations of socialism; isolated by Latham as mutual trust and respect, 
social cooperation and connectedness – what he terms the mutualism of civil 
society (Latham 1999).  
 
Before proceeding it may be useful to elaborate upon the specific notions of 
family values, responsibility and mutualism from the Giddens’ perspective. 
Giddens addresses the concept of “family” at various points in his books 
(1998: 12, 16, 68, 89-92, 94-95, 97, 98; 2000: 4, 23, 36, 44-48, 50, 103, 166). 
According to Giddens “…family is the basic institution of civil society” 
(Giddens 1998: 89) with the “…protection and care of children (being) the 
single most important thread that should guide family policy” (ibid: 94). In 
concluding that the need for strong families exists for the promotion of social 
cohesion (ibid: 97) and recognising that the relationship between work and 
family life has changed (2000: 103), Giddens promotes what he calls the 
“democratic family” imbued with qualities, as previously mentioned in Chapter 
2, including “mutual rights and responsibilities in relationships (and) the 
socially integrated family” (1998: 95).  In discussions with the researcher, 
Giddens expands upon this notion of the “democratic family” in the context of 
what he refers to as “traditional family” structures: 
 
I am in favour of strong families but I don’t think strong families are 
likely to look too traditional because if you have equality between the 
sexes and if you give children voice within the family I think that is a 
much more open democratic family structure and most traditional 
families were not open and democratic. That’s why in previous books I 
spoke about this thing called demogs of the emotions by which I 
meant essentially relationships formed around equality, 
communication, lack of violence, rights on the part of parents and 
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children and I think you see a certain reconstruction of family life 
around those things but you can also see plenty of problems that 
these changes have brought in their train as well. Creating strong 
families that are also fairly egalitarian is very difficult (Giddens 2002 – 
Transcriptions: 46). 
 
The ideas of “rights and responsibilities” that flow from his “egalitarian 
families” are not confined to the family structure alone. Indeed, as outlined in 
Chapter 2 (and earlier in this chapter), rights and responsibilities are core to 
the business of the ‘third way’ defining a new relationship between the 
individual and the community (1998: 65). He references this notion at various 
points throughout his books (1998: 65-66, 121, 141; 2000: on rights -130, 
155, 161; and responsibilities – 2, 5, 6, 52, 106, 165) and speaks of his ‘third 
way’ encased within a “moral ethic of (these) rights and responsibilities” 
(Giddens 2002 – Transcriptions: 44) – guided by the sense of “mutualism” 
articulated by Latham (1999), previously discussed.  
 
As has been articulated in part 1 of Chapter 2, the adoption of ‘third way’ 
thinking by traditionally labour governments appears to move democratic 
socialism away from historically grounded principles engineered towards 
egalitarianism and the consolidation of the welfare state towards moral 
imperatives on citizens that define “... no rights without responsibilities” 
(Giddens 1998: 65). To extrapolate from Latham, this proposition is best 
defined as “mutualism” which becomes the guiding ideology of the ‘third way’ 
– the notion that socialist goals are redefined in terms of relations between 
people, a “trusting” society where the role of government becomes one of 
facilitator or “enabler” (Latham 1999). It is noted that this “mutualism” is not 
that different from views held by neo-conservatives who speak of “mutual 
obligation” (Abbott: 1999) although the use of “obligation” in this context 
connotes mutualism in action irrespective of whether trust is present or not – 
which, in turn, is suggestive that trust does not always need to be present 
within this transaction. Further to arguments advanced in Chapter 4 (and 
touched upon in Chapter 2), Latham uses familiar language to introduce new 
meaning; for example, he uses the term “mutualism” interchangeably with 
that of “social capital” which, to him, brings together the competing goals of 
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liberty and equality, liberty in the freedom to associate and equality in the 
trust reciprocated between people. He suggests that this is the best way to 
build a sense of worth among society’s most disadvantaged citizens (Latham 
2000 [b]). The concept of social capital, in a ‘third way’ context, was touched 
upon in discussion about strategic alliances and partnerships in Chapters 2 
and 4.  
 
Latham claims that unless the disadvantaged are prepared to develop new 
skills and take new opportunities, governments are wasting their time. 
Without effort, he asserts, there can be no achievement. Herein lies the nub 
of mutual obligation: public responsibility to help the disadvantaged must be 
matched by a corresponding responsibility by the recipients of this help to 
help themselves, the turning of the “something-for nothing-welfare into 
something-for-something”.  This is a recrafting of the “pulling yourself up by 
your own bootstraps” syndrome prevalent in the United States. It is a 
decidedly “moral” approach, but also one that would find common ground to 
capture the “margins” discussed in Chapter 5. But what then of a definition of 
equity and fairness in this approach? 
 
Giddens dwells upon the concept of inequality, at least his version of it (e.g. 
1998: 41-42, 101-104, 106-108 and 2000: 24, 33, 45, 53, 85-86, 102, 120). 
The new way of politics, according to him, redefines equality as inclusive and 
inequality as exclusion.  Inclusion “….refers in its broadest sense to 
citizenship, to the civil and political rights and obligations that all members of 
a society should have, not just formally, but as a reality of their lives” 
(1998:102), examples of which are opportunities that arise from education 
and access to work. Whilst not defining exclusion per se he gives the 
examples of those “cut off from the bottom” (those not having access to the 
opportunities that society offers) and those cut off from the “top” (or those 
privileged members of society who voluntarily choose to live separately from 
the mainstream) (1998:103). In essence Giddens refers to “... mechanisms 
that act to detach groups of people from the social mainstream” (1998:104) 
rather than gradations of inequality. Giddens’ “inclusive” society is 
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characterised by:  
 
Equality as inclusion 
Limited meritocracy 
Renewal of public space (civil liberalism) 
‘Beyond the work society’ 
Positive welfare 
The social investment state (1998:105). 
 
The keynote policies of the ‘third way’ acknowledge that exclusion is not 
merely a matter of “economic exclusion”, indicated, in part by the concept of 
power devolution: 
 
Without discounting the importance of the debates about economic 
policy which have been developing on the list, I think we need to 
recognise the extent to which economic issues don’t always correlate 
neatly with emotional and cultural symbolism. Inclusion/Exclusion 
depend on a more than monetary bottom line can reveal (Mellissa 
Lane in Halpern and Mikosz 2000: 18).  
 
and; 
 
A communitarian project must have two axes. The first is inclusion or 
involvement. Any form of community which is exclusive necessarily 
exacerbates conflict and division. Hence the project must have as its 
priority the involvement of those who are marginalised at present – not 
because they are more important than others but because that are the 
test of a successful policy. Moreover, formal inclusion is not sufficient. 
Any policy must make people more active participants who feel they 
have a say in decisions. Forced community discredits the whole idea 
of community. Secondly, the project must operate at all levels of social 
activity. At the economic of course, but equally at the cultural (Steven 
Reicher in Halpern and Mikosz 2000: 18).  
 
 
In their conclusion of the on-line debate on the ‘third way’, Halpern and 
Mikosz acknowledge that the ‘third way’ does not have a “universally 
accepted” definition but that the debate does reveal what they term the 
“practical” and “principled” approaches; the former relating to keynote polices 
such as “employment-centred social policy”, “the State as a guarantor but not 
necessarily provider of public services” and a receptivity towards new forms 
of “mutualism”, the latter being determined by a choice of “values” (such as 
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well-being, solidarity, justice and freedom – all of which imply a “social 
justice” dimension). Implicit to this definition is reward for performance based 
upon conformity to these “universal” values and punishment for non-
compliance. This will be discussed further within the context of the data. 
Certainly the shared view of Rawls and Marx to oppose the suppression of 
dissent and enhance social justice and partiality to the least advantaged in 
society (Baumrind 1998) provides the contested space for ‘third way’ 
implementation – as the data will establish. We must, however, keep in mind 
the data from Chapter 5, which suggests that the “margins” may not be the 
poor and disadvantaged, but those who value difference over conformity, i.e. 
cultural exclusion or marginality is pivotal to the moral imperative. 
 
Nonetheless, to Giddens exclusion implies an absence of the conduct and 
self-control that is implicit to work (cf. the Protestant work ethic) whereas 
inclusion creates a reattachment back to a set of more stable relations (even 
equality) through the home and work (Giddens: 1998:102-104). These are 
moral determinants centred within the economic structures of government. 
As Rose appropriately points out: 
 
Exclusion codes a way of thinking that paradoxically - and despite its 
sociological takeup – is more concerned with describing the damaging 
and dangerous effects of these fragmentations on the individual and 
the community than with seeking to grasp the political and economic 
processes that generate such phenomena and that they, indeed, are 
dependent on them …. In its place, a sector of problematic persons 
comes into view …. the residuum, the unemployables … (as) the 
social problem group (Rose 2000: 1406). 
 
In the end equality is synonymous with opportunity, according to Giddens, 
married with ethics. Extending upon Hobhouse, Giddens affirms the 
desirability of market mechanisms presuming community and cooperation, 
“....which must have an ethical base” (2000: 86). The buzzwords of 
“efficiency” and “reciprocal obligations” again raise their heads to arrive at a 
balance between the individual and government, public and private concerns. 
Whilst he denies that the ‘third way’ is a reinvention of ethical liberalism, one 
can’t help but note the similarities in spite of the Giddens’ assertion that he is 
responding to the causes of the “demise” of socialism. “... Inequality can no 
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longer, if it ever could, be countered only by income transfers from the more 
to the less affluent. Some forms of welfare provision, have had the effect of 
creating or perpetuating it” (2000: 53). Compare this analysis with that of 
Roche who, in his section on The Neoconservative Challenge: Reforming 
Social Citizenship 1, in his book Rethinking Citizenship (1992)(and in a 
parody of a L.A Times Opinion Poll conducted in 1985) concludes: 
 
....single mothers are encouraged to remain single in order to remain 
eligible for benefit, while women in less than satisfactory marriages 
and partnerships are encouraged to divorce or breakup the 
partnership in order to gain the independent and relatively secure 
income provided by the welfare system. Overall, the welfare state, 
whatever its goals, appears to have constructed a system of ‘rewards’ 
for behaviour that the wider culture claims to regard as problematic 
and negative in all sorts of ways (from the moral to the social and 
economic), together with a system of ‘penalties’ for behaviour (like 
marriage, self-reliance etc.) which it claims to regard as positive and 
valuable (Roche 1992: 101). 
 
Of course one is inevitably led to the flaw in this argument, that of the 
undeniable reality that the pension or benefit derived by such beneficiaries is 
totally inadequate and therefore offers no real incentive or reward. However, 
the popularist notion that such people are “exploiting” society and not living 
up to their “responsibilities” (which persists some fifteen years after that poll), 
is implicitly advanced by Giddens as he seeks to limit (exclude can no longer 
be used, lamentably) inequality of outcome. This populist interpretation, that 
allegedly confirms the failure of the welfare state, is illustrated through the 
comments of a respondent who is an administrator with a significant 
nongovernmental organisation in noting the angst of “middle England” voters: 
 
….One of the disillusionments of the Welfare State for ordinary people 
who pay taxes and have always paid taxes is the sense of resentment 
when you see that people are claiming benefits and working at the 
same time and that makes people cross…. I applaud the government 
in many ways, applaud its pragmatism, welfare for all as a right only 
gets abused – you get some people who are held down in the poverty 
trap, my God we’re working in some housing estates, even now, 
where 80 percent of the population is dependent upon one State 
benefit or another – 80 percent! (Wisken 2002 - Transcriptions: 34). 
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Even if the Giddens’ view of social exclusion (derived, he assures us, not by 
third wayers but by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) and the European Union (EU) researchers [2000: 
104]) is constructed to revise the “....social mechanisms that produce or 
sustain deprivation” (ibid), its potency to generalise (particularly in the context 
of “obligations”) to include welfare beneficiaries (note the Clinton plan to limit 
welfare to five years in each individual’s lifetime, mirrored by the Blair 
administration) cannot be ignored.  
 
Social Exclusion can mean different things to different people and, according 
to Walker (1995) its ambiguity permits an ongoing discussion about issues 
that some would equate with the concept of poverty (Walker 1995). 
 
The idea of social exclusion is, according to Atkinson (2000), not new having 
originated in France (see also Martin: 1996; Révauger and Ravanuger: 
Silver: 1994; 1998; Spicker: 1998) arguing that anyone who was separate 
from the main stream (what he terms those who adopt a “bohemian” lifestyle 
or the “poor”) were defined as excluded (Atkinson 2000). He suggests that 
the predominant French Republican ethos failed to recognise the legitimacy 
of difference thereby stigmatising those who were different. It is important to 
note that, at the same time, the usage of exclusion tended to depoliticise the 
processes that creates exclusion by placing an emphasis on individual or 
group behaviours which, in turn, made structural inequalities the product of 
an acceptable way of life (Révauger and Ravanuger 1998). Interestingly 
Spiker (1998) notes that in French political discourse the notion of solidarity 
is central to debates centring upon two definitions; one reliant upon mutual 
aid (or “mutualism”) in which individuals support themselves against 
uncertainty and that which is based upon the construction of the nation and 
citizenship (Spicker 1998). Whilst suggesting that social exclusion has both a 
positive and negative aspect, Atkinson believes that, in circumstances where 
there is an economic downturn and mass long-term unemployment, it is the 
“underclass route” that would be followed with an engagement in “victim 
blaming”. He nonetheless concedes that social exclusion offers a less 
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emotive alternative to the term poverty (Walker 1995).  Atkinson does note 
that as a relatively new term there will be problems with definition. Certainly 
the measurement of the phenomenon is extremely problematic according to 
Abrahamson (1998) who asserts that defining poverty and social exclusion is 
difficult in terms of their implementation and measurement. Further 
Abrahamson recommends that when comparing nations on these issues it is 
virtually impossible to come up with reliable data. 
 
To summarise: 
 
o The approaches by Giddens to issues of morality are less structured 
than with Etzioni and centre upon the notions of “inclusion” and 
“exclusion” to explain inequality (equality being “opportunity married 
with ethics”). 
o Nonetheless, Giddens has a moral imperative with the following 
features: 
! Family values; 
! Responsibility; 
! Mutualism. 
o It would appear that the drawstring of religion provides a common goal 
for ‘third way’ thinking in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
o The role of government, to Giddens, is to shape a civilising experience 
through education and elsewhere. 
o The definition of inequality is one thing, but the implementation and 
measurement of outcome is quite another.  
 
The discussion will now turn its focus to the writings of Amitai Etzioni, for 
whom the “moral voice” is far less muted. 
 
Etzioni and his view of building Supranational Communities 
 
The approach by Amitai Etzioni and his communitarians suggests that 
individuals are socially embedded arguing the inevitability “....of the social 
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formulation of the good” (Etzioni 1997: 5). Clearly in conflict with liberals who 
argue the opposing position, the “newer” communitarians (1990) of which 
Etzioni is leader, coin the term “responsive communitarian” to connote a 
process that is responsive to individuals. This position advances a balance 
between individual rights and social responsibilities, individuality and 
community, and autonomy and social order. According to Etzioni, this 
evolved form of communitarian philosophy neutralises social conservative 
criticisms levelled against Tönnies (and others) to “....social and moral risks 
one faces when one promises – above all, seeks to impose – virtue and 
conformity” (p.5).  The paradigm promoted by Etzioni in his publication The 
New Golden Rule, Community and Morality in a Democratic Society (1997) 
purports to be more sociological (and therefore empirical) and less normative 
(or prescriptive). In seeking to arrive at this point he lays claim to a process 
that “leapfrogs” the left-wing/right-wing debate to suggest a third social 
philosophy wherein the relationship between the individual and the 
community and between freedom and order become the new “axis” for 
debate. This realignment, he argues, moves beyond the role of the 
government versus that of the private sector and the authority of the state 
versus that of the individual implicit to left/right thinking (p.7).  In seeking to 
strengthen his argument for his “third” philosophy, Etzioni suggests that it lies 
between individualists who he asserts champion autonomy and social 
conservatives who, he claims, champion social order.    
 
Whilst other distinctions between the approaches by Etzioni and Giddens 
have been articulated elsewhere (in the Introduction and Chapter 2), it would 
seem that the fundamental criterion of difference is vested in the notion of 
who is beholden to whom within ‘third way’ politics. To Etzioni it would appear 
to be the state that is beholden to the community, which has a long tradition 
in the United States, whereas with Giddens it appears to be the community 
that is beholden to the state. Furthermore Etzioni (1988) asserts: 
 
Socio-economics is … to view pleasure and self-interest within the 
broader context of human nature, society, and ultimate values, rather 
than either ignore the self-oriented force, or build a paradigm, theory, 
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and morality focused entirely on self (Etzioni 1988: 251). 
 
Contrast the Giddens assertion about the capacity of community with that of 
Etzioni: 
 
I think communities create lots of problems for people especially if 
they’re too tightly knit. It can be misleading to talk too easily of the 
notion of community as somehow producing socially desirable goods 
so really you want cooperation and activity with local communities 
directed towards social ends ….. For lots of poorer areas I think you 
need the active involvement of government  …..  A lot of it is 
resources rather than lack of community spirit … I don’t think you get 
too far with just voluntary agreement when you’ve got gangs roaming 
the streets and so on …. you need a certain amount of coercion I think 
… there is a trade-off between loss of civil liberties and creation of 
hopefully really liberties for the people who want safe streets and want 
freedom from crime and want economic development in the local 
areas (Giddens 2002 - Transcriptions: 47). 
 
For Giddens, it seems, social actors should engage in the construction of “life 
narratives” and seek “personal development”. This narrative model of the self 
is narcissistic to the extent that it fails to come to terms with the human need 
for connection or belonging – that it focuses on middle-class, post-scarcity 
values and ignores such matters as the structural constraints of self-
actualisation and so forth.  
 
An implicit flaw in the arguments of the communitarians rests with the 
proposition that the maintenance of pre-existing community structures and 
“traditions” is somehow superior to other approaches. Such an insistence 
implies a willingness to retain and advance structures that may be construed 
to be elitist, inequitable and exclusive.   
 
The implicit assumption of cultural and social homogeneity 
 
Either way, communitarian or not, there is a moral fibre to the ‘third way’ that 
points to implementation praxis which makes certain assumptions about the 
nature of society as a pluralistic but homogenised entity. As Jon Bright, Head 
of Programs for the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit attached to the British 
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Government asserts: 
 
Well I don’t know. I’m not sure that there is a really massive 
disagreement about levels of standards between different sectors of 
society. I don’t think there are sort of a set of middle class standards 
and a set of working class standards. Most people in these 
neighbourhoods have broadly similar standards to people who don’t 
live in those neighbourhoods (Bright 2002 - Transcriptions: 16). 
 
One is again drawn to the race riots in Oldham and Burnley, which surely 
indicate differing levels of “standards”, or at least that perception. As a policy 
officer with UNISON, the largest union of public sector workers in the United 
Kingdom suggested: 
 
 ….in the north-west of England, there is a culture where actually you 
have   …. is that you’ve often had segregation in factory and shift 
systems, you have white shifts and black shifts through the system, 
whereas some new employers into north-west largely in the retail 
trade, if a new retail Tescos or Sainburys is opened up the shop 
workers union have worked with Tescos to have none of that, have 
completely mixed workforces and no racial implicit in any racial shift 
patterns or anything where black workers would work one shift and 
white workers work another. They are trying to break down those 
patterns. The other underlying thing is that there is often a lack of 
housing resources and though the government may talk a good game 
on racial equality a lot of the policies are far from joined-up and a lot of 
the policies on privatising Council and Municipal Housing stock is sort 
of leading to higher market rents, more over-crowding and problems 
with segregation so there is a lot of government policies tend to at 
some stage lead to more segregated communities even though they 
profess a willingness to integration (Low 2002 - Transcriptions: 26). 
 
This position accords with that of an anonymous respondent who alleges that 
“....the whole education agenda is very 3rd way – trying to eradicate inequality 
while retaining a structure based on inequality” (Anonymous [a] 2001). This 
proposition concurs with comments by Ruth Lupton (2001) who, in an 
unpublished Draft document and speaking on the ‘third way’ agenda with 
respect to education, notes:  
 
… the government is unquestionably committed to raising educational 
standards and reducing inequalities in attainment.   School 
improvement is at the centre of its policy programme, especially for 
disadvantaged areas where poor schooling, as well as low attainment, 
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is concentrated.  But in failing to accept that poverty has a direct 
impact on organisational performance, and failing to reject an 
education system and funding mechanisms which perpetuate 
inequality, New Labour is trapping struggling schools in a situation in 
which improvement is extremely difficult, no matter how many targets, 
inspections and good practice guidelines are imposed.  Without 
changes in structure, improvements in standards may prove an 
impossible goal (Lupton 2001: 9). 
 
The proposition of the political imperative, canvassed in the previous chapter, 
may make this conceptual notion of who drives community decision-making 
redundant, a matter which will be explored in greater depth through 
explication of the data that follows in this chapter (specifically in relation to 
the transportability of the philosophy, left to right). In Chapter 4, the real-life 
experiences of those responsible for ‘third way’ implementation were 
canvassed, specifically in relation to the mechanics of strategic alliances and 
partnerships.  It would be useful at this point to amplify upon the historical 
antecedents for this moral imperative in relation to those engaged with 
partnership operations and ‘third way’ or communitarian implementation. 
Whilst this has been commenced in the Introduction, the discussion on this 
matter will arise from the data gleaned from respondents in the first instance. 
At a later time in the discussion we will return to the perceptions of these 
respondents with a specific orientation towards the impacts of this 
phenomenon for their work. 
 
Perceptions on “morality” within the third wave of the United States 
 
In the United States there has been a more clearly defined historical religious 
progression. The views of respondents in that place on the question of 
whether the current circumstances for Foundations and charitable causes 
were predicated upon religious fervour appears better understood than in 
other places under investigation. Jim Copple, Vice President and Chief 
Operating Officer for a major National nongovernmental organisation located 
in Washington DC suggests that the Cain Ridge Revival in Kentucky in 
Tennessee and the rise of the Common Man gave birth to highly vocal 
abolitionists, women’s rights advocates and health care. He argues that 
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these movements should be more appropriately assigned in this manner than 
upon the New England transcendentalism, which is historically linked to 
major reforms in America (Copple 2002 - Transcriptions: 241).  
 
In speaking on the relationship between the beneficence of corporate leaders 
with their corporate mission (to make profit) Copple recounts the 
development of the graham cracker in that country as being developed by an 
evangelical who felt that people should be eating healthier, thus combining 
profit with charity. Similarly Henry Ford was philanthropic to the extent that he 
believed that the resources he acquired should, in part, be redirected to do 
good. The point, according to Copple, was that whilst these entrepreneurs 
were well intentioned, they nonetheless developed models for philanthropy 
that asserted an almost patronising tone in that the beneficence was about 
what the benefactors assumed to be best for the individual, that is, the 
assistance was prescriptive (Copple 2002 – Transcriptions: 242). He argues 
that this is a model, which still dominates today in the United States, albeit 
with differing protocols mediated by “faith based” connectedness. The earlier 
Foundation models in the United States were therefore mediated by a food 
chain process whereby policy generates from government, filters through to 
Foundations who have a vested interest in terms of tax write-offs and a 
positive relationship with government, then down to the local level for 
implementation. Given the number of Foundations in the United States and 
the quantum of monies involved, Copple argues, this becomes a very 
important lever politically (ibid:. 244). He agrees that a conundrum exists in 
terms of a moral imperative, that the closure of abortion clinics and other 
controversial social justice initiatives by George W. Bush has created a 
degree of circumspection by organizations about the way they present or 
argue policy in the public arena: 
 
I think people are much more measured but that was also true in the 
Clinton administration. It’s just the players have changed. The 
question is how much do ideological definitions drive the way in which 
we are going to have to do policy at that particular election and during 
that particular term of office (Copple 2002 - Transcriptions: 246). 
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Yes there is that concern. …. I certainly have heard, I’ve certainly 
heard many stories where non-sectarian groups are concerned and I 
suppose it’s right for them to be concerned because it can certainly 
look, appear, that something like the faith-based initiatives could get a 
steam-rolling effect and all of a sudden everyone is jumping on that 
bandwagon and neglecting the other side of it (Thomas 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 301). 
 
Not unlike Copple, Conner suggests that over the course of American history 
there have been a series of religious groups that were dominant and then lost 
dominance to more robust groups in a typically dialectic manner. Firstly, he 
suggests, there was the Congregationalist Church in the 18th century, who 
lost their “vigour” when their Ministers went to Harvard. They were followed 
by the Methodists who were young robust and youthful. Their Ministers 
appealed directly to the people drawing resistance from every mainstream 
religious quarter. Along with the Catholics they became very powerful 
because they started preaching directly to the people, “....to the heart and not 
to the head”. 
 
Now what’s happening now? What’s happening now is the new group 
is the Evangelicals. Now, what are Evangelicals like? Speak directly to 
the people; their Ministers are not high falluting Harvard types. They 
are now the robust and growing group that is creating resistance and 
fear from the established religious groups. Who are the groups 
seeking government funds that are always brought up when people 
explain why they are against the faith-based initiatives? It’s Teen 
Challenge, Prison Fellowship run by highly church lay people that are 
part of this bursting, growing Evangelical big Church movement so 
that it’s like Bush is surfing and he doesn’t realise he is surfing in a 
place where there are undertows (Conner 2002 - Transcriptions: 307). 
 
 
According to Conner, Bush was “misled” by the apparent consensus being 
advocated by ‘third way’ types “....in Gore-speak, that we are building on the 
strength of community based organizations and faith-based organizations” 
(Conner 2002 – Transcriptions: 307) believing that the ACLU position 
advocating Church/State separation was a “fringe movement”. In more 
probability, Bush believed that the third wayers of Clinton had cleared the 
way for him and that this was a consensus position to validate the position of 
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the Evangelicals, of which he is one (Copple 2002 - Transcriptions: 247). 
This position is suggestive of a perception to exploit an idea for a particular 
political or moral purpose – in this case, using the morality of the ‘third way’ 
to validate a political position. We will return later to the matter of the ACLU 
on Church/State separation. 
 
Not surprisingly, given the evolution of religious tenets in the advancement of 
charitable work in the United States, some major players have deeply 
committed Christian backgrounds. This sometimes creates cognitive 
dissonance about the way in which to proceed: 
 
I tell communities always have a policy in place before you’re looking 
at a cheque. In other words if the alcohol industry wants to support a 
substance abuse coalition, have a policy in place whether you’re going 
to take industry money or not take industry money because if you’re 
staring at a cheque for $200,000 from the industry and you’re a grass-
roots group and you don’t have a policy in place, you’re going to figure 
out a way to take it (Copple 2002 - Transcriptions: 248). 
 
There is no escaping the dilemma that this association, coupled with the 
need to maintain the employability of staff engenders, particularly given the 
need to advance social agendas beyond political necessity. These are 
organizations that are constantly looking to maintain, and enhance, 
significant infrastructures. At times this means compromise, at others 
acquiescence:  
 
Inside the beltway we’re all prostitutes, we’re just haggling over the 
price. It’s sad. ….. it’s easy for the Board or anybody else to say well 
don’t go there but I have 80 staff and so I’m constantly casting about, 
figuring out where the next grant is going to come from to sustain this 
work and to keep the infrastructure in place (Copple 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 254). 
 
 
From the data it is revealed that it is not only the administrators of these 
organizations that face these difficulties. Board members of these 
organizations are constantly in a state of tension about how best to proceed 
in order to balance the competing interests of political expediency placed 
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upon them by government and the social problems that they are mandated to 
pursue in the community: 
 
It’s … one of our tensions, even with our Board ….. How close do you 
guys really want to dance with this administration? …..Our position is, 
and I think it grows out of Jack’s theology and out of my theology, 
we’re incarnate, we have to be enfleshed in this world to engage the 
conversation …. (ibid: 248). 
 
Some respondents have suggested that the need for nongovernmental 
organizations to participate in front of a religious backdrop is politically 
cultured, that is, that the moral imperative reaches across the electoral 
choice points of Republican and Democrat administrations: 
 
So you can’t criticise it then, you’re both sort of hugging the same tree. 
Whether the faith initiative can be isolated as the only example of that 
I think there’s some larger forces at work which is, in this country at 
least, two things; one, the general rightward movement of public policy 
and political debate and secondly; at the same time, and they’re not 
unrelated, the fuzziness of the distinction between the Republican and 
Democratic parties. There’s a debate within both Parties as to whether 
the sacrifice of ideological purity is worth the price right? So there’s a 
fuzziness at the middle, there’s a general rightward movement and 
particularly on the faith initiative it’s hard for either Party to criticise the 
other’s position on that because they both embraced it to some extent 
(Travis 2002 - Transcriptions: 287). 
 
The assumption of political homogeneity 
 
In speaking on the history of the apparent homogenisation of political views 
by Democrats and Republicans in relation to the rise in emphasis on religion, 
Conner (2002) claims that we need to go back to the war on poverty created 
by Lyndon Johnson. He suggests that programs constructed during this 
period concentrated on persons aged 16 and over, ignoring, he states, the 
age group 5-16. He argues that the conflict between the catholic church and 
the unions and their public schools, that he purports represents the “....third 
rail of American politics” from the progressive era until the present, was 
threatening the established religious groups which in turn led them to resist 
and oppose through the establishment of Americans United for Separation of 
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Church and State: 
 
That’s why Johnson created Head Start, that was new territory but 
could not do anything in that area and it was not like that’s an 
accident. There is history on this that Johnson said the only way we 
can get the war on poverty through is by sidestepping the dispute 
between the catholic parochial schools (Conner 2002 - Transcriptions: 
307).  
 
Another respondent (2002) presents a differing, yet compelling, argument to 
explain the homogenisation of policy approach for Democrats and 
Republicans. She claims that the “baby boomers” came into prominent public 
service positions with a common view that transcended Party politics and that 
ultimately helped shape a systemic approach to problem-solving in spite of 
Party politics. In responding to a question about the fundamental shift in the 
paradigm for both the left and the right this person asserts a shared 
consciousness: 
 
 … For me, I think that’s critical. I think what’s happened with the right 
is that the people who are making up the right now are the same 
generation (as those that make up the left). I really believe there’s a 
huge amount of generational influence here and just as our parents, 
having gone through World War 2 realised that we were not alone, 
there were other people over there and we might get hurt and that was 
really not nice, we now have a generation coming up who realises that 
not only might get hurt, we might get hurt right here as we just did 
(Anonymous [n] 2002 - Transcriptions: 271). 
 
 
This position implies a sense of anomie that binds a generation, which, 
according to this respondent, has a thirst for knowledge with a different 
mindset about how to handle and process knowledge (ibid: 269). Whilst this 
may seem to serve an argument for shared values and reinforce ‘third way’ 
approaches, it nonetheless ignores the overarching economic structures that 
direct the mindset that creates this environment for shared values – both 
political and moral (Anonymous [a] 2001). 
 
As Travis (2002) notes, the last fifteen to twenty years of American 
philanthropic history, supported substantially by the Foundations, was geared 
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towards activity known as community building or community strengthening: 
 
…the common core idea is that communities have within them the 
assets that can be very useful in developing their own resiliency and 
that organising the community to harness those assets also provides a 
political point of leverage for increasing government accountability. So 
it really has two strands to it; one is inward looking, which is to say 
communities have strengths and that a strong society builds on those 
strengths and the second is in essence a governance question, which 
is how to strengthen the voice of communities in the making of policy 
(Travis 2002 - Transcriptions: 284). 
 
Such processes of course aid in the expansion and application of social 
capital. Originally tracing back to the development of Community 
Development Corporations (CDCs) which were principally designed to build 
housing in poorer areas and auspiced by Foundations such as the Ford 
Foundation and Mitchell Svirdoff, Travis argues, these corporations then 
became “....instruments of social policy” (ibid) through financing 
intermediaries such as the Enterprise Foundation and the Neighbourhood 
Reinvestment Corporation: 
 
…these are now public policy vehicles that have had the effect of 
creating, strengthening, sustaining, empowering community 
development corporations that are not governmental at all but perform 
an important public service – that’s the third way idea, that they are 
private but they are performing an important public service which is 
developing housing (Travis 2002 - Transcriptions: 284). 
 
If Travis is correct in his assessment of such organizations empowering 
community development, then surely it alludes to a caveat being placed upon 
those organizations so empowered not to work against the interests of the 
government that funds them. Travis explains this issue: 
 
 … the Bush administration (is) using the faith initiative as a way of 
neutralising social justice debate – I think that’s true, I think it helps to 
say we care about people who are at the bottom of society’s hierarchy, 
of low income or immigrant or impoverished or whatever, but we care 
differently for them – we care through our faith, our vehicles of faith. 
So it’s clearly a pragmatic position that has political advantages …. 
there’s a general rightward movement and particularly on the faith 
initiative it’s hard for either Party to criticise the other’s position on that 
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because they both embraced it to some extent (Travis 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 287). 
 
In summary of the preceding section, the perceptions of respondents in the 
United States, coupled with historical information, suggests that: 
 
o There is a more clearly defined historical religious progression 
emanating from the philosophies inherent to Foundations and 
charitable organizations, which is linked to prescriptive models of 
philanthropy (in a patronising manner that assigns what is best for 
individuals). 
 
o This progression tracks, in a dialectic manner, the rise to dominance 
by particular religious groups based upon economic and political 
linkages between these organizations and government. 
 
o Such a relationship alludes to a caveat placed upon funding by 
government for nongovernmental organizations not to work against 
the interests of the funding body. 
 
o A religious backdrop substantially governs those nongovernmental 
organizations, combined with sustainability criteria to maintain 
organizational infrastructure and development. 
 
o In turn, a political “culture” has developed whereby the moral 
imperative reaches across the electoral choice points of Republican 
and Democratic administrations in an apparent homogenisation of 
political views. 
 
o The current (and former) administrations utilise the morality of the third 
way to validate a political position, the current administration deferring 
significantly to the new wave of Evangelicalism. 
 
Reflecting in the data is the consideration that in the United States there is 
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not an unhealthy view of faith-based engagement in service delivery. The 
Church is viewed as a respectable conduit but is also a powerful force 
around which considerable numbers of people galvanise. The data of “faith-
based” initiatives and their position within the “political imperative” will now be 
dealt with. 
 
The faith-based initiatives 
 
The political and economic linkages between “faith-based” organizations and 
government have already been alluded to in the previous section. The 
cynicism of some respondents towards this orientation is quite profound: 
 
At one point I think we might have said take the money, give it to these 
groups and as long as you’ve got the neighbourhoods involved 
because these people are poor themselves, they will automatically 
make the right decisions. Right now we’re saying take this money, 
give it to the Churches, give it to the congregations, give it to faith-
based organizations and because they are faith-based and because 
they are of God they will automatically do what’s best, they will do 
better than government (Raley 2002 - Transcriptions: 322). 
 
… the Churches are now very closely aligned with the right-wing 
agenda which says oh for gosh sakes yes we must get God back in 
this country, we must get God involved in our government, we must 
have prayer in the schools, now it’s their prayers and their God being 
in government but I think Bush has managed to manipulate that and 
sees it as a way to get broad-range support that almost invites people 
to attack him (Raley 2002 - Transcriptions: 329). 
 
The irony to this researcher investigating the ‘third way’ as a reinvigoration of 
social democracy for “labour” style administrations is that the clearest 
manifestation of its application to moral issues can be found in a neo-liberal 
context, that being the faith-based initiatives of George W. Bush in the United 
States. The idea of faith-based initiatives that were vigorously contested by 
both Democrats and Republicans in the lead-up to the 2000 Presidential 
election is, in my opinion, possibly the best demonstration of a ‘third way’ 
program in practice offering an ideal-type situation with which to explore 
defining elements. 
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The case for inclusion as ‘third way’ “ideal-type 
 
Some may be confused about the inclusion of the George W. Bush “faith-
based initiatives” in a ‘third way’ camp, let alone epitomize them as an ‘ideal-
type’ for ‘third way’ praxis - as this thesis recommends. It might be suggested 
that George W. Bush, far from being centrist, is to the extreme “right” and 
that his “faith-based initiatives” were merely concessions to gain voter 
support from, and appease, Christian fundamentalists within the Republican 
Party. These same people would characterise these Christian 
fundamentalists as “red-neck” with policies that are racist, homophobic, anti-
abortion, anti-environmental, pro-war, anti-feminist and so forth (which would 
be anathema to most social democrats) and would rail at the thought that 
George W. Bush is moving to the centre in the application of his policies of 
“compassionate conservatism”.  
 
As noted throughout this thesis, much of early ‘third way’ literature was not 
simply about capitalism versus communism or left versus right.  Nor does this 
literature suggest that the ‘third way’ conceptually is exclusively about finding 
middle ground between these apparently competing interests. It also 
demonstrates an interest in the relationship of the state with civil society 
through, for example, corporatist ideas. By way of example, some thinkers in 
the 1930s who were self-proclaimed fascists advocated a ‘third way’. 
Contemporary commentators tend to overlook this aspect as they focus upon 
their perception of Giddens’ recent treatment. The idea that the ‘third way’ 
has always, and just, been about finding a middle pathway in politics is 
flawed in any reasoned analysis of history. There is, indeed, a strong right 
wing tradition to ‘third wayism’. 
 
Interestingly, and in spite of the failure by commentators to recognise this 
tradition, Anthony Giddens himself recognised the propensity for his ‘third 
way’ to be embraced by the right of politics – and indeed suggests legitimacy 
for this to occur, although he does raise concerns about his project being 
embraced by the far right: 
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Well I think on the whole to have a decent society you need 
responsible politics from left and right and I think if you have a country 
that has as it were a right wing version of the third way, that is 
essentially what conservatives need to develop in countries like Spain 
that’s essentially what they’ve got. I take it that the third way is a left of 
centre project but you often need to collaborate with political parties of 
different persuasion – that was how the welfare state was created 
because you had collaboration between Tories and Labour in this 
country and you had collaboration between social democrats and 
Christian democrats in most European countries – the welfare state 
doesn’t simply have social democratic roots. What’s worrying I think in 
quite a few countries is a new kind of rightist coalition which involves 
some elements of the quote responsible right emerging with or 
agreeing to form coalitions with as it were the irresponsible far right 
and the dangerous far right and that’s happening in several European 
countries and that is a worrying trend (Giddens 2002 – Transcriptions: 
49). 
 
Giddens argues that he is “not in the business of developing models for the 
right of centre” (ibid: 50), and expresses his concern about the emergence of 
the “irresponsible far right” and the “dangerous far left” in Europe (that could 
be argued to emanate from the successful coalitions hallmarking his ‘third 
way’). Nonetheless, he appears not to notice the American equivalence of his 
evolved ‘third way’ in the George W. Bush “faith-based initiatives”. As noted 
elsewhere, Etzioni has proposed that his communitarian approach (which, as 
outlined elsewhere, embodied the moral right used for electoral purposes by 
both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush), is the ‘third way’ (Etzioni 2000: 25) – 
in spite of Giddens assertions to the contrary (Giddens 2002 – 
Transcriptions: 47). It would appear, from respondent perceptions outlined 
elsewhere, that the politics of the ‘third way’ in the United States is not about 
moving to the ‘centre’, but rather about the expropriation of support from civil 
society to the cause of achieving political power, irrespective of whether that 
power is vested with the left or the right. It would also appear that political 
patronage by the “thin margins” (i.e. whether the left or the right would be 
supported by such voters) is based upon which administration will provide the 
more right wing policies.  
 
The presumption by those who would be critical of “faith-based initiatives” 
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being included in the ‘third way’ stable is their belief that George W. Bush is 
not a centrist and indeed his policies may be somewhere to the right of 
Genghis Khan. Respondent perceptions from this research would not 
generally be at odds with this position. Based upon these perceptions, a 
more compelling proposition emerges that suggests that social democrats, 
under the guise of the ‘third way’, have moved radically to the right and not to 
the centre as they purport. As has been demonstrated from the data 
elsewhere, political parties in mass democracies have to pay attention to the 
‘thin margins’ that separate government from opposition. The proposition that 
perhaps these “thin margins” represent a view that belongs to the far right is, 
in the opinion of this researcher and based upon respondent perceptions, 
being lost or ignored by those who believe that the ‘third way’ is centrist. 
Respondents speak of nuances rather than chasms of difference between 
‘third way’ types (social democratic to neo-liberal) and note the competition 
between both for ownership of the method. The idea of the capturing of the 
“thin margins” to obtain government correspondingly implies a degree of 
ideological compromise by both left and right to satisfy the agendas of those 
at the extremes – in the case of the United States, the extreme right.  
 
The evidence from this research does not suggest that the ‘third way’ is 
about a movement to the centre by neither social democrats nor neo-liberals 
as much as it suggests that the key defining features relate to the relationship 
between the state and civil society and the utilisation of significant religious 
organizations by both the left and the right for the purpose of attaining 
government. Some would gasp at this proposal but how else could one 
explain the unusual pacts between the allegedly far-right George W. Bush 
and the allegedly left-wing Tony Blair? The common denominators raised 
throughout Chapters 5 and 6 by respondents relate to religion, specifically 
Christian religion, and the need for political parties to gain power at any cost. 
A definition of the ‘third way’, therefore, needs to accommodate this 
phenomenon and discount the apparent rhetoric of a movement to the 
centre. In this context, the ‘third way’ becomes seamless, not because of the 
perceived differences between social democrats and neo-liberals but as a 
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consequence of their similarities in practice. Hence the inclusion of the Bush 
“faith-based initiatives” as an “ideal-type” for ‘third way’ investigation in this 
study can exemplify a strong, neo-liberal, morally conservative agenda in a 
‘third way’ context.  Whereas during the 1930s, a study such as this may 
have enquired into a fascist corporatist case for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the then extant ‘third way’ as it influenced the “right”, now 
we are obliged to examine a different kind of ideological configuration based 
upon individualism rather than collectivism. 
 
Perceptions of the religious agenda 
 
In her assessment of the first year of implementation of the Office of Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives, Kathryn Tenpas (2002) noted the hasty 
assembling of the Office to, she asserts, gain national recognition for a pet 
issue which was constrained by organizational problems including shifting 
priorities, lack of autonomy and inflated expectations, as well as a propensity 
for a lack of support at either a public or congressional level. It is significant, 
however, that the pursuit of a campaign promise embedded in faith-based 
initiatives commenced in the second week after inauguration. The concept 
was initiated during the ‘third way’ years of Bill Clinton when John Ashcroft 
introduced amendments to the 1996 Welfare Reform Act designed to ease 
restrictions on government funding for faith-based organizations. According 
to respondents, it would seem, nonetheless, that the idea was not 
necessarily given a strategic purpose beyond the apparent harnessing of the 
political forces that the third sector was able to rally. Certainly most 
respondents appeared unmoved by the process of implementation, which 
lacked clarity about who the beneficiaries of such initiatives would be: 
 
First of all what is faith? There are some really interesting legal 
questions there. What is faith right? Do witches get to run their 
programs? There was a lot of talk at the beginning of the faith initiative 
when DiIulio; was the Director of it at the White House about 
evidence-based decision-making. The evidence is pretty weak here so 
we wouldn’t allow the Researchers in to see what works here. That’s 
an interesting proposition and this more traditional sort of legal 
question of how do you keep the Church and State separate in the 
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work of faith service organizations. Those are very difficult 
implementation questions (Travis 2002 - Transcriptions: 290). 
 
The offices of the White House Office of Faith-based and Community 
Initiatives (OFBCI) and the executive department centres for faith-based and 
community initiatives within cabinet Departments (Justice, Education, Labour, 
Health and Human Services) were established by executive orders on 29 
January 2001 (Tenpas 2002). In signing these orders President Bush 
asserted: 
 
America is rich materially, but there remains too much poverty and 
despair amidst abundance … I outline my agenda to enlist, equip, 
enable, empower and expand the heroic works of faith-based and 
community groups across America  (Bush 2001; “Rallying the Armies 
of Compassion” in Tempas 2002: 1). 
 
As the cornerstone of what was to become known as “compassionate 
conservativism”, according to Martin Olasky (2001), Bush asserted that his 
initiative would fundamentally change America (Olasky 2001: 20). In effect 
these orders were designed to further ease restrictions on government 
funding for faith-based organizations, a process, according to Tenpas, which 
was, as previously noted, initiated by John Ashcroft and the Democrats in the 
1996 Welfare Reform Act (Segal 1999 in Tenpas 2002). Following the issuing 
of these orders the “Community Solutions Act of 2001” was enacted by the 
Bush administration as one of its first pieces of legislation. Known as HR7, 
this Bill sought to expand opportunities for charitable organizations in the 
competition for federal funds. In the opinion of Olasky (2001) HR7 bans most 
overt kinds of anti-religious bias.  At the same time, Olasky asserts, there are 
“bias in grants” issues inherent to the Bill which would see some religious 
groups preferred over others, a violation, Olasky continues, of the first 
Amendment ban on the “establishment” of religion. On the question of 
whether the government would push funding in alternative directions based 
upon non-compliance by some Church-based nongovernmental 
organizations one respondent quipped:  
 
They could and they actually have. I think some of the more 
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mainstream liberal groups, quote unquote, in the Catholic charities 
have been the beneficiary, Salvation army has been the beneficiary  
….. I think George Bush wants to try to make that happen and if they 
eventually stand up and say nope you’re asking us to sell out too 
much then they will probably try to find something or institutionalise it 
in a community-based organisation where faith is not so much the 
defining platform, it may be for the workers in it (Copple 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 249). 
 
 
From the data there can be no doubt that there would be considerable 
resistance on the part of “independent” Church-based organizations to set 
aside their fundamental religious tenets in the pursuit of the funding dollar.  
 
(There is)  a legal matter in terms of our Constitution. The ways in 
which you engage the asset ….. in this case an asset that has a faith 
dimension, and ask them at the same time to set aside what they 
consider their greatest asset which is their spirituality, and say that 
that is not a part of the public’s business that’s a private matter the 
State cant interfere with that, that’s a challenge …... I think it’s an open 
question, …. what role the faith institutions can play as a government 
agent, I think it’s much more comfortable conversation to talk about 
the role that the faith institutions can play as a private community 
asset in this work. That’s the third way rub right? How do you resolve 
that tension? And that’s particularly true in the faith arena (Travis 2002 
- Transcriptions: 286). 
 
As Joseph Loconte (2002) noted: “The remarkable thing is that … open 
assaults on an independent civil society are now routine. No private 
organization - secular or religious - can preserve its freedom if it loses control 
over its fundamental mission” (Loconte 2002: 16). The seeming reality is, 
however, that religious organizations are somewhat immune from civil 
libertarian scrutiny with a President who appears moved by his own 
experience of faith in dealing with a drinking problem.  This was the same 
President who moved swiftly to close down nongovernmental abortion clinics. 
It is true that faith-based groups, under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, are 
specifically exempted from anti-discrimination laws on the employment 
question. It is similarly true that the Supreme Court in California has upheld 
the right of the Church to discriminate against employees on the basis of 
religion (Dolan 2002). This particular case related to an evangelical Christian 
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who was fired from a Catholic medical Foundation for “proselytising” to other 
employees. Whilst this case would not appear to breach the Civil Rights Act 
in terms of the “fundamental mission” of the service offered (one religious 
view versus another), the case of a homosexual worker dismissed from the 
Salvation Army does. This particular situation significantly raises the bar in 
terms of the Church-State divide. According to Loconte (2002) the Salvation 
Army came under fire for allegedly offering the White House a quid pro quo: 
support of the Bush plan for federal exemptions from anti-discrimination laws 
that clash with Salvation Army rules against hiring homosexuals. Suddenly 
one of the nation's most respected charities became vilified as a “haven of 
intolerance”.  This relationship between Church and State, according to one 
respondent, works to blur the intentions of each to the other in terms of their 
respective missions, perhaps at the expense of non-sectarian groups with 
shared intentions: 
 
…the traditional State response is well we’re well intended, we’re good 
people and that becomes particularly acute in the case of government 
action that’s exercised through religious organizations because they 
more than others are justified in saying we’re good people right? 
Because we’re doing God’s work. It’s more than an attack on the 
Church; it’s an attack on intentions. In this case the intention is 
because they have the spiritual base are elevated to some higher level 
of presumptive purity (Travis 2002 - Transcriptions: 288). 
 
It is this very notion of doing God’s work that makes it difficult for criticism to 
be levelled against the Church, according to respondents. If it were the case 
that government could in fact harness the Church to its agenda (as has been 
argued and will be advanced further), the role of social advocates from 
outside the Church becomes extremely problematic. The role of civil 
libertarians who critique the encroachment of discrimination (such as outlined 
previously) changes from one that attacks the government to one that attacks 
the Church – an almost untenable position. Many respondents feared the 
future of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the most conspicuous 
and financially capable American advocate, forced to a position of litigation 
against the Church. One respondent, in particular, cynically suggested that 
the President would gladly invite a challenge from the ACLU to affirm his 
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allegiance to “God’s work”: 
 
To be extra cynical I would not be surprised if Bush was having 
someone contribute an extra million dollars or two to the ACLU hoping 
they would indeed take him on. I think you’ve identified the strategy 
which is, I suspect, that indeed they are hoping that the ACLU and the 
libertarians (not so much) but the ACLU certainly is one which as they 
take on correct positions, they tend to take them on when they’re 
politically unpopular. The fact that they’re politically unpopular means 
that Bush will love it so the more people who will get up and make 
speeches about how Bush is trying to keep God in this country, that 
works to Bush’s favour (Raley 2002 - Transcriptions: 327). 
  
The support for predominantly Christian organizations in the advancement of 
a political agenda, particularly in the context of the events of September 11 
2001 in the United States, is a matter that appears to move from an anomaly 
that was embraced by both the left and the right for the purposes of 
“....colonisation of religion” (harnessing it to the government’s agenda) 
(Anonymous [a] 2001) to a new level that blurs the divide between Church 
and State, an issue being vigorously debated in the United States in 
particular. What emerges from the data is the increasing emphasis on 
support for faith-based organizations, which appears to have gained 
considerable momentum since September 11 2001. Perhaps the comments 
by one respondent in the United Kingdom exemplify this mood: 
 
I think it’s to do with September the 11th and the Americans 
discovering a new enemy – a clear view of good and evil which they 
find easier to live with but may not be so easy for the rest of us to live 
with – that’s what I think is happening (Stern 2002 - Transcriptions: 9). 
 
…… it’s not clear yet whether moderate, all sorts of moderate religious 
people, are going to be pulled in as the new acceptable face, or 
whether fundamentalist Christians are going to be OK and 
fundamentalist Muslims are not. I think that battle is still going to rage 
so I think it’s all too soon to say but it’s all changed, I’m sure it’s all 
changed and I think those American fundamentalists saying that 
September 11th was a punishment to America for its wickedness has 
probably put them a little bit outside acceptability in government circles 
for quite a while. It’s all going to change and it’s not at all clear yet how 
(Stern 2002 - Transcriptions: 6). 
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In summary of the discussion on faith-based initiatives thus far and from the 
perspective of respondents we note that: 
 
o The faith-based initiatives in the United States supported by both 
Republicans and Democrats provides an ideal-type process with 
which to explore ‘third way’ defining elements. 
 
o The implementation of faith-based initiatives was achieved with 
apparent haste and without a strategic purpose beyond the perceptible 
harnessing of the political forces that the third sector was able to rally. 
 
o The method for faith-based implementation resides in the lessening of 
restrictions on government funding (and competition for government 
funding) for faith-based organizations with some religious groups 
finding political favour over others. 
 
o The Church-state divide diminishes in terms of the blurring of 
intentions of each to the other on the basis of their respective 
missions. 
 
o Support for predominately Christian organizations in the wake of the 
“War on Terrorism” harnesses the work of the Church to the 
government’s agenda (“colonisation of religion”) and subsequently 
silences criticism of government policy. 
 
Morality and the UK experience 
 
From the UK perspective the Blair government is, according to informants, 
responding to locally determined “problems”, albeit those that would seem to 
have a moral flavour. From the data, it becomes apparent that these 
“problems” are more at the microscopic level than at the systemic or 
macroscopic level. Consider, for example, this quote from a senior 
government official when asked about the issue of morality in governance: 
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….so if there is an issue about family dysfunction and single mothers 
as it often is not being able to control their kids well there are 
interventions that can help them deal with those issues …. I’m more 
interested in what you do to rectify those problems rather what works 
to rectify those problems than the sort of philosophical issues around 
morality because I think it’s more difficult to see quite how you 
intervene on that. …but that’s not to say that you shouldn’t approach 
these issues from a morality perspective and perhaps there’s a role for 
government and faith communities and so on in doing that (Bright 
2002 - Transcriptions: 15). 
 
Another respondent, representing the Union movement in the UK, implied 
that the concentration of effort at the local level was a strategy, seemingly 
designed to deflect criticism away from central government, a matter 
canvassed in the previous chapter. He further insinuated that this 
devolvement of responsibility was not confined to local communities but 
extended to employers: 
 
……(the government) feel very vulnerable to .. charge and so they 
always seem very reluctant to legislate and are far more happy with 
exhorting employers to do the right thing on say maternity provision, 
flexible working, the right to go to work part-time or forcing equal pay 
for work of equal value between men and women, they are happy to 
set up Commissions and Codes of Practice and all sorts of things but 
they will not go the final step for instance and legislate on these kind of 
issues (Low 2002 - Transcriptions: 23). 
 
A Manager within a local authority took a companion position to this 
lamenting that the government was not capitalising on the public service 
“ethos”, believing rather that they were more concerned about the interests of 
for-profit enterprise in public service delivery: 
 
….there’s a quite strong value base that is shared across the public 
sector which we call the public service ethos …. it’s very deep and 
fundamental ….people who come into the public sector have a 
motivation to help people and …that creates a lot of common ground 
across the public sector and it’s extremely powerful and I think public 
sector organizations that do better are those that recognise and 
nurture it than those that try and say we’re going to put everything on 
a business footing and we’re going to become business oriented. They 
tend to destroy it I think (Wright 2002 - Transcriptions: 56). 
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The moral framework that commercially reorients community responsiveness 
to social issues is, amongst respondents, desirable. The same respondent 
who spoke of the power of the public service ethos had this comment with 
respect to business engagement in public services delivery: 
 
….those businesses that have found that they need to have values, 
we’ve now got values as a County Council and we’re treating those 
values as really important but other businesses are saying we have 
basic values and it seems to me it’s the new way of people finding a 
common moral code amongst themselves, to actually say within this 
organisation these behaviours are acceptable and these behaviours 
aren’t and a lot of highly successful organizations are delivering on the 
basis of a kind of moral framework (Wright 2002 - Transcriptions: 59). 
 
On the emergence of nongovernmental organizations as service providers 
and as an alternative to both the public sector and for-profit organizations in 
the United Kingdom, a UNISON official raised the issue of tension implicit to 
this construction: 
 
….There is a lot of tension  - I think the tension with a lot of union 
alliances with not-for-profit groups is …. that a lot of them are now 
service providers with ongoing government contracts and puts them in 
a difficult control (Low 2002 - Transcriptions: 27). 
 
Having regard to previous comments from Giddens and Latham about the 
disadvantaged taking up opportunity (otherwise “....governments are wasting 
their time”), one anonymous respondent quipped: 
 
…it’s just a very kind of Thatcherite way of going about things that 
they’ve got this idea that if you open up opportunities for people and 
they don’t take them that’s their own fault and so they can talk, by 
talking quite a lot about inclusion and ways that they’re including 
people they actually manage to deflect the debate, do you see what I 
mean? It’s kind of phoney inclusion. People having a chance isn’t 
being called inclusion (Anonymous 2002 [b] - Transcriptions: 98). 
 
….It is difficult to believe that they haven’t noticed that part of the 
falling unemployment is that people don’t claim anymore and indeed 
that that wasn’t part of what was expected to happen (Anonymous [b] 
2002 - Transcriptions: 94). 
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Amongst the respondents engaged in this research (and beyond the United 
States and the United Kingdom) there is a general consensus that 
government is seeking to contain political discussion and control the 
parameters of public discourse on significant social issues, the most pressing 
it would seem being the “War Against Terrorism” which seemingly galvanises 
the left and right to a common purpose. The clear winners for the “trust” of 
government become the bastions of Christian morality, the Church. The 
curious paradox is that the seemingly independent nature of these 
organizations removes their activity from the gaze of public scrutiny in spite 
of their being fundamentally influenced by this political agenda. This, in turn, 
deflects criticism for the implementation of government policy away from 
government itself – a reasonable explanator to its utility to both the left and 
the right of politics. Respondents noted that these kinds of organizations are 
less likely to be critical of government policy and less inclined to attack policy 
(see for example, Kennedy 2002 - Transcriptions: 111). According to Lynne 
Kennedy in Canada, the pursuit of moral agendas within a political context by 
religious organizations is legitimised by an outcome centred about the 
salvation of those for whom the programs are operated: 
 
You’ve got the Salvation Army and they are a religious based group 
and you have Central City Mission and you have First United Church 
and you have a lot of the helping organizations that are there are 
Church-based and religious based but many of them don’t push their 
religion it’s out of the goodness of their heart that they’re there trying 
to help people and if by chance through the helping something 
happens that these folk want to come to Chapel on Sunday too as part 
of their healing then that’s good (Kennedy 2002 - Transcriptions: 111). 
 
In summary of the perceptions of respondents in relation to morality and the 
UK experience it is noted that: 
 
o The Blair government is concentrating on microscopic issues at a local 
level that have a moral flavour. 
 
o This concentration of effort at the local level is seemingly designed to 
deflect criticism away from the government. 
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o The consequence for nongovernmental organizations being service 
providers has been to raise tension in relation to the capacity for these 
organizations to be critical of government policy. 
 
o The Christian Church appears to have emerged as the bastion of 
morality (those that are “trusted” by government) in a galvanised 
position shared by both the left and right of politics. 
 
The threat of defunding - a control mechanism?  
 
If the “carrot” for more active engagement by the Church is funding (which in 
turn strategically aligns the Church with Government policy), the “stick” would 
seem to be the threat of withdrawal of funding. From the data, Giddens 
himself agrees that a degree of compliance to government policy by funded 
organizations is necessary in order to maintain funding arrangements 
irrespective of religious orientation: 
 
And it’s also quite hard to negotiate as you know … because you’ve 
got to give a fair amount of autonomy but as you say you don’t want 
the money just to be swallowed up in local organizations that are not 
accountable to the wider public purpose (Giddens 2002 
Transcriptions: 48). 
 
Some respondents cynically suggest that funded organizations from within 
nongovernmental organizations are now participating more from a concern 
with funding through service delivery than a concern for advocacy: 
 
… they were all bought off with lots of money. Bought off in inverted 
commas in the sense that they felt that there was lots of money to do 
the things they’d always wanted to do and now was the time to do 
them and they may turn out to be right in the sense that at least lots of 
things are being done out there on the ground and social policy is 
being developed and the government doesn’t listen to advocacy 
anyway so it may have been the right decision but that’s what has 
happened (Stern 2002 - Transcriptions: 8). 
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On the question of the impacts for nongovernmental organizations in 
criticising government policy potentially losing their funding base, this same 
respondent suggests that: 
 
Nobody would say that but that’s what seems to have affected the 
sector with one or two notable exceptions (ibid: 8). 
 
Others are less candid suggesting that dissent against government policy in 
the United Kingdom could signal funding loss by those dissenting 
(Anonymous [b] 2002 - Transcriptions: 91). Certainly, to the majority of 
respondents, the trend would seem to favour a politically compliant 
nongovernmental sector which echoes adherence to government policy 
centred upon market philosophy rather than addressing inequality. There is a 
similar view by some respondents that there is a real danger that ‘third way’ 
thinking may end up neutralising debate on important social issues as 
reflected in this comment (see also: Giddens 2002 - Transcriptions: 48; 
Anonymous [e] 2002 - Transcriptions: 87; Anonymous [g] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 125; Anonymous [k] 2002 - Transcriptions: 463; and Travis 
2002 - Transcriptions: 286): 
 
Yes (emphatically). I think is it neutralising debate. Within the LSE I 
find that it’s quite difficult to talk about poverty or inequality, I mean ….  
it’s a bit frown(ed) (up)on to talk about those issues as being not 
resolvable by 3rd way policies. I mean you just get a bit laughed at if 
you actually use the terms inequality or poverty (Anonymous [b] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 96). 
 
A reasonable extrapolation to the phenomenon of neutralising debate within 
nongovernmental organizations may be to link the need for funding by the 
sector to undertake its work with the moral imperative, coupled with the 
political imperative that is invoked by government in the provision of that 
funding. When questioned on the conundrum for the sector to engage in 
debate on controversial social issues and the actions by government to 
defund organizations that do engage in such discussion there was 
considerable acknowledgement of at least the potential for that to happen. 
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I think people are much more measured but that was also true in the 
Clinton administration. It’s just the players have changed. The 
question is how much do ideological definitions drive the way in which 
we are going to have to do policy at that particular election and during 
that particular term of office (Copple 2002 - Transcriptions: 246). 
 
There is little doubt that constricting financial opportunities for 
nongovernmental organizations both in America and elsewhere has led the 
sector to participate at an increasing level in the contract provision of 
government services. This achieves two outcomes from the perspective of 
government, overtly or not. The first would seem to be the emasculation of 
the formerly legitimate advocacy role assumed by the sector, that is the 
curbing of the ability to negatively critique government policy (a matter 
explored elsewhere); the second, a more insidious outcome, has been to tie 
the work of this sector to neo-liberal machinations involving the quest for 
profit. This latter issue came to the fore with the collapse in 2002 of the first 
faith-based initiative trialled in Washington D.C. During the closing stages of 
the Democratic administration, the federal government partnered with a 
District-based organisation called the Church Association for Community 
Service to refurbish some 300 housing properties. The intention of this 
partnership was to provide opportunity for the nongovernmental organisation 
to raise additional capital whilst at the same time making available low-cost 
housing for eligible citizens. Once completed, the average price of these 
houses was intended to be $39,000. The nongovernmental organisation, 
however, hired the services of a for-profit company with a side-deal that has 
seen the price of this housing blow out to $141,000, clearly eliminating the 
savings intended for low-income families. According to the Washington Post, 
the partnering agreement bridged two administrations and benefited from 
both (Leonnig 2002). In this report Leonnig asserts that the waning Clinton 
administration waived the minimum standards required of the program by a 
member of the Church Association Board and the incoming George W. Bush 
administration continued to promote the program as an example of his faith-
based initiative. When money is involved it is not hard to understand this 
seduction and, some could argue, betrayal, in spite of the social justice 
mission of the engaged parties.  
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As outlined in the Introduction, the American version of the ‘third way’ has as 
its antecedents “American progressivism” which, according to Birnbaum 
(1999) equates social change to a theology (Birnbaum 1999: 437-438) 
encapsulating the elements of a belief in human capacity in much the same 
way as “new liberalism” in Blair’s ‘third way’ captured the historical solidaristic 
doctrines of British social Christianity. What makes the American and 
Continental versions of the ‘third way’ different, according to one respondent, 
is that the antecedents for the American system are bound with 
evangelicalism whereas the British system are not: 
 
But isn’t the difference … I mean does the UK have an Evangelical 
movement that people are afraid of?  … you see people are not afraid 
of (family values, morals), people are not afraid of Ministers who’ve 
been to Oxford who speak in measured tones who see things in 
shades of grey. What they are afraid of is a guy who goes out and all 
of a sudden has thousands of people flocking to him, like for example 
Jesus Christ, you know they killed him. …. If there was a set of British 
Evangelists who started access to the airwaves and were building a 
media empire because they were getting thousands or millions or 
listeners calling and sending them money, I’ll guarantee you that if 
Blair were cozing up to them, there’d be a firestorm.  It’s because 
underneath this, in America anyway, there is a constant struggle for 
hegemony among these religious movements (Conner 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 311). 
 
It would seem not to be surprising that Blair, like Bush, is “courting” the 
Churches. They remain as the final bastion of social dissent that could 
endanger government. This proposition constantly resurfaces in the data by 
way of discussion on the compulsion placed upon them to be bound to 
government policy through funding contracts (Anonymous [f] 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 69, Low 2002 - Transcriptions: 22; Lyotier 2002 - 
Transcriptions: 133, and; Thomas 2002 - Transcriptions: 296). On the one 
hand, to meet the agenda of financial independence, and on the other they 
become mute on the question of policy critique. They therefore become 
effectively removed as an impediment for governments to retain political 
power. On the question of the moral imperative in the Australian context, 
Duncan Kerr (2002) Federal Member of the Australian Parliament and a 
former Justice Minister in that country suggests that: 
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…the Labor Party has always had a sort of a very strong Catholic 
social justice component within it, it’s not a background that I come 
from but it’s always been there and it’s always in  tension with the 
libertarian outlook that has been manifested by people like Dunstan 
and many others and we’re going through a profoundly conservative 
time at the moment. The person who is really articulating a real retreat 
to much more conservative values is Howard (the Australian Liberal 
Prime Minister). It’s interesting that that Howard is the person who is 
either covertly or overtly deliberately playing to a social conservatism. I 
think that Labor would fracture if we took a strategic decision to 
attempt to outflank Howard to the right (Kerr 2002 - Transcriptions: 
517). 
 
This is not necessarily a view supported by others within Australia. Certainly 
one of the principle proponents of the ‘third way’ is a current Member of 
Parliament (and a potential future Minister of the Crown), Mark Latham. The 
warnings about ‘third way’ implementation by a future Australian Labor 
government were recently foreshadowed by the Australian Manufacturing 
Union who, in a Submission to the Australian Labor Party in April of 2002, 
suggested that: 
 
Ultimately, the third way is based on the illusion that the ideological 
war has actually ended in some kind of permanent peace and 
furthermore, that it is possible to balance right wing neo-liberal 
doctrine with any sort of non-market approach to social organisation 
…. In fact this process has undermined the level of commitment to 
collectivism in the society. The glorification of individualism and 
individual greed in particular undermines not only trade unionism but 
also the political space for the Labor Party (Australian Manufacturing 
Workers Union 2002). 
 
In summarising the perceptions of respondents on the question of whether 
defunding of organizations emerges as a control mechanism over those 
funded, it is noted that: 
 
o The threat of withdrawal of funding is the fear for non-compliance to 
government policy by nongovernmental organizations thereby moving 
the “mission” of these organizations away from advocacy and more 
towards service delivery. 
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o ‘Third way’ thinking, therefore, has the effect of neutralising debate on 
social justice issues with the emasculation of advocacy and the 
binding of nongovernmental organizations to for-profit organisational 
motives. 
 
o A convergence of moral thinking between the UK and the United 
States can be found in the companion antecedents of “American 
progressivism” (social change as a theology) and the historical 
solidaristic doctrines of British social Christianity (“new liberalism” or 
the belief in human capacity), with the former having a more 
Evangelical flavour.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As we entered this chapter we did so on the basis that we had discovered the 
“head” of the ‘third way’ – that which this researcher refers to as the political 
imperative (established in Chapter 5). At the completion of the chapter, in the 
opinion of this researcher, we have established the “heart” of the ‘third way’, 
that being the moral imperative. According to respondents, both appear to be 
inexorably linked, with this “head and heart” combined to influence the 
struggle of government for the purpose of retaining power, irrespective of 
government “type”, be it social democratic or neo-liberal. This is an important 
consideration, albeit it premised upon the reflections of a small number of 
elite respondents and not totally inclusive of all the potential elements of the 
‘third way’. 
 
It has been argued, on the basis of respondent perceptions, that this moral 
imperative is the impelling force that guides the enabling process for ‘third 
way’ government. It has further been suggested from these perceptions that 
the emergence of morality has defined historical antecedents but that 
previous government models have recognised the separation of the Church 
and the State whereas the ‘third way’ model thrives on its active association. 
Finally, respondent perceptions inform that compliance to the common 
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“good” through faith-based sponsorship by government is the fuel that seeks 
to both remove criticism for government policy away from government onto 
the Church and also legitimise the removal of public funding for those who 
present as a threat to government.  
 
In the chapter that follows, discussion and conclusions that flow from this 
research project will be canvassed. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions   
 
From the outset this research has sought to explain and evaluate the 
dissonance between those who view the ‘third way’ as a device to enhance 
democracy and those who hold an opposing position. This project has 
investigated the perceptions of those persons responsible for the 
implementation of ‘third way’ processes in an attempt to evaluate such 
assertions. This cross-section of elite respondents included government 
employees, government officials, nongovernmental organizations, for-profit 
organizations, engaged community members and academics. They 
participated in interviews on their perceptions of the ‘third way’ from which 
inference could be drawn about the phenomenon. In order that reasonable 
conclusions may be extracted from these perceptions, data was assessed 
across four research sites to which a ‘third way’ character was inferred; 
Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Canada. 
This research has not evaluated or critiqued the whole ‘third way’, only a part 
of it – specifically that part that deals with development, community and the 
relations that guide each from the perspective of respondents. There is a 
considerable amount that remains to be done to fully explore the 
phenomenon of the ‘third way’ in practice over a variety of domains. 
 
In seeking to better understand the ‘third way’ model, this study has explored 
and theorised about its “philosophy” and “armature” having regard to the 
opinions and worldviews of the respondents. Findings have been generated 
that present and inform the ‘third way’ in a range of practical settings and in a 
new way. This has been achieved within narrative constructions of 
respondent’s meanings (Chapter 4) applied in a critical theoretical setting that 
accounts for its philosophy (part 1 of Chapter 2) and armature (part 2 of 
Chapter 2) whilst also having regard to the new features of the “political” and 
 The ‘third way’: Inclusion at a cost
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“moral” imperatives (Chapters 5 and 6) that appear to substantially drive the 
phenomenon. In this chapter I will review the study and its outcomes. The 
first section of this chapter will substantially draw from Chapter 2. 
 
What is the ‘third way’? 
 
It has been raised throughout that the current ‘third way’ is a concept that 
emerges initially from the “left” of political thought – that is, it evolves from 
social democracy – and attempts to find a median point between social 
democracy and neo-liberalism.  It has been suggested that this evolution has 
been contingent upon the desire for left-aligned political structures to 
maintain electoral power, first through the Keynesian “welfare state” 
processes of the post World War 2 period now though the strong market 
orientation that epitomises contemporary ‘third way’ thinking. It could be 
suggested that the melding of social democratic/neo-liberal ideals may well 
have been the objective of the ‘third way’ - with power consolidation 
becoming an unintended consequence by policy-makers through the process 
of centralisation. An equally compelling argument could be advanced, 
however, to suggest that such power consolidation through centralization is 
an intentional devise by politicians for the purpose of maintaining governance 
– a scenario that gains some veracity on the basis of evidence from 
respondents who report a contest for control of the ‘third way’ by both the left 
and the right of politics across all sites. There would also appear to be some 
merit in this latter contention based upon the prescriptions of Giddens’ 
theory. These matters will be reviewed in some depth in that section of this 
Chapter that deals with the political imperative. 
 
The Giddens scenario proceeds from the simple axiom that socialism is 
dead.  Moreover, Giddens tells us that social democracy (as characterised by 
the Keynesian-inspired “welfare state”) is similarly moribund. As outlined in 
Chapter 2, his precept is that the “ideals” of Marxism need to be 
reconstructed since socialism has failed to deliver a society that has 
generated greater wealth or/but is capable of more equitable distribution than 
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capitalism, which, he argues, has demonstrated its capacity to be “efficient”.  
By his own admission however, Giddens acknowledges that totally 
unregulated market systems independent of government control can produce 
widespread disaffection and conflict. To him the deep inequalities of outcome 
will give rise to an absence of “social cohesion”. The research proceeds 
(throughout Chapter 2) from the fundamental premise that the evolution of 
such a model presupposes clearly defined historical, cultural and economic 
antecedents – the exposition of which has been referred to as its 
“philosophy”. From part 1 of Chapter 2 it is noted that this philosophy has 
paralleled corresponding developments within capitalism and, as such, 
appears to be significantly influenced by globalisation with the 
homogenisation of markets and political processes, worldwide, concomitant 
with this progression. It is in the formalisation of the ‘third way’ by Anthony 
Giddens based upon the experiences of social democratic governments in 
Australia (to retain power when their European and American counterparts 
failed) and the communitarian experiences of Amitai Etzioni in the United 
States, that the current version finds political favour.  
 
For his part, Giddens has a history of synthetic incursions drawing together 
competing ideas in much the same way as he constructed his ‘third way’. 
Consider his amalgamation of ideas from Marx, Weber and Durkheim in his 
earlier publications whereby he reconstructed a view of sociology centred 
upon capitalism and modernity (Isaac 2001). In his later writings he focuses 
the ideas of Foucault, Habermas, Gadamer and Lévi-Strauss in arrive at his 
“structuration” theory. At a later time he borrows from Ulrich Beck (1994) to 
integrate the concept of a “sub-politics” located within civil society, 
engendered from dissatisfaction by citizens engaged in social movements, 
particularly those related to ecological issues.  
 
Giddens position finds an influential parallel in the United States in the work 
of Amitai Etzioni. The communitarian approach by Etzioni is a constructed 
median point between the Liberal and conservative paradigms where, 
according to Connor (2002) the emerging social problems no longer fit a 
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bipolar description. He describes Etzioni’s theorem, as a unified field theory 
with a coherent worldview that once applied would yield better solutions. 
Nonetheless, Connor asserts, the intellectual archipelago that such a process 
produces applies principles that are contingent upon the economic and 
political agendas of specific interests or classes. This view accords with that 
of Raley (2002) who believes that the communitarian vision may allow an 
abrogation of social responsibility by government through the advancement 
of volunteerism at the expense of political intervention. These matters will be 
expanded upon in that section dealing with the moral and political 
imperatives below. 
 
Why is the ‘third way’ important? 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, the ‘third way’ model has found support among 
governments across the world having been adopted by Blair in the United 
Kingdom, Clinton in the United States and others. The model has also found 
support amongst conservative administrators. Its significance to government 
style is, therefore, considerable.  
 
The pre-eminence of globalisation as a major contributing influence to the 
dominance of the ‘third way’ (and the manner by which it accommodates 
market forces) cannot be understated in this discussion. As suggested from 
the Introduction, the ‘third way’ may have emerged as the homogenised 
voice, given political expression, for what Norberg-Hodge (1996) refers to as 
the “global monoculture”, the new mode of capitalism where nations are no 
longer linked by external flows and relations but are integrated through the 
whole social, political, judicial and cultural superstructure (Robinson 2000: 
91). It is within the notion of a transnational civil society that Robinson and 
Norberg-Hodge invoke that we find remarkable equivalence in the work of 
Giddens. The pursuit of globalisation as a prime objective for ‘third way’ 
theory overlays this research as the common thread that seeks to legitimise 
the idea that social democracy is redundant (Blair and Schroeder 2000) with 
unfettered globalisation accepted unconditionally as the necessary and 
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unalterable context for the ‘third way’ (Barkan in Blair and Schroeder 2000).  
 
As noted in Chapters 2 and 5, the apparent blurring of the distinction 
between the left and right of politics has given ascendency to the ‘third way’ 
across government “types”. Thus, we find evidence of ‘third way’ 
implementation within neo-liberal administrations as much as within social 
democratic styled administrations. This implication for this transmogrification, 
left to right (and back again), demands greater explication of the impacts in 
practice than is currently available. In setting the scene for data interrogation, 
the researcher isolated what was termed the “armature” of the ‘third way’ as 
the concrete examples of ‘third way’ philosophy, these being civil society, 
NGOs and partnerships, i.e. those mechanisms or sub-systems that do the 
work of the ‘third way’.  
 
What do we still need to know? 
 
As a model that has attracted considerable support politically, the ‘third way’ 
is of significance. It can neither be ignored, nor treated as an anomaly. Yet, it 
has been advanced, the implications of the model in practice appear not to 
have been given much consideration in the literature. Given that the model 
seems ill-defined and contestable but that it is one that has been adopted 
across a range of administrations an explication of these implications is vital. 
We need to know whether the ‘third way’ construct is understood on the 
ground. Furthermore we need to assess whether indicators exist that either 
affirm or refute the contention that it increases democracy and whether the 
theory of the model accords with its practice. We also need to know how the 
armature of the ‘third way’ (civil society, NGOs and partnerships) operates in 
the real world and whether political and moral imperatives exist that drive the 
phenomenon. 
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In seeking to arrive at an understanding of these matters, the following 
research question was posed: 
 
o What does the ‘third way’ mean in practice?  
 
In seeking to answer this question, it is noted that this was a small research 
project looking at just one corner of the very large picture of the ‘third way’. 
 
The discussion will now turn to review the investigative tools (from Chapter 3) 
that were used to reach some conclusions in relation to this question. 
 
The tools of investigation and methods 
 
As maintained throughout, this investigation has sought to explicate the 
perceptions of significant persons directly engaged in implementation 
processes. As such the views of a wide cross-section of respondents from 
government, the nongovernmental and for-profit sectors, academics and 
involved community members were canvassed. The investigation sought to 
infer from the selected sites a ‘third way’ character based upon an inter-
relationship between the theory of the phenomenon, the public assertions of 
governments within these sites (overt ascription to ‘third way’ principles), the 
usage of terminology by respondents (covert ascription to ‘third way’ 
principles), the apparent transmogrification of ‘third way’ principles (both left 
to right, and right to left) and data otherwise available (historical 
documentation, newspaper and electronic reportage and so forth). 
 
The method applied in drawing data engaged in-depth qualitative exploration 
via open-ended and otherwise unstructured interviewing of lead (or elite 
[Marshall and Rossman 1995; Platt 1981]) members of each corner of the 
“partnership” matrix as previously described. As specified in the work of Gray 
and Bass (2000), Marshall and Rossman (1989) Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
and others, the research sought to identify consistent patterns across the 
data by a systematic process.  
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Consistent with Winn (2001), the data was recorded in a transparent explicit 
and retrievable manner within a set of protocols that were predetermined. 
The methodological tools of constructivism and interpretivism were applied to 
give meaning to worldviews of respondent’s actions (Schwandt 1998), the 
latter providing a perspective to accommodate the understanding and 
meaning of respondent experiences (Neuman 2000). In the context of the 
research key respondent insights into the ‘third way’ were garnered in order 
that a logic (or set of logics) could be extracted that are transportable, 
relevant and engaged with social explanations of wider resonance. The 
background of the researcher engaged in social justice enquiry over a 
considerable period of time presents as an expressed bias in terms of the 
relationships between the investigator and those being investigated and was 
dealt with by way of self-reflective disclosures in Appendix 3 (Mason 1996). 
As the researcher, prior to this investigation, knew the majority of 
respondents, the meanings attaching to responses were both shaped by this 
history and the interview process (Crotty 1998).  
 
The data was then cast within a critical theoretical framework (Klein and 
Myers 1999). From Alvesson and Skèoldberg (2000) the research moved 
from a focus on interpretation of the material itself to an interpretation of this 
material in the context of political/ideological forces that threaten to suborn 
open dialogue (Alvesson and Skèoldberg 2000). Accordingly the mining of 
data was complimented by an historical overview, analysis of political 
structures and a comprehensive literature review across the relevant areas of 
research. Further to Alvesson and Skèoldberg the research attempted to 
clarify and affirm the democratic process recognizing that societal conditions 
are historically determined and influenced by the asymmetries of power and 
spatial interests. The practical intent of the investigation, following from 
Zanetti (1997), was to reveal the socially constructed nature of the 
phenomenon of the ‘third way’ recognising that reified explanations passing 
as reality are not immutable and that the application of additional insight may 
help transform society in an “emancipatory” manner. The researcher was 
significantly directed beyond the data to “read” a social world behind the 
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words of the respondents – a world that is characterised by power structures, 
vested interests and limited resources (Klein and Myers 1999).  
 
In summary, the elements of the research design proceed along the following 
continuum: 
 
o The Research Question: What does the ‘third way’ mean in practice? 
 
o The Theoretical Perspective: Interpretivism and Constructivism in the 
context of critical theory. 
 
o Methods: Active elite interviewing, narrative analysis and 
categorisation, and literature and document review. 
 
The discussion will now turn to further specifics of investigation, building 
upon the “philosophy” of the ‘third way’ and focussing initially on what 
meanings attached to the ‘third way’ by respondents. 
 
The “meaning” of the ‘third way’ 
 
The earlier chapters sought to articulate the theory of the ‘third way’. In so 
doing, we established that the phenomenon has assumed the proportions of 
a solid policy agenda embraced by both formerly social democratic and neo-
liberal governments. The transportability of the model in both directions 
(social democratic to neo-liberal and vice versa) was consistently alluded to. 
What became apparent from respondent’s perceptions of the model in the 
real world is that there is a significant deficiency in understanding about what 
this ‘third way’ involved. Respondents neither had heard of Anthony Giddens 
(in general) nor had a comprehension of the ‘third way’. Paradoxically, 
respondents did appear to have integrated ‘third way’ terminology into their 
every-day experience seemingly as a consequence of its application by 
government in common use language. We noted that respondents had no 
corresponding lack of knowledge or lack of comprehension about the 
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elemental features of ‘third way’ parentage, that being social democracy and 
neo-liberalism. 
 
The limitations that surfaced during the pilot period in Melbourne during 
August of 2001 relating to this lack of specific knowledge about Giddens or 
the ‘third way’ (in spite of the application of ‘third way’ terminology) required 
some analysis about whether this phenomenon was isolated or could be 
generalised across the research sites. In an effort to test this possibility, 
questioning was undertaken based upon definitional criteria established from 
Giddens himself. As previously noted the Australian experience was to prove 
not to be anomalous, with respondents across the three sites exhibiting a 
paucity of knowledge about the ‘third way’.  Respondents tended to have 
partial understanding apparently dependent upon the particulars of their 
professional or political affiliations. Those engaged directly in political 
(government) processes in relation to the application of ‘third way’ theory into 
practice, by and large, demonstrated circumspection in their responses 
suggesting two divergent pathways for explanation – either a lack of 
understanding or the reflection of fear in answering “inappropriately”. This 
latter possibility will be considered again in the context of argument on the 
“political imperative” to be discussed later. Some were cynical suggesting it 
as a nebulous or incoherent construct, whilst others, particularly in 
nongovernmental organizations saw it as a method by which they could 
financially bolster their existing infrastructure. An understanding of the ‘third 
way’ was more in evidence from respondents in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, with serious deficiencies being recorded specifically by 
respondents in both Australia and Canada. Based upon criteria distilled from 
Giddens, only one in five of respondents (from Chapter 4) demonstrated both 
knowledge of this author and his ‘third way’. Given the credentials of the 
respondents this was a surprising outcome.  
 
Having said that the majority of respondents did not understand the broad 
concept of the ‘third way’, a further test on the application of ‘third way’ 
terminology was applied. What emerged was evidence that respondents 
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were using ‘third way’ jargon without either knowledge of the philosophy that 
drives these concepts or the intended definition of terms. Australian 
respondents in part, explained this curiosity as consequent upon a “cut and 
paste” exercise of British policy by program managers into local frameworks 
without localised modification or definition of terms.  
 
In an attempt to rationalise why the dominating ideology of the ‘third way’ 
should elicit such a lack of understanding by respondents, the researcher 
turned to the notions of “practical” or “tacit” knowledge posed by Giddens and 
Polyani respectively.  The application of the theorems of Polyani, in 
particular, became the backbone upon which the flesh of the research was 
ultimately laid. In essence Polyani argues that tacit knowledge derives from a 
subject’s desire to pragmatically make concrete aspects of one’s world based 
upon value judgements, intuitions and insights drawn from the duree of 
experience. As argued early in the thesis in relation to the “philosophy” of the 
‘third way’, the reworking or redefinition of familiar language (familiar in the 
context of social democratic vocabulary) by ‘third way’ proponents may act to 
reinforce common use terms from one political schema to another without 
those using the language being aware of its redefinition. Certainly in the 
context of the current research we can reasonably explain the lack of the 
specific ‘third way’ knowledge by respondents though their application of tacit 
(or practical, to use Giddens’ term) knowledge to clarify familiar terminology 
within their own life experiences. The application of this knowledge based 
more upon intuition and embedded within their experiential understandings 
provides a reasonable explanator to the use of this language in the first 
instance. 
 
In summary of the “meaning” of the ‘third way’ by respondents, we can 
conclude that: 
 
o Respondents generally were unfamiliar both with the broad concept of 
the ‘third way’ and its author. 
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o Respondents were similarly vague about specific definitions within 
‘third way’ terminology. 
 
o However, respondents used ‘third way’ terminology in a non-reflexive 
way. 
 
o This anomaly can be explained through the application of Polyani’s 
theorem of “tacit” knowledge (or Giddens’ “practical knowledge”) 
whereby respondents applied meaning to terminology based upon 
their experience in the real world.  
 
Having reviewed the “philosophy” and “meaning” of the ‘third way’ the 
discussion will now turn to the mechanics of ‘third way’ implementation, what 
the researcher refers to as its “armature”. 
 
The “armature” of the ‘third way’ 
 
It has been argued that if there is a “philosophy” that defines the ideology of 
the ‘third way’, there must also be a set of “armature” that specify the nature 
of its implementation. For the purpose of definition, this “armature” is deemed 
to be that set of concrete policies and institutional relationships that 
determine what happens in practice and within this research are isolated as 
being “civil society”, NGOs and “partnerships”, i.e. those mechanisms or sub-
systems that do the work of the  ‘third way’. The data in relation to each of 
this armature will now be explicated.  
 
Civil Society 
 
What became evident with respect to the notion of civil society was that, to 
respondents, this was the least understood. Most respondents were not able 
to relate the specific relevance of this construct to their immediate reality. 
However, the majority did recognise the potency of communities to problem-
solve social issues. In other words, respondents had a comprehension not 
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aligned to academic discourse but based upon their specific engagement 
with the community (tacit knowledge). Certainly there was evidence that 
some respondents seemed confused about how government policy could 
give life to the concept. The majority of respondents did, as discussed, 
recognise the value of connecting disparate strands of thought within the 
community.  
 
Interestingly many respondents did link the idea of civil society with a more 
middle-range idea - that of social capital (Putnam 2000), conceptually 
imbuing social capital with catalytic properties for the realisation of civil 
society. A belief in the capacity for social capital to be harnessed by 
government and the community to reconstruct civil society is clearly 
demonstrated throughout the data and across all sites, albeit from slightly 
different perspectives. For example, in the United Kingdom, whilst social 
capital was acknowledged, there was a degree of cynicism about the 
potentiality for government to achieve engagement at a civic level; in Canada 
respondents felt constrained by an approach that aligned the creation of 
social capital with money (paying for attendance at meetings and so forth), 
and in the United States, social capital associated with community 
empowerment, became the recurring theme. It should be noted, however, 
that some other respondents, principally in Australia, acknowledged the 
fallacy of community engagement and the harnessing of social capital in the 
context of citizens struggling on a day-to-day basis just to survive. There was 
general consensus across the sites that the development (and utilisation) of 
social capital within civil society was constrained by a feeling that the 
community was fractured. 
 
In summary of the perceptions of respondents to the notion of civil society: 
 
o Respondents did not know a great deal about the concept of civil 
society in the abstract. 
 
o There was consensus that community empowerment and engagement 
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are synonymous with civil society. 
 
o There was a general view that the community was fractured (across all 
sites) with a lack of connectedness that impeded the development of 
social capital. 
 
o Some maintain that this fragmentation arises as a result of the 
pragmatics of day-to-day survival. 
 
o Others suggest that fragmentation arises as a consequence of 
government policy. 
 
o All respondents recognised that the “sense of community” provides an 
extended worldview for the development of government policy and an 
accountability mechanism for government in the design and 
implementation of policy. 
 
The discussion will now focus on the second of the ‘third way’ “armature”, 
that of NGOs. 
 
NGOs 
 
As the exemplars of civil society, according to Giddens and others (for 
example, Keane 1988), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) became of 
some importance to this research, particularly in the absence of more defined 
understanding of civil society by respondents. The nature of disclosure on 
NGOs by respondents centred about the problems associated with 
fragmentation, suspicion and containment; the history of “anti”-community 
development, and; affiliations with government. Each will be reviewed in turn. 
 
It became evident across all sites that the role of NGOs is viewed with 
considerable suspicion by government with some government officials 
characterising them as “undemocratic”. It would seem that some, including 
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Giddens, would like to see their role limited to welfare service delivery without 
an advocacy role, which to others (particularly from within the NGO sector) is 
seen to be a legitimate function. This suspicion manifests, according to 
respondents, through funding strictures designed to curtail non-welfare 
service delivery functions for the sector. Respondents suggested that as 
government significantly funds the activity of the sector, they are able to 
control dissent (expanded upon under the “political imperative” section of this 
chapter) by way of “competitive tendering” and other market philosophy 
devices. Some within government went so far as to suggest that 
“problematic” NGOs can be excluded from funding arrangements which in 
turn, it is suggested, forces them to become financially unviable. This view 
accords with Fowler (2000) who traced the change of NGOs from the period 
from the 1950s and 1960s away from a concern based upon “compassion” to 
a motivation towards the development of a political project. The Fowler thesis 
rests on the proposition that processes of decolonisation informed this 
change. In the current research it has been suggested that more recent 
trends are potentially seeing NGOs being used as tools for the 
implementation of a new form of colonisation via globalisation with the 
“colonisation” of religion for state purposes (expanded upon under the “moral 
imperative” section of this chapter). 
 
For those who are successful in tendering, others argue, contractual 
arrangements forced compliance that, in turn, contributed to the 
fragmentation of the sector. The fear for respondents was that the reliance 
upon government funding has the dual effect of detaching the sector from its 
constituency and enabling government policy to proceed without criticism. In 
the United Kingdom respondents noted a move to cluster NGOs to create a 
more efficient industry. The consequence of containing NGOs in this manner, 
respondents conclude, is to recreate it as an adjunct to government in the 
delivery of specific services, not as a sector that could hold the government 
accountable (Edwards, Hulme et al 1996) which it is argued, was a prime 
mission for the sector historically. Many respondents questioned the motives 
of government to fund sectarian organizations to the exclusion of non-
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sectarian organizations, particularly in the United States under George W. 
Bush’s faith-based initiatives project (raised in the “moral imperative” 
section).  
 
On the matter of a perceived history of “anti”-community development (which 
this researcher defines as that period of neo-liberal administration where 
agendas were pursued which significantly curtailed the capacity of NGOs in 
terms of social debate), in those places that had not experienced a social 
democratic styled government for some period, there was considerable angst 
expressed by respondents about a lack of continuity of history in social 
justice critique. These same respondents believed that a return to a social 
democratic administration (albeit now ‘third way’) would assist in reversing 
this trend but were disappointed that this in fact had not occurred. 
Respondents believed that ‘third way’ administrations were extending what 
they perceived to be the neo-liberal process of “neutralising” debate. In 
tandem with this process is, according to respondents, a market-based 
philosophy that required NGOs to participate along “industry” lines linking 
their maintenance and infrastructure demands on government-imposed 
conditions to ensure employability of staff. In reviewing this matter in the 
context of Najam’s (1997 in Young 2000) schemata on confrontational, 
complementary and supplementary relations for NGOs with government 
(outlined in Chapter 2, part 2), we should consider complementary and 
supplementary relations (as those advanced by neo-liberal administrations 
and substantially extended under ‘third way’ administrations) in the context of 
a further consideration which is advanced from the observations of 
respondents - that of covert pressure to conform to economic and political 
strictures encased within contractual arrangements in the delivery of services 
that are publicly funded. It would seem that confrontational approaches, as 
isolated by Najam, to “prod” government on matters of public policy are being 
(or have been) relegated into redundancy under the ‘third way’. This concern 
was foreshadowed by Fowler (2000) who asserted that the former 
motivations and legitimacy for NGOs (in terms of social justice engagement) 
is ending in favour of market forces – where the homogenising forces of 
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economic globalisation establish the normative modes of individualism, 
competitiveness, exploitation and rivalry between “... people and between 
people and nature”. 
 
The notion of affiliations to government arose substantially from respondents 
in Canada. This site (British Columbia), in the process of a change from a 
social democratic administration to a ‘third way’ Liberal administration, 
exposed respondents who cited close affiliations by NGOs with the former 
provincial NDP government as problematic. Having said that, similar 
concerns were raised in the United Kingdom and the United States. In the 
former jurisdiction respondents noted both positive and negative 
consequences from this style of relationship particularly with respect to 
tender arrangements (previously mentioned), in education, and through 
tensions and power relations between nongovernmental and for-profit 
organizations for service delivery contracts. In the United States respondents 
also alluded to “unresolved power relations” between NGOs and government 
with some issuing a cautionary note about the reliance of NGOs on 
government funding. In Australia, respondents noted a decreasing trust of 
NGOs by government with opposition by NGOs being perceived as a threat 
to the sector. The “bitch fight” in British Columbia, which seemingly purges 
supporters of the formerly social democratic administration in favour of new 
players who will undoubtedly have linkages to the newly-installed Liberal 
provincial government, is reminiscent of what must have occurred in the 
United Kingdom when Margaret Thatcher was installed as Prime Minister and 
in the United States when Ronald Reagan became President (also consider 
the closure of abortion clinics by George W. Bush following his election).  
 
In summary of the perceptions of respondents to NGOs we note that 
respondents thought that: 
 
o NGOs are being treated with suspicion by government. 
 
o Under a ‘third way’ approach NGOs are becoming adjuncts to 
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government in the provision of services. 
 
o The historical role of advocacy by NGOs is being considerably 
impaired. 
 
o NGO organizations are becoming more compliant to government 
policy and are being tied to contractual strictures that inhibit their 
capacity to engage in social debate on government policy. 
 
o “Anti”-community development approaches towards NGOs that was 
nurtured under neo-liberal administrations are being substantially 
advanced under ‘third way’ administrations. 
 
 
The discussion will now focus on the final ‘third way’ armature isolated within 
this research, that of partnerships. 
  
Partnerships 
 
The lack of understanding of civil society and the emotional interchanges that 
flowed from discussion on NGOs did not find a corresponding confusion 
among respondents about the concept of partnership. This term was well 
understood by respondents, albeit again with meaning based upon tacit or 
practical knowledge with definition being provided couched in terms of praxis 
rather than theory. It would seem that the ideological precepts that govern 
the particular organisation, be it religious-based, social justice based or 
others guide the more specific nature of definition.  
 
The recurring themes from respondents across all jurisdictions with respect 
to partnerships related to power, patronage and control and analysis. Each 
will be reviewed in turn. Firstly the matter of power (or the lack of) between 
partnership members was raised consistently. Many respondents alluded to 
the ineffectiveness of partnerships based upon the dominance of one group 
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over another and the failure to appropriately culture individuals within groups 
to the “committee structure” that dominates partnership relations. Other 
respondents, more particularly from government, suggested that partnerships 
were more of a sham with the perception of them being more important than 
the actuality. Respondents within the NGO sector alluded to this matter by 
suggesting that the labyrinth of committees of “experts” that purport to be 
partnerships are predicated upon a “financial knife-edge” approach by the 
sector with NGOs never actually being the power broker but at the end of a 
funding chain, The notion of “elites” governing the process of partnerships 
was mentioned on several occasions. It was Taylor (1998) who raised the 
proposition that NGO partners are not full participants in the process of policy 
development by asserting that despite the “rhetoric of partnerships” 
significant barriers still existed. One respondent cynically suggested that 
there was no sector but rather a handful of people doing the same work 
across many committees.  
 
As noted previously in relation to the financial dependence on government 
forced upon NGOs, respondents reiterated that partnerships tended to 
neutralise these agencies away from dissent of government policy. Even 
Giddens noted the quid pro quo necessary from NGOs in gaining public 
funds in the delivery of services – this requiring a lack of criticism of the 
funding source. Indeed, some respondents noted that infighting amongst 
partnerships to secure financial security, coupled with this willingness to 
acquiesce to government policy, tended to create a preferred status for some 
agencies. Respondents noted that this status was contingent upon their 
lobbying ability or religious or political considerations beyond service delivery 
requirements. The net effect of such processes, some argued, has been to 
divide partnerships and groups rather than meet intended outcomes. This 
position accords with the observations of Smith and Rochester (1995) who 
believe that competition between NGOs gives rise to conflict, distrust and 
scepticism with competition compounding an imbalance of power and money 
which created a climate where voluntary agencies are likely to be less 
interested in creating partnerships and more interested in ensuring their 
 290
 
 
organisational survival. There is evidence from the current research across 
all sites that this is indeed the case. Certainly there was a corollary position 
that suggested that opportunism, to get things done, is the guiding light that 
influences the relationships between some NGOs and government. The 
views of respondents to this research added significant weight to Hasting’s 
(1999) assertion that research into multi-sectoral partnerships was lacking, 
specifically with respect to power relations. Partnerships as part of the 
“transformational project” that Hastings raises (which are political in nature) 
suggest that challenges to the bureaucratic nature of public agendas can flow 
as much as the anticipated outcomes of efficiency and effectiveness. There 
is no evidence of this within the data for this research – indeed the contrary 
may be advanced. 
 
On the matter of patronage and control of NGOs by government, 
respondents suggested that government tended to have a negative view 
about the capacity of communities to deliver partnership models. This was 
particularly evidenced across the various jurisdictions from government 
personnel. Still other respondents believed they were deliberately being 
alienated from the partnership process as a result of pressure from 
government to control the outcomes.  
 
There was no shortage of respondent opinion in relation to the analysis of 
partnerships in action. Those from NGOs tended to be generally cynical of 
the current structure of partnerships. This cynicism was also noted from for-
profit respondents. One respondent suggested that the use of the term 
partnership was itself problematic suggesting differing interpretations 
between government and community sector organizations. This issue 
significantly accords with the view of Starr (1990) who argued that 
partnerships tended to blur the boundaries between the public and private 
with an elaborate overlay of administrative law and regulatory apparatus 
specifically designed to inhibit cooperative ventures (including NGOs). Local 
government respondents tended to view partnerships as “one way” 
transactions with central government directing the process suggesting that 
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beneficial transactions are not possible between partnership members. This 
process tended to validate Jacob’s (1997) view that partisan alignments 
became “... contests over the hegemony of one sector over the other” 
(Jacobs 1997 in Linder 1999: 36) and tended to refute the contentions by 
Ring and Van De Ven (1994) and Lewis (1998) that facilitating factors for 
effective partnerships can be achieved (trust, mutual influence, cooperative 
interpersonal relationships and so forth) in light of unequal power 
relationships of one sector over the other.  
 
Notably respondents again reaffirmed their view that NGO engagement in 
partnership work was linked to economic sustainability, a position echoed by 
a UK government official who suggested that the nature of ‘third way’ 
outcomes appeared to be more associated with economic benefits to NGOs 
than pursuing a social change agenda.   
 
In summary of this section on respondent attitudes in relation to partnerships, 
it can be stated that: 
 
o In line with previous discussion on civil society and NGOs, 
respondents had differing definitions of partnership and its “utility” 
based upon their particular worldview (government employee, NGO, 
community etc.). 
 
o Respondents again iterated their concerns about power relationships 
between partnership members. 
 
o There was a view that elements of the NGO sector had found, or will 
find, political favour with government based upon their political or 
religious orientation. 
 
o From the data, it would appear that partnerships are an applied logic 
for the enhancement of government policy and market philosophy, 
rather than a process defining the best interests of the community. 
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The use of tacit or practical knowledge to explain the lack of understanding of 
the principles and processes of the ‘third way’ by respondents, particularly as 
it relates to the armature of civil society, NGOs and partnerships is, of itself, 
not sufficient. In seeking to explain this phenomenon in a contextual manner, 
the researcher examined two key dimensions that arose from the data linking 
these to respondent’s ideas about how these operate. These dimensions 
have been isolated in the research as the “political” and “moral” imperatives. 
Discussion on these matters follows. 
 
The political imperative 
 
Up to this point the research had explored the “meaning” of the ‘third way’ 
within what has been termed its “philosophy” and “armature” through analysis 
of the literature, historical antecedents, contemporaneous commentaries and 
interrogation of the data. Given the paucity of knowledge on the phenomenon 
by significant respondents and in light of the unambiguous adoption of the 
model across differing environments one concludes that there may be other 
dimensions that exist that influence the intent of those who are applying ‘third 
way’ approaches. The first of these “dimensions” is what the researcher 
refers to as the “political imperative”. In seeking to explicate this notion, the 
political imperative has been defined as the combination of inferred (to the 
extent that these are not publicly debated) political dictates of a 
fundamentally conservative nature designed to maintain political power by 
governments. Giddens, as a respondent to this research, in speaking of the 
evidentiary basis for the success of the ‘third way’ in the United Kingdom, 
asserts that for the first time the Labour Party has been in power for two 
terms, with the possibility of a third. This response lays the foundation for the 
political imperative. We need to backtrack to the literature however in order to 
substantiate this phenomenon in the context of other respondent views on 
the subject. 
 
It is within the writings of Anthony Giddens that the issue of the political 
imperative first arises. This specifically manifests in terms of his apparent 
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intolerance to political activism, believing that nongovernmental organizations 
have taken power without waiting for the politicians. From his later 
publications on the ‘third way’, a series of themes emerge against which data 
was compared. The first of these relates to his view that partnerships, 
community groups and non-governmental alliances should not be allowed to 
develop a political presence that could threaten ‘third way’ governance. The 
second theme relates to a position that arises from the first, that is, the 
containment of organised movements with, as some respondents suggested, 
dissent equating with the actions of an “enemy”. Finally, there is the view that 
social democratic government needs to accommodate middle ground voters - 
this increasingly moves them from the left to the right. 
 
The first of these themes presupposes that NGOs (and other significant 
community affiliations such as Unions) present as a challenge to 
government. According to Demirovic (2000) this is the case by virtue of the 
fact that they are autonomous, form networks, pursue similar goals to that of 
government and are associated with what is being termed “new 
internationalism” with Southern and Northern linkages to mobilise against 
inappropriate political, social and ecological decision-making. It has already 
been suggested that in such an environment where both the left and the right 
seem to fear the consequences of organised social movements, 
nongovernmental organizations face the possibility of either redundancy or 
worse disestablishment.  
 
The views of respondents tended to echo Giddens’ view that the 
achievement of power for the British Labour Party after 18 years out of 
government was an important incentive for accepting ‘third way’ philosophy. 
Not unlike their American counterparts, several respondents recognised that 
‘third way’ principles were important for the maintenance of political power 
and were being adopted by both Labour and Conservative Parties. 
Opponents to the Blair government, according to respondents, are being 
dealt with in a negative manner, the Union movement recently being branded 
as “wreckers” – see footnote ix. Other respondents directly suggested that 
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“social control” comes through government policy, whether it is over Unions, 
nongovernmental organizations or Local Authorities by way of techniques 
employed to contain dissent, these being “invention of dissent” (a speculation 
in this study), pragmatism and centralisation of power.  
 
On the matter of capturing the middle ground voters, respondents in the 
United States were of the opinion that both the Republicans and the 
Democrats were concerned about the “fuzziness” between both Parties and 
the need for both to reorganise around a political program that attracted the 
thin wedge of difference between them. The ‘third way’, according to 
respondents, provided that mechanism. In what respondents termed the 
pragmatism of American politics both parties embraced a “faith-based” 
approach in a bid to attract the religious right for the purpose of winning an 
election. The consistency of view by respondents on this matter affirms the 
political imperative in this jurisdiction. Indeed, developments since the latest 
Presidential election have seen, according to one respondent, the search for 
symbolic issues to which ownership can be staked for the ‘third way’. He 
asserts that the main game is no longer between Republicans and 
Democrats but between ‘third way’ nuances. The marketing devices utilised 
in promoting the leadership style of Clinton (and subsequently George W. 
Bush) and Blair were seen by most respondents as presidential in style. 
Accordingly, so respondents assert, this approach was specifically designed 
to capture market share for the purpose of winning government. One 
respondent went further in suggesting that the power of government is 
directed by corporate wealth and those “who own money” to manipulate 
messages to the point where people are no longer voting for people or 
principles but rather voting for an image given to them repeatedly without 
them “... even be(ing) aware of what the message is” (Raley, 2002 
Transcriptions: 317). The net effect of courting support in this way, according 
to respondents, ensured government and consolidated ongoing support for 
the implementation of policy that is not inconsistent with religious dogma but 
which demerits social democratic tradition in favour of market forces. Several 
respondents acknowledged that this pursuit was knowingly at the expense of 
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traditional support bases for the Parties. Indeed, the speculation about the 
invention of dissent (within this research) as a precursor to labelling of those 
who deviate from, or present as a danger to, government policy, exposes a 
distinction for the ‘third way’. It has been argued that governments have 
always labelled threats and invented dissent – this is not specific to the ‘third 
way’. However, what does set the ‘third way’ apart in this respect is its 
apparent willingness to label its old friends as enemies, an anomalous 
situation for a movement that originates from the left.  
 
If we consider this political imperative as the “head” of the ‘third way’, then 
the “moral imperative” is its “heart”. The discussion that follows reviews this 
moral imperative, which, it will be argued, in combination with the political 
imperative influences the machinations of government for the purpose of 
retaining power, irrespective of government type (either social democratic or 
neo-liberal). 
 
On the matter of this political imperative, in the light of respondent 
perceptions, we can conclude that: 
 
o It arises as a consequence of the apparent intolerance (within the 
writings of Giddens) towards the political activism of NGOs that 
threatens government. 
 
o “Social control” reflects in government policy for the purpose of 
containing political dissent and manifests through the techniques of 
invention of dissent, pragmatism and centralisation of power. 
 
o The acceptance of ‘third way’ principles arises as a consequence of 
the electoral success of its advocates. 
 
o Political parties are courting the slim middle ground that separates 
government from opposition and this entailed acquiescence to the 
mood of the religious right (“faith-based initiatives”). 
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o This process moves the intent of ‘third way’ government away from 
formerly social democratic principles to market forces and government 
“at all costs”.  
 
The moral imperative 
 
For the purpose of definition this moral imperative is deemed to be a series of 
moral dictates of a broadly conservative nature involving the imposition of 
narrow understandings of “family”, “community” and “responsibility” upon 
citizens which may be threatening to cultural and lifestyle difference and/or 
political dissent. In the United States context these are bolstered by religious 
forces and factors through George W. Bush’s “faith-based initiatives”. It has 
been argued in Chapter 6 that this moral imperative becomes a companion 
device to consolidate political control once the political imperative has been 
realised. 
 
It has been further suggested that issues of morality are better defined within 
the communitarian experience, however the approaches by Giddens do 
centre upon the concepts of “inclusion” and “exclusion” to explain inequality, 
with equality, to Giddens, represented by “opportunity married with ethics”. 
This moral overtone appears to have an historical imperative to moral 
predetermination (note Birnbaum 1999). ‘Third way’ theorists present a moral 
imperative based upon “family”, “responsibility” and “mutualism”. Giddens 
further asserts that the role of government is to shape a “... civilising aim” 
(Giddens 1998: 48) through education and elsewhere in an apparent 
blending of the communitarian view with that of the libertarians, in much the 
same way as he blended social democratic and neo-liberal philosophies. The 
keynote policies of the ‘third way’ assert that exclusion is not only a matter of 
“economic exclusion” but also encases the concept of power devolution for 
those otherwise marginalised (Steven Reicher in Halpern and Mikosz 2000). 
The Etzioni “responsive communitarian” approach claims to “leapfrog” the 
left/right divide wherein the relationship between the individual and the 
community and between freedom and order become the new “axis” of 
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debate. It has been argued that a significant difference between the 
approaches of Giddens and Etzioni lies in the simple proposition of who is 
beholden to whom – to Etzioni it is the State that is beholden to the 
community and to Giddens it is the community that is beholden to the State. 
Based upon respondent opinion, it is the latter contention that now appears 
to dominate. 
 
The adoption of a moral overlay to what respondents believe is the 
“pragmatism” of the ‘third way’ evolves from a contest, it has been 
suggested, between the views of the libertarians and laissez-faire 
conservatives who fear the growth of government, religion and power elites 
and those who set about to counter what its proponents believe as the moral 
decay of society (Sandal 1996). It has been argued in Chapter 6 that religion 
provides a common goal for ‘third way’ thinking across both the United 
Kingdom and the United States in that it links a pre-existing social order of 
solidarity and conservatism to the political imperative of maintaining 
government. Certainly the “faith-based initiatives” of George W. Bush would 
appear to have some equivalence to what some respondents referred to as 
the “colonisation” of religion by Blair in the United Kingdom. 
 
According to respondents, there appears to be a moral fibre to the ‘third way’ 
that suggests that society is a pluralistic homogenised entity with some 
asserting that there is no “massive disagreement” about levels of standards 
between differing sectors of society. This position accords with others who 
suggest that a “one size fits all” mentality is being applied by ‘third way’ 
governments with efforts to eradicate inequality while retaining a structure 
based upon inequality. In the United States respondents demonstrated a 
more clearly defined historical religious progression linked to the prescriptive 
models of philanthropy embedded in Foundations and charitable 
organizations in that jurisdiction. Furthermore this progression appears 
dialectic in nature with the rise and fall of particular religious groups 
(Christian) combined with economic and political linkages with governments. 
The religiosity of organizations is said by respondents to significantly guide 
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American nongovernmental organizations with apparent caveats being 
placed on organizations not to work against the interest of funding bodies 
(government). It would seem that as the choice points between the major 
political parties in the United States have narrowed to the point where both 
Republicans and Democrats view the Church as a respectable conduit for 
faith-based engagement in service delivery. 
 
The irony that presents to the research, that of the clearest manifestation of a 
‘third way’ style program in action being seated in a neo-liberal administration 
within the United States, was noted. For the purpose of the research this 
demonstration of a ‘third way’ program in practice provided an ideal-type 
situation, supported by both Republicans and Democrats, with which to 
explore defining elements. It has been argued in Chapters 5 and 6 that the 
‘third way’ is not about a movement to the centre by either social democrats 
or neo-liberals but is rather about the relationship between the state and civil 
society and the utilisation of the support bases within civil society for the 
purpose of attaining political power. Accordingly, the phenomenon of the 
‘third way’ becomes seamless left to right not because of the differences 
between the left and the right but as a consequence of their similarities in 
practice.  
 
Respondents noted the haste with which the faith-based initiatives were 
implemented following the election that brought George W. Bush to power, 
particularly in the absence, some suggest, of a strategic purpose beyond the 
perceptible harnessing of the political forces that the third sector could rally. 
The method for implementation, it has been suggested, resides in the 
lessening of restrictions on government funding for faith-based organizations. 
There was consternation on the part of several respondents that the Church-
state divide was diminishing with blurred intentions of each to the other on 
the basis of their respective missions. It is also noteworthy that support for 
predominately Christian organizations in the wake of the “War on Terrorism” 
appears, to respondents, to tie the work of the Church to that of the State 
(the “colonisation of religion” notion described elsewhere) with an intended or 
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unintended outcome silencing criticism of government policy. 
 
In the United Kingdom, respondents noted that the government was 
concentrating on local issues and that these appeared to have a moral 
flavour. It was not lost on other respondents that the net effect of moving 
responsibility for problem solving to the local level was that criticism was 
deflected from central government as a consequence. Whilst there didn’t 
appear to be any problem associated with the commercialisation of public 
services, particularly as they related to nongovernmental contracting, some 
respondents were sensitive to the tension implicit to this construction, that is, 
that these contractors were less likely to be critical of government policy, a 
matter, as mentioned earlier, echoed across the Atlantic.  
 
Among respondents across all sites there appeared to be a general 
consensus that government is seeking to contain political debate and control 
the parameters of public discussion on significant social issues, the most 
conspicuous example of which is the “War on Terrorism” where respondents 
noted the galvanisation of position for both the left and the right of politics. It 
was constantly noted in the data that the Church has become the beneficiary 
of trust by government with the emergence of the curious paradox that the 
apparent independence of the Church removes attention from their activities, 
again affirming the proposition that the acquiescence by the Church removes 
criticism from government for its policies.  
 
It was noted that if the carrot for active engagement by the Church is funding, 
then the stick would seem to be the threat of withdrawal of funding. In other 
words respondents view non-compliance to government policy as the 
mechanism by which government realigns the mission of these organizations 
away from advocacy and more towards service delivery. As a result, intended 
or otherwise, debate is neutralised, according to respondents, on issues of 
social justice. In an historical context, the convergence of moral thinking 
between the United Kingdom and the United States can be found in the 
companion antecedents of “American progressivism” (social change as a 
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theology) and the solidaristic doctrines of British social Christianity (“new 
liberalism”). 
 
In summary of this notion of the “moral imperative” in the context of 
respondent perceptions we can conclude that: 
 
o It is a companion device to consolidate political control once the 
political imperative has been realised. 
 
o The pragmatics of this moral imperative evolves from a fear of the 
“moral decay of society” and a desire to coopt religious interest 
groups. 
 
o In both the United States and the United Kingdom there is a linkage 
between a pre-existing social order of solidarity and conservatism that 
resonates with the political imperative of maintaining government. 
 
o There appears to be a moral fibre to the ‘third way’ that suggests that 
society is a homogenised entity without differences on levels of 
standards between sections of the community. 
 
o In the United States the religiosity of organizations appears to guide 
nongovernmental organizations with a preparedness by some of these 
organizations to be compliant to government policy in return for 
funding – thereby neutralising debate on social issues. 
 
o Conservatives and non-conservatives both view the Church (Christian) 
as a respectable conduit for faith-based engagement in service 
delivery, which has the “trust” of government. 
 
o The “faith-based initiatives” and the blurred Church/state divide in the 
United States provided an ideal-type of ‘third way’ implementation with 
which to explore defining features. 
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Summary of Conclusions 
 
This study has generated theoretical and empirical findings based upon 
narrative accounts of engaged respondents in the context of the philosophy 
and armature of the ‘third way’ and in consideration of the “political” and 
“moral” imperatives that appear to drive the phenomenon. My conclusions in 
the light of these findings and based upon the perceptions of respondents are 
summarised below: 
 
o The ‘third way’ appears to have evolved as a dominant ideology 
embraced by both the left and the right of politics with “parenthood” 
assertions related to civil society, values and partnerships being used 
to capture middle ground voters. Further, there is evidence that the 
model is transportable left to right and back again. 
 
o Respondents exhibited a lack of understanding about the meaning of 
the ‘third way’ and its armature deferring to tacit knowledge based 
upon their experience and worldview. This lack of knowledge raises 
serious questions about the intent for applying ‘third way’ theory. 
 
o In the absence of definition it is concluded that other dimensions exist 
that might guide the dominance of ‘third way’ thinking, those being the 
political imperative which is suggestive of an enabling process 
concerned with the attaining and maintenance of political power, and; 
the moral imperative which ties a series of moral dictates of a broadly 
conservative nature involving the imposition of narrow understandings 
of "family", "community" and "responsibility" upon citizens which may 
be threatening to cultural and lifestyle difference and/or political 
dissent. 
 
o That ‘third way’ models impose contractual and other strictures on 
nongovernmental organizations that may seriously impede their 
historical mandate to participate, as exemplars of autonomous civil 
 302
 
 
society, in the construction, review and accountability of government 
policy development. Further that these organizations are evolving as 
adjuncts to government in the provision of services. 
 
o That advocacy roles for nongovernmental organizations are similarly 
constrained with strategies apparently being applied to interfere with 
the outreach and autonomy of critics. 
 
o That elements of the NGO sector had found, or will find, political 
favour with government based upon their political or religious 
affiliations. 
 
Relevance of findings and recommendations for further research 
 
It is clear that researchers have given little empirical attention to the practical 
implications that flow from ‘third way’ theory. In the context of the current 
investigation, this presents as a serious deficiency, specifically in terms of the 
viability of a community sector that has historically advocated with 
government in the development of policy to assist disadvantaged 
constituencies. The observations of significant respondents suggest that they 
are now working in an environment of mistrust, competitiveness, hostility and 
uncertainty. The implication to these workers (and their organizations) in the 
real world consequent upon the political and moral imperatives that have 
been exposed through this research, are potentially profound. Nonetheless, 
in the absence of such analysis, a chain reaction could potentially have found 
this sector deconstructed or disestablished. The relevance of their work and 
their contributions to their societies militates against inaction.  Further, there 
is cause for concern about the intent by government in the implementation of 
the ‘third way’.  This research has touched upon the competitiveness of 
political Parties in their quest for electoral power and their willingness to 
attain this power at all costs - sometimes at the expense of historical social 
justice considerations. The research has sought to iterate the impacts of 
‘third way’ theory on the nongovernmental sector in an environment, 
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respondents report, where government appears to demand compliance by 
the sector to its policies with disincentives for those who would dissent. This 
would seem to strike at the heart of reasoned debate and, if correct, would 
cast a shadow on those who argue that the ‘third way’ enhances democracy. 
Finally, this research affirms an urgent need for a specific evaluation study of 
manifest ‘third way’ programs with measurement of real outcomes and 
outputs. In the absence of such a research agenda, as suggested earlier in 
the thesis, the debate on the ‘third way’ between supporters and detractors 
will continue to spin in the literature on its theory. 
 
Further Research 
 
A series of research directions are implied from the current investigation and 
recommendations follow: 
 
o The elemental features of the ‘third way’ that distinctively set it apart 
from its parentage remain contested. In the absence of the specifics 
that clearly define its intent, the debate on the model will continue to 
spin in the literature on an ideological axis between supporters and 
detractors. A more comprehensive effort to define the phenomenon is 
suggested that has regard to testable indicators based upon 
definitional content. 
 
o The lack of understanding by respondents charged with the 
implementation of ‘third way’ programs in practice (to what this model 
entails) is deeply problematic. A research direction is indicated to 
more comprehensively understand this anomaly and, more 
importantly, relate this lack of understanding to the many and varied 
government-designed programs that purport to be ‘third way’ in 
character and which are being put in place by those without this 
understanding. 
 
o The matter of the political and moral imperatives raised as a 
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consequence of this research need to be explicated as a matter of 
some urgency, particularly in relation to the impositions that appear to 
be being placed upon the nongovernmental and community sectors. 
Should current arrangements between ‘third way’ styled governments 
and this sector persist, there is a considerable risk that this sector will 
collapse. The implications for such a collapse, whilst considered 
severe for Northern communities, are exacerbated considerably within 
Southern communities for whom the sustainability of Northern NGOs 
is vital. 
 
o This research indicates that the practical constructs of social capital, 
civil society and partnerships that considerably enhance a sense of 
community connectedness and anomie within local social systems are 
being eroded through suspicion, disrespect and patronage in spite of 
the rhetoric of inclusion espoused by ‘third way’ administrators. In 
order that the apparent decline in these elements may be arrested, 
research should be undertaken to test the actual health of these 
systems. 
 
o As this research related to perception data, a need exists for an 
evaluation study engaging quantitative research into manifest ‘third 
way’ programs, with measurement criteria that address outcomes and 
outputs. 
 
Limitations 
 
The recommendations for further inquiry made above address both the 
strengths and weaknesses of the present research. The overriding strength 
of the study has been to articulate implementation issues in relation to the 
phenomenon of the ‘third way’ in the absence of other similar data. A related 
strength has been to elicit responses from highly proficient and engaged 
practitioner/administrators on the matter of ‘third way’ implementation. The 
obvious weakness of these transactions is that the research has been reliant 
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upon their observations and perceptions, the adequacy of which may be 
drawn into question by other researchers. A further issue can be found in the 
process for defining the sites for investigation, through inference and 
historical exploration. It is important that a comprehensive evaluation of 
specific ‘third way’ programs (those that have a ‘third way’ shingle attached) 
be undertaken to see if these perceptions are reflected within these sites.   
 
The findings of this research do presume to be generalisable, that is that they 
seek to inform convergent and divergent experience across settings. As such 
the research is capable of replication given the transparent nature of process 
and reporting, as accurately as possible, participant opinions and 
perceptions. There was, however, no homogenous sampling strategy used. 
Indeed, the elite participants chosen (with some chosen for the researcher) 
ensured diversity of fact and opinion. This proved to be a strength in terms of 
the consistency with which issues were raised and explicated. It is restated 
that a number of respondents were known to me and may be construed to 
hold liberal/left political orientations and were, therefore, not necessarily ‘third 
way’ enthusiasts or experts. Having said that, there was a sense that many of 
the respondents supported the general thrust of the ‘third way’, at least in 
terms of its theory. It would not be unreasonable to assert that the majority of 
respondents who were familiar with the construct were similarly prepared to 
continue to support its implementation through its “teething stages”. Whilst 
there are apparent similarities between the respondents – specifically in 
terms of their current professional positions and the depth of experience 
within their sectors – there is also considerable diversity mitigated by 
geography and cultural experiences across several Continents. It is 
predicted, nonetheless, that replication using respondents closer to the 
ground would most likely elicit results that are even more extreme that those 
within this study. The findings of this research could have been enhanced 
through a more expansive exploration of the experience of different groups in 
light of the varied roles of respondents and their positions within and across 
community and government sectors. Having said that, I am unsure, as noted 
previously, that the results would have been any different. 
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Finally, I believe there have been outcomes generated for respondents to this 
study. The extensive dialogues that ensued from conversations that both 
formed part of the formal procedure and led to engagement beyond the 
interview process created a mood of reflexivity that many respondents had 
not had the opportunity to participate in during the normal course of their 
work.  Certainly the opportunity for them to hear one person’s interpretation 
of the ‘third way’ appeared to be instructive in the absence of other overt 
discussion. 
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
 
Although this has been a study that was not inclusive of all aspects of the 
‘third way’, it has, I believe, added to the body of knowledge about this 
important phenomenon in practice. By engaging elite respondents who are 
representative of a number of significant sectors and who have both 
expansive knowledge in their respective areas of competence  - and authority 
to implement programs in practice - this research has crystallised an 
important set of views across a number of jurisdictions that have an inferred 
‘third way’ character. As noted throughout, this study, of itself, provided the 
opportunity for this to occur outside the constraints that these people 
normally operative within. From the outset, it was evident that research into 
the impacts of the ‘third way’ in practice was either scant or non-existent. The 
fact that this model is endorsed and being implemented across a large 
number of countries (and across differing political persuasions) makes this 
absence of investigation problematic. The findings of this research suggest 
that a dominance, premised upon political and moral imperatives, demand 
further, and specific, evaluative research that particularises the outcomes 
and outputs of ‘third way’ programs. The development of schemata such as 
the political and moral imperatives, by this researcher, enables future 
explication and definition of the ‘third way’ in a specific and new contextual 
environment that transcends the current level of debate. 
 
The common themes of control, invention of dissent and pragmatism that 
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appear to guide relations between government and civil society in partnership 
(through its exemplar, NGOs), presents as a clear and undeniable threat to 
the future viability of the NGO sector. The disclosure of concern and 
intimidation that flow from contractual strictures that appear to accompany 
entrepreneurship threaten the viability of historical advocacy roles for 
community organizations in the pursuit of government by political parties, 
irrespective of their orientation. This contribution, of itself, adds value to the 
debate. This is a matter that has not been fully developed in the literature on 
the ‘third way’ to date and which, now exposed, should provide important 
context for future research into community organizations and their 
contributions to civil society. 
 
I have also introduced a new technique for interviewing elite respondents as 
a result of this research – one that elicits responses that otherwise would be 
closed off to investigators. This technique I have referred to as deliberative 
confrontational and collaborative interviewing which, if applied, reduces the 
impact of both deference (overt respect for the person being interviewed 
resulting in an inability on the part of the interviewer to pursue issues) and 
interview contagion (those techniques applied by elite interviewees as a 
defensive response to a perceived threat resultant from the interview process 
– which is a trained response in media interview situations). In the absence 
of this technique, it is suggested, many of the, at times, extremely frank 
disclosures by respondents would not have occurred. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This thesis attempts to reinvigorate debate on the ‘third way’. The prevailing 
literature tends to focus upon adversarial positions with respect to its theory. 
There is a notable paucity of information in relation to the implications for its 
implementation. The debate, it would seem, has stalled on the basis of; (1) 
an animosity that derives from left/right differences of opinion at an 
intellectual level and further, that (2) the view that it a curiosity that will slip 
silently into the night. Nothing could be further from the truth as the model 
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entrenches itself, in varying forms and across differing political “types”, 
throughout the Western world. There does not appear to be a cogent global 
perspective that places the philosophical, economic, social and political 
antecedents to the phenomenon in a context that reasonably explains its 
aetiology and persistence within these societies. This thesis has attempted to 
fill this void.  
 
In the absence of such an analysis, the almost unfettered (and certainly 
unchallenged) progression of the ‘third way’ (or new social democracy as 
Giddens now refers to it) redefines significant community linkages in a 
manner that neutralises important social justice debate and, at the least, 
destabilises those who otherwise would provide alternative critiques to 
government policy.  
 
If nothing else, the ‘third way’ demonstrates the resilience of capitalism. Here 
is a proposition that piggybacks the traditions of social democratic 
administration, which were borne out of decidedly capitalist-unsympathetic 
Marxist theory, to acquiesce to those features that Marx would have found 
abominable. Whether we liken the ‘third way’ (in practice) to the Emperor’s 
New Clothes as being vacuous and devoid of substance, the compelling 
elements of its structure borne out of social democratic and neo-liberal 
“tradition” will, nonetheless, ensure the persistence of certain of its elements 
both in rhetoric and implementation long after Blair, Schroeder, Clinton and 
now George W. Bush (in the North) have politically bit the dust. The almost 
simplistic distillation from both the left and right - a tapestry woven over the 
past century and a half – will find favour by both ends of the political 
spectrum, particularly as a system that is loaded in favour of capitalist 
ideology.  
 
By seeking to negate the mantra of profit implicit to capitalism and confining 
its argument (substantially) to the moral imperatives of “responsibilities”, 
“obligations” and “mutualism” and the need for individuals to redefine each of 
these imperatives in their own lives (and thereby create a sense of belonging 
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and “community”), the ‘third way’ morphs the moral arguments of the 
Protestant work ethic, American progressivism, British social Christianity and 
Evangelical Protestantism. At its heart it is a movement that reaffirms that 
which is moral, not necessarily that which is good.   
 
Married with this fundamental shift in emphasis for government (from the 
central to the local) is an undeniable fear of organised interest groups 
inherent to ‘third way’ thinking. The amelioration of prejudice in some 
circumstances is applauded (homosexuality, single parent families etc.) 
however the warning is clear to those who would organise on interest or 
social lines (interest and social groups should watch their backs including 
unions and the nongovernmental sector, traditionally the social conscience of 
government) and which would “threaten” ‘third way’ governance. In saying 
that the ‘third way’ is here to stay, it would be fallacious to suggest that the 
underpinning ideologies (Marxism, Socialism, Social Democracy, Neo-
Liberalism, Conservativism, neo-Conservativism) have lost their teeth – these 
merely reside in the glass beside the bed awaiting reinsertion. In the case of 
socialism, far from being “obsolete” or moribund, the emergence of the ‘third 
way’ merely regenerates the argument. Globalisation marches on – but so 
too does the distinction between those who have and those who have not. 
There is always a certain inevitability about outcome on this irresolvable and 
immutable fact.   
 
The problem with the ‘third way’ appears to be that, like Jurassic Park, it 
wasn’t given sufficient time to be thought about before ideas were made real. 
It is a hasty experiment, and thus manifests in a lack of definition of 
fundamental terminology, which, in turn, leads to incoherent and possibly 
anti-democratic political programs. It is evident that it may take another ice 
age before this experimental dinosaur gives way to a more mature reason.  If 
one acknowledges that the ‘third way’ is here to stay across historically 
defined left/right political persuasions, then it behoves an urgent effort to 
construct a meaningful respecification that enhances, rather than constricts, 
social dialogue and which, ultimately, advances the human condition.      
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Both Giddens and Etzioni, from differing standpoints, deliver a process that 
defies the nature of change and the necessity for conflict to bring about 
change. Such a proposition flies in the face of history. The belief that citizens 
across varying cultural and religious backgrounds residing in countries at 
varying points in the globalisation process can somehow consensually agree 
to a fundamentally white Christian philosophy is pure fantasy. There is 
undoubtedly a cost associated with inclusion in the ‘third way’ – and this 
thesis suggests that this cost is ultimately at the expense of democracy. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1: LIST OF RESPONDENTS 
 
 
London, United Kingdom 
 
 
Anonymous [b] 
Leading British Academic 
 
Anonymous [f] 
County City Council Psychologist 
 
Anonymous [e] 
Senior Municipal Government Administrator 
 
Jon Bright 
Head of Programs 
Neighbourhood Renewal Unit 
(formerly Head of the Exclusion Unit, Office of Cabinet) 
 
Anthony Giddens 
Director 
London School of Economics 
 
Sampson Low 
Policy Advisor 
UNISON (UNISON is the largest union in the Trades Union Congress [TUC] 
in the United Kingdom) 
 
Dame Vivien Stern 
Director 
International Centre for Prison Studies 
King's College London - School of Law 
(former Head of the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of 
Offenders [NACRO] in the United Kingdom) 
 
Nigel Wisken 
Chief Executive Officer 
Crime Concern 
 
Anna Wright 
Director Strategic Planning 
Surrey County Council 
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Vancouver, British Columbia Canada 
 
Anonymous [l] 
Community Activist and Businessperson 
 
Anonymous [g] 
City Councillor 
 
Anonymous [h] 
Prominent Businessperson in the Downtown Eastside (DTES) 
 
Wendy Au 
Project Officer 
Downtown Eastside Revitalisation Program (DTES) 
City of Vancouver Council 
 
Buzz Hargrove 
President 
Canadian Auto Workers Union 
 
Councillor Lynne Kennedy 
Deputy Mayor 
City of Vancouver Council 
 
Ken Lyotier 
Director 
United we Can 
Downtown Eastside 
(former drug addict and garbage miner) 
 
Donald MacPherson 
Drug Policy Coordinator 
Community Services 
City of Vancouver Council 
 
Michael McCoy 
Former resident of Gastown, Vancouver 
 
Washington DC, United States of America 
 
Anonymous [m] 
Juvenile Justice Administrator 
 
Anonymous [n] 
Researcher 
Major nongovernmental organisation 
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Roger Connor 
Director and CEO 
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(one of the architects of Clinton third way approach from Etzioni) 
 
 
 
Jim Copple 
Deputy CEO 
The National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) 
 
Gordon Raley 
Vice President 
Federal Partnerships National Mental Health Association 
 
John Thomas 
Vice President, Strategic Outreach 
Independent Sector 
 
Jeremy Travis 
Senior Fellow 
Urban Institute 
(former Head of the National Institute for Justice) 
 
Melbourne, Australia 
 
Anonymous [c] 
CEO 
Significant Melbourne Corporation 
 
Anonymous [j] 
Community Development Worker 
 
Nicholas Abbey 
Co-architect of Safer Cities and Shires 
Doctoral Student 
 
David Butten 
Co-architect of Safer Cities and Shires 
Former Coordinator Hume City Council Safer Cities Project 
 
Rebecca Coleiro 
Health Planning and Promotions Officer 
Hobsons Bay Council 
 
Nancy Di Santo 
Community Health and Safe City Planner 
Broadmeadows City Council 
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Duncan Kerr 
Member of the House of Representatives, Australian Parliament 
Former Minister for Justice 
 
Henk Harberts 
Latrobe City Council 
Co-Chair of the Victorian Safe Communities Network 
 
Gary Yungwith 
Former Mayor of Hume City Council 
Ministerial Advisor to the Victorian Government 
National President of the Fabian Society 
 
Anonymous [k] 
Private Consultant 
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APPENDIX 2:  INFORMATION SHEET AND INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Research Information Sheet 
General 
 
I am inviting you to participate in an important Research Project engaging 
key Informants from across Government, Non-Government, Grass-Roots and 
Issues-Orient Sectors in Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the 
United States of America. This Research is enquiring into the role and future 
of non-government, not-for-profit, issues-oriented and Grass Roots 
organizations (and their contribution to “community development”) in the 
context of various political models, in particular, the ‘third way’ and “neo-
liberalism”. 
 
As you would appreciate, effective community development requires data to 
validate implementation strategies. This Study is seeking to provide 
outcomes, which will potentially provide transportable options, and which will 
enhance relations between civil society and government for the beneficence 
of mutual constituencies.  
 
This participation is strictly voluntary and no financial or other 
remuneration of any kind whatsoever will be given for involvement in 
this Research.   
 
You will be required to participate in a face-to-face interview with the 
Researcher. This interview will be of approximately one (1) hour’s duration 
and, subject to your concurrence and any requirements for anonymity or 
confidentiality, be conducted in your Office or other place mutually agreed. 
The interview will be recorded and ultimately transcribed with comments and 
observations cited in Research and other Publications. 
 
At all times the confidentiality of your remarks and observations will be 
assured. Should you require anonymity, the Researcher guarantees that the 
recording will be digitised by him and encrypted on a dedicated password-
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protected computer system. Otherwise both this recording and any 
transcriptions will not have identifiers that would identify you. In both the case 
of those who require anonymity and those who don’t, interview material will 
be stored securely to ensure confidentiality. 
 
You will be required to complete an “Informed Consent Form” which outlines 
the “Terms of Engagement” between the Researcher and yourself. A copy of 
that “Informed Consent Form” is attached for your information. 
 
You will have the right at any time and without prejudice to withdraw from the 
Interview process. You can also refuse to participate in the Research Project 
without giving a reason or justification for that decision.   
 
The intended outcome from this Research Project is its publication as a 
Thesis. Furthermore, elements of Research findings may be used in other 
Publications such as Journal Articles and Books. Your acceptance to 
participate in this Research acknowledges these probable outcomes. 
 
Purpose of Research Project 
 
The Research Project is designed to investigate and report upon 
relationships between Government, Non-Government, Grass-Roots and 
Issues-Oriented Sectors in the context of “community development” and 
Social Policy. The Project will be particularly concerned with the concept of 
“Partnerships” and “Civil Society” with respect to these relationships, 
particularly from a “Third Way” and “Neo-Liberal” approach. 
 
 
The Objectives for this Research are: 
 
• To arrive at an understanding of formalized and non-formalised 
transactions between Government, Non-Government, Grass-Roots 
and Issues-Oriented organizations  
 
• To establish a consensus on the role of Non-Government, Grass-
Roots and Issues-Oriented organizations in the context of Social 
Policy and political governance; 
 
• To report on the historical and developmental characteristics of Non-
Government, Grass-Roots and Issues-Oriented organizations; 
 
• To compare and contrast different or similar systems with a view to 
informing the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches 
 
Research Outcomes 
 
This Project is intended to provide outcomes that will assist in enhancing 
relations between the government and non-government sectors in the pursuit 
of beneficence for those constituencies they each represent. It will provide a 
global perspective that should be transportable thereby adding to the 
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knowledge base for the sectors and the achievement of workable 
Partnerships across jurisdictions. 
 
Research Method 
 
A qualitative research approach is being adopted, utilizing key Informant’s 
observations to explain the particulars of their own experiences. In-depth 
structured and non-structured face-to-face interviewing will be complemented 
by an historical overview, analysis of political structures and comprehensive 
literature review across the relevant areas of investigation.  
 
Risks, Inconvenience and Discomforts 
 
You should be aware of the peculiarities of your Sector and relations 
between Sectors with respect to observations divulged to the Researcher. 
Should there be a perception that these observations constitute a risk to the 
your profession or position (or to your sector), you should consider anonymity 
in the knowledge that such information, whilst publishable, will be subjected 
to absolute discretion and privacy to ensure that you cannot be identified. 
With this in mind you are urged to participate in this important Research 
undertaking. 
 
At least one (1) full hour should be set aside for the interview in a place that 
is private, quiet and free from disturbances. 
 
Feedback 
 
The Investigator will provide a summary of findings at a time immediately 
following publication or Submission of the Thesis. 
 
Ethical Clearance 
 
This study has been cleared by one of the human ethics committees of the 
University of Queensland in accordance with the National Health and Medical 
Research Council's guidelines (Clearance Number B/531/SS/01/M/ACRO). 
You are of course, free to discuss your participation in this study with project 
staff (contactable on +61 7 32210088). If you would like to speak to an officer 
of the University not involved in the study, you may contact the Ethics Officer 
on +61 7 33653560. 
 
I would like to thank you for considering participation in this important 
Research Project and will be happy to discuss with you any concerns you 
may have. I look forward to speaking with you in the near future to arrange a 
suitable time to conduct the interview, should you be prepared to be involved. 
I can be contacted by email, telephone, facsimile or ordinary mail at the 
contacts listed below. 
 
Clive Begg 
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Researcher 
 
Researcher Details: 
 
Name:  Clive Begg, PhD Research Candidate, University of 
Queensland  
 
Profession:  Executive Director, ACRO, Australian Community Safety 
& Research Organisation Incorporated 
 
Postal Address:  P O Box 65 
BRISBANE Albert Street 4002 
QUEENSLAND AUSTRALIA 
 
Email Address:  clive@begg.com.au 
 
Supervisor:  Dr. Philip Smith, Head of Sociology, School of Social 
Science, the University of Queensland 
(p.smith@mailbox.uq.edu.au)  
 
Telephone:   +61 (0) 7 32210088 
+61 418735797 
 
Fax:    +61 (0) 7 32210878 
 
A Profile on the Researcher is attached for your information. 
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CLIVE BEGG       
 
Clive Begg is the 
Executive Director of 
ACRO, the Australian 
Community Safety & Research Organisation Incorporated, 
Australia’s principal non-government practitioner organisation 
dealing with criminal and social justice issues. He is a 
graduate of the University of Queensland, State President of 
the Australian Crime Prevention Council, a Past National 
President of this Council and founding member of the Victims 
of Crime Association of Queensland. He is currently 
undertaking Post-Graduate Research at the University of 
Queensland on Community Partnerships. 
 
Acting from within the community sector, he was a principal 
advocate for penal reform in Queensland during the 1980's and successfully agitated for the 
closure of the notorious "Black Hole" Detention Unit at Boggo Road Prison, the dismantling 
of the infamous "Special Squad", and significantly contributed to a major Review into 
prisons, particularly in the development of community based and managed corrections 
options for currently serving prisoners. He acted as the State’s first community 
representative of the Home Detention Scheme (1986); was the first Official Visitor appointed 
to investigate prisoner grievances under the Corrective Services Act (1988-1994); and has 
acted as a Deputy Inspector of a Ministerial Review. In 1994 he was appointed an Inspector 
under the Corrective Services Act (and remains an approved person for the purpose), a 
position which purpose is to enquire into any matter within the Correctional System, under 
instruction of the Queensland Government. In 1996 he was an official delegate to the Fourth 
Commonwealth Correctional Administrators Conference. 
 
In 1992 he was jointly funded by ACRO and the Queensland Government to undertake an 
overseas Study Tour to investigate corrections and crime prevention initiatives in the UK, 
Canada, the United States of America and Europe. As a consequence of his investigations 
he vigorously, and successfully, campaigned for a National Strategy on Crime Prevention in 
Australia. His subsequent drafting of "Safer Australia" in 1995 led to the implementation of 
his strategy by the National Government (this was later renamed National Crime Prevention).   
 
He has advised all levels of government in Australia and several jurisdictions offshore on 
proactive responses to social and criminal justice issues. His work was instrumental in the 
adoption of the Crime Prevention Partnership (CPP), a unique holistic crime prevention 
strategy, in Queensland. He has also orchestrated National campaigns against youth 
suicide, racism and elder abuse. He has a high media profile and is viewed as a credible 
“voice of reason” on important social debates. 
 
At the invitation of the Australian Government he was an Australian delegate to the 9th. 
United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders in Cairo, 
Egypt during May 1995 and contributed significantly at the “Towards World Change” 
Conference held in Vancouver, Canada in 1996. His work is respected both within Australia 
and internationally. 
 
Mr Begg has lectured throughout Australia, his views have been published widely and he 
has convened significant Conferences in the field of community safety. Mr. Begg was a 
speaker at the International Conference for Crime Prevention Partnerships Conference in 
Johannesburg South Africa in October 1998 on the subject of the politics of crime prevention 
and addressed the 10th. United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders as an “individual expert” in Vienna during April 2000. He is an active 
member of an Asia/Pacific Consortium of academics and practitioners working towards the 
recrafting of United Nations Resolutions relating to violence against women and children 
from the Asia/Pacific perspective. 
 
In 1994 he undertook the first of a series of Crime Surveys (further refined and conducted in 
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1996, 1997 and 1998) on community perceptions and attitudes towards community safety 
and social justice. The results of these Surveys have been used as a tool for defining issues 
of concern for citizens at a local level for response by locally constituted Partnerships, 
resourced by all levels of government. Mr. Begg has assisted local people throughout 
Australia to forge meaningful partnerships to fight crime involving government, the business 
sector and community. He is 46, married with two children and lives in Brisbane, Australia. 
His partner, Fiona, is a leading educationalist in the field of youth crime prevention.  
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Informed Consent Form* 
 
 
Name of Informant: 
 
Position of Informant: 
 
Address of Informant: 
 
Other contact details: 
 
 
Purpose and Procedure of Research 
 
This Project is being undertaken as part of a Post-Graduate Research Study 
into the role and future of non-government, not-for-profit, issues-oriented and 
Grass Roots organizations in the context of various political models, in 
particular, the “third way” and “neo-liberalism”. An emphasis will be placed 
upon the concept of “partnership” and “civil society” specifically as they relate 
to these models. The investigation is proposed to conclude in March of 2002 
with a publication of results by June/July 2002. 
 
Approximately 30 Informants from across the Government and Non-
Government sectors in Australia, Canada, the United States of America and 
the United Kingdom will participate in this Research. 
 
You are asked to provide approximately an hour to the Researcher during 
which time structured and unstructured questions will be asked. This 
interview will be tape-recorded and ultimately transcribed. Subject to 
anonymity provisions discussed below, observations and comments from you 
may be cited in any subsequent publication. Should you formally request it, a 
copy of the Transcript will be made available. 
 
The involvement in the Research is voluntary and, in the opinion of the 
Researcher, will not involve any risks or discomfort to participants. 
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Subject to negotiation and a request from you, alternative procedures will be 
considered for the conduct of engagement. 
 
The Researcher:  
 
Clive Begg 
 
• Executive Director: ACRO, Australian Community Safety & Research 
Organisation Incorporated, Australia  
• PhD Research Candidate, School of Social Science, the University of 
Queensland, Australia. 
 
 
Contact Details:  
 
Telephone:  +61 (0) 7 32210088 
+61 (0) 418735797 
Email:  clive@begg.com.au 
Address:  P O Box 65 
  BRISBANE, Albert Street, 4002 
  AUSTRALIA 
 
Person to whom contact may be made in relation to the rights of 
Informants and/or questions about the Study: 
 
Dr. Philip Smith 
School of Social Science 
The University of Queensland 
ST. LUCIA, QUEENSLAND 4072 
AUSTRALIA 
 
Email: p.smith@mailbox.uq.edu.au 
 
TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT 
 
Guarantee of Anonymity 
 
Should you indicate by signature at the appropriate section below that you 
desire anonymity, the Researcher will guarantee this. Should this be your 
expressed desire (and whilst comments from you may be used in the final 
Publication), your name, position, specific location and/or any other matters 
that may indicate your identity will be absolutely suppressed from any 
Publication. 
 
Guarantee of Confidentiality 
 
The Researcher warrants that all records in relation to Informants will remain 
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confidential. 
Statement of Participation 
 
You will undertake an involvement in this Research on the basis that this 
involvement is completely voluntary. You are at liberty to terminate your 
involvement at any time during the interview process without penalty. 
 
 
Remuneration 
 
You will undertake an involvement on the understanding that no financial or 
other remuneration or compensation (in any form) will be forthcoming for that 
involvement. 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
The Researcher will, within a reasonable time following Publication, provide a 
Summary of Findings to you. 
 
DECLARATIONS 
 
I declare that I have read and understand this Form and give my permission 
for all or any material provided by me by way of interview to be used by the 
Researcher in the progress of his Study. 
 
 
Signed: 
 
Witnessed: 
 
Date: 
 
Researcher: 
 
 
I do / do not (cross out that which does not apply) wish to remain anonymous 
but agree that material provided by me by way of interview may be used in 
part or in whole by the Researcher. 
 
 
Signed: 
 
Witnessed: 
 
Date: 
 
Researcher: 
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This study has been cleared by one of the human ethics committees of the 
University of Queensland in accordance with the National Health and Medical 
Research Council's guidelines (Clearance Number B/531/SS/01/M/ACRO). 
You are, of course, free to discuss your participation in this study with project 
staff (contactable on +61 7 32210088). If you would like to speak to an officer 
of the University not involved in the study, you may contact the Ethics Officer 
on +61 7 33653560. 
 
 
*This Informed Consent Form is based upon material provided at page 96 in 
Neuman, Lawrence W., 2000, Social Research Methods Quantitative and 
Qualitative Approaches, MA, USA, Allyn and Bacon. 
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APPENDIX 3:  A SELF-REFLEXIVE COMMENT 
 
 
This Thesis is fundamentally informed by an accumulation of experiences – 
the elements of which I will try to convey in order to clarify the rationale for 
undertaking this exercise. I undertake this research in the knowledge that I 
cannot distance myself entirely from the precursors to the choice of research 
topic - to assume that there is no inherent bias that is borne out of the 
selection of dissertation would be fallacious. The worldview that I adopt has 
been shaped by a number of specific events – all of which add to, all of which 
converge, all of which distinguish a career of activism and at times, open 
dissent against political and social forces that have sought to impede the 
advancement of social justice principles for the betterment of civil society. 
 
I grew up in a working class suburb of Brisbane, Australia. My parents were 
shopkeepers and my father worked a second job in order to give educational 
opportunity to his children. They were certainly not conventional parents – 
giving advice, monetary and other support to women who were the victims of 
domestic violence in the Suburb and supporting other families during difficult 
financial times.  
 
As a child I learnt about the struggles of the trade union movement, the 
Depression and World War from my parents, retired railway workers and 
stevedores who would “story-tell” their experiences in the shop which to me 
became the “stuff” of civil society. What came from the experience of those 
others were the lessons of history, organisation, the struggle for “rights” and 
the sense of indebtedness that these others imbued in me (the pervasive 
message which is still indelibly etched in my mind can be summed up by a 
statement made to me as an ten year old by a railway worker: “never forget 
where you came from, what it took to get you here and always give back 
what you owe because of the struggles of the past”. This was the 1960s in 
Australia, a period of full employment, low interest rates, transportability of 
employment without qualifications and a relatively egalitarian community 
where citizens had fundamentally won the industrial battle and social and 
economic conditions were being met. It was also the period of the Vietnam 
War, the fear of communism, the racist “White Australia” policies of the then 
federal government, the racist Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act of the 
then state (provincial) government and the church based extremism of the 
Democratic Labour Party (DLP) (who held considerable electoral support at 
the federal level).   
 
These “struggles” against racism, intolerance, political extremism, sexism, 
homophobia and the Vietnam War were to become my lifeblood during the 
1970s and 1980s. This was also a period of political conservatism (federally - 
with the “white Australia” policy and anti-communist sentiment) and within the 
state (under the repressive Bjelke-Petersen government which, amongst 
other matters, introduced the outrageous Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Act).  At a later time (and following through my undergraduate years) 
I engaged in civil dissent on apartheid (the “Springbok Tour”), the Anti-
Uranium mining movement, the Anti-Street March Legislation movement (a 
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state Law was enacted to curtail the congregation of citizens and which 
forbad groups of “more than three” moving together in protest), the Anti 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act movement and others. I was 
arrested and convicted for “civil disobedience” (“taking part in an unlawful 
procession” and “disobeying a lawful direction”) and had a Special Branch file 
(the Special Branch existed within the Queensland Police Service and it 
constructed “files” on activists taking part in protest marches) that was 
marked “never to be employed by the state Public Service” (as I discovered 
in 1988). Through studies at the University of Queensland I became 
interested in conditions for prisoners. This entrée to criminal justice was to 
become an important aspect of a later engagement in prisoner activism. For 
several years I created and ran several companies having formed my first 
when I was 20 and for a number of years was actively involved in 
development projects on the Sunshine Coast of Queensland.  
 
For the past 18 years I have been the Executive Director of a not-for-profit, 
non-government organisation, which is now known as ACRO, the Australian 
Community Safety and Research Organisation Incorporated, whose mission 
is “(to be a) social justice organisation committed to the development of a 
safe and caring society”. Originally having a “prisoner aid” focus, this 
organisation has reinvented itself several times over the past two decades 
(having reincorporated and changed its name several times) through 
significant strategic developments to become a significant National 
organisation engaged in diverse public discussion on issues such as racism, 
homophobia, elder abuse, drug misuse, crime prevention, youth suicide, 
youth issues, emergency relief, housing, social justice and community 
development as well as maintaining its historical connection with criminal 
justice and prisons.  
 
When I first engaged with this organisation I used to visit various Correctional 
Centres to assist offenders and their families. On my first visit to Boggo Road 
Jail I met a young man who was only just 17. His name was Brendan and 
through tears of desperation and fear he begged me to stop his transfer to 
another prison because, as he told me, he was being moved specifically for 
the purpose of being used for sex in that other place. The prison system at 
that time was closed and fundamentally unaccountable so there was nothing 
that an “outsider” like me could effectively do to interfere with the process of 
transfer. No matter how shocked I was about Brendan’s allegations I was 
horrified to learn, upon investigation, that children as young as 13 and 14 
were being detained in adult correctional facilities in what were 
euphemistically called “boys yards” and further, that these boys were 
allegedly moved into “adult yards” to be preyed upon for sexual favours in 
order, it was claimed, to “keep the peace” amongst inmates. The more I 
looked, the more I asked - the more that which I learnt and saw horrified me.  
 
The apparent existence of a style of “star chamber” emerged which allegedly 
consisted of Officers who, in full black uniform and helmets that masked their 
identity, would single out particular inmates for “special treatment” 
(“ramping”) a nice way of saying “beatings”. I then learnt of the “Black Hole” 
at Boggo Road prison, an underground set of cells that were devoid of 
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natural lighting and ventilation into which problematic prisoners were moved, 
I was told, and systematically beaten. One prisoner described to me the 
experience of sitting cold and naked in one of the cells, not knowing whether 
it was day or night, hearing the progression of Officers cell to cell metering 
out “punishment” as they went along – hearing the tortured screams of others 
for hours. This prisoner described his terror, wishing that they would arrive at 
his cell and be “done with it”. Other prisoners detailed how they would be 
secured to a chair in the Black Hole cells and beaten with a baseball bat – 
one telling me that his testicles were the size of “baseballs” by the time they 
had finished dealing with him.  
 
Not surprisingly, I chose to become an advocate for the prisoner class and, 
drawing upon the strength of a specific group of inmates who were promoting 
reform from within the prison (at enormous cost) and using information from 
them and other sources including families, prison chaplains and others began 
a media blitz to inform the public. The personal cost of my family and me was 
enormous. I was spat on, my tyres were slashed, a gun was trained and 
cocked on me, I received an anonymous phone call from someone who 
threatened to “rape my wife” and “disembowel my child”, I was “ramped” 
myself by Officers who threw me against a wall and threatened me and some 
Officers tried, unsuccessfully, to “set me up”. On the upside, after long 
discussions with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission and 
following a long period of Inquiry, the prison system in Queensland was 
reformed: Boggo Road prison was closed, the “Special Squad” was 
disbanded, Official Visitors were put in place to investigate prisoner 
grievances (I was the first Official Visitor appointed in the state [1988-1994] 
originally with wide-ranging powers unlike its British equivalent, although 
these powers in Queensland have been substantially removed through 
recent changes to legislation), community-based correctional facilities 
proposed by ACRO were implemented, and significant “checks and 
balances” to the quasi-militaristic authority of prison officers were put in 
place.   
 
So, what ever happened to Brendan? He was to serve many years in jail; he 
tried, unsuccessfully, to have gender realignment; was abused by countless 
people and committed suicide in 1995. The investigation into his death was 
the last investigation that I undertook in my capacity as an Official Visitor. In 
1994 I was appointed an Inspector under the Corrective Services Act (and 
remain an approved person), a position with authority to enquire into any 
matter within the Correctional System, under instruction of the Queensland 
government. 
 
During a study Tour in 1992 which took me to the United States, the UK, 
parts of Europe and Canada, the purpose of which was to investigate 
correctional initiatives in those places, I came across a small number of 
academics and practitioners who were advocating for a new style of 
intervention in criminal justice – that of prevention. I resolved to return to 
Australia and to both contribute to the establishment of a National Crime 
Prevention Strategy and to realign the work of ACRO to reflect a more 
comprehensive approach to deal with the causes of crime. The publication of 
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the federal government’s document Creating a Safer Community: Crime 
Prevention and Community Safety into the 21st. Century followed in 1994.  
 
The opportunity to strategically advance the agenda for a National Strategy 
occurred in 1994 in Cairns, Far North Queensland. ACRO had been involved 
in this community for some years administering Rose Blank House, a 
resettlement facility for currently serving prisoners located in the Mulgrave 
Shire Council. (Cairns, a popular tourist destination in Australia as the 
“gateway” to the Great Barrier Reef, was a city which, at that time, was 
governed by two local government authorities, the Cairns City Council [which 
basically took in the Cairns City Business District {CBD}] and the Mulgrave 
Shire Council [which “surrounded the Cairns CBD]. Rose Blank House was 
located within in the Mulgrave Shire Council precinct.)  
 
The state government had decided to amalgamate a number of local 
government Authorities, including the two local Authorities in Cairns. The 
then Mayor of the Cairns City Council had determined to run a “law and 
order” campaign as a forerunner to this “amalgamation” election. He 
implemented private security patrols along the Esplanade of Cairns (a 
popular tourist and “backpacker” district) and, in an extremely controversial 
move, organised to have homeless murris (Indigenous Australians) and 
Torres Strait Islanders relocated from the parkland adjoining the Esplanade 
to their “communities” in Cape York, presumably on the basis that they were 
harassing visiting tourists. The whole issue of “fear of crime” was brought 
onto the agenda in the community of Cairns. Through a significant business 
connection in the city I arranged a meeting on 28 March 1994 with the Mayor 
of Mulgrave to canvas the possibility of running an anti- law and order 
program as an electoral strategy. With his support (and that of his Council) a 
formal proposal to conduct a Survey among Mulgrave Shire residents on 
their perceptions and attitudes towards community safety with a view to 
constructing a whole-of-community, whole-of-Council partnership to devise 
strategies resultant from this Survey, was presented, and approved “in 
principle”, at a full meeting of Council on 30 May 1994. (Final approval was 
obtained on 6 June 1994.). Following considerable consultation within the 
community (involving murris, non-government organizations, the media, 
education and other government agencies and corporate interests, a Survey 
kit was distributed to the entire population of Mulgrave with an interim Report 
on findings presented to the Council on 31 August 1994. (A Survey of high-
school aged students was also undertaken within the region.) Valid Surveys 
were returned by 7327 respondents, of which 2965 were high-school aged 
students. The opportunity for the City of Cairns Council to participate in the 
Survey was given at a meeting I held with the Mayor of that Council, however 
I was literally “thrown out of the Office”.  
 
The Final Report, a seminal document on Community Safety and Crime 
Prevention in Australia titled The Crime of Fear: Attitudes, Perceptions and 
Community Safety, demonstrated, beyond doubt, the sensitivity of the 
community of Cairns (an alleged “red neck” community) to crime issues and 
their belief that proactive measures that interfere with crime causation were 
of greater value than imprisonment (Begg, Boorman et al. 1994). Whilst not 
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going into detail here about the elements of this Report and its 
recommendations, the electoral outcome is of some significance. The 
election result was a resounding victory for the previous Mayor of Mulgrave 
with his “ticket” winning eleven of the thirteen divisions with a personal vote 
for him in the 70th percentile. A new importance was now assigned to law and 
order discussion in politics. The previous methodology of increased 
punitiveness by government administrations in the wake of a perceived 
acceptance by citizens to expenditure on “cops, courts and corrections” (at 
the expense of education, health and social services) was now directly 
challenged – and from within a non-participating arm, local government. (In 
Australia local government Authorities have no involvement in the criminal 
justice process with state and federal authorities responsible for police, 
corrections and judicial administration.)  
 
Armed with the outcomes from Cairns, I organised a meeting with the then 
federal Minister for Justice in the hope of reinvigorating the stalled debate on 
a National Crime Prevention Strategy. With the convening of the 9th United 
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders due in Cairo in April/May of 1995, I convinced the Minister that his 
government would benefit from a “significant announcement” on Australia’s 
progress towards a National Strategy at this forum. (It was not originally 
intended that the government would send a Minister to this Congress.) I was 
invited to be a delegate at this Congress to accompany the Minister – the first 
non-government representative to be afforded this privilege.  
 
On our return from Egypt, I was involved with the development and launch of 
Safer Australia. At the same time I sought to engage state governments in 
the development of “local” strategies to replicate the work undertaken in 
Cairns. As part of a National Media Tour, I promoted the idea of the “fear of 
crime” and spoke with Ministers of the Crown, Senior Public Servants and 
community members about the need to consider crime causation as a more 
“cost-effective” methodology in dealing with crime. At the same time, and with 
the support of ACRO, I implemented schools-based programs (Youth Action 
Panels – based upon the UK Crime Concern model) in Queensland and 
encouraged a youth arm of ACRO to publicly to engage in debates on issues 
as wide-ranging as racism, drug abuse, youth suicide, peer pressure and 
homophobia (for additional information see: http://www.acro.com.au/teens) – 
this group has subsequently won National and state Awards for their work, 
including the Queens Trust Award for Achievement and the Nescafe “Big 
Break” (their nationally broadcast Community Service Announcements “Not 
One More [anti-drugs], “The Race is On” and “Defending Principles” [anti 
racism], “Loaded Gun” [a positive youth message] have similarly received 
broad-based acclaim and support).  
 
In 1996 the opportunity arose to involve the then Queensland government in 
a state-based Crime Prevention Strategy. Again this involvement was clearly 
political in nature. With a state election looming, the government of the day 
was looking to extend its law and order repertoire. The relevant Minister of 
the day was convinced, in private meetings, to undertake a Survey of citizens 
(along the lines of the Cairns experience) in selected (his government’s 
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selection) jurisdictions. Thus was created CPP (originally community Policing 
Partnerships and later to become Crime Prevention Partnerships) across 
various cities of Queensland during 1997/98. Again without great detail (with 
more detailed information about this process to be found in a later chapter), 
this process was about reinforcing a good concept using a political 
opportunity. ACRO was contracted to conduct Surveys in these places and 
construct community-based partnerships that would notionally advise a 
“whole-of-government” Central Board for financial and other support in the 
implementation of locally determined and prioritised crime prevention 
initiatives.  
 
I stated at the beginning that all actions are informed by our experiences and 
by our position in history. What I have sought to convey through this self-
reflexive “free-fall” discussion is that my position within the non-government 
sector, my association at the highest levels of government and community, 
my intense belief in social justice and my over-riding concern for the well-
being of civil society castes my role in this research. Being intimately involved 
in the development of ideas into praxis and having regard to the political and 
other machinations that both enhance and impede the process by which 
change is implemented, I conclude that a more thorough consideration and 
disclosure of such processes are vital to the future of the sector that has 
been the social conscience of the community. I therefore acknowledge, 
openly, my bias towards that which is appropriate and in the best interests of 
civil society and my concern for the future of a sector that has, I believe, 
positively arbitrated over models of governance that have been (or may be in 
the future) prone to autocratic or moral excess. My experience over my 
lifetime to date demonstrates the authority of collective action to give effect to 
social change; that partnerships of good citizens can make a great difference 
in the face of social adversity. The recurrence of these relationships has 
been thematic throughout my life and the shaping of experience has been 
contingent upon those relationships.  
 
 
 
